Government Size,the Role of Commitments*

We explore the hypothesis that long‐term commitments affect the dynamics of government expenditure. With the aid of a simple median‐voter model we interpret the pattern of increasing‐then‐constant tax rates observed in OECD countries in the second half of the last century: persistence of public expenditure and a lower bound on new interventions will push government size upward, and preferences of the electorate put a halt to this growth at some point. In this view, the fiscal policy variable is seen to consist of only a part of the total expenditure, the rest being predetermined by its past level.     

Fiscal centralization versus decentralization: Growth and welfare effects of spillovers, Leviathan taxation, and capital mobility

This paper develops an endogenous growth model with spillovers of public goods, Leviathan taxation, and mobile capital to examine the relative merits of centralized and decentralized fiscal systems for economic growth and social welfare. We show that a decentralized system dominates a centralized system in terms of economic growth; however, the difference in social welfare between a decentralized and a centralized system is non-monotonic and displays a hump-shaped relationship with respect to capital mobility. Since higher capital mobility induces stronger tax competition, this finding implies that there is an optimal degree of tax competition; some tax competition is desirable, but fierce tax competition may be harmful. We also show that there is a critical level of spillovers of public goods above which centralization dominates decentralization in terms of social welfare, as in previous studies; however, if spillovers are below this critical level, capital mobility also matters in the welfare comparison between centralized and decentralized systems.     

谈政府集中采购模式下政府集中采购机构与招标代理中介机构的利与弊

政府采购就是指国家各级政府为从事日常的政务活动或为了满足公共服务的目的,利用国家财政性资金和政府借款购买货物、工程和服务的行为。我国的政府采购制度将采购行为划分为集中采购和分散采购。集中采购的代理行为是政府采购流程中的关键环节。     

Growth and fluctuations: The role of public dividends and public spending

In this paper, we consider a discrete-time version of the endogenous growth model developed by Barro [Barro, R.J., 1990. Government spending in a simple model of endogenous growth. Journal of Political Economy 98, 103–125], but augmented in order to envisage a public participation in the production of private goods. Public dividends are invested in order to provide a public good; in turn, the public good plays a role of indispensable production externality and, eventually, of growth engine.For what concerns the production of private goods, we find that an optimal policy is always based on a positive participation of the government as shareholder; also, when growth is slow, a public intervention or large substitution effects stabilize the economy.A right mix of short-run services and long-run infrastructures is suggested in slow economies to rule out expectation-driven fluctuations. Infrastructures are mainly recommended in presence of moderate income effects, while services are recommended in presence of strong income effects.     

'Public Goods' from the Market

In the mounting criticism of 'government failure', a role for government is stubbornly argued by statist-minded economists on the ground that only government can supply public goods - from defence to (some) research (p. 34). Frank van Dun of the University of Ghent argues that public goods have the same disadvantages of monopoly, restriction of choice, confiscation by taxation, pressure group distortion, as non-public goods unnecessarily supplied by government. Moreover, technical progress will make it possible to supply more public goods in the market by creating separable benefits that can be financed by pricing.     

Voting on road congestion policy

This paper studies the political economy of urban traffic policy. A city council and a regional government (representing city and suburbs) decide respectively on parking fees and a road toll. Both charges are below the optimum when median voters in city and suburbs prefer cars to public transport sufficiently more than the average. Even if the city government would set an optimal road toll, the regional government blocks it when the median suburban voter prefers cars strongly enough. Letting the city control parking and road pricing may therefore increase chances of adoption of the latter. However, if the city controls parking and the region road pricing, the combined charges are higher than if the city controlled them both. Hence, when voters want all charges below the optimum, the involvement of two governments may be desirable. We also find that earmarking road pricing revenues for public transport is welfare-enhancing, compared to lump-sum redistribution, only if they are topped up by extra funds granted to the city by a higher level of government.     

Growth, debt and public infrastructure

This paper presents a closed economy model of endogenous growth driven by capital externalities arising from both private capital and public infrastructure. The model is calibrated to fit data for India, an approximately closed economy. Simulations suggest that fiscal policy certainly matters and the choice of the income taxation rate, the mix of government spending between infrastructure and public consumption goods, and the long-run government debt/GDP ratio can all significantly affect the long-run growth rate. Intertemporal aspects of fiscal policy are also important and the precommitment (time-inconsistent) and non-precommitment policies differ substantially.     

Reviewing Oates' insights in a repeated game setting

This paper analyzes the optimal assignment of public good policies to layers of a federal system in a repeated game setting. Under a centralized regime, public goods are financed jointly across regions, and a federal legislature decides on the regional quantities. Under a decentralized regime, public goods are financed locally, and governments play a non-cooperative provision game. We find that a centralized (decentralized) regime is more likely to provide the efficient public good policies in case spillovers are small (large). Received: September 2003, Accepted: October 2004 JEL Classification: H11, H41 I wish to thank Clemens Fuest, Anke Kessler, Christoph Lülfesmann, and an anonymous referee for valuable comments on this paper. Financial support by the DFG (SPP 1142) is gratefully acknowledged.     

多任务代理下地方政府行为取向研究

从中央对地方政府的激励机制出发,分析了在“经济人”假设下地方政府的行为受激励机制的影响,并通过实证分析证明了地方政府重视基础设施建设而轻视科教文卫等支出;地方政府从追求“社会合意”型向追求“中央合意”型转变。地方政府的这一行为取向影响到公共品供给效率,以致带来某些公共品提供不足而某些公共品供给过度等后果。     

PAC Congressional Election Campaign Contributions and Other Political or Economic Influences on the Voter Participation Rate

A bstract .   This study empirically investigates the potential impact of political action committee (PAC) election campaign contributions and other factors on the aggregate voter participation rate in the United States. For the study period 1960–1998, the aggregate voter participation rate appears to have been positively and significantly affected by the opportunity to vote in presidential elections and by the Vietnam War, as well as by "excessive" inflation and slow real GDP growth. The latter two findings of this study appear to be unique to this literature. In addition, the Watergate scandal and increased public dissatisfaction with government appear to have significantly discouraged voter participation. Finally, there appears to be strong evidence that PAC congressional election campaign contributions may have also acted to reduce the voter participation rate over the study period, a finding that also is unique to this study.     

A supply-demand model of public sector size

We develop a supply-demand model for the public sector with a political equilibrium. The model considers the inefficiencies caused by taxes and includes costs associated with the provision of public goods to consumers. We show that the size of the public sector may depend on the median voter's income, population size, costs associated with paying tax, and quality of institutions, all of which reflect the costs of provisioning public goods. The estimates for the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development member countries are compatible with theoretical predictions; however, they do not confirm Wagner's law, which holds that the public sector share does not grow with an increase in income. A greater dependency ratio and the Gini coefficient increase demand for redistribution policies. Greater government effectiveness is a supply-side factor that increases the public sector's share in an economy.     

Effects of an anticipated expansion in international public goods on public capital accumulation

This paper presents a generic model to include public capital accumulation and the services of international public goods provided by a neighbor country. It examines the long-run and short-run responses of private and public capital accumulation in the home country to an anticipated increase in international public goods. It is found that the home economy in effect cuts its public capital stock, but keeps an unchanged private capital stock in the long run when a neighbor commits itself to expanding the stock of public goods in the future. The key factor determining the short-run responses of the home country is the extent to which it will match its government spending with a neighbor country's policy, which is associated with the relative difference between the marginal utility of consumption and that of home public capital affected by an increase in international public goods.     

Interdependence and the location of economic activities

This paper deals with the ability of a decentralized price system to sustain an optimal assignment of activities assuming complete interdependence among them. There are two goods, each of which is used in its own production and in the production of the other, along with land. An infinitely elastic final demand exists for both goods at given market prices, and either good may be imported. It is demonstrated that a decentralized price system will sustain an optimal allocation of land, and that a nonoptimal allocation of land will not be sustained.     

SWITZERLAND: GROWTH OF GOVERNMENT, GROWTH OF CENTRALISATION

Switzerland has a tradition of decentralised government, decentralised tax setting and direct reference to the voters through referendums. Such mechanisms should give rise to lower taxes, better provision of public goods and higher economic growth. However, these mechanisms have not been effective in the last 30 years at preventing the growth in government spending and centralisation. This is partly because of the consensus in favour of centralisation that exists among institutionalised politicians. The performance of the Swiss economy since 1970 has consequently been dismal. Real per capita post-tax incomes have been stagnant. There is now an opportunity for the growth of centralisation to be reversed.     

Citizen Willingness to Assist as Volunteers in the Provision of Local Public Goods: A Case Study of Volunteer Firemen in 70 West German Cities

A bstract . Volunteer activity , from one perspective, that of the theory of public choice , provides an outlet for the articulation of demand for public goods. To analyze its role in that function, a theoretical model is constructed which incorporates the social, benevolence and demand articulation elements of volunteerism into a single utility function. The utility function is based on the economics of clubs and the economics of charity views of utility. The theoretical model shows how the rational individual weighs the benefits and costs of volunteerism and relates this behavior to the rational voter model of demand articulation. The model is then empirically tested, using data for volunteer fire companies in 70 West German cities. The empirical results show that to the extent volunteer activities are considered to be a form of demand articulation, they are consistent with the rational voter hypothesis.     

Voluntary contributions and local public goods in a federation

This paper considers nonneutral effects of government spending in a federation of multiple jurisdictions. Both government spending and private donations finance local public goods, redistributive programs, that provide transfers for the poor. In the standard model, government spending has no effect on the public goods, as donors reduce their donations one for one in response to an increase in government spending. In a federation, donors of a jurisdiction donate, through federal charities, to help the poor in the jurisdiction and the poor in other jurisdictions as well. Jurisdictions are thus linked through donations. Such linkage influences donors' behavior beyond the traditional crowding-out effect. As a result, government spending has nonneutral effects on the level of public goods.     

The Median Voter Model Fails an Empirical Test: The Procedure, Useful in the Absence of a Better One, Is Not Valid for Multidimensional Issues

Abstract . The median voter model is a frequently used tool in analyzing local public sector issues. However, its use in analyzing multidimensional issues has been criticized. This study examines the criticism in the context of the decision by a municipality to establish a local constitution by voting for a home rule charter. A model is developed and tested using a variety of income measures. This model reveals that median income is not a better explanatory variable than other income measures. Based on this evidence, the authors conclude that the median voter model is not appropriate for analyzing multidimensional issues.     

Federalism,distributive politics and representative democracy

We analyze federal systems of government in which local public policies are financed by general taxation. In a decentralized political system there is, in each region, a vote to elect a local representative while in a centralized political system a single representative is elected by a federal vote. It is shown that under decentralization, voters strategically elect liberal representatives so as to nullify any element of cooperation between representatives in the decision-making stage. Thus, there is a trade-off between the budgetary externality and a "policy closer to the people", but the democratic choice is biased towards decentralization.     

区域公共物品政府供给的博弈分析

区域公共物品是一种特殊的公共物品,不仅具有公共物品的一般属性,还具有其自身特殊属性。正是由于区域公共物品的这些特性,区域内地方政府在供给区域公共物品时容易陷入"囚徒困境",导致区域公共物品供给不足,阻碍区域经济一体化的发展。本文运用博弈分析原理,对区域公共物品供给不足进行了分析,认为区域公共物品供给不足除了区域公共物品的特性以外,政府的有限理性和信息不对称也是导致区域公共物品供给不足的重要因素,并就区域公共物品供给不足提出一些政策建议。     

Efficient inequality: differential allocation in the local public sector

This paper examines the consequences for social efficiency if the locally provided public input can be differentially allocated among residents. We derive the distributional efficiency condition, which is the distribution of public inputs that maximizes within-city gains from trade. Differential allocation also causes modifications to the standard (Samuelsonian) allocative efficiency condition. Additionally, we explore the consequences of differential allocation for the median voter model. Standard empirical voter models are seriously flawed because they fail to distinguish final public output production from either individual demand or the distribution of publicly provided inputs. Finally, we derive the club sharing efficiency condition.