Private Money and Banking Regulation

We show that a competitive banking system is inconsistent with an optimum quantity of private money. Because bankers cannot commit to their promises and the composition of their assets is not publicly observable, a positive franchise value is required to induce the full convertibility of bank liabilities. Under perfect competition, a positive franchise value can be obtained only if the return on bank liabilities is sufficiently low, which imposes a cost on those who hold these liabilities for transaction purposes. If the banking system is monopolistic, then an efficient allocation is incentive feasible. In this case, the members of the banking system obtain a higher return on assets, making it feasible to pay a sufficiently high return on bank liabilities. Finally, we argue that the regulation of the banking system is required to obtain efficiency.     

Money, intermediation, and banking

The business of money creation is conceptually distinct from that of intermediation. Yet, these two activities are frequently—but not always—combined together in the form of a banking system. We develop a simple model to examine the question: When is banking essential? There is a role for money due to a lack of record-keeping and a role for intermediation due to the existence of private information: both money and intermediation are essential. When monitoring costs associated with intermediation are sufficiently low, the two activities can be separated from one another. However, when monitoring costs are sufficiently high, a banking system that combines these two activities is essential.     

Improving Overnight Loan Identification in Payments Systems

Information on the allocation and pricing of over‐the‐counter (OTC) markets is scarce. Furfine (1999) pioneered an algorithm that provides transaction‐level data on the OTC interbank lending market. The veracity of the data identified, however, is not well established. Using permutation methods, I estimate an upper bound on the daily false positive rate of this algorithm to be between 10% and 20%. I propose refinements that reduce the bound to 10% or lower with negligible power loss. The results suggest that the inferred prices and quantities of overnight loans provide viable estimates of interbank lending market activity for Canadian data.     

Private cards and the bypass of payment systems by merchants

This paper studies the incentives of a merchant to bypass a payment platform by issuing private cards. In our model, a payment platform allocates the total cost of a card transaction between a monopolistic issuer and a monopolistic acquirer by choosing an “interchange fee”. We determine how the level of the interchange fee impacts a merchant’s decision to issue private cards, if there are strategic interactions between merchants. We prove that the payment platform can only deter entry by lowering the level of the interchange fee. If the payment platform chooses to accommodate entry, we find that the total user surplus increases, but that entry is beneficial to social welfare only if the entry cost is sufficiently low.     

Optimal pricing of intraday liquidity

This paper presents a general equilibrium model where intraday liquidity is needed because the timing of payments is uncertain. A necessary and sufficient condition for an equilibrium to be efficient is that the nominal intraday interest rate be zero, even when the overnight rate is strictly positive. Because a market for liquidity may not achieve efficiency, this creates a role for the central bank. I allow for the possibility of moral hazard and study policies commonly used by central banks to reduce their exposure to risk. I show collateralized lending achieves the efficient allocation, while, for certain parameters, caps cannot prevent moral hazard.     

Liquidity-saving mechanisms

This paper studies the incentives of participants in a real-time gross settlement system with and without the addition of a liquidity-saving mechanism (LSM). Participants in the model face a liquidity shock and different costs for delaying payments. They trade off the cost of delaying a payment against the cost of borrowing liquidity from the central bank. The main contribution of the paper is to show that the design of an LSM has important implications for welfare. In particular, parameters determine whether the addition of an LSM increases or decreases welfare.     

Why Commercial Banks Held Excess Reserves: The Japanese Experience of the Late 1990s

We investigated, empirically, why Japanese banks held excess reserves in the late 1990s. Specifically, we pin down two factors explaining the demand for excess reserves: a low short-term interest rate, or call rate, and the fragile financial health of banks. The virtually zero call rate increased the demand for excess reserves substantially, and a high bad loans ratio largely contributed to the increase in excess reserve holdings. We found that the holdings of excess reserves would fall by two-thirds if the call rate were to be raised to its level prior to the adoption of the zero-interest-rate policy, and the bad loans ratio were to fall by 50%.     

A practical approach to validating a PD model

The capital adequacy framework Basel II aims to promote the adoption of stronger risk management practices by the banking industry. The implementation makes validation of credit risk models more important. Lenders therefore need a validation methodology to convince their supervisors that their credit scoring models are performing well. In this paper we take up the challenge to propose and implement a simple validation methodology that can be used by banks to validate their credit risk modelling exercise. We will contextualise the proposed methodology by applying it to a default model of mortgage loans of a commercial bank in the Netherlands.     

A study of competing designs for a liquidity-saving mechanism

We study two designs for a liquidity-saving mechanism (LSM), a queuing arrangement used with an interbank settlement system. With a balance-reactive LSM, banks can set a balance threshold below which payments are not released from the queue, an action not possible with a receipt-reactive LSM. Payments that are costly to delay are settled earlier with a receipt reactive LSM. Payments that are not costly to delay may be queued with a balance reactive LSM but are always delayed with a receipt reactive LSM. We show that either system can provide higher welfare.     

Bank capital,interbank contagion,and bailout policy

This paper develops a theoretical framework in which asset linkages in a syndicated loan agreement can infect a healthy bank when its partner bank fails. We investigate how capital constraints affect the choice of the healthy bank to takeover or liquidate the exposure held jointly with the failing bank, and how the bank’s ex ante optimal capital holding and possibility of contagion are affected by anticipation of bail-out policy, capital requirements and the joint exposure. We identify a range of factors that strengthen or weaken the possibility of contagion and bailout. Recapitalization with common stock rather than preferred equity injection dilutes existing shareholder interests and gives the bank a greater incentive to hold capital to cope with potential contagion. Increasing the minimum regulatory capital does not necessarily reduce contagion, while the requirement of holding conservation capital buffer could increase the bank’s resilience to avoid contagion.     

Precautionary Demand and Liquidity in Payment Systems

In large‐value real‐time gross settlement payment systems, banks rely heavily on incoming funds to finance outgoing payments. Such reliance necessitates a high degree of coordination and synchronization. We construct a model of a payment system calibrated for the U.S. Fedwire system and examine the impact of realistic disruptions motivated by the recent financial crisis. In such settings, individually cautious behavior can have a significant and detrimental impact on the overall functioning of the payment system through a multiplier effect. Our results quantify the mutually reinforcing nature of greater caution, and allow comparative statics analysis of shifts in key parameters.     

Private equity and regulatory capital

Regulatory capital requirements for European banks have been put forward in the Basel II Capital Framework and subsequently in the capital requirements directive (CRD) of the EU. We provide a detailed discussion of the capital requirements for private equity investments under different approaches. For the internal model approach we present a structural model that we calibrate to a proprietary dataset. We modify the standard Merton structural model to make it applicable in practice and to capture stylized facts of private equity investments. We also implement the early default feature with a fast simulation algorithm. Our results support capital requirements lower than in Basel II, but not as low as in CRD, thereby giving adverse incentives to banks for using advanced risk models. A sensitivity analysis shows that this finding is robust to parameter uncertainty and stress scenarios.     

An Experiment on Retail Payments Systems

We develop a novel theoretical and experimental framework to study adoption and use of cash versus electronic payments in retail transactions. The design allows us to assess the behavioral impact of sellers' service fees and buyers' rewards from using electronic payments. In the experiment, buyers and sellers faced a coordination problem, independently choosing a payment method before trading. Sellers readily adopted electronic payments but buyers did not. Eliminating service fees or introducing rewards significantly increased adoption and use of electronic payments. Buyers' economic incentives were crucial for the diffusion of electronic payments but cannot fully explain their adoption choices.     

Certainty Equivalence and the Excess Sensitivity of Private Consumption

For a panel of OECD countries, we show that the magnitude of the estimate for the excess sensitivity of private consumption to current income cannot be explained by a model based on certainty equivalence.     

Funding liquidity risk: Definition and measurement

Funding liquidity risk has played a key role in all historical banking crises. Nevertheless, a measure for funding liquidity risk based on publicly available data remains so far elusive. We address this gap by showing that aggressive bidding at central bank auctions reveals funding liquidity risk. We can extract an insurance premium from banks’ bids which we propose as a measure of funding liquidity risk. Using a unique data set consisting of all bids in all auctions for the main refinancing operation conducted at the ECB between June 2005 and October 2008 we find that funding liquidity risk is typically stable and low, with occasional spikes especially around key events during the recent crisis. We also document downward spirals between funding liquidity risk and market liquidity. As measurement without clear definitions is impossible, we initially provide definitions of funding liquidity and funding liquidity risk.     

Bank health in varying macroeconomic conditions: A panel study

Using panel data on selected Financial Soundness Indicators (FSIs) this paper investigates the potential strengths and vulnerabilities of financial intermediaries across more than 50 countries. Our econometric analysis reveals strong influence of business cycle, inflation, and real effective exchange rates, and size of the industry on capital adequacy —a core indicator of banks' financial soundness. Furthermore, our analyses provide evidence that banks' profitability is determined by a combination of macroeconomic, bank specific and industry characteristics such as business cycle, inflation, credit risk, capital adequacy, and the level of competition.     

Financial dollarization: The role of foreign-owned banks and interest rates

Why in many economies households and firms borrow and make deposits in foreign currency? Expanding on the existing literature, our framework addresses this question allowing for interest rate differentials and access to foreign funds to play a role in explaining this process of asset substitution or financial dollarization. Using a newly compiled data set on transition economies and employing a standard panel as well as a panel-VAR methodology we find that increasing access to foreign funds leads to higher credit dollarization, while it decreases deposit dollarization. Interest rate differentials matter for the dollarization of both loans and deposits.     

Consolidation in banking and the lending channel of monetary transmission: Evidence from Asia and Latin America

This paper examines the relationship between increased consolidation in banking and monetary policy transmission in eighteen Asian and Latin American economies, using bank-level data from 1996 to 2006. Our results provide consistent evidence that as concentration in banking increases, the bank lending channel is weakened, leading the monetary policy transmission mechanism to be less effective. We also investigate how this relationship between concentration and the strength of the lending channel depends on bank-specific characteristics. Using bank-level balance sheet and income statement data allows us, first, to better identify the effects of banking consolidation on the supply-side bank lending channel from those of the demand-side interest rate channel, and second, to test for any systematic differences in the impact of consolidation on monetary policy transmission across banks of different size and financial strength. We also discuss potential explanations for and policy implications of the main findings of this paper.     

Determinants of banks’ risk exposure to new account fraud – Evidence from Germany

This paper studies empirically the determinants of new account fraud risk within two dimensions: the probability of fraud, and the expected and unexpected (monetary) loss-per-account due to fraud. By fraud risk, we mean the risk that a bank fails to enforce a debt because the identity of the person incurring the debt cannot be ascertained. Using a unique and rich data set of account applicants, provided by a German Internet-only bank, we find that fraud risk is highly sensitive to demographic and socio-economic variables like nationality, gender, marital status, age, occupation, and urbanisation. For example, foreigners are 22.25 times more likely to commit account fraud than Germans, and men are 2.5 times more risky than women.     

Auditor reputation and earnings management: International evidence from the banking industry

We examine the relation between auditor reputation and earnings management in banks using a sample of banks from 29 countries. In particular, we examine the implications of two aspects of auditor reputation, auditor type and auditor industry specialization, for earnings management in banks. We find that both auditor type and auditor industry specialization moderate benchmark-beating (loss-avoidance and just-meeting-or-beating prior year’s earnings) behavior in banks. In addition, we find that once auditor type and auditor industry specialization are included in the same tests, only auditor industry specialization has a significant impact on constraining benchmark-beating behavior. In separate tests related to income-increasing abnormal loan loss provisions, we find that both auditor type and auditor expertise constrain income-increasing earnings management. Again, in joint tests, only auditor industry expertise has a significant impact on constraining income-increasing earnings management.