Risk preferences and transaction costs

Kahneman and Tversky have collected evidence of behavior in the face of risk which is seemingly at odds with von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility theory. To account for their observations they propose a new approach which they christen ‘Prospect Theory’. This note argues that introducing transactions costs into expected utility theory systematically accounts for many empirical results without unduly straining the conventional analysis. It may therefore be premature to abandon expected utility theory.     

Water quality trading with asymmetric information,uncertainty and transaction costs: A stochastic agent-based simulation

We examine the efficiency of emissions trading in bilateral and clearinghouse markets with heterogeneous, boundedly rational agents making decisions under imperfect and asymmetric information, and transaction costs. Results are derived using a stochastic agent-based simulation model of agents’ decision-making and interactions. Trading rules, market structures, and agent information structures are selected to represent emerging water quality trading programs. The analysis is designed to provide a strong test of the efficiency of trading occurring through the two market structures. The Differential Evolution algorithm is used to search for market trade strategies that perform well under multiple states of the world. Our findings suggest that trading under both bilateral and clearinghouse markets yields cost savings relatively to no trading. The clearinghouse is found to be more efficient than bilateral negotiations in coordinating point–nonpoint trading under uncertainty and transaction costs. However, the market under both structures is unlikely to achieve or even approximate least-cost pollution control allocations. Expectations of gains from water quality trading should, therefore, be tempered.     

Remittances,transaction costs,and informality

Recorded workers' remittances to developing countries reached $167 billion in 2005, bringing increasing attention to these flows as a potential tool for development. In this paper, we explore the determinants of remittances and their associated transaction costs. We find that recorded remittances depend positively on the stock of migrants and negatively on transfer costs and exchange rate restrictions. In turn, transfer costs are lower when financial systems are more developed and exchange rates less volatile. The negative impact of transactions costs on remittances suggests that migrants either refrain from sending money home or else remit through informal channels when costs are high. We provide evidence from household surveys supportive of a sizeable informal sector.     

Coase theorem, complexity and transaction costs

This paper, by introducing complexity considerations, provides a dynamic foundation for the Coase theorem and highlights the role of transaction costs in generating inefficient bargaining/negotiation outcomes. We show, when the players have a preference for less complex strategies, the Coase theorem holds in negotiation models with repeated surplus and endogenous disagreement payoffs if and only if there are no transaction costs. Specifically, complexity considerations select only efficient equilibria in these models without transaction costs while every equilibrium induces perpetual disagreement and inefficiency with transaction costs. We also show the latter is true in the Rubinstein bargaining model with transaction costs.     

Financial markets with endogenous transaction costs

The paper proposes an alternative general equilibrium formulation of financial asset economies with transaction costs. Transaction costs emerge endogenously at equilibrium and reflect agents’ decisions of intermediating financial activities at the expense of providing labor services.     

Rising trade costs? Agglomeration and trade with endogenous transaction costs

Abstract.  While transport costs have fallen, the empirical evidence also points at rising total trade costs. In a model of industry location with endogenous transaction costs that seeks to replicate features from the machinery industry, we show how and under which conditions a decline in transport costs can lead to an increase in the total cost of trade. The subtle relationship between (endogenous) transport costs and the sensitivity of trade to distance is also explored.     

Economics of transaction costs saving forestry

Following the arguments concerning the problems of traditional forest economics in Putz (2000), this article shows that transaction cost economics can overcome some of the shortcomings of the main stream forest economics. The public forestry, subsistence forestry, non-industrial private forestry, China's share-holding forestry, and their revolutions are analyzed by the relative transaction costs of labor, capital, land and forest products. Potential implications of transaction cost economics in forest policy, including regulated access to commons, sustainable forestry criteria, ecological certificates and land tenure decentralization, have also been discussed.     

The endogenous transaction costs of delegated auditing

This paper analyzes the deadweight loss of delegated auditing in a three-tier hierarchy. In a costly-state verification model, this cost depends on the endogenous information structure, the auditor's degree of risk-aversion and the size of the punishment. We identify the optimal contractual outcome of this delegation model with the solution obtained in a standard three-tier hierarchical model of collusive auditor. We then derive from this identification the set of parameters of the physical environment which may affect the efficiency of side-contracting within the firm.     

Equilibrium interest rate and liquidity premium with transaction costs

Summary. In this article we study the effects of transaction costs on asset prices. We assume an overlapping generations economy with two riskless assets. The first asset is liquid while the second asset carries proportional transaction costs. We show that agents buy the liquid asset for short-term investment and the illiquid asset for long-term investment. When transaction costs increase, the price of the liquid asset increases. The price of the illiquid asset decreases if the asset is in small supply, but may increase if the supply is large. These results have implications for the effects of transaction taxes and commission deregulation. Received: December 5, 1997; revised version: March 19, 1998     

Interest rate rules and macroeconomic stability with transaction costs

This paper analyzes the relationship between interest-rate feedback rules and macroeconomic stability in the presence of transaction costs. We show that with the Sims-type (1994) transaction-cost technology, a passive, rather than an active, interest-rate rule is more likely to generate a stabilizing effect against belief-driven fluctuations if both the intertemporal elasticity of substitution with respect to consumption and the sensitivity of the transaction costs with respect to the velocity of money are low. This result is valid under either an unbounded or a bounded transaction-cost technology. Of importance, our result is relevant under empirically plausible parameters, while it sharply contrasts with Taylor's (1993) prediction.     

Existence of financial market equilibria with transaction costs

The purpose of this paper is to give an existence proof of equilibria in a two-period exchange economy with incomplete markets and transaction costs. When tradings on financial markets incur real transaction costs —interpreted as costs of enforcement of financial contracts or real taxation of financial revenues —the set of individual portfolios is bounded by the limited resources of the economy. Existence of equilibria then follows from Kakutani 's fixed point theorem.     

Computing equilibria in finance economies with incomplete markets and transaction costs

Summary. Transaction costs on financial markets may have important consequences for volumes of trade, asset pricing, and welfare. This paper introduces an algorithm for the computation of equilibria in the general equilibrium model with incomplete asset markets and transaction costs. We show that economies with transaction costs can be analyzed with differentiable homotopy techniques and thus in the same framework as frictionless economies despite the existence of non-differentiabilities of agents asset demand functions and the existence of locally non-unique equilibria. We introduce an equilibrium selection concept into the computation of economic equilibria that picks out a specific equilibrium in the presence of a continuum of equilibria.Received: 2 December 2002, Revised: 15 November 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: C61, C62, C63, C68, D52, D58, G11, G12. Correspondence to: P. Jean-Jacques HeringsThis research started when Jean-Jacques Herings enjoyed the generous hospitality of the Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics at Yale University. His research has been made possible by a fellowship of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences and a grant of the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research. We thank audiences at Stanford University, UC San Diego, and Venice for discussions on the subject. We are very grateful to an anonymous referee for very helpful comments on an earlier draft.     

The importance of management and transaction costs for large UK firms

This article develops an approach to the firm using the principle that any organization is an amalgam of two production functions: a control function and a real function. The resulting non-linear regression equation allows estimation of model parameters that can be used to calculate firm-specific production and transaction costs. The paper uses a sample of large UK firms for the four years 1980, 1986, 1992 and 1997. The parameter and cost estimates appear intuitively plausible given developments in competitive conditions and environmental uncertainties. Broadly speaking the results support the view that transaction cost economizing is a primary determinant of improved firm performance. This result is particularly apparent when monopoly power and the positive dynamic advantages of firm slack are identified.     

Non-neutral information costs with match-value uncertainty

This paper investigates a model featuring a monopolist seller and a buyer with an uncertain valuation for the seller’s product. The seller chooses an information system which allows the buyer to receive a private signal, potentially correlated with her valuation. No restrictions are imposed on the conditional distributions of the signal; the cost of the information system is proportional to its precision, measured by the mutual information between the distributions of the buyer’s valuation and the signal. In equilibrium, the information system trades off the information cost against the losses deriving from a probability of trade that is either “too high,” or “too low”—depending on the relative weight of the expected losses resulting from errors of the two types—and sends “non-neutral” signals, typically. Thus, in general, the probability of a correct signal depends on the buyer’s actual valuation, and the probability of trade differs from the probability of a valuation exceeding the cost of production. The expected total surplus generated by the exchange is maximized, in equilibrium.     

An extended Heckscher-Ohlin model with transaction costs and technological comparative advantage

Summary. This paper introduces technological differences and transaction costs into the Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) model and examines the HO theorem, factor price equalization theorem, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem and the Rybczynski theorem. It shows that the HO theorem can be refined, and that the factor price equalisation theorem, the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem and the Rybczynski theorem do not always hold. It also shows that transaction costs play an important role in determining the equilibrium trade pattern.Received: 26 February 2001, Revised: 27 May 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: F10, F11. Correspondence to: Wenli ChengWe are grateful for comments from the anonymous referee, Hugo Sonnenschein, Guangzhen Sun and participants of the seminar on this paper at University of Washington.     

Information technology,transaction costs and the decision to 'make or buy'

Information and communication technology (ICT) has a wide ranging impact on business. One of the effects is on the 'make or buy decision'. This is analysed from the perspective of transactzon cost economm (TCE). On the one hand ICT reduces transaction costs by reducing search costs, by facilitating monitoring and control of performance and by yielding a greater flexibility of production, which reduces the transaction specificity of assets. These efiects, favour the decision to 'buy'. On the other hand, ICT reduces economies of scale, in some areas of production, which makes outside production i n a specializedfirm less attractive. Also, ICT may be used to impose switching costs between suppliers and buyers, thereby miszng transaction costs. But such ploys appear to be feasible only temporarily, with a pressure from users and competitors towards standardization and open systems. Thus the effects of ICT are diverse, but on the whole it tends to favour the option to contract out.