ECONOMIC INCENTIVES FOR AN URBAN BIAS IN DEVELOPMENT POLICIES*

This paper presents a labor turnover model in which urban employers have an economic incentive to support an urban bias in development policies because of the indirect effect of rural incomes on urban training expenditures through the rate of labor turnover. A comparative static analysis of the model shows that an income transfer from rural workers to urban workers increases the profits of urban employers, even if urban employers are not directly involved in the transfer. Unlike previous versions of the labor turnover model, worker behavior is explicitly grounded in utility maximization.     

PROGRESSIVE TAXATION AS A MEANS FOR IMPROVING COMPETITIVE BALANCE

The existing instruments for improving the competitive balance within a sports league, such as revenue sharing, restrictions on free agency and salary caps, all have their shortcomings. In this paper, we show that a progressive sports tax, the revenues of which are not redistributed to smaller teams in the league, could be a better instrument. From the broader perspective of the theory of optimum taxation, this instrument may have advantages as well.     

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FINANCIAL INCENTIVES FOR COMPANY PRESIDENTS AND FIRM PERFORMANCE IN JAPAN*

Kaplan (1994 ) concludes that the relationship between top pay and stock performance in Japan is similar to that in the USA. Using a new and comprehensive data set that includes presidents’ stock and their stock option holdings, this study estimates the sensitivity of Japanese presidents’ wealth to shareholder wealth in the period 1977–2000. Contrary to the commonly held belief that Japanese corporate governance is becoming more like that in the USA, the results show that pay–performance sensitivity actually decreased substantially after 1990. In 2000, Japanese presidents received $US22,100 when stock returns increased from ?2.1% to 14.8%.     

REVENUE DIVERGENCE AND COMPETITIVE BALANCE IN A DIVISIONAL SPORTS LEAGUE

The North American model of resource allocation in professional sports leagues is adapted for English (association) football. Comparisons are drawn between the equilibrium allocations of playing talent under objective functions of profit maximisation and win percent maximisation subject to a financial constraint. Empirical revenue functions are reported for 1926–1999. These indicate a shift in the composition of demand favouring big‐city teams and an increase in the sensitivity of revenue to performance. An analysis of match results in the FA Cup suggests an increase in competitive imbalance between teams at different levels of the league's divisional hierarchy, as the theory suggests.     

COMPETITIVE GROWTH IN A LIFE‐CYCLE MODEL: EXISTENCE AND DYNAMICS*

The dynamic behavior of the capital growth rate is analyzed using an overlapping‐generations model with continuous trading. Assuming a technology satisfying constant social returns to capital, the equilibrium growth rate is piecewise‐defined by functional differential equations with both delayed and advanced terms. The main result concerns the existence of a solution expressed as a series of exponentials, which is shown to crucially depend on the initial wealth distribution among cohorts. Upon existence, the dynamics of the capital growth rate has a saddle‐point trajectory that converges to a unique steady state. Along the transition path, the growth rate exhibits exponentially decreasing oscillations.     

R&D INCENTIVES UNDER BERTRAND COMPETITION: A DIFFERENTIAL GAME*

We investigate dynamic R&D for process innovation in an oligopoly where firms invest in cost‐reducing activities. We focus on the correlation between R&D intensity and market structure, proving that the industry R&D investment at equilibrium monotonically increases in the number of firms. This result contradicts the established wisdom acquired from static games on the same topic. We also prove that, if competition is sufficiently tough, any increase in product substitutability reduces R&D efforts.     

FORECASTING AND POLICY EVALUATION IN ECONOMIES WITH RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS: THE DISCRETE TIME CASE*

Several techniques for solving dynamic rational expectations models have been proposed. This paper puts forward an alternative method for discrete time models, which is significantly simpler to use in practice. That solution is used to derive and compute optimal policy selections (incorporating ‘noncausal’ effects) which, by exploiting the discrete time framework, are also time consistent when sequentially reoptimized. Those decisions are shown to contain an optimal open loop component plus an innovations dependent correction mechanism. A numerical example is used to verify these properties, and to demonstrate the superiority of this policy selection technique over recursive methods (e.g. dynamic programming).     

THE POSTAL SERVICE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION PUBLIC MONOPOLY OR COMPETITIVE MARKET?: A transaction cost approach

The paper discusses the relevant institutional and economic aspects of the postal service, and analyses both the arguments for abolishing the statutory monopoly and those for retaining it. The main thesis of the paper is that public and private postal services differ from each other in many aspects: transaction costs, the willingness of the customer to pay, market structure, and possibilities of substituting the service with other communication instruments. Therefore, a simple privatisation will not solve per se the efficiency problems of the service. furthermore, the European Commission, which published in 1992 a green paper on postal services, is considering the possibility of harmonising the quality of the service within the EU and gradually reducing the gap in national postal prices. This seems to be an effective device to force firms towards the greater efficiency required in a Continental market. In future, the competition will take place not so much between private firms (more interested in running the high-value segments), as between national public carriers, as shown by the phenomenon of remail.     

An IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM IN PURE PUBLIC GOODS ECONOMIES WITH FEASIBILITY CONSTRAINTS: VOTING BY COMMITTEES IN NON-RECTANGULAR FEASIBLE SETS*

We consider the problem of choosing an alternative in a pure public goods economy with feasibility constraints when voters have "additively-separable and single-peaked"preferences.Our purpose is to identify tops-only voting procedures satisfying "nonmanipulability" and "voter sovereignty". First, we show that such procedures are generalizations of the schemes of "voting by committees"¹)introduced by Barbera, Sonnenschein and Zhou (1991) in the sense that these procedures are defined similarly for the generalized feasible set. Second, we establish that when no two goods can be simultaneously produced at their maximal feasible levels, the procedures are characterized by the existence of a very powerful voter.     

基于竞争视角的广州高星级酒店集聚分析

高星级酒店在空间上的集聚,提升了区域竞争能力但亦加剧了内部竞争。文章分析了广州高星级酒店集聚特征和集聚动力,从区域竞争和产业内部竞争分析其竞争结构,并从政府、企业层面提出了对策思考。     

DOES A TRADE UNION SET A LOWER EFFORT LEVEL THAN WOULD BE DETERMINED IN A COMPETITIVE LABOUR MARKET?

The level of effort which would be set by a firm hiring in a competitive labour market is contrasted with the effort level which would be chosen by a utilitarian trade union.     

THE ATTRIBUTION PROCESS OF DELEGATION CONTRACTS IN THE FRENCH URBAN PUBLIC TRANSPORT SECTOR: WHY COMPETITIVE TENDERING IS A MYTH

ABSTRACT ** :  This paper analyses the French recent experience of franchising in the urban public transport sector in the light of Transaction Cost Economics arguments. It provides theoretical arguments supported by empirical evidence explaining why the compulsory use of competitive tendering in this sector did not translate into better performance, the main reasons being the lack of transparency of the attribution process and the limited monitoring capabilities of local authorities.     

中国新亚欧大陆桥经济带城市竞争力比较研究

本文首先构建用来测度城市竞争力的指标体系,继而运用因子分析等方法,对所选择的中国新亚欧大陆桥经济带25个样本城市的竞争力进行计算,求出各城市的竞争力得分;接着对所有城市的6个主成分进行聚类分析,将其竞争力划分为强、较强、较弱、弱四类并相应地做出评价。主要结论是：绝大多数城市的竞争力综合得分皆偏低;各城市之间的竞争力综合得分有较大差距,排名前三位的西安、郑州、乌鲁木齐与其后诸城市悬殊很大。