Sharing Rules in Teams

We examine the problem of output sharing in a moral hazard in team situation. Although we do not consider any particular procedure, we assume that the team uses some procedure to decide a sharing rule before actual production takes place (for example, this may be a bargaining process or a team welfare maximization problem). This must take into account that the team will play a noncooperative game in the production process conditional on the chosen sharing rule. We show that the procedure for deciding the sharing rule does not have to look for anything more complicated than simple linear sharing rules. We also show that, when there is limited liability, the procedure needs to consider only the slightly more complicated piecewise linear rules. As a consequence of the linear sharing rule result, we are also able to provide a characterization of implementable outcomes. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D82, D2, C72, J54.     

Bertrand Games and Sharing Rules

We consider asymmetric Bertrand games with arbitrary payoffs at ties or sharing rules, and identify sufficient conditions for the zero-profit outcome and the existence of Nash equilibria. Subject to some technical conditions on non-tied payoffs the following hold. If the sharing rule is strictly tie-decreasing all players but one receive zero equilibrium payoffs, while everybody does so if non-tied payoffs are symmetric. Mixed (pure) strategy Nash equilibria exist if the sharing rule is (norm) tie-decreasing and coalition-monotone. I would like to thank Fernando Branco, the audience at Pompeu Fabra (Barcelona), ISEG (Lisbon), University of Mannheim, ESEM 2003 (Venice), EARIE 2005 (Porto), two anonymous referees, and the editor Dan Kovenock for very useful comments. This research received financial support under project POCTI/ECO/37925/2001 of FCT and FEDER.     

Voting for Burden Sharing Rules in Public Goods Games

We experimentally investigate whether groups of heterogeneous agents can reach an agreement on how to share the costs of providing a public good. Thereby, we explore the performance of different burden sharing rules being implemented either endogenously or exogenously. In case of an endogenously implemented burden sharing rule, subjects vote for different burden sharing schemes either by unanimity or majority vote. Despite the fact that preferences for the allocation schemes differ among agents, most groups agree upon a common scheme, and consequently avoid an uncoordinated action. Our results reveal both the opportunities and risks of burden sharing negotiations. We find average efficiency levels to increase in case an agreement is reached. If groups however fail to agree upon a common rule, cooperation collapses and efficiency levels decrease compared to a voluntary contribution mechanism being exogenously imposed. Most importantly, agents who face a voting decision on average receive higher payoffs than agents in an exogenously implemented voluntary contribution mechanism and do not earn less than participants in any externally determined burden sharing rule.     

Revenue Sharing,Competitive Balance and the Contest Success Function

Abstract. This paper investigates revenue sharing in an asymmetric two‐teams contest model of a sports league with Nash behavior of team owners. The innovation of the analysis is that it focuses on the role of the contest success function (CSF). In case of an inelastic talent supply, revenue sharing turns out to worsen competitive balance regardless of the shape of the CSF. For the case of an elastic talent supply, in contrast, the effect of revenue sharing on competitive balance depends on the specification of the CSF. We fully characterize the class of CSFs for which revenue sharing leaves unaltered competitive balance and identify CSFs ensuring that revenue sharing renders the contest closer.     

企业间专利组合收益分成的信号博弈策略

利用信号博弈理论,对专利组合策略领导者存在逆向选择情况下的专利组合收益分成策略进行了规范性分析。主要结论如下:当专利组合策略的领导者有高素质与低素质两种类型时,若低素质领导者的模仿成本大于模仿收益,则专利组合策略领导者制定的专利组合收益分成比率完全可以作为一种传递领导者类型的信号,此时的信号博弈存在一个序列分离均衡;反之,则专利组合策略领导者制定的专利组合收益分成比率的信号传递作用将减弱以至不存在,此时的信号博弈存在一个混合策略均衡或混同均衡。最后,从实践角度给出了对策和建议。     

关于房地产估价收益共享法的探讨

在现行房地产估价收益法中,关于收益价格的公平性存在一定的矛盾。本着以提高房地产估价质量为目的,改进后的收益法即收益共享法将房地产未来的净收益在房地产买方和卖方之间进行了合理的分配,既满足了买方的投资目的,也提高了房地产交易真实发生的可能性。由此,达到了完善现行的房地产估价理论、构建优化的估价方法的目的。     

供应链中的收益共享博弈与契约设计

从博弈的角度探讨了供应链中的收益共享契约设计问题。应用LF博弈方法研究了供应商与零售商在收益共享机制下的博弈过程,得出了满足双方最优决策的博弈均衡解,在此基础上设计了收益共享契约,给出了双方能够接受契约的参数范围。     

制造商与零售商共同努力减少无缺陷退货的收益共享合同

针对制造商与零售商在共同努力减少客户无缺陷退货中的双边道德风险问题,本文分析了制造商和零售商的努力水平对无缺陷退货率的影响,运用委托-代理理论设计了双边道德风险下的收益共享合同,分析了各参数对合同的影响。结果表明,最优收益共享激励系数与制造商的努力弹性系数负相关,与零售商的努力弹性系数正相关,与产品的单位收益、产品的首次销售量以及双方的努力成本系数无关。     

我国增值税收入地区分享不均衡问题的再思考

长期以来,在以生产地原则为基础的课税制度主导下,我国增值税收入地方政府间的分享呈现逆向分配特征.全面"营改增"后,地方政府纵向分享增值税收入比重虽有提升,但横向分享不均衡的弊病始终存在,而当前留抵退税背景下地方政府收入分成和退税责任不匹配再次凸显了这一问题.为推动地方政府间收入均衡发展,我国借助留抵退税地方分担调整机制部分缓解了地区间收入分配不均衡的矛盾,但仍存在调整范围过窄、比例设置不科学、实施效率有待提升等问题.新时期,增值税收入地区间分享不均衡问题的解决,需要以受益原则导向下的公共服务均等化为目标,通过坚持税源贡献、税负归属、成本和收益相匹配原则合理分配地区间收入.同时,应结合消费支出、居民数量等因素推动增值税收入在地区间的加权分配,并通过建立专门的留抵退税财政调节基金、加强地方主体税种建设和完善财政转移支付制度,有效缓解地区间增值税收入分享不均衡的矛盾.     

基于收益共享契约的三级供应链如何应对突发事件

本文针对一个由供应商-制造商-零售商构成的三级供应链,在考虑随机性需求基础上,探讨突发事件对三级供应链的影响,同时改进了协调供应链的收益共享契约,使之能够应对突发事件。     

Revenue Sharing and Information Exchange under Non‐discriminatory Taxation*

The international exchange of tax information, and its merits compared to withholding taxation, has emerged as a central topic in international tax policy. We characterize and compare the outcomes that emerge, in a two‐country world, with and without information exchange, under the assumption that countries are unable to tax residents and non‐residents differentially. The analysis focuses on the role of asymmetries in country size (capturing a key feature of tax havens) and on the impact and potential desirability of schemes to share the revenue raised by withholding (as under the new EU savings tax arrangements) or (more innovatively) as a consequence of information exchange. We show that, irrespective of any difference in country size, it is in the interests of both countries, in terms of tax revenue, that all revenue collected from non‐residents be transferred to the residence country—which would entail taking the EU practice even further from the norm, but is currently the standard in relation to information exchange. A withholding scheme with revenue fully reallocated in this way gives both countries more revenue than does information sharing, whatever the allocation under the latter.     

关于通过对外投资促进国际收支平衡的思考

近年来,我国的国际收支出现了经常账户和资本与金融账户的双顺差现象,外汇储备已达到了九千多亿美元,如何实现国际收支的基本平衡便成了一个现实的问题。文章认为:可通过加快立法、完善政府职能等促进企业对外投资,从而实现国际收支的基本平衡。     

The Design and Performance of Sharing Rules for a Partnership in Continuous Time

We study repeated partnerships with imperfect monitoring and risk neutrality. The interval between the partners' decisions, the delay, is given but can be arbitrarily small. Each stage-game's output is Gaussian, with mean and variance depending on the partners' actions, making the sequence of outcomes a discretization of a diffusion. A sharing rule is efficient if there is an equilibrium of the corresponding game whose outcomes are Pareto efficient; it is stable if these equilibria approach a limit as the delay approaches zero. We characterize partnerships for which there exist stable, efficient sharing rules, and describe the corresponding equilibria.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C73, D2, D82.     

Simple Rules for the Optimal Taxation of International Capital Income

In this paper we reconcile and extend previous results on the collectively optimal taxation of international investment income. The “weighted average” rule of Horst (1980), for example, is shown to rest on unattractive assumptions on the set of instruments available, ruling out any need for distorting taxes. The principal contribution is to establish a new and strikingly simple weighted average rule — encompassing the other key result in this area — for the general case in which lump-sum taxes are unavailable, the ability to tax pure profits is perhaps restricted and distorting taxes on both domestic and border-crossing capital income are optimally deployed.     

基于收益共享和成本共担的供应链双向激励协调

在供应商和销售商组成的二级供应链中,供应商隐藏关于生产成本的私人信息,销售商隐藏关于销售努力的行动,且双方地位相当,此时协调主体不明确。为了解决该问题,文章引入虚拟第三方为利他的委托人,站在供应链整体利润最大化的角度,设计基于收益共享和成本共担的协调契约,对供应商和销售商实施双向激励。研究结果表明:当收益共享比例和成本共担比例满足一定条件时,供应链实现了协调。此时,该契约调动了供应商降低生产成本、销售商提高努力水平的积极性,合作双方达到了"双赢"。笔者通过数值实验对结果进行了验证,表明了结果的有效性。     

分税制下的地方财政收入——以陕西省为例的实证分析

中国在20世纪90年代中期进行了分税制改革以及政府间财政转移支付制度改革,建立了较为规范的预算管理体制和政府间财政转移支付体系.分税制改革对地方财政收入产生了深远影响.本文以陕西省为例,对1994-2006年陕西省财政收入数据进行实证分析,并依据分析结论评价分税制对地方财政收入的影响.本文的结论是:分税制改革促进了地方财政收入增长,但财政集中程度不高;地方财政收入和财政集中程度差异明显;财政收入在各级政府间分配不平均,转移支付政策调节作用不显著.     

Optimal Reimbursement and Malpractice Sharing Rules in Health Care Markets

When health care sponsors such as HMOs or PPOs can use "utilization reviews" in order to indicate to the provider what type of treatment to administer to the patient based upon a diagnosis that is established by the provider, it is possible to implement the "first best" levels of investment in cost control efforts and in aggressiveness of treatment. The implementation of the "first best" requires the utilization of the prospective reimbursement rule accompanied by the removal of all malpractice liabilities from the provider. In contrast, when the type of treatment cannot be enforced by the payer, implementation of the "first best" is not feasible if the payer places a higher weight on the welfare of consumers than that of providers in its objective function. In this case, the reimbursement scheme deviates from the prospective rule, and the provider assumes liability to part of the cost incurred by society as a result of unsuccessful medical outcomes. When the payer can enforce treatment only partially by establishing bounds on the range of acceptable treatments, a minimal acceptable standard will be established and the outcome will be an intermediate case between the above two extremes.     

Flexible Water Sharing within an International River Basin

Increasing scarcity of water resources, and greatervariability in available water supply, are causingacute difficulties for allocation agreements amongusers of water bodies. One cause of controversy,especially for river waters, is the inability of mostallocation operations to accommodate variations inconditions. In this paper we develop a flexiblemechanism that produces a Pareto-efficient allocationfor every possible flow volume in a river. Extensionsto accommodate other kinds of variation, such as waterdemand, are feasible. The mechanism is demonstratedusing historical water flow data for the Ganges, basedon stylized water demand relationships for India andBangladesh. Quantitative comparison between fixed andvariable allocation suggests that variable allocationsubstantially outperforms fixed allocation, improvingregional welfare by at least ten percent.