Food Protection for Sale*

This article tests the Protection for Sale (PFS) model using detailed data from US food‐processing industries under alternative import‐demand specifications. All empirical results support the PFS model predictions and previous empirical work qualitatively. However, a surprising result is that we obtain weights between 2.6 and 3.6 for domestic welfare using import slopes or elasticities derived from domestic demand and supply functions. In contrast, results based on directly specified import demands (including the Armington model) yield the usual, unrealistically large estimates for the domestic welfare weight. We contend that this empirical paradox arises mainly because the explanatory variables tend to be extremely large for industries with low import ratios and/or low import elasticities (or slopes) resulting from relatively volatile import prices. The results with derived import parameters point to a much stronger role of campaign contributions within the PFS model than previously found.     

The Effective Protection Rate Under Uncertainty: A Note*

This note presents a measure of the effective protection rate in a general equilibrium model under uncertainty where a stock market exists and international trade in securities takes place. Real equity prices replace the final commodity prices since, in the presence of uncertainty, resource allocation and therefore the output of each industry is governed by real equity prices. Using expected utility as a welfare criterion, it is shown that second-best optimum can be achieved by a tariff on the intermediate good at a rate given by setting the new measure to zero. This note provides the theoretical foundations to the measure estimated by Eldor (1984).     

Assessing Applied Protection across the World*

This paper presents MAcMap–HS‐6, a database providing a consistent, ad valorem equivalent measure of tariff duties and tariff rate quotas for 163 countries and 208 partners, at the six‐digit level of the Harmonized System (5111 products), accounting for all preferential agreements. We describe the methodology used to compute and aggregate an ad valorem equivalent of applied protection. Emphasis is placed on minimizing the endogeneity bias in the aggregation procedure, while acknowledging structural differences in export specialization. The resulting quantitative assessment is illustrated by giving an overview of applied protection across the world in 2001, in terms of average as well as distribution.     

Quality Bargaining and Intermediate Goods Protection*

This paper offers an explanation for the proposition that removing protection from a firm can induce an improvement in product quality. In a vertically separated industry the quality of the final good is dependent on the quality of the intermediate goods used in its production. This model is used to consider removal of protection from the upstream firm (the supplier) which gives the downstream firm (the assembler) greater bargaining power since the option of turning to a foreign supplier becomes more attractive.     

Transport Cost and Tariff Protection of Australian Manufacturing*

This paper provides estimates of transport cost and tariff protection available to import-competing Australian manufacturing industries. It finds that transport costs provide an important component of total protection available to such industries; one which, for many, is more important than the Australian tariff. In view of the effects of protection on industrial structure and performance, it should be explicitly recognized that transport costs are an unavoidable element of the protective structure and are deserving of study in their own right.     

Temporary Protection and Technology Choice under the Learning Curve*

This paper examines the effects of temporary protection in a model of Cournot competition under the learning curve. We show that when the protected firm can choose among multiple technologies subject to different scopes for learning, protection may hurt the long‐run competitiveness of the firm by inducing it to choose a technology with little scope for learning.     

Optimal Protection of Property Rights in a General Equilibrium Model of Growth*

We incorporate weak property rights into an otherwise standard general equilibrium model of growth and second‐best optimal policy. In this setup, the state plays two of its key roles: it protects property rights and provides public services. The government chooses policy (the income tax rate, as well as the allocation of collected tax revenues between law enforcement and public services) to maximize the growth rate of the economy. The focus of our analysis is on how weak property rights generate multiple decentralized competitive equilibria, the different properties of these equilibria, and the implications of second‐best optimal policies.