Setting Price Controls While Facing Variable Or Uncertain Market Conditions

Price controls under variable or uncertain market conditions do not lead to market equilibrium. Under different assumptions for the rationing mechanism during shortages and surpluses, I find, assuming small market shocks, that the optimal regulated price can be related in a simple way to the relative slopes of the marginal benefit and marginal cost functions. In addition, if the consumption price may differ from the production price, then consumers should pay less than or equal to what producers receive, implying possibly a unit subsidy to market transactions.     

Domestic and Foreign Price/Marginal-cost Margins: an Application to Spanish Manufacturing Firms

The authors investigate the differences in margins of export and domestic markets for Spanish manufacturing firms in the period 1990 to 1997. They estimate jointly a multiproduct cost function, a variable factor share equation, and two price/marginal‐cost margin equations. The results indicate that the marginal cost of production sold in export markets is slightly greater than in domestic markets. At the same time, the price/marginal‐cost margins in export markets are smaller than in domestic markets. There is also strong evidence that margins are procyclical in domestic markets, but this evidence is less clear in foreign markets.     

价格歧视战略与福利效应分析

在完全竞争市场条件下 ,竞争均衡可实现帕累托最优效率。垄断市场一般很难提供价格等于边际成本的产量水平 ,其产量与价格选择对社会来说不是最优的。垄断厂商以内生范畴和外生范畴为基础对消费者进行分类 ,使得价格歧视成为一种可行战略。由于定价策略存在差异 ,不同类型的价格歧视便具有不同的福利效应。     

Corporate social responsibility and strategic relationships

We analyze a delegation game relevant to the conduct of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in which the firm’s owner offers the manager a contract consisting of firm profit and social welfare. We derive three results that distinctly differ from existing findings. First, CSR decisions are strategic complements for firms. Second, with simultaneous CSR decisions, the equilibrium price is equal to marginal cost, despite the fact that firms compete in a Cournot duopoly. Finally, with sequential CSR decisions, unlike the follower firm, the leader firm never exhibits CSR. However, the follower firm can enjoy a profit equal to that derived by the leader in a Cournot–Stackelberg game.     

On the Second-best Policy of Household's Waste Recycling

This study analyzes the second-best household's waste recycling policy. If we assume the first-best economy with no illegal disposal or transaction costs, then unit pricing, an advance disposal fee and a recycling subsidy are required in order to achieve the social optimum such that both the sum of unit pricing and an advance disposal fee and the sum of unit pricing and a recycling subsidy are equal to the marginal disposal cost. Furthermore, the first-best outcome can also be obtained by a producer take-back requirement system.In the real economy, however, various factors prevent the first-best optimal outcome. In this study we consider two factors, one being the transaction cost associated with a recycling subsidy (or refund) and the other being illegal disposal by the consumer. If a recycling subsidy (or a deposit-refund system) is adopted, a transaction cost associated with it will be generated. Alternatively, if unit pricing is adopted, some of the consumed goods may be disposed of illegally. We show the complete trade-off between unit pricing and a recycling subsidy. In other words, we can not adopt unit pricing and a recycling subsidy simultaneously. As a result, there are three candidates for the second-best policy: unit pricing with an advance disposal fee, a deposit-refund system, and a producer take-back requirement system.Which of these three policies is the second-best policy will depend on the relative magnitude of the price of a recycled good and the marginal transaction cost associated with a recycling subsidy (or the refund in a deposit-refund system). Generally, if the price of a recycled good is positive and the marginal transaction cost is relatively high, unit pricing with an advance disposal fee is the second-best policy. However, where the price of a recycled good is negative and the marginal transaction cost is relatively high, a producer take-back requirement system is the second-best policy. Further, where the marginal transaction cost is relatively low, a deposit-refund system is the second-best policy, regardless of whether the price of a recycled good is positive or negative.     

A Discriminatory Mechanism to Reduce Urban Congestion

In this article, we propose an optimal mechanism to reduce congestion when information is asymmetric. Each car driver receives a quantity of traffic rights such that his adjusted marginal benefit is equal to the marginal cost of congestion and payments are based on willingness to pay. We show that the level of congestion achieved is lower and each car user can receive more or fewer rights than under complete information. With symmetric beliefs, the payment rule results from a second‐degree price discrimination. When beliefs are asymmetric, it results simultaneously from a second‐degree price discrimination and from a third‐degree price discrimination and high willingness‐to‐pay car users are discriminated against. The revenue raised can be used to reduce distortionary taxes, thereby gaining public acceptability.     

One-sided private provision of public goods with implicit Lindahl pricing

We consider a sequential game in which one player produces a public good and the other player can influence this decision by making an unconditional transfer. An efficient allocation requires the Lindahl property: the sum of the two (implicit) individual prices has to be equal to the resource cost of the public good. Under mild conditions this requires a personal price for the providing player that lies below half of the resource cost. These results can, for example, justify high marginal taxes on wages of secondary earners.     

Exchange Rate Changes and Pricing Behavior of US Exporters

This paper studies export pricing behavior following exchange rate changes in US manufacturing industries. Through a monopolistic model, the paper predicts that export prices should change, but less than proportionally, in response to exchange rate changes if either or both demand elasticity and marginal cost are variable. Cross-industry variation of such price changes can be explained by the difference in demand elasticities between the domestic and the export markets, the elasticity of marginal cost with respect to output. and the export share. These predictions are supported by the empirical findings of the paper.     

Regulating a manager whose empire-building preferences are private information

We obtain the optimal contract for the government (principal) to regulate a manager (agent) who has a taste for empire-building that is his/her private information. This taste for empire-building is modeled as a utility premium that is proportional to the difference between the contracted output and a reference output. We find that output is distorted upward when the manager’s taste for running large firms is weak, downward when it is strong, and equals a reference output when it is intermediate (in this case, the participation constraint is binding). We also obtain an endogenous reference output (equal to the expected output, which depends on the reference output), and find that the response of output to cost is null in the short-run (in which the reference output is fixed), whenever the manager’s type is in the intermediate range, and negative in the long-run (after the adjustment of the reference output to equal expected output).     

我国进一步推进水价改革的思考

随着工业化和城市化的发展,供水成本的不断上升和水资源的日益稀缺已经成为经济社会发展的一大障碍。水价政策能够在解决这些问题上发挥重要的作用。无论是工业和服务业用水、城市居民用水还是农业用水,其价格都应该体现水资源成本、供水成本和环境成本。水价改革必须在确定保障正常生产生活的基本用水量的基础上,通过水资源成本和环境成本在水价格中的充分体现,兼顾水企业和用水主体的利益,达到节约用水和水资源环境可持续发展的目的。     

The worst absolute surplus loss in the problem of commons: random priority versus average cost

A good is produced with increasing marginal cost. A group of agents want at most one unit of that good. The two classic methods that solve this problem are average cost and random priority. In the first method users request a unit ex ante and every agent who gets a unit pay average cost of the number of produced units. Under random priority users are ordered without bias and the mechanism successively offers the units at price equal to marginal cost. We compare these mechanisms by the worst absolute surplus loss and find that random priority unambiguously performs better than average cost for any cost function and any number of agents. Fixing the cost function, we show that the ratio of worst absolute surplus losses will be bounded by positive constants for any number of agents, hence the above advantage of random priority is not very large. I especially thank Herve Moulin for helpful comments and suggestions. I also appreciate the feedback from Justin Leroux and an anonymous referee.     

New Phillips curve under alternative production technologies for Canada, the United States, and the Euro area

This paper shows that alternative production technologies imply two modifications to the New Phillips Curve (NPC): A specific ‘strategic complementarity parameter’ that affects the relationship between real marginal cost and inflation and a specific modification to the labour share measure of real marginal cost. Estimates of average duration of nominal price stickiness obtained conditional on the strategic complementarity parameter are substantially smaller, and therefore more plausible, relative to when this parameter is ignored. Modifications to the marginal cost measure alone have little effect on the NPC estimates. The empirical fit of the NPC under alternative production technologies is similar.     

Strategic managerial incentives in a two-period Cournot duopoly

This paper examines the nature of optimal managerial incentives in the context of a duopoly marked by competition between the firm's managers in a dynamic production environment. If the marginal cost of production falls moderately over time or remains unchanged, there exists an equilibrium where one owner requires her manager to maximize profit, whereas the rival-owner requires her manager to maximize sales revenue. The profit-maximizing manager turns his firm into a Stackelberg-leader, while the sales-revenue-maximizing manager turns his firm into a Stackelberg-follower. Further, the profit-maximizing manager may generate a larger firm profit relative to the sales-revenue-maximizing manager.     

Regulatory tune-ups

Regulators cannot continuously and perfectly monitor firms. The alternative considered here supposes the regulator sets prices at discrete, unforeseen, times. I show that when marginal cost follows a stochastic diffusion process, but the regulator only irregularly adjusts the regulated price, the optimal price may be less than or greater than the expected level of marginal costs. The regulated price should be higher the steeper the demand curve, the lower the discount rate, and the greater the variance of costs. The social benefit of changing the price following a change in marginal cost is usually greater if at the time price was set marginal cost was low.     

THE VALUE OF IN‐STREAM WATER TEMPERATURE FORECASTS FOR FISHERIES MANAGEMENT

Water temperature is an important factor affecting aquatic life within the stream environment. Cold water species, such as salmonids, are particularly susceptible to elevated water temperatures. This paper examines the economic value of short‐term water temperature forecasts for salmonid management. Forecasts may have economic value if they allow the water resource manager to make better water allocation decisions. This study considers two applications: water releases for management of Chinook salmon in the Klamath River and leasing water from agriculture for management of steelhead trout in the John Day River. We incorporate biophysical models and water temperature distribution data into a Bayesian framework to simulate changes in fish populations and the corresponding benefit from recreational fishing and opportunity cost of water under different temperature forecast accuracies. Simulation results indicate that use of the forecasts results in increased fish production and that marginal costs decline and net benefits increase as forecast accuracy increases, suggesting that provision and use of such stream temperature forecasts would have value to society. (JEL Q22, Q25, Q28, Q50)     

效率、边际等式与成本分离

理解真实世界各种现象和行为之道,在于寻找影响成本和收益的约束条件。考虑了所有的约束条件,经济总是有效率的,边际收益总是等于边际成本,私人成本与社会成本没有分离。现实中,帕累托改进是不存在的。帕累托改进要求约束条件不变,那些所谓的帕累托改进其实伴随了约束条件的改变,因而不是真正意义上的帕累托改进,也就不能成为无效率的理由了。     

Hydro-economic river basin modelling: The application of a holistic surface-groundwater model to assess opportunity costs of water use in Spain

Combined hydro-economic models of river basins are fundamental tools for assessing management and infrastructure strategies to improve the economic efficiency of water use in a context of competition over scarce water resources. Integrated hydro-economic models have to be capable to properly reproduce the physical behavior of the system, with a realistic representation of the different surface and groundwater resources, including their interaction, and the spatial and temporal variability of resource availability. On the other hand, such models must incorporate the value of water for different urban, agricultural and industrial uses and users. Economic values for water use are defined according to the marginal residual value of water for production (for agricultural and industrial uses) or the aggregated willingness-to-pay (WTP) for urban supply and other final water uses. In this paper, we present a systematic approach to estimate the marginal economic value of surface and groundwater resources at different locations within a complex water resources system. Based on a holistic conjunctive optimization model applied to the Adra river system in Spain we asses the total and marginal opportunity costs of capacity and operation constraints, including the opportunity cost of imposing environmental constraints on water use as foreseen in future Spanish water policy following the implementation of the European Water Framework Directive. The resulting opportunity costs provide important information to water managers about economic inefficiencies of current water allocation policy or infrastructure design, and about the resource opportunity costs to be considered in the design of efficient pricing policies in regions with water scarcity issues.     

Estimation of non-tap water demand in Central American cities

We study water demand among non-tap households in three cities in El Salvador and in marginal barrios in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, using data from identical household studies in the four cities. We estimate water demand functions separately for El Salvador and Tegucigalpa, using a two-step procedure. We find non-tap water demand elasticities with respect to total water cost (defined as the sum of water price and hauling cost) of between −0.4 and −0.7. We discuss implications of the results, for welfare and distributional analysis, for documentation of the value of adding new connections, and for general water sector planning.     

Fresh surface water resource allocation between Bulgaria and Greece

This paper addresses the important issue of transboundary sharing of fresh surface water resources, including quantity and quality dimensions. It carves a simple economic model of the benefits which can be generated by maximizing the joint profits earned, when the resource is shared efficiently between two countries. The appropriate policy instrument towards this end is a bilateral agreement to charge the same water price to all water users in a given sector. Market clearance will then follow to determine the optimal water price. The case of the Nestos river flowing through Bulgaria and Greece, but overexploited by Bulgaria, in the Balkans is used as a case study. The empirical estimation of a fixed proportions production function for corn derives a marginal water value of the Nestos water for Greece. This value, which applies under the current non-cooperative solution, is higher than the optimal water price in the cooperative solution.     

Biased managers as strategic commitment: The relative profit approach

This paper analyzes a duopolistic model wherein each firm׳s owner can hire a biased manager for strategic reasons. We focus on the situation wherein each firm׳s owner evaluates the performance of her/his manager on the basis of her/his relative profit, which is equal to the weighted sum of her/his absolute profit and the absolute profit of her/his opponent firm. We show that in both price-setting and quantity-setting competitions, the owners of the two private firms employ aggressive managers rather than absolute profit maximizing managers regardless of the degree of importance of each firm׳s relative performance. Furthermore, in both the price competition and the quantity competition, as the degree of importance of each firm׳s relative performance increases, we show that the firms׳ owners tend to hire more aggressive managers when the degree of importance of each firm׳s relative performance is sufficiently low, whereas in both the price competition and the quantity competition, the firms׳ owners tend to hire less aggressive managers otherwise. Thus, in both the price competition and the quantity competition, the type of each firm׳s manager is not monotone with respect to the degree of each firm׳s relative performance. Thus, in both the price competition and the quantity competition, we find that the change in the optimal type of manager hired by each firm is non-monotone against the change of competitiveness in the market with the increase in the degree of importance of each firm׳s relative performance.