On dollarization and currency boards: Error and deception

A diagnosis of the laws and balance sheets of the monetary authorities in Argentina, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Estonia, Hong Kong and Lithuania is presented. With the exception of Bosnia, all employ active monetary policies and engage in sterilization. Accordingly, they are not currency boards. The methods used to dismantle the Argentine system in 2001, prior to its eventual abandonment, are presented. An evaluation of the Hong Kong system (1997-1998) suggests that its so-called currency board was not a party to counter-speculation in the stock market. Evidence is presented to show how deception was employed by the US and the IMF during the Indonesian currency board debate (1998) as a means to engineer a political regime change.     

Currency Boards in the Baltic Countries: What Have We Learned?

Straightforward exchange rate arrangements known as currency boards have gained popularity during the past decade. Among transition economies, Estonia first introduced a currency board in 1992, followed by Lithuania in 1994 and Bulgaria in 1997. Currency boards have been useful in achieving macroeconomic stabilisation, and they may have helped the Baltics become the first countries of the former Soviet Union (FSU) to achieve economic growth after the slump in production of the early 1990s. Moreover, Baltic inflation performance has been substantially better than in other FSU countries. Both in Estonia and Lithuania the present exchange rate system has been accompanied by strong real appreciation of the currency, although it is widely accepted that the currencies were very much undervalued when they were initially pegged. However, if rapid real appreciation is accompanied by increases in labour productivity, the present pegs can be maintained. Banking crises in Estonia and Lithuania have not been particularly severe, so apparently rigid currency pegs have not been accompanied by excessive financial sector instability. The tight fiscal policies pursued in both countries, especially Estonia, have been instrumental to the success of these currency board arrangements.     

Currency boards: More than a quick fix?

Once a popular colonial monetary arrangement, currency boards fell into disuse as countries gained political independence. But recently, currency boards have made a remarkable come-back. This essay takes a critical look at their performance. Are currency boards really a panacea for achieving low inflation and high growth? Or do they merely provide a 'quick fix' allowing authorities to neglect fundamental reforms and thus fail to yield lasting benefits? We have three major findings. First, the historical track record of currency boards is sterling, with few instances of speculative attacks and virtually no 'involuntary' exits. Countries that did exit from currency boards did so mainly for political, rather than economic reasons, and such exits were usually uneventful. Second, modern currency boards have often been instituted to gain credibility following a period of high or hyperinflation, and in this regard, have been remarkably successful. Countries with currency boards experienced lower inflation and higher (if more volatile) GDP growth compared to both floating regimes and simple pegs. The inflation difference reflects both a lower growth rate of money supply (a 'discipline effect'), and a faster growth of money demand (a 'credibility effect'). The GDP growth effect is significant, but may simply reflect a rebound from depressed levels. Third, case studies reveal the successful introduction of a currency board to be far from trivial, requiring lengthy legal and institutional changes, as well as a broad economic and social consensus for the implied commitment. Moreover, there are thorny issues, as yet untested, regarding possible exits from a currency board. Thus currency boards do not provide easy solutions. But if introduced in the right circumstances, with some built-in flexibility, they can be an important tool for gaining credibility and achieving macroeconomic stabilization.     

Optimal monetary policy regime for oil producing developing economies: Implications for post-war Iraq

This paper theoretically investigates optimal monetary policy regime for oil producing developing countries. We analyze credibility and reputation of the Central Bank and macroeconomic dynamics under alternative monetary policy regimes. We construct a detailed and realistic model that can be used to analyze macroecomic structure and expectation dynamics of an oil producing open economy. We take into account the asymmetric information between the public and the central bank and theoretically investigate how this asymmetric information impacts the real economy and the credibility of the central bank. The simulation results indicate that central bank achieves higher credibility and lower inflation under dollarization and higher output levels under currency board regime. The model constructed in this paper has many policy implications for oil producing open economies. Using the implications of the model, we make monetary policy regime recommendations for post-war Iraq.     

On the Credibility of Currency Boards*

The paper compares the credibility of currency boards and (standard) pegs. Abandoning a currency board requires a time‐consuming legislative process and an abolition will thus be well‐anticipated. Therefore, a currency board solves the time‐inconsistency problem of monetary policy. However, policy can react to unexpected shocks only with a time lag, thus the threat of large shocks makes the abolition more likely. Currency boards are more credible than standard pegs if the time‐inconsistency problem dominates. In contrast, standard pegs, that can be left at short notice, are more credible if exogenous shocks are highly volatile and constitute the dominant problem.     

Beliefs about Exchange‐Rate Stability: Survey Evidence from the Currency Board in Bulgaria

Abstract

Currency pegs seldom achieve full credibility even after delivering low inflation and a stable exchange rate for many years. We use unique survey data from Bulgaria’s currency board to investigate the origins of incomplete credibility. We show that the limitations imposed by the currency board on output stabilization policies are a major source of concern. Many people view the financial stabilization policies as a reason for high unemployment and therefore as unsustainable. Another important factor for low credibility is the concern over potential international shocks. Conversely, past instability does not seem to translate strongly into expectations of future instability.     

Fundamentals, the exchange rate and prospects for the current and future EU enlargements: evidence from Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania and Turkey

We analyze the link between macroeconomic fundamentals and exchange rate dynamics in two new and two potential EU member states: Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, and Turkey. Given the different institutional settings of the exchange rate market in the countries of interest, we follow two different modelling strategies. For Romania and Turkey, we evaluate possible exchange rate misalignments based on a monetary model of exchange rate determination. In the case of Bulgaria and Croatia, with currency board and narrow-band peg arrangements against the euro, we discuss possible exit strategies and quantitatively assess the effects of the peg arrangements by means of simulation.

Costs and benefits of unilateral euroization in central eastern Europe

Countries unable or unwilling to join a monetary union can replicate most membership effects unilaterally through either a currency board or the formal replacement of domestic currency by that of the Union. Potential benefits include lower transaction costs, lower interest rates, and lower exposure to speculative attacks. Costs include initial reserves, inadequate response to asymmetric shocks, loss of seigniorage, no lender of last resort. Expected costs and benefits have probably been exaggerated. Net effects depend primarily on the degree of monetary, real, and institutional convergence. Positive net advantages will accrue to countries that are either already converging, or wish to use a single currency to speed up convergence — especially if small. There is no legal or economic justification for EU aversion to unilateral euroization in accession candidate countries. JEL classification: F33, F36, E58, P33.     

Fixed exchange rate credibility with heterogeneous expectations

After disinflation has been achieved, agents who form more sophisticated forecasts have lower confidence in the sustainability of a peg compared to less sophisticated agents. Furthermore, sustained financial stability leads to a declining proportion of sophisticated agents. Thus, the credibility of a fixed exchange rate regime grows over time partly because fewer people pay attention to the workings of the monetary regime. These results are derived in a rules-versus-discretion model of a fixed exchange rate regime with heterogeneous agents. We provide unique supporting evidence using data on expectations and information about the monetary regime from Bulgaria’s currency board.     

UNEMPLOYMENT PERSISTENCE AND THE SUSTAINABILITY OF EXCHANGE RATE PEGS

It is commonly thought that an open economy can accommodate output shocks through either exchange rate or real sector adjustments. We formalize this notion by incorporating unemployment persistence into a two‐sided escape clause model of currency crises. We show that unemployment persistence makes a currency peg more fragile and undermines the credibility of the monetary authority in a dynamic setting. The fragility is captured by a devaluation premium in expectations that increases the average inflation rate when the currency peg is more vulnerable to ‘busts’ than ‘booms’. This interaction between macroeconomic and microeconomic rigidities suggests that a policy reform can only be consistent if it renders either exchange rates or the economy more flexible.     

Does One Size Fit All? A currency union with asymmetric transmissions and a stability pact

The theory of optimal currency areas stresses that a single currency zone should have symmetry across shocks and structures. What happens if the monetary transmission mechanisms differ so that a common monetary policy has different effects in different places? Using a fully specified econometric model, we find that such asymmetries are likely to destabilise the business cycle and put countries out of phase with each other in a way that cannot be corrected by deficit-constrained national fiscal policies. Market discipline, however, could achieve this. Hence, the question is whether the markets would create sufficient discipline on their own.     

FDI into transition economies

The article explores the determination of foreign direct investment (FDI) into the Balkan transition economies – Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania and Serbia. Detailed FDI inflows to Southeast Europe are analysed to determine the main differences in the volume, timing and sectoral structure of FDI within the region and in comparison to the Central East European countries. A gravity model for all transition economies during 1990–2011 is then estimated to assess whether the factors driving FDI to the Western Balkans are different. They are found to be so; even when the size of their economies, distance from the source economies, institutional quality and prospects of EU membership are taken into account, Western Balkans countries receive less FDI than other transition countries. These issues are of policy relevance for the Balkan economies and ought to contribute to the current debate on the ‘new growth model’.     

Development of the banking system under the Estonian currency board

The choice of a suitable exchange rate regime is the subject of numerous discussions in economic literature. Estonia has been successful in achieving economic stabilization and growth and steadily declining inflation. It has one of the highest per capita foreign direct investments in central and eastern Europe. Estonia also has one of the most liberalized economies among all transition countries. An essential element of the success of Estonian economic development is strict exchange rate control. Estonia has adopted a currency board that serves as a signal of commitment to prudent monetary policy and as a guarantee of sound money during the transition period. This paper discusses the experience of operating the currency board, some future prospects of the currency board arrangement, and the development of the banking system in Estonia.     

The evolution of east-west trade and the role of the Ecu in Eastern Europe

Conclusion This paper arrives at the conclusion that the expanding European Community is a dominant attraction for Eastern Europe, including the former USSR. Since the Community will have privileged trade arrangements with most, if not all, of Eastern Europe, optimal monetary solutions will be strongly influenced by trade relations. The future Western European currency therefore, is also playing a dominant role in the monetary choices of Eastern Europe. We have discussed several aspects of this choice (anchor of the exchange rate regime, management of foreign reserves, parallel currency and currency of a possible payments union) and conclude that the Ecu is the dominant contender.Opinions expressed in this paper are strictly personal.     

Commitment and the adoption of a common currency*

In contrast to Mundell's inquiry on the optimality of currency areas, this article aims to understand under what circumstances a Pareto‐dominant monetary union will be established. Using a multicountry overlapping generations model, we highlight gains from monetary union arising from reduced transactions costs and lower inflation. Despite these gains, countries acting independently will impose barriers to exchange through local currency restrictions, thereby creating transactions costs and providing an incentive for inflation. Therefore, the gains from monetary union are most likely to be lost without collective effort.     

Fiscal consolidation under imperfect credibility

This paper examines the effects of expenditure-based fiscal consolidation when credibility as to whether the cuts will be long-lasting is imperfect. We contrast the impact limited credibility has when the consolidating country has the means to tailor monetary policy to its own needs, with the impact when the country is a small member of a currency union with a negligible effect on interest rates and on nominal exchange rates of the currency union. We find two key results. First, in the case of an independent monetary policy, the adverse impact of limited credibility is relatively small, and consolidation can be expected to reduce government debt at a relatively low output cost given that monetary policy provides more accommodation than it would under perfect credibility. Second, the lack of monetary accommodation under currency union membership implies that the output cost may be significantly larger, and that progress in reducing government debt in the short and medium term may be limited under imperfect credibility.     

Outsourcing Central Banking: Lessons from Estonia

An orthodox currency board (CB) renders central banking redundant for interest and exchange rate determination. Thereby, monetary policy is de facto outsourced. Foreign direct investment (FDI) in banking can lead to outsourcing of the second important central bank function, responsibility for banking supervision. Economic and political conditions for outsourcing of central banking are discussed. Estonia's experience with a CB and expanding foreign involvement in banking is reviewed. The Argentine CB experience is discussed briefly to provide a contrast. The conclusion outlines the conditions for successful currency outsourcing to another country or regional authority.     

Does clarity of central bank communication affect credibility? Evidences considering governor-specific effects

Central banks have made great efforts to increase transparency and accountability to the public. Since then, studies seek empirical evidences about the effects of monetary policy communication over agent’s expectations. The recent literature on central bank communication draws attention to the importance of clarity of central bank communication. However, researches on this theme are still scarce, and there are few empirical studies with conclusive findings. Our study seeks empirical evidences on the relation between clarity of central bank communication and credibility of monetary policy. Estimates through different methods aim to identify whether clarity of central bank communication improves credibility. The study is the first to provide empirical evidence that a clearer communication can improve credibility. We also consider the differences between the two governors who ruled the Central Bank of Brazil in the period under analysis. The results indicate that a clear communication can improve credibility, but it depends on the commitment of the central banker with the goal of inflation control. Furthermore, estimates based on quantile regression indicate that the benefit brought by the clarity to the credibility depends on the commitment of the monetary authority with the goal guiding inflation expectations.     

Bi‐currency versus Single‐currency Targeting: Lessons from the Russian Experience

This paper examines how the 2005 shift in Russian exchange rate policy from US dollar (USD) single‐currency to USD–EUR (euro) bi‐currency targeting has impacted domestic interest rates. The finding show that this policy shift has disconnected Russian interest rates from US dollar‐denominated interest rates, while instead linking them to a synthetic interest rate composed of USD and EUR rates at the same proportion as that of these two currencies in the currency basket against which the ruble's exchange rate is set. The Russian experience shows that while the adoption of bi‐currency targeting may help ensure that domestic interest rates are less dependent on the monetary cycle of a single country, these rates are instead likely to reflect financial developments in all countries whose currencies are included in the currency basket. This insight is likely to be relevant for other countries that pursue basket‐targeting policies.     

Transmission of monetary policy and exchange rate shocks under foreign currency lending

This paper analyses the differences in reaction of domestic and foreign currency lending to monetary and exchange rate shocks, using a panel VAR model estimated for the three biggest Central and Eastern European countries (Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary). Our results point toward a drop in domestic currency loans and an increase of foreign currency credit in reaction to monetary policy tightening in Poland and Hungary, suggesting that the presence of foreign currency debt weakens the transmission of monetary policy. A currency depreciation shock leads to an initial decline in foreign currency lending, but also in loans denominated in domestic currency as central banks react to a weaker exchange rate by increasing the interest rates. However, after several quarters, credit in foreign currency accelerates, indicating that borrowers start using it to substitute for depressed domestic currency lending.