CEO compensation,family control,and institutional investors in Continental Europe

This paper investigates the impact of family control and institutional investors on CEO pay packages in Continental Europe, using a dataset of 754 listed firms with 3731 firm-year observations from 14 countries during 2001–2008. We find that family control curbs the level of CEO total and cash compensation, and the fraction of equity-based compensation. Moreover, we do not observe a significant effect of family control on the excess level of total and cash compensation. This evidence indicates that controlling families do not use CEO compensation to expropriate wealth from minority shareholders. We show that institutional ownership is associated with higher levels of CEO cash and total compensation in Continental Europe, especially in family firms. Also, foreign institutional investors have a positive and significant impact on CEO compensation level. Finally, results indicate that institutional investors affect CEO pay structure: they increase the use of equity-based compensation in both family and non-family firms.     

Search,product market competition and CEO pay

We develop a market equilibrium model to show how search frictions in the CEO market, agency conflicts and product market characteristics interact to affect CEO market tightness, firm size and CEO incentive pay. The theory generates novel implications that link firms' product markets with CEO markets. Different determinants of competition—the entry cost, product substitutability, and market size—have contrasting effects on CEO market tightness, CEO pay and firm size. We also derive new predictions for the impact of product market risk on firm size and CEO incentive compensation. We show empirical support for several cross-sectional hypotheses derived from the theory for how CEO pay, CEO incentives, firm size and market tightness vary with product market characteristics.     

Does Sensationalism Affect Executive Compensation? Evidence from Pay Ratio Disclosure Reform

Beginning in 2018, U.S. public firms were required to report the ratio of the chief executive officer's (CEO) compensation to their median employee's compensation in the annual proxy statement. Exploiting the staggered reporting of pay ratios, we find little evidence that total CEO compensation changes in response to pay ratio disclosure reform. However, we do find that boards significantly adjust the mix of compensation awarded by reducing the sensitivity of CEO pay to equity price changes, particularly when the CEO is likely to garner media scrutiny, and by reducing reliance on stock-based and other compensation components that are most susceptible to media coverage surrounding the pay ratio disclosure. Firms ultimately disclosing higher pay ratios garner more media coverage around the filing of their proxy statement, and more negative-toned coverage in the subsequent month. Finally, we find evidence that greater pay disparity is associated with greater selling activity by retail investors and more negative say-on-pay votes following pay ratio reform, consistent with a broad set of investors responding to public scrutiny resulting from pay ratio disclosures.     

CEO Compensation and Firm Performance: an Empirical Investigation of UK Panel Data

This paper examines the link between CEO pay and performance employing a unique, hand‐collected panel data set of 390 UK non‐financial firms from the FTSE All Share Index for the period 1999–2005. We include both cash (salary and bonus) and equity‐based (stock options and long‐term incentive plans) components of CEO compensation, and CEO wealth based on share holdings, stock option and stock awards holdings in our analysis. In addition, we control for a comprehensive set of corporate governance variables. The empirical results show that in comparison to the previous findings for US CEOs, pay‐performance elasticity for UK CEOs seems to be lower; pay‐performance elasticity for UK CEOs is 0.075 (0.095) for cash compensation (total direct compensation), indicating that a ten percentage increase in shareholder return corresponds to an increase of 0.75% (0.95%) in cash (total direct) compensation. We also find that both the median share holdings and stock‐based pay‐performance sensitivity are lower for UK CEOs when we compare our findings with the previous findings for US CEOs. Thus, our results suggest that corporate governance reports in the UK, such as the Greenbury Report (1995) that proposed CEO compensation be more closely linked to performance, have not been totally effective. Our findings also indicate that institutional ownership has a positive and significant influence on CEO pay‐performance sensitivity of option grants. Finally, we find that longer CEO tenure is associated with lower pay‐performance sensitivity of option grants suggesting the entrenchment effect of CEO tenure.     

CEO power,M&A decisions,and market reactions

In this study we examine the relationship between CEO power, corresponding acquisition activities and market reactions to mergers and acquisitions (M&A) announcements with a Canadian M&A dataset (1997–2005). We use CEO excess pay as a proxy for CEO power. Our empirical results show that the market reactions to M&A announcements are not related to CEO power. It implies that powerful CEOs do not necessarily make value destroying acquisitions. Our results further show that CEO power levels are significantly higher for acquiring firms compared to the CEOs of non-acquiring firms. In other words, CEOs with more relative power make more acquisitions. Such acquisitions will increase the size of the firm and will allow CEOs to demand a higher compensation level for managing larger asset pools and to derive higher performance incentives that are also generally tied to firm size.     

Extreme CEO pay cuts and audit fees

This study investigates whether sudden and severe reductions in total CEO compensation affect auditor perceptions of risk. We argue that extreme CEO pay cuts can incentivize the CEO to manipulate the financial reports or make risky operational decisions in a desperate attempt to improve firm performance. This incentive, in turn, is likely to impact auditor assessments of audit risk and auditor business risk, leading to higher audit fees. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find evidence of a positive and highly significant association between extreme CEO pay cuts and audit fees. The results suggest that audit fees are 4.6% higher when there is an extreme CEO pay cut, which corresponds to an audit fee that is $111,458 higher for the average firm-year observation in our sample.     

Unintended consequences of compensation peer groups on corporate innovation

When companies select and use compensation peers to determine chief executive officer (CEO) compensation, they create unintended peer effects on corporate innovation due to the similarities between these companies and their compensation peers in terms of product markets, CEO characteristics, and compensation schemes. After controlling for industry and geography peer groups, the findings confirm that the average innovation activity of compensation peers is a significant and distinct predictor of corporate innovation. Further analysis showed that (1) the peer effect is stronger in firms and compensation peers that pay their CEOs using long-term compensation, in firms with stronger labor market competition and board monitoring, and in peer companies that experience higher innovation competition and are closer to the median peer company in the peer group; (2) the obtained results are likely not attributable to the knowledge spillover mechanism and are more consistent with the peer pressure mechanism; and (3) the Securities and Exchange Commission's 2006 executive compensation disclosure rules may have generated peer effects.     

Governance structure and the weighting of performance measures in CEO compensation

We empirically examine how governance structure affects the design of executive compensation contracts and in particular, the implicit weights of firm performance measures in CEO’s compensation. We find that compensation contracts in firms with higher takeover protection and where the CEO has more influence on governance decisions put more weight on accounting-based measures of performance (return on assets) compared to stock-based performance measures (market returns). In additional tests, we further find that CEO compensation in these firms has lower variance and a higher proportion of cash (versus stock-based) compensation. We further find that CEOs’ incentives (measured as changes in CEO annual wealth which includes expected changes in the value of the CEO’s equity holdings in addition to yearly compensation) do not vary across governance structures. These findings are consistent with CEOs in firms with high takeover protection and where they have more influence on governance negotiating different contracts.

Optimal CEO Compensation with Search: Theory and Empirical Evidence

We integrate an agency problem into search theory to study executive compensation in a market equilibrium. A CEO can choose to stay or quit and search after privately observing an idiosyncratic shock to the firm. The market equilibrium endogenizes CEOs’ and firms’ outside options and captures contracting externalities. We show that the optimal pay‐to‐performance ratio is less than one even when the CEO is risk neutral. Moreover, the equilibrium pay‐to‐performance sensitivity depends positively on a firm's idiosyncratic risk and negatively on the systematic risk. Our empirical tests using executive compensation data confirm these results.     

CEO Pay and Corporate Governance in the U.S.: Perceptions,Facts, and Challenges

This article brings a broad range of statistical studies and evidence to bear on three common perceptions about the CEO compensation and governance of U.S. public companies: (1) CEOs are overpaid and their pay keeps increasing; (2) CEOs are not paid for their performance; and (3) boards do not penalize CEOs for poor performance. While average CEO pay increased substantially during the 1990s, it has declined since then— by more than 30%—from peak levels that were reached around 2000. Moreover, when viewed relative to corporate net income or profits, CEO pay levels at S&P 500 companies are the lowest they've been in the last 20 years. And the ratio of large‐company CEO pay to firm market value is roughly similar to its level in the late 1970s, and lower than the levels that prevailed before the 1960s. What's more, in studies that begin with the late '70s, private company executives have seen their pay increase by at least as much as public companies. And when set against the compensation of other highly paid groups, today's levels of CEO pay, although somewhat above their long‐term historical average, are about the same as their average levels in the early 1990s. At the same time, the pay of U.S. CEOs appears to be reasonably highly correlated with corporate performance. As evidence, the author cites a 2010 study reporting that, over the period 1992 to 2005, companies with CEOs in the top quintile (top 20%) of realized pay in any given year had generated stock returns that were 60% higher than the average companies in their industries over the previous three years. Conversely, companies with CEOs in the bottom quintile of realized pay underperformed their industries by almost 20% in the previous three years. And along with lower pay, the CEOs of poorly performing companies in the 2000s faced a significant increase in the likelihood of dismissal by their own boards. When viewed together, these findings suggest that corporate boards have done a reasonably good job of overseeing CEO pay, and that factors such as technological advances and increased scale have played meaningful roles in driving the pay of both CEOs and others with top incomes—people who are assumed to have comparable skills, experience, and opportunities. If one wants to use increases in CEO pay as evidence of managerial power or “board capture,” one also has to explain why the other professional groups have experienced similar, or even higher, growth in pay. A more straightforward interpretation of the evidence reviewed in this article is that the market for talent has driven a meaningful portion of the increase in pay at the top. Consistent with this conclusion, top executive pay policies at roughly 97% of S&P 500 and Russell 3000 companies received majority shareholder support in the Dodd‐Frank mandated “Say‐on‐Pay” votes in 2011 and 2012, the first two years the measure was in force.     

CEO wage dynamics: Estimates from a learning model

The level of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) pay responds asymmetrically to good and bad news about the CEO's ability. The average CEO captures approximately half of the surpluses from good news, implying CEOs and shareholders have roughly equal bargaining power. In contrast, the average CEO bears none of the negative surplus from bad news, implying CEOs have downward rigid pay. These estimates are consistent with the optimal contracting benchmark of Harris and Hölmstrom (1982) and do not appear to be driven by weak governance. Risk-averse CEOs accept significantly lower compensation in return for the insurance provided by downward rigid pay.     

Board Share‐Ownership and Takeover Performance

Abstract:   We investigate the relation between takeover performance and board share‐ownership in the acquiring company for a sample of 363 UK takeovers completed in the period 1985–96. In investigating this relationship we pay particular attention to the composition of board shareholdings as well as their size. Thus, in addition to the analysis of total board holdings, we analyse the separate impact of CEO shareholdings and of the pattern of non‐executive and executive holdings within the board. In addition to our detailed examination of board holdings we assess the impact of non‐board holdings. Our analysis controls for a number of non‐shareholding constraints on discretionary director behaviour and for a variety of other influences on takeover outcomes including: the means of payment; acquirer size and market to book value; the relative size of the acquirer and the target; the nature of the bid in terms of hostility and industrial direction; and the pre‐takeover performance of the acquiring company. We assess performance in terms of announcement returns, long run share returns and a portfolio of accounting measures. We find evidence that overall board ownership has a strong positive impact on long run share returns and a weak positive impact on operating performance. However, much stronger effects are found when the overall board measure is split into CEO, executive, and non‐executive directors. We find strong evidence of a positive relation between takeover performance and CEO ownership, which holds for both long run returns and operating performance measures. This finding is robust to controlling for other factors that determine takeover performance and holds in a two stage least squares framework that controls for endogeneity effects. Shareholdings of other executive directors, non‐executive directors, and non‐board holdings are found to have no significant effect on takeover performance.     

Restricting CEO pay

We analyze several proposals to restrict CEO compensation and calibrate two models of executive compensation that describe how firms would react to different types of restrictions. We find that many restrictions would have unintended consequences. Restrictions on total realized (ex-post) payouts lead to higher average compensation, higher rewards for mediocre performance, lower risk-taking incentives, and the fact that some CEOs would be better off with a restriction than without it. Restrictions on total ex-ante pay lead to a reduction in the firm's demand for CEO talent and effort. Restrictions on particular pay components, and especially on cash payouts, can be easily circumvented. While restrictions on option pay lead to lower risk-taking incentives, restrictions on incentive pay (stock and options) result in higher risk-taking incentives.     

CEO optimism and incentive compensation

I study the effect of chief executive officer (CEO) optimism on CEO compensation. Using data on compensation in US firms, I provide evidence that CEOs whose option exercise behavior and earnings forecasts are indicative of optimistic beliefs receive smaller stock option grants, fewer bonus payments, and less total compensation than their peers. These findings add to our understanding of the interplay between managerial biases and remuneration and show how sophisticated principals can take advantage of optimistic agents by appropriately adjusting their compensation contracts.     

Disproportional ownership structure and pay–performance relationship: Evidence from China's listed firms

This paper examines the impact of ownership structure on executive compensation in China's listed firms. We find that the cash flow rights of ultimate controlling shareholders have a positive effect on the pay–performance relationship, while a divergence between control rights and cash flow rights has a significantly negative effect on the pay–performance relationship. We divide our sample based on ultimate controlling shareholders' type into state owned enterprises (SOE), state assets management bureaus (SAMB), and privately controlled firms. We find that in SOE controlled firms cash flow rights have a significant impact on accounting based pay–performance relationship. In privately controlled firms, cash flow rights affect the market based pay–performance relationship. In SAMB controlled firms, CEO pay bears no relationship with either accounting or market based performance. The evidence suggests that CEO pay is inefficient in firms where the state is the controlling shareholder because it is insensitive to market based performance but consistent with the efforts of controlling shareholders to maximize their private benefit.     

The differential CEO dominance-compensation and corporate governance-compensation relations: Pre- and post-SOX

We examine the relationship between corporate governance (as measured by traditional corporate governance variables and a new measure of corporate governance, called CEO dominance) and executive compensation, pre- and post-SOX. We conceptualize CEO dominance as a measure of a CEO's power and define it as the difference between CEO pay and the next highest executive's pay divided by the CEO's pay. We argue that for traditional corporate governance variables, the inverse governance-compensation relation that exists pre-SOX will improve post-SOX. On the other hand, we expect a strong and positive CEO dominance-compensation relation to exist both pre- and post-SOX. Consistent with expectations, our results indicate that SOX has changed the relationship between CEO duality and compensation relation, but it has not changed the CEO dominance-compensation relation. This suggests that SOX regulatory reforms do not limit the ability of CEO power to obstruct traditional corporate governance mechanisms in extracting compensation-related rents.     

Non-compensation-related consultant service and CEO compensation

This study examines how consultants’ non-compensation-related consulting service (NCS) affects the contractual usefulness of accounting and stock information in executive compensation, as reflected in pay-performance sensitivity. The hypothesis is based on anecdotal evidence suggesting that consultants’ provision of NCS is likely to adversely affect the quality of CEO compensation plans. We investigate whether the consultants providing NCS are involved in potential conflicts of interest. The results show that CEO pay is higher in companies where consultants provide NCS and have a higher NCS fee ratio. The pay-performance sensitivity in CEO compensation decreases when consultants engage in NCS. The overall results are consistent with NCS representing a conflict of interest and compromising the quality of compensation committees.     

Compensation consultants and CEO pay

The study examines the practice of employing multiple compensation consultants. Examining data of a sample of UK companies over the period 2003–2006 we find that CEOs receive higher equity-based pay when firms employ more than one compensation consultant. An increase in the number of compensation consultants is also associated with an increase in CEO equity-based pay, whereas no decline in CEO pay takes place when firms reduce the number of pay consultants. We also observe that the market shares of compensation consultant are positively related to CEO equity-based pay.     

Corporate governance,external market discipline and firm productivity

Using a sample of Australian companies over the 2000–2005 period, we examine the impact of internal corporate governance on firm's total factor productivity, taking into account the interaction between internal governance and external market discipline. Our empirical findings point to a substitution effect between product market competitiveness and firm-level corporate governance. Overall, internal corporate governance mechanisms – more efficient boards and greater CEO stock-based compensation – are effective instruments for improving firm productivity. However, internal governance is less effective when a firm faces a highly competitive product market. We find only weak empirical support for an association between firm's ownership structure and productivity, and no support for an association between industry takeover intensity and firm productivity.     

The effect of change-in-control covenants on takeovers: Evidence from leveraged buyouts

Change-in-control covenants first became commonplace towards the end of the takeover wave in the 1980s. We examine merger and acquisition activity from 1991 to 2006 to see how such covenant protection influences the wealth effects and probability of takeovers. Examining a sample of leveraged buyouts (LBOs) we find bondholders with such covenant protection experience average wealth effects of 2.30% while unprotected bonds experience ? 6.76% upon the announcement of an LBO. Furthermore, we document that the existence of bondholder change-in-control covenants cuts the firm's probability of being targeted in an LBO in half. We also find that change-in-control covenants reduce the probability of being targeted in non-LBO takeovers, but the effect appears less dramatic.