资本流入对国内福利的影响

本文分析了在不完全竞争的产品市场中,在东道国的进口竞争性部门为资本密集型的情况下,外资流入对福利的效应问题。如果市场结构是外生的,那么资本流入会提高东道国的福利;然而,如果市场结构是内生的,由于资本流入导致新企业进入市场,从而提高了企业的平均成本,这样,资本流入反而会有贫困化效应。此外,本文还提出了一些新的观点,即研究了在考虑贸易中的一些限制性条件的情况下,资本流入对福利的效应。     

MARKET STRUCTURE,CAPITAL INFLOWS,AND HOME WELFARE

The welfare implications of foreign capital inflows in an economy with an imperfectly competitive product market and a capital-intensive import-competing sector are analyzed. If the market structure is exogenous with a fixed number of firms, then a capital inflow improves welfare of the host country. However, if the market structure is endogenous, then a capital inflow tends to be immiserizing because it increases entry and reduces per firm output, thus driving firms up their average cost schedule. In addition, the welfare implications of capital inflows in the presence of trade restrictions are also studied, generating some new insights.     

Tariffs,foreign capital and immiserizing growth

For a small tariff-imposing country, within the standard two-commodity two-factor model of international trade, this paper reconsiders the implications of an inflow of capital from abroad. When the host country continues to import the capital-intensive good while remaining incompletely specialized, the analysis shows that the capital inflow must reduce host-country welfare, assuming that the foreign capital receives the full (untaxed) value of its marginal product. Under other circumstances considered, however, the inflow may have different consequences for welfare.     

How and how far to liberalize a developing economy with informal sector and factor market distortions

Whether a liberalizing developing economy should implement the entire WTO-prescribed package, and to what extent this is expedient, are two important questions, especially because the available empirical evidence suggests that developing countries have been facing substantial adjustment costs in their endeavour to implement trade and investment reform. The present paper makes a humble effort to provide answers to the above questions in terms of a three-sector general equilibrium model with informal sectors. Welfare implications of three liberalization policies: inflow of foreign capital, tariff reduction and labour market reform, have first been analysed in a full-employment framework. Later, the paper has been extended into a Harris?–?Todaro framework with an urban informal sector and capital market distortion. We have shown that welfare consequences of a tariff reform and/or a policy of deregulating the labour market crucially depend on the presence and magnitude of foreign capital in the economy. It is argued here that unless a proper choice among different prescribed policies, compatible with the internal institutional, technological and trade-related characteristics, is made, drastic implementation of reform measures may produce counterproductive results for the welfare of the relevant country.     

Export subsidies and foreign capital inflows

The welfare effect of a foreign capital inflow in an economy which practises an export-oriented trade policy is examined. The latter takes the form of optimally designed export subsidies, minimizing the welfare costs of existing import tariffs. Under the practice of this policy, an inflow of foreign capital is shown to have anambiguous welfare effect. An empirically relevant condition for welfare improvement is derived and discussed.     

A general equilibrium analysis of foreign investment and intersectoral linkage

In this paper, we demonstrate that a foreign capital induced growth in a protected sector, which provides an industrial input for agricultural products, may increase welfare even after the entire foreign capital income is repatriated. Such a policy may lead to an increase in the volume of trade along with an increase in the size of the protected sector, quite contrary to the usual perception. The analysed structure also incorporates migration and unemployment.     

Aggregate scale economies, market integration, and optimal welfare state policy

Using a two-sector-two-country model with aggregate scale economies and unionisation, we show that optimal welfare state policy entails positive levels of unemployment benefits under free-trade and capital mobility. In this setting, economic integration does not reduce the revenue raising capacity of governments and thus does not lead to a race-to-the-bottom in social standards. Instead, trade and capital flows interact with welfare state policies in increasing welfare even when each government acts independently (non-cooperatively) in determining its optimal welfare payment. Cooperation is shown to improve upon non-cooperative outcomes by raising both the generosity of the welfare state and aggregate welfare.     

Is FTA/EPA effective for a developing country to attract FDI? The knowledge‐capital model revisited

To prepare an answer to the question of how a developing country can attract foreign direct investment (FDI), this paper explored the factors and policies that may help bring FDI into a developing country by utilising an extended version of the knowledge‐capital model. With a special focus on the effects of a free trade agreement (FTA) or an economic partnership agreement (EPA) between a pair of market and non‐market countries, simulations with the model revealed the following: (i) although FTA/EPA generally tends to increase FDI to a developing country, the possibility of improving welfare through increased demand for skilled and unskilled labour decreases as the size of the country grows; (ii) a developing country may suffer severe welfare losses through FTA/EPA if the availability of skilled labour is extremely limited; and (iii) a developing country can enhance welfare gains from a FTA, and it is even possible to recover the welfare effects from negative to positive, by making the arrangement an EPA.     

Bilateral versus Multilateral Trade and Investment Liberalisation

To assess the welfare effects of bilateral versus multilateral trade and/or investment liberalisation in general equilibrium, we set up a three‐country and three‐factor knowledge‐capital model of trade and multinational activity. Numerical simulation results indicate that multilateral liberalisation tends to dominate bilateral liberalisation in welfare terms. A transition economy tends to prefer bilateral over multilateral liberalisation to avoid plant relocation. For similar reasons, a developed country may prefer bilateral over multilateral liberalisation, if the other economies exhibit big relative factor endowment differences.     

国际油价冲击对中国贸易条件的传导机制和动态影响

在成本传递和"部门转移效应"基础上,本文构建并检验了国际油价冲击对中国贸易条件的传导路径,同时利用VAR模型模拟了油价冲击的动态影响,最后分析了全球金融危机是否改变了油价对贸易条件的冲击效应。结果表明:(1)能源密集型产品与整体贸易条件的运动轨迹基本一致,先恶化后改善,最终收敛于0,但不管恶化还是改善,主要取决于外部因素的影响;(2)由于"部门转移"比较弱,非能源密集型产品的贸易条件改善,贸易福利虽有所提高,但仍会导致失业和资本闲置,从而扼杀社会经济长期健康的发展;(3)全球金融危机强化了能源密集型产品与整体贸易条件的运动轨迹,但削弱了国外的"部门转移效应"。     

自由贸易及跨界污染背景下的国际环境政策协调

文章构建了一个考虑跨界污染损害的福利函数,推导出自由贸易背景下某国的最优污染税,并与世界福利最大化时的最优污染税进行比较,以说明国家间环境政策协调的必要性。文章考虑了四种情况,分析结果表明,只有在该国为小国且污染不跨界时不需要国际协调;当该国为大国或者污染跨界时,单个国家的独立行为通常不会产生合意的世界福利水平,此时需要国际协调以实现世界福利最大化。大国的污染政策具有贸易条件效应,因而出口国有设定过高污染税的激励,而进口国则会设定过低的污染税,双方都寻求转变贸易条件以有利于本方。而污染跨界时单个国家通常会有"搭便车"的激励,此时会实施较为宽松的环境政策。     

Trade Unionism and Welfare Consequences of Trade and Investment Reforms in A Developing Economy

This paper explains the existence of intersectoral wage differential in a developing economy in terms of trade union behavior in the formal sector industry and analyzes its role in predicting the outcomes of trade and investment reforms on welfare. It provides theoretical explanations of certain real life phenomena e.g. why the developing countries are yearning for foreign capital despite the standard immiserizing result and why these countries are not reducing the tariff rates beyond certain levels although they have chosen free trade as their development strategy.     

Real GDP, real domestic income, and terms-of-trade changes

Real GDP tends to underestimate the increase in real domestic income and welfare when the terms of trade improve. An improvement in the terms of trade is similar to a technological progress, but when computing real GDP, the national accounts treat the former as a price phenomenon and the latter as a real event. Calculations for 26 countries show that the divergence can add up to more than 10% of GDP in less than two decades. Our analysis has a solid theoretical foundation, being based on the GNP/GDP function approach to modeling the production sector of an open economy.     

Tariffs and capacity utilization by monopolistically competitive firms

This paper examines the effect of a tariff imposed on a monopolistically competitive (MC) sector on firm output in a 2 × 2 × 2 model with nonhomothetic technology. If the MC sector is capital intensive, then a tariff will improve the terms of trade, lower home firm demand elasticity, but raise firm output relative to foreign firms. If the MC sector is labor intensive, then excess supply for firm output may be decreasing in price, so the tariff may worsen the home country's terms of trade. Home firm demand elasticity falls but firm output rises relative to the partner country. These results qualify conclusions based on single-sector and single-country models.     

Economic Reform,Skill Formation and Foreign Capital

Does trade liberalisation promote skill formation and positively influence the inflow of foreign capital in an economy? How do incentives offered to foreign capital affect skill formation and skilled‐unskilled wage inequality? Is liberalisation of agricultural exports counterproductive to skill formation and foreign capital inflow in the economy? We try to capture these relationships between foreign capital and skill formation in a small open economy facing various exogenous shocks. Among other results, we show that import liberalisation increases skill formation and the inflow of foreign capital in the country. We explore the evolving state of the skilled‐unskilled wage gap in a regime of greater skill formation.     

Optimal tax and tariff policies with tax credits

This paper examines the optimal tax and tariff policies for a small open economy when mobile capital receives a tax credit for taxes paid to the host country. For a capital-importing country, a tax on capital equal to the source country tax rate (to capture tax revenue) combined with a subsidy to encourage capital imports is the optimal policy. Results are also derived for cases in which only one of the instruments can be varied. For a capital-exporting country that cannot reduce its capital tax rate, a subsidy to the sector using exported capital is desirable.     

Tourism Promotion,Increasing Returns and Domestic Welfare

This paper compares the effect of tourism promotion funded by commodity tax and income tax on domestic welfare in an open economy with increasing returns in the tourism and the non‐tourism sector. A promotion may overcome the under‐production of tourism goods through taking account of the implications of increasing returns, but at the same time, the taxation may have an adverse impact on the rest of the economy. Employing a general equilibrium analysis, we find that the cost of tourism promotion overcomes the benefit, reducing local residents' welfare. Furthermore, commodity tax on tourism consumption is relatively more efficient than income tax in a monopolistic competition, with less adverse impact on the variety of non‐tourism goods. We also clarify the condition for deteriorating ‘terms of trade’, which only happens when the country has a small allocation of factor endowments.     

Customs union theory and the nonuniformity of tariffs

Allowance is made for the initial nonuniformity of the tariffs of a union country before it joins a customs union. The reduction of such nonuniformity is a possible source of welfare again distinct from the usual trade creation and trade diversion effects. A net welfare gain from a union may result even when the country's total trade stays unchanged and even when all trade with the outsider ceases. A three-product, small-country model is used, domestic production and consumption substitution between the two importables yielding the import pattern effect that produces the possible gains referred to.     

Uneven Development and Bilateral Conflict

We consider the dynamics of bilateral conflict within the framework of a standard two‐country, two‐sector model of international trade with increasing returns in one sector. Free trade leads to asymmetric equilibria among otherwise identical countries and, in some circumstances, to uneven development in the sense of persistent disparities in wages, income and welfare. In the latter case, distortionary industrial policy by the less developed country may be welfare enhancing. When the dynamics of policy change are endogenized, the model gives rise to periodic changes in industrial leadership or leapfrogging. Implications of this phenomenon for the empirical literature on convergence are discussed.     

Inefficient trade patterns: Excessive trade, cross-hauling and dumping

I study an example of a competitive environment in which trade occurs in a sequential manner. In this example, a country with a stable demand may suffer from trade with a country with unstable demand, there may be too much trade, a country may import and export the same good in the same period (cross-hauling) and dumping may occur. The timing of delivery is important. When delivery occurs before trade (delivery to stocks), trade improves welfare, there is dumping but no cross-hauling. When delivery occurs after trade (delivery to order), trade may reduce welfare and cross-hauling may occur.