Does stronger corporate governance constrain insider trading? Asymmetric evidence from Australia

We investigate the role of internal corporate governance in limiting opportunities for ASX company ‘insiders’ to extract abnormal returns from trading ‘own shares’. We show that stronger governance translates into more restrictive insider trading policies and, while not resulting in lower insider purchase volumes, values or profits, it does reduce insider selling profitability. Firm size and increasing trading policy restrictiveness is associated with reduced insider purchase profitability while insider sale profitability is reduced by aggregate governance, trading restrictions and increasing trading policy restrictiveness. We conclude that internal firm governance constrains insider sales but not purchases, providing contrarian trading signals.     

How to detect illegal corporate insider trading? A data mining approach for detecting suspicious insider transactions

Only in the U.S. Stock Exchanges, the daily average trading volume is about 7 billion shares. This vast amount of trading shows the necessity of understanding the hidden insights in the data sets. In this study, a data mining technique, clustering based outlier analysis is applied to detect suspicious insider transactions. 1,244,815 transactions of 61,780 insiders are analysed, which are acquired from Thomson Financial, covering a period of January 2010–April 2017. In order to detect outliers, similar transactions are grouped into the same clusters by using a two‐step clustering based outlier detection technique, which is an integration of k‐means and hierarchical clustering. Then, it is shown that outlying transactions earn higher abnormal returns than non‐outlying transactions by using event study methodology.     

Is managerial rent extraction associated with tax aggressiveness? Evidence from informed insider trading

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - Despite the agency perspective of corporate tax avoidance, there is little empirical evidence that managers do extract rents derived from aggressive...     

IQ and corporate insiders’ decisions to time insider and outsider trading

We examine how corporate insiders’ cognitive ability (IQ) affects their decisions to time insider and outsider trading before abnormal stock price changes. Our analysis of archival data on male corporate insiders in Sweden shows they are less prone to time their insider selling and to sell in larger amounts, before abnormal stock price declines as IQ increases. We also find that insiders with a higher IQ are better at timing their outsider buying. Taken together, our results show that corporate insiders’ IQ affects their trading decisions differently, depending on whether they are trading in their insider or outsider stocks.     

Do commonalities facilitate private information channels? Evidence from common gender and insider trading

We examine insider trading profitability and common identity between insiders and top executives. We argue that common gender and the resulting social connections influence access to private information, wherby insiders benefit from greater information-sharing with top executives of the same gender. Using a large sample of US firms between 1995 and 2016, we find higher (lower) insider trading profitability for female (male) insiders in the presence of a female CEO or CFO. We also find that, in isolation, other social and professional commonalities, such as age, ethnicity, having attended the same university or having worked at the same firm also increase insider profitability, albeit to a lesser extent. Our evidence suggests that some of these commonalities enhance the common gender effect when combined with it. We examine formal interactions and find that attending meetings and serving on committees with top executives of the same gender enables private information-sharing, consistent with gender acting as an informational channel. We also document greater clustering of insiders' trades around the trades made by common gender top executives. Our findings are consistent with flows of private information from CEOs and CFOs to less informed common gender insiders.     

Are corporate managers savvy about their stock price? Evidence from insider trading after earnings announcements

We find that insiders trade as if they exploit market underreaction to earnings news, buying (selling) after good (bad) earnings announcements when the price reaction to the announcement is low (high). We also find that insider trades attributable to public information about earnings and the price reaction generate abnormal returns. By demonstrating that managers spot market underreaction to earnings news, our results imply that managers are savvy about their company’s stock price.     

Aggregate insider trading: Contrarian beliefs or superior information?

We decompose realized market returns into expected return, unexpected cash-flow news and unexpected discount rate news to test the relation between aggregate market returns and aggregate insider trading. We find that (1) the predictive ability of aggregate insider trading is much stronger than what was reported in earlier studies, (2) aggregate insider trading is strongly related to unexpected cash-flow news, (3) market expectations do not cause insider trading contrary to what others have documented, and (4) aggregate insider trading in firms with high information uncertainty is more likely to be associated with contrarian investment strategy. These results strongly suggest that the predictive ability of aggregate insider trading is because of insider’s ability to predict future cash-flow news rather than from adopting a contrarian investment strategy. These results hold even after we control for non-informative trades and information uncertainty.     

Do co-opted boards increase insider profitability?

Using a sample of U.S. firms over the period 1996–2014, this paper examines whether insider trading profitability increases with high board co-option. Indeed, we find that firms with a higher level of co-opted directors exhibit higher insider trading profitability, largely due to a lower level of managerial ability and analyst coverage. Co-opted boards are also unlikely to implement self-imposed insider trading restrictions, exacerbating this relationship. This positive association is mitigated by a higher level of external monitoring by institutional investors and if the CEO receives more performance-based incentives. Overall, co-opted directors demonstrate aligned interests with CEOs and corporate insiders rather than performing their role as monitors. As a result, a more co-opted board is positively associated with exploitative behaviour of insiders.     

Does exposure to product market competition influence insider trading profitability?

We examine whether and how product market competition affects insider trading profitability. We empirically show that the insiders of firms in highly competitive industries make higher abnormal profits. Our identification strategy includes both a quasi-natural experiment setting and an instrumental variable approach to address endogeneity concerns. We also run an extensive array of robustness checks and find that our baseline results remain substantially unchanged. Our cross-sectional analyses show that insider trading profitability is more pronounced for firms with: a higher level of trade secrecy, a higher level of R&D, a lower level of management voluntary disclosures, less readable 10-K reports and highly tone-ambiguous financial disclosures. We also find that our results are robust to the inclusion of corporate governance mechanisms. Overall, this study is consistent with the theoretical predictions that support the information asymmetry and proprietary cost channels of competition and that increases in competition lead insiders to undertake more rent-seeking activity.     

Does insider trading have information content for the bond market?

This study documents that there is significant information content in stock trading by registered corporate insiders for the bond market. We report significant positive price reactions for convertible and straight bonds in response to the Wall Street Journal's Insider Trading Spotlight publication of insider buy transactions and significant negative reactions for insider sell transactions. The stock market response to the publication of the insider transactions, although weaker than the bond market reaction, is also found to be significant. Cross-sectional results suggest that bond market participants extract the quality of the insider-trading signal by observing factors such as the dollar volume of the trade, the percentage change in the holding of the insider, and the insider's position in the firm. Lower-rated (riskier) bonds are found to be more sensitive to the information than higher-rated issues. The empirical evidence presented in this paper suggests that the absence of any reporting requirement for insider bond transactions may create aan enhanced opportunity for the insiders to exploit private information to expropriate wealth from uninformed bond traders.     

Did CDS trading improve the market for corporate bonds?

Financial innovation through the creation of new markets and securities impacts related markets as well, changing their efficiency, quality (pricing error), and liquidity. The credit default swap (CDS) market was undoubtedly one of the salient new markets of the past decade. In this paper we examine whether the advent of CDS trading was beneficial to the underlying secondary market for corporate bonds. We employ econometric specifications that account for information across CDS, bond, equity, and volatility markets. We also develop a novel methodology to utilize all observations in our data set even when continuous daily trading is not evidenced, because bonds trade much less frequently than equities. Using an extensive sample of CDS and bond trades over 2002–2008, we find that the advent of CDS was largely detrimental. Bond markets became less efficient, evidenced no reduction in pricing errors, and experienced no improvement in liquidity. These findings are robust to various slices of the data set and specifications of our tests.     

Do investors care about corporate taxes?

This paper conducts a comprehensive examination of the link between corporation tax payment and financial performance in the UK. We find no discernible link between tax rates and stock returns for the UK, no matter how tax payment is measured. This is true throughout the sample period and for both customer-facing and non-customer-facing companies. However, allowing for industry norms and a host of firm characteristics, companies with lower effective tax rates have significantly higher levels of stock market risk. Firms that are reported in the newspapers in a negative way in relation to their level of corporation tax payment experience small negative stock returns, which are partially reversed within a month. However, the initial negative effects and subsequent rebound are both more pronounced for smaller companies. News announcements of the potential involvement of a firm in a corporate inversion (expatriation) result in steeper and much longer-lasting falls in share prices, whereas news stories of a more general nature relating to a firm's tax avoidance or tax payments have little noticeable effect.     

Do corporate tax cuts increase investments?

This paper studies the effect of corporate taxes on investment. Since firms with a foreign parent have more cross-country profit shifting opportunities than domestically owned firms do, their effective tax rate and, consequently, their tax-induced costs to investment are lower. We therefore expect capital investment responses to a corporate tax cut to be heterogeneous across firms. Using firm-level data on German corporations, we exploit the 2008 tax reform, which substantially cut corporate taxes as an exogenous policy shock and expect domestically owned firms' investments to be more responsive to the reform. We show exactly this in a difference-in-differences setting. We find that the reduction in corporate tax payments led to a one-to-one increase in the real investments of domestic firms. The effect is stronger for domestic firms relying more on internal funds. Correspondingly, labor investment increased more for domestic firms, ensuring a constant mix of input factors. In addition, we show that domestic firms' sales grew faster after the tax cut than the sales of foreign-owned firms. Our results imply that corporate tax changes can increase corporate investment but that domestic firms benefit more than foreign-owned firms from a tax cut through higher investment responses resulting in greater sales growth.     

Does common ownership constrain managerial rent extraction? Evidence from insider trading profitability

This study identifies a new economic benefit of common institutional ownership, which refers to the increasingly contentious phenomenon of U.S. firms sharing stockholders with their industry competitors. We find a significantly negative relation between common ownership and insider trading profitability. The disciplinary effect of common ownership on opportunistic insider trading is particularly evident when the information effects of common ownership are greater, when common owners are more likely to benefit from positive governance externalities, and in the subset of trades made by opportunistic insiders. Using the exogenous variations in common ownership induced by financial institution mergers, we conduct a difference-in-differences analysis and find consistent results. We also provide evidence that common owners encourage firms to impose ex-ante restrictions on insider trading and take ex-post actions to discipline opportunistic insiders by voting against management. Overall, our findings suggest that common institutional shareholders have information advantages, governance incentives, and effective means to constrain opportunistic insider trading.     

Does informed trading occur in the options market? Some revealing clues

This paper analyses the relationship between proxy variables for informed trading in the options market and a set of exogenous news variables. The aim was to test directly for the presence or absence of informed trading in the options market and for the possible impact of this trading on underlying asset prices. Our findings reveal that potential informed trading in options markets is channelled basically through out‐of‐the‐money options, except for volatility trading which mainly involves at‐the‐money options because of their liquidity. In both cases, we have found evidence in favour of investors’ strategic fragmentation of transactions into intermediate size trades (stealth trading). Finally, it is shown that lack of consensus among agents also generates increased trading, particularly in out‐of‐the‐money and at‐the‐money options.     

Double signals or single signal? An investigation of insider trading around share repurchases

We examine directors’ dealing activity around share repurchasing periods in Hong Kong. There are significant insider trading activities before the share repurchasing period. Consistent with the signaling hypothesis, the directors’ purchase activities during the share repurchase period are significantly higher than the expected level while the directors’ sale activities are significantly lower than the expected level. Double signals of share repurchase and directors’ purchases create a stronger signal in conveying undervaluation, while insider sales around share repurchase reduces the undervaluation signal. We find some evidence that is consistent with the free cash flow and signaling arguments for share repurchases.     

Do corporate press releases drive media coverage?

We examine the role of voluntary corporate press releases about firms' financial performance as a stimulus for financial media coverage. We find that there is a spike of media articles on the same day and one trading day following firms' press releases. We provide evidence that managers compete for media attention and can use voluntary press releases to increase their firms' media coverage; a firm's issuance of press releases attracts more media articles about the firm leading to greater abnormal returns and trading volumes. Our results are robust to controlling for firm characteristics, different model specifications as well as regular earnings announcements, which have been the focus of prior literature. We also show that our inferences are not sensitive to managers' duty to disclose material information to investors. Collectively, our findings suggest that media coverage decisions can be influenced by a firm.     

Do regulatory policies matter to corporate innovation?

This paper examines the relationship between regulation and innovation from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. The theoretical model focuses on the role of competition policy (measured by increases in the number of firms) and the strength of intellectual property rights in fostering cost-reducing R&D, under both R&D competition and R&D cooperation. It is shown that, theoretically, competition policy and intellectual property rights are complements under R&D competition, while they are substitutes under R&D cooperation. Moreover, under R&D competition, innovation is maximized through strict competition policy and strong intellectual property rights; whereas under R&D cooperation, innovation is maximized through strict competition policy and weak intellectual property rights. The empirical model tests the effect of several regulatory policies on innovation in several MENA countries. The results of dynamic panel data regressions point that competition policy and intellectual property rights are complements. In addition to competition policy and intellectual property rights protection, the following country/regulation characteristics are considered: human capital, government efficiency, foreign direct investment, natural resources dependence, labor market regulations, and GDP level. The paper finds that the extent of regulations in all categories has statistically significant effects on R&D, except FDI. One explanation is that most FDI to the MENA region flows to natural resources and non-tradable sectors, which are less relevant to R&D than other sectors (e.g., manufacturing and information and communications technology sectors).     

What do insiders know? Evidence from insider trading around share repurchases and SEOs

We examine the nature of information contained in insider trades prior to corporate events. Insiders' net buying increases before open market share repurchase announcements and decreases before seasoned equity offers. Higher insider net buying is associated with better post-event operating performance, a reduction in undervaluation, and, for repurchases, lower post-event cost of capital. Insider trading also predicts announcement returns and long-term abnormal returns following events. Overall, our results suggest that insider trades before corporate events contain information about changes both in fundamentals and in investor sentiment.     

Do corporate governance characteristics influence tax management?

This paper investigates how corporate governance plays a role in long-run tax management and contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, we add insight into the horizon problems related to executive and director compensation and show that incentive compensation provides long-term incentives to improve performance by establishing a link between higher pay-performance sensitivity and lower taxes. Second, this is one of the first papers, to our knowledge, to empirically examine the role of governance in corporate tax management from a long-term perspective in order to better understand the lasting effects of governance. We find that incentive compensation drives managers to make investments into longer-horizon pay outs such as tax management. Furthermore, we find that this investment into tax management benefits shareholders; better tax management is positively related to higher returns to shareholders. We also address the endogeneity issues of corporate governance and performance measures. Finally, our paper is unique in examining which type of tax management strategy (domestic or foreign) different firms focus on. Our results shed light into how governance can improve firm performance and increase shareholder value in the long run.