Effects of Network Embeddedness on the Relationship Between Environmental Volatility and Interfirm Contracts

Purpose: This study examines the effects of an embedded network on the contractual relationship between exchange parties under conditions reflecting varying levels of environmental volatility and investigates the role of an important network factor—the embedded network—in the contractual relationship between manufacturers and their suppliers.

Methodology: The empirical test was conducted with manufacturing companies in the context of manufacturer–supplier relationships. Construct measures were based on existing measures and previous research. Measurement reliability and validity were established using exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis and an overall measurement model was assessed with structural equation modeling using LISREL.

Findings: The results of a survey of manufacturers indicate that firms in an embedded network preferred “soft” contracts even when they face volatile environments, whereas those facing volatile environments in a less embedded network preferred “hard” contracts with explicitly specified written requirements. Network partners carefully evaluated embedded networks (a critical factor that has not received enough attention) before forming contractual relationships in a network perceiving interfirm relationships differently.

Originality: The study introduces network embeddedness to explain governance mechanisms in volatile environments and shows that the explicit recognition of embedded network may facilitate the development of contracts with specific provisions as the contractual relationship evolves.     

Foreign Market Entry Under Incomplete Contracts

This paper shows that incomplete contracts serve as a determinant of the mode of foreign market entry – that is exports versus foreign direct investment (FDI). When contracts between two agents within a firm are too costly to be written, the share of multinational firms may be higher or lower compared with a world without contractual frictions. The direction of change depends on the technologically required relative contribution of headquarter services in the joint production process. For example, in industries that use more inputs from the management unit as compared to inputs from a component supplier, the share of firms engaging in foreign direct investment is higher than under complete contracts. This effect may be so strong that the share of multinational firms increases in trade freeness.     

The Relationship between Mutual TSI and Interfirm Contracts: The Moderating Effect of Strong Ties

ABSTRACT

Purpose: This study examines the influence that tie strength has on contractual relationships between exchange parties with specific investments and also explores the role of network intensity in contractual relationships between buyers and suppliers. We hypothesize that the relationship between transaction-specific investments (TSIs) and contracts is moderated by network intensity.

Methodology: An empirical test is carried out by analyzing buyer–supplier relationships of manufacturing companies. The construct measures were based on those obtained from prior research, and the reliability and validity were established using exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis. The overall measurement model was then assessed with structural equation modeling using AMOS.

Findings: We focus primarily on contract variables as a governance mechanism that can be affected by the strength of ties among firms and the results of our empirical study indicate that supplier TSIs improve the use of informal contracts while the use of formal contracts undermines the effect on supplier TSIs. In addition, we found that firms with weak ties with their partners in the network are more likely to use both formal and informal contracts than those with strong ties.

Contribution: Our study has several contributions. First, our research improves the understanding of the relationship between TSIs and the choice of contracts as a governance mechanism, especially for mutual TSIs. Second, our research improves our understanding of the network strength in the context of business-to-business relationships extending the understanding of the relationship intensity among firms in a network. Third, we focused on the effects of network intensity on contractual relationships.     

The Exporter - Import Agent Contract and the Influence of Cultural Dimensions

This paper examines the relationship between an exporter and an import agent in an international marketing channel using agency theory and cultural dimension frameworks, and proposes a research agenda with five testable propositions from this literature. Agency theory provides a way of forming an efficient exporter-agent contract and suggests that efficient contractual conditions are likely to provide the basis of a successful negotiated outcome. Cultural dimensions are elements that are likely to create obstacles to an efficient contractual outcome. This paper presents the concept of the dimensional gap that exporters may need to bridge in order to form an efficient contractual relationship. We suggest that in a cross cultural encounter, a divergence of cultural dimensions between the parties to the contract will impact adversely on agency costs and lead to contractual inefficiencies. By identifying gaps in the cultural dimensions between contractual parties, and taking steps towards reducing these gaps, the potential for such inefficiencies can be reduced, improving the chances of successful contractual outcomes. The dimensional gap considers the influence of four cultural dimensions on contractual efficiency. This paper presents five testable propositions suggesting that cultural gaps within power distance, individualism and masculinity, can be bridged through greater flexibility and adaptability in management decisions acquired through experience and learning, whereas gaps in long term orientation and uncertainty avoidance are less likely to be influenced by such behaviour. Where the latter condition exists, it is proposed that the potential of high transaction costs will result in exporters by-passing intermediaries and using more integrated forms of entry.     

The stock of external sovereign debt: Can we take the data at ‘face value’?

The stock of sovereign debt is typically measured at face value. Defined as the undiscounted sum of future principal repayments, face values are misleading when debts are issued with different contractual forms or maturities. In this paper, we construct alternative measures of the stock of external sovereign debt for 100 developing countries from 1979 through 2006 that correct for differences in contractual form and maturity. We show that our alternative measures: (1) paint a very different quantitative, and in some cases also qualitative, picture of the stock of developing country external sovereign debt; (2) often invert rankings of indebtedness across countries, which historically defined eligibility for debt forgiveness; (3) indicate that the empirical performance of the benchmark quantitative model of sovereign debt deteriorates by roughly 50% once model-consistent measures of debt are used; (4) show how the spread of aggregation clauses in debt contracts that award creditors voting power in proportion to the contractual face value may introduce inefficiencies into the process of restructuring sovereign debts; and (5) illustrate how countries have manipulated their debt issuance to meet fiscal targets written in terms of face values.     

A Software Implementation of Kimbrough's Disquotation Theory for Representing and Enforcing Electronic Commerce Contracts

Kimbrough's Disquotation Theory, a formal theory about sentences that embed propositional content, expounds the fulfillment and violation conditions for speech acts such as asserting, permitting, and obliging. This paper aims to show how the theory can be profitably applied to the creation of computational environments for monitoring and enforcing electronic commerce contracts using pervasive, mainstream industrial technologies such as Java and relational databases. We examine the notion of an occurrence and provide a structural representation of this abstraction. We show how contractual provisions – obligations, permissions, prohibitions, and powers – can be stored, monitored, and enforced. A query overlap determination mechanism is applied to the problem of monitoring occurrences and analyzing contractual provisions for conflicts. The work presented here demonstrates that, with certain alterations, Kimbrough's theory presents a promising means of storing interrogable and executable specifications for e-commerce workflow applications.     

Crossing the borderline in strategic corporate philanthropy: Dangote and the construction of cement roads in Nigeria

Using the case of Nigeria's Dangote Group and an exploratory research technique, we critique CSR practices in a developing country context based on a three‐pillar model—traditional CSR, strategic CSR and strategic business engagements. Our paper makes a unique contribution by revealing how a company can transform its strategic CSR into strategic business engagements that permit it to circumvent public procurement laws and secure public contracts at non‐competitive terms. We show how, in weak institutional and regulatory contexts, strategic CSR could be turned to a tool for rent extraction and profit maximization. We advocate for regulatory measures that impose ex ante and ex post limits on the extent to which firms can go in integrating CSR into their normal business operations. Based on the outcomes from this important African case study, we illustrate and propose the strategic business engagement model as a new framework for analysing the social benefits of strategic CSR practices in developing countries.     

Examining the Nature and Effects of Psychological Contract: Case Study of an Indian Organization

This study investigates psychological contract contents and the effects of different types of psychological contracts on the work outcomes of employees in an Indian organization. Analysis of case study interviews and secondary data suggests that employee expectations can be categorized into relational and transactional psychological contracts. The contents of these contracts, while largely similar to those in the West, reflected certain aspects that are unique to the sociocultural context of employment relationships in India. Further, the fulfillment or breach of these psychological contracts led to different effects on work outcomes. Relational psychological contracts affected long‐term affective work outcomes, such as prosocial work behaviors, psychological ownership, and engagement. Transactional psychological contracts had stronger effects on turnover intentions and attitude to work. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Contractual Design as a Determinant of Performance: Evidence from Franchising

This empirical note deals with the contractual design of relationships between producers and retailers. It provides evidence on the links between the features of vertical contracts organizing franchising networks and the performances of these networks. An agency perspective is used to understand the structure of contracts. We focus on the relevance of vertical restraints by the upstream firm to prevent retailers from free‐riding in the distribution networks. From six frequent contractual provisions we distinguish two types of contracts according to the degree of constraint imposed on the franchisees. Econometric estimations carried out on this basis offer evidence consistent with the hypothesis that within franchising systems, more constrained contracts for retailers encourage better performance at the network level.     

The index futures markets: Is screen trading more efficient?

This article uses a nonparametric test based on the arc‐sine law (see, e.g., Feller, 1965 ), which involves comparing the theoretical distribution implied by an intraday random walk with the empirical frequency distribution of the daily high/low times, in order to address the question of whether the abandonment of pit trading has been associated with greater market efficiency. If market inefficiencies result from flaws in the market microstructure of pit trading, they ought to have been eliminated by the introduction of screen trading. If, on the other hand, the inefficiencies are a reflection of investor psychology, they are likely to have survived, unaffected by the changeover. We focus here on four cases. Both the FTSE‐100 and CAC‐40 index futures contracts were originally traded by open outcry and have moved over to electronic trading in recent years, so that we are able to compare pricing behavior before and after the changeover. The equivalent contracts in Germany and Korea, on the other hand, have been traded electronically ever since their inception. Our results overwhelmingly reject the random‐walk hypothesis both for open‐outcry and electronic‐trading data sets, suggesting there has been no increase in efficiency as a result of the introduction of screen trading. One possible explanation consistent with our results would be that the index futures market is characterized by intraday overreaction. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 24:337–357, 2004     

内生性财务契约研究范式转换:从完备契约观到不完备契约观

现代公司财务契约理论研究范式经历了三次转换:由外生性的新古典完备财务契约范式转换为内生性的完备财务契约范式,再转换为内生性的不完备财务契约范式。而作为最新的研究范式,不完备财务契约研究也先后经历了静态控制权理论范式和动态控制权理论范式的演进。内生性不完备财务契约研究范式将交易费用、制度、产权、契约等因素正式纳入公司财务理论研究视野,弥补了传统财务理论研究范式内生的制度性缺失。该范式也大大促进了我国公司财务理论研究,为解决经济转型阶段我国公司尖锐的财务冲突提供了更合理的解释和指导思路。     

Bernoulli speculator and trading strategy risk

In a continuous‐time model of a complete information economy, we examine the case of a “pure” speculator who chooses to trade only on forward or futures contracts written on interest‐rate‐sensitive instruments. Assuming logarithmic utility, we assess whether his strategy exhibits the same structure as when he uses primitive assets only. It turns out that when interest rates follow stochastic processes, as in the model of Heath, Jarrow, and Morton (1992), where the instantaneous forward rate is driven by an arbitrary number of factors, the speculative trading strategy involving forwards exhibits an extra term vis‐a‐vis the one using futures or primitive assets. This extra term, different from a Merton–Breeden dynamic hedge, is novel and can be interpreted as a hedge against an “endogenous risk,” namely the interest‐rate risk brought about by the optimal trading strategy itself. Thus, only the strategy using futures (or the cash assets themselves) involves a single speculative term, even for the Bernoulli speculator. This result illustrates another major aspect of the marking to market feature that differentiates futures and forwards, and thus has some bearing on the issue of the optimal design of financial contracts. Real financial markets being, in fact, incomplete, the additional “endogenous” risk associated with forwards cannot be hedged perfectly. Since using futures eliminates the latter, risk‐averse agents will find them attractive in relation to forward contracts, other things being equal. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 20: 507–523, 2000     

Entrepreneurial alliances as contractual forms

Advancing upon taxonomical research on interfirm alliances, we investigate the design of entrepreneurial firms' alliances in more fine-grained terms by focusing on the specific contractual provisions that firms negotiate into their alliance contracts. Drawing upon transaction cost arguments, we examine the determinants of the contractual complexity of collaborative agreements in the German telecommunications industry. The findings reveal that alliance contracts vary greatly in their complexity, yet contracts for non-equity alliances tend to be no more or less complex than those for equity alliances on average. Furthermore, multivariate findings on the roles of transaction-specific investment, relational capital, search costs, and so forth demonstrate that firms' contractual and governance choices have distinct antecedents.     

The impact of regulatory legislation on contractual costs risk and the form of contracts used in the UK and Republic of Ireland

The problem of contractual cost and quality risk within the public sector has been infrequently addressed within the EU regulated procurement environment. The view of Member States has been that concentration of buying power, standard conditions of contract and competitive bidding are the protective mechanism and cornerstones of regulated sector buyers. Aspects of the size of the ‘bidding pool’ and the influence of EU purchasing requirements are addressed and seen as largely unsatisfactorily addressed. This article provides an empirical analysis on two significant points:

• •that the UK and Republic of Ireland (ROI) public sector bodies have not significantly changed the type of contract (or contractual form) as a result of regulatory requirements.
• •that the form of contract adopted does not effectively address the cost and quality risks management may face once such contracts have been let.

     

The Prospect of Infrastructure Public‐Private Partnerships in Kuwait,Saudi Arabia,and Qatar: Transforming Challenges into Opportunities

This article examines the prospect of using infrastructure public‐private partnerships (PPPs) within Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar in light of the drastic drop in oil prices since mid‐2014. It argues that, while PPPs appear to be a strategic policy option for the three Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states to tackle growing fiscal deficits, these states are constrained by numerous governance‐related, administrative, and regulatory challenges that make PPPs problematic. Effective implementation of the inherently complex and contractual PPP policy requires addressing the existing institutional, economic, bureaucratic, and cultural constraints within these three states. This article concludes with recommendations to mitigate these challenges, that require serious political will and sufficient time to yield positive results, and to attract international investors and contractors to the Gulf region. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

The combination of contracts in Shariah: A possible mechanism for product development in Islamic banking and finance

The combination of contracts is a potential mechanism of product development in Islamic finance. However, this concept encounters legal issues due to ahadith that prohibit two contracts in one deal. The article argues for the validity of combining two or more contracts to structure Shariah‐compliant products. It discusses many aspects of combination of contracts, including terminologies and purposes of the con‐tracts, the degree of uncertainty and ambiguity, and the nature of the bargain in the contracts combined. If the contracts combined pass the tests established by legal prin‐ciples, there will be no legal objection to combine such contracts into one deal. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

The role of ethics in global corporate culture

Whatever ethnic, religious, or other cultural boundaries may have evolved through history, a global corporate culture is increasingly subsuming these traditional divisions. Multinational corporations, internationally linked securities markets, and omnipresent communication networks characterize this global corporate culture. The dynamics of corporate culture centres on the intricate web of contractual relations between stakeholders. This study addresses the question of how these stakeholder contracts can be most efficiently enforced. Three alternative contractual enforcement mechanisms are identified: the legal system, a generally accepted moral code, and stakeholders' desire to build and maintain reputations. Each alternative is critically evaluated and conclusions are drawn as to the relative feasibility and desirability of each enforcement mechanism. John Dobson is an Assistant Professor of Finance at The University of Mississippi. As a member of The Centre for Industrial Planning and Strategy (CIPS), he co-authored a study on the global man-made fibre industry. He has recently presented papers on reputation effects at the Southern Finance Association annual meeting, and has had articles and letters published in various academic journals including Business and Society and Financial Management. He is currently developing a curriculum for a course in Financial Contracting at the University of Mississippi. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1988 Southern Finance Association meetings in San Antonio.     

Mitigation of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection in Venture Capital Financing: The Influence of the Country's Institutional Setting

A venture capitalist (VC) needs to trade off benefits and costs when attempting to mitigate agency problems in their investor‐investee relationship. We argue that signals of ventures complement the VC's capacity to screen and conduct a due diligence during the preinvestment phase, but its attractiveness may diminish in institutional settings supporting greater transparency. Similarly, whereas a VC may opt for contractual covenants to curb potential opportunism by ventures in the postinvestment phase, this may only be effective in settings supportive of shareholder rights enforcement. Using an international sample of VC contracts, our study finds broad support for these conjectures. It delineates theoretical and practical implications for how investors can best deploy their capital in different institutional settings while nurturing their relationships with entrepreneurs.     

Strategic fit, contractual, and procedural governance in alliances

This paper focuses on the simultaneous mediating and moderating effects of different governance mechanisms on the relationship between conditions for alliance formation and outcome. Alliance governance takes two distinct forms: contractual integration and procedural coordination. While contracts may help set the legal parameters of the alliance agreement, it is day-to-day coordination of activities and processes that determine the effectiveness of such contracts. The proposed framework explains how knowledge outcome of collaborative relationships may be determined by the match of partner motives, influenced by the mix of contractual and procedural governance. A series of testable propositions helps answer the following question. Do combinations of contractual and procedural governance mechanisms, given specific strategic fit, explain knowledge performance differentials?     

Incompleteness,regularity, and collective preference

This paper examines the incompleteness of collective preference. We provide a series of Arrovian impossibility theorems without completeness. First, we consider the notion of regularity introduced by Eliaz and Ok (2006, Games and Economic Behavior 56, 61–86); it is an appropriate richness property for strict preference when preference is allowed to be incomplete. We examine the implication of imposing regularity on collective preference. Second, we propose responsiveness, a variation of positive responsiveness. This axiom requires that some changes in individual preferences make an alternative weakly better than another. Third, we consider coherency conditions for collective preferences; this conditionally requires the existence of comparable pairs in a certain manner. We prove an impossibility result for each condition using Arrovian axioms.