Conglomerate investment under various capital market conditions

This paper studies the investment of diversified and focused firms under various capital market conditions. When external capital becomes more costly at the aggregate level, investment declines in focused firms but remains unchanged in diversified firms. This investment advantage enjoyed by diversified firms could attribute to both their easy access to external capital and their ability to substitute internal capital markets for costly external markets. Consistent with the internal capital market argument, our findings show that the investment advantage exists for diversified firms even after we control for their easy access to external markets. We also find that the role of internal markets in financing investment is more important for diversified firms that are more financially constrained in external markets. Finally, we find that the segment-level investment becomes more efficient in conglomerates’ internal capital markets under depressed external capital market conditions. Overall, our findings suggest that internal capital allocation functions as a valuable and efficient substitute for diversified firms in a tightened external capital market.     

Value of Conglomerates and Capital Market Conditions

This article studies variations in the value of diversification across time under various capital market conditions. I find that when external capital is more costly at the aggregate level, the value of conglomerates increases relative to focused firms. I also find that this increase is greater for financially constrained conglomerates, such as bank-dependent or small conglomerates. My findings support the theories on the advantage of diversification over focus. They suggest that the ability to substitute external capital markets with internal capital markets creates value for conglomerates when the financing cost in external markets is high, especially for those conglomerates that are financially constrained.     

Corporate diversification,investment efficiency and the business cycle

I document the time-varying investment efficiency of conglomerates compared with single-segment firms. I find that, during recessions, conglomerates have higher Q-sensitivity of investment than do stand-alone firms, in contrast to the relationship during expansion periods. I also find that conglomerates, with the benefits from internal capital markets, exhibit increased dependence of investment on internal capital during recessionary periods, while stand-alone firms significantly increase cash retention and deviate their investment from its optimal level more severely. I examine the effect of the degree of diversification and find consistent evidence on investment efficiency and deployment of internal capital. I also provide evidence that conglomerates with stronger governance do not improve investment efficiency during recession, which suggests that agency costs cannot fully explain the changes in investment of conglomerates.     

The Capital Structure of Large Firms and the Use of Dutch Financing Entities

Large firms may issue debt securities to obtain external financing or set up lowly‐taxed affiliates for internal debt‐shifting purposes. In addition, they may channel interest payments through Dutch special purpose entities (SPEs) to avoid withholding taxes, a widely‐used arbitrage strategy. Analysing the capital structure of large EU‐based multinationals, this paper provides evidence that the use of Dutch‐issuing SPEs is associated with higher debt financing relative to equity. Furthermore, it shows that EU subsidiaries of larger firms are more leveraged and that the use of Dutch on‐lending SPEs is also associated with higher subsidiary leverage. Thus, the paper provides evidence that Dutch SPEs facilitate higher external debt financing as well as internal debt shifting. The findings indicate that withholding taxes on interest payments to entities outside the EU, determined by individual EU member states, are not very effective. The national tax systems of EU countries such as the Netherlands, which does not impose interest withholding tax, allow large firms to avoid those taxes.     

How firms manage their cash flows: an examination of diversification’s effect

We extend recently documented evidence that diversified firms hold significantly less cash than specialized firms to consider differences in how diversified and specialized firms adjust their cash flows to achieve their target cash balance. We find that diversified firms have higher free cash flows as a result of equal operating cash flows and lower investment in comparison to specialized firms. Diversified firms save less cash by placing less reliance on external financing; by issuing less debt and equity, and distributing higher cash dividends. Our findings support the hypothesis that diversified firms are able to hold less precautionary cash as they are in better position to finance investment opportunities internally from operating cash flows.     

How Do Capital Structure Policies of Emerging Markets Differ from Those of Developed Economies? Survey Evidence from Korea

We examine the capital structure policies of Korean firms using survey data for business group (chaebol) firms and independent firms. Our results are compared with findings in earlier studies for developed economies: Graham and Harvey (2001) for the United States and Brounen et al. (2004, 2006) for Europe. Korean chief financial officers are concerned about financial flexibility and volatility of earnings when issuing debt; they are concerned about target debt ratio maintenance and recent stock price increases when issuing equity. In contrast to independent firms, chaebol firms are more concerned about differences in corporate tax rates between foreign and domestic markets and the risk of refinancing in bad times. Chaebol firms are less likely to issue debt when faced with insufficient internal funds, which indicates that active internal capital markets are at work among the firms in a business group. Our results suggest that, compared to U. S. and European firms, Korean firms are under more pressure from their peers in formulating capital structure policies, consider equity a cheap source of financing, are less concerned with the dilution of earnings per share, and less frequently provide shares to employees as compensation.     

Diversification and cash dynamics

Why do diversified firms hold significantly less cash than focused firms? We study this question using a dynamic model of corporate investment, saving, and diversification decisions. We find that investment dynamics are more important in explaining the cash differences than financing frictions. More efficient internal capital markets increase cash differences and are especially valuable when a firm diversifies or refocuses. Contrary to static models, more diverse conglomerates have lower cash differences. Endogenous selection (diversifying firms are larger and have better growth opportunities) accounts for 68% of the cash difference, and the diversification event itself reduces cash holdings by 32%.     

Internal Capital Markets in Financial Conglomerates: Evidence from Small Bank Responses to Monetary Policy

This paper looks at internal capital markets in financial conglomerates by comparing the responses of small subsidiary and independent banks to monetary policy. I find that internal capital markets in financial conglomerates relax the credit constraints faced by smaller bank affiliates. Further analysis indicates that those markets lessen the impact of Fed policies on bank lending activity. The paper also examines the role of internal capital markets in influencing the investment allocation process of those conglomerates. My findings suggest that frictions between conglomerate headquarters and external capital markets are at the root of investment inefficiencies generated by internal capital markets.     

Does the timing of dividend reductions signal value? Empirical evidence

This paper examines a firm's dividend reduction timing relative to other dividend reductions in the same industry. It tests if the timing of dividend cuts is informative in firm valuation. The findings suggest that during periods of less accessible external financing, such as recessions, firms with greater investment opportunities are among the first firms to make necessary dividend reductions to take advantage of such opportunities. When external financing is more accessible, firms with superior investment opportunities are able to access capital markets in lieu of dividend-reducing internal financing, indicating higher firm values for earlier dividend reductions during periods of costly external financing and significantly lower firm values for early reductions when financing is more easily obtained. A series of empirical tests show that, in periods of less accessible external financing or during a recession, early dividend-reducing firms significantly outperform late reducers in announcement day and contraction cycle cumulative abnormal returns. The results also show that, outside of a recession, early dividend-reducing firms have significantly lower industry contraction cycle returns than late dividend reducers. Additionally, this study compares early dividend reductions that occur during periods of costly external financing (or during a recession) against early reductions that occur when external financing is more available (or outside of a recession) and finds the former to have significantly higher announcement day and contraction cycle cumulative abnormal returns.     

Financing constraints and internal capital markets: Evidence from Korean `chaebols'

We compare the investment–cash flow sensitivity of Korean chaebols (conglomerates) and non-chaebol firms. We show that investment–cash flow sensitivity is low and insignificant for chaebol firms but is high and significant for non-chaebol firms. On the other hand, a chaebol firm's investment is significantly related to the growth opportunities but that of a non-chaebol firm is not. A chaebol firm's investment is significantly affected by the cash flow of other firms within the same chaebol even though they are independent legal entities. With these findings, we argue that there is an internal capital market in a chaebol and the internal capital market reduces the financing constraints of the chaebol. However, the operation of the internal capital market does not improve the efficiency of allocation of scarce funds in the Korean economy since we find that chaebols invest more than non-chaebol firms despite their relatively poor growth opportunities.     

The role of parent firms in business groups’ internal capital markets

Using a unique dataset of unconsolidated financial statements, we investigate the investment and financing policies of parent firms in South Korea's business groups over the period 2003–2016. Parent firms add to their equity-stake holdings substantially each year to support affiliated firms’ capital expenditures. Parent firms finance their equity-stake investment primarily with external funds. These tendencies are more pronounced if parents sit high in the pyramidal chain or are central to controlling other group firms and if parents belong to large business groups. Overall, parent firms prioritize their role as capital raisers and distributors for affiliated firms, and business groups’ internal capital markets are supported by external finance.     

Family Control and Financing Decisions

This study uses a comprehensive European dataset to investigate the role of family control in corporate financing decisions during the period 1998–2008. We find that family firms have a preference for debt financing, a non‐control‐diluting security, and are more reluctant than non‐family firms to raise capital through equity offerings. We also find that credit markets are prone to provide long‐term debt to family firms, indicating that they view their investment decisions as less risky. In fact, our empirical results demonstrate that family firms invest less than non‐family firms in high‐risk, research and development (R&D) projects, but not in low‐risk, fixed‐asset capital expenditure (CAPEX) projects, suggesting that fear of control loss in family firms deters risk‐taking. Overall, our findings reveal that the external financing (and investment) decisions of family firms are in greater (lesser) conflict with the interests of minority shareholders (bondholders).     

Access to Capital, Capital Structure, and the Funding of the Firm

Based upon a large data set of public and private firms in the United Kingdom, I find that compared to their public counterparts, private firms rely almost exclusively on debt financing, have higher leverage ratios, and tend to avoid external capital markets, leading to a greater sensitivity of their capital structures to fluctuations in performance. I argue that these differences are due to private equity being more costly than public equity. I further examine the private firms subsample to show that private equity is more costly than its public counterpart due to information asymmetry and the desire to maintain control.     

How Firms Make Capital Expenditure Decisions: Financial Signals, Internal Cash Flows, Income Taxes and the Tax Reform Act of 1986

This paper empirically assesses the determinants of future net capital expenditures for a broad cross-section of COMPUSTAT firms from 1973 to 1989. We explore three general categories of factors expected to affect investment: (1) external equity financing, (2) internally generated accounting information, and (3) tax incentives. We find that external financing and information plays a role in that both positive stock returns and equity issuances indicate future increases in investment. The results suggest that high stock prices not only lower the cost of capital, but also signal good investment opportunities. Accounting information about internal sources and uses of funds are also important in the investment decision. In particular, net income and depreciation are positive indicators of future investment while there is a tradeoff between the payment of dividends and investment. Further, positive changes in available cash liquidity also motivate future investment. While taxes are not important in the investment decision on average, we find that firms with previously higher income taxes invested substantially more in 1985 and 1986. This coincides with the repeal of the investment tax credit and the accelerated depreciation schedules in the Tax Reform Act of 1986. We view this as evidence that federal tax policy in the 1980's induced firms with high income tax obligations to accelerate capital expenditures just before the favorable tax treatment of capital expenditures was eliminated.     

The impact of cash flows and firm size on investment: The international evidence

This paper examines the degree to which cash flow availability influences firm investment in six OECD countries. In particular, we are interested in the extent to which the reliance on internal funds is affected by firm size, since there is general agreement that smaller firms have less access to external capital markets and, thus, should be more affected by the availability of internal funds. Earlier work has concluded that the documented positive relationship between cash flow and investment is evidence of the existence of financial constraints. We first examine all firms, regardless of size, in each country, and we find that the amount of corporate investment is affected by internal resources in all six countries; that is, internal financing affects firm investment. We then repeat the analysis segmenting the sample using three measures of firm size. Contrary to our a priori expectations, we find that the cash flow-investment sensitivity is generally highest in the large firm size group and smallest in the small firm size group. We deduce that the explanations for these findings are grounded in managerial agency considerations, and in the greater flexibility enjoyed by large firms in timing their investments. Thus, we conclude that the degree of sensitivity of a firm's investments to its cash flows cannot be interpreted as an accurate measure of its access to capital markets (as do Kaplan, S., Zingales, L., 1997. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 169–215), since small firms are known to have less access to external markets.     

Implications of Internal Funds Surplus for Determining Agency Spending of SEO Proceeds and Timing Incentives

According to the pecking order theory, firms with potential investment projects should raise external capital if and only if sufficient internal funds are not available. The theory can be violated if equity issuers are motivated by market timing and increasing funds for insiders’ benefits, indicating that firms may already have internal funds surplus without including external funds, but still issue equity. By controlling for future funds needs, the analyses show that issuers that engage in market timing and spend the SEO proceeds on value-destroying projects are strongly associated with their internal funds surplus. Moreover, SEO announcement returns are lower for issuers with internal funds surplus. This pattern strongly supports the predictive ability of internal funds surplus to detect the need for external capital and ultimately to determine timing incentives and agency spending of SEO proceeds.     

Ownership,Internal Capital Market,and Financing Costs

The development of China’s financial markets lags behind its economic development, which has set constraints for firms to obtain external finance. In practice, Chinese firms employ an internal capital market to mitigate financial constraints. We provide a case study and empirical analysis to investigate both the determinants for the establishment of an internal capital market and its economic consequence. We find that private enterprises (PEs) have greater motivation to establish an internal capital market and to allocate capital by the market-oriented way. In addition, we find that the internal capital market can help firms reduce financing costs, especially in PEs.     

Law,Stock Markets,and Innovation

We study a broad sample of firms across 32 countries and find that strong shareholder protections and better access to stock market financing lead to substantially higher long‐run rates of R&D investment, particularly in small firms, but are unimportant for fixed capital investment. Credit market development has a modest impact on fixed investment but no impact on R&D. These findings connect law and stock markets with innovative activities key to economic growth, and show that legal rules and financial developments affecting the availability of external equity financing are particularly important for risky, intangible investments not easily financed with debt.     

Tracking Stock or Spin‐Off? Determinants of Choice

I examine the roles of valuable internal capital markets, cross-subsidization, and insider ownership as determinants of choice between tracking stock and spin-offs in corporate equity restructuring. I show that conglomerates are more likely to choose tracking stock if they want to obtain some of the benefits offered by a spin-off, without loosing the potential for valuable internal capital markets. My results suggest that the market rewards firms with valuable internal capital markets that opt for tracking stocks, and penalizes the possibility of consolidated tax treatments. The market also reacts more favorably to unanticipated tracking-stock announcements.     

Corporate governance and long run performance of seasoned equity issuers

This paper examines the effect of corporate governance on the likelihood of issuing Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEO) between 1990 and 2005. It also examines the long-run post-issue performance using operating and stock return measures. Our results suggest that well-governed firms are less likely to issue equity. Nevertheless, when they do so, they outperform both matching non-issuers and issuers with minimal shareholders’ rights from pre- to post-issue—with the highest operating out-performance occurring in the two post-issue years. A negative correlation exists between the post-issue performance and the anti-takeover measures, primarily, the protection associated with management entrenchment. Nonetheless, measures of board structure do not appear to affect the post-issue operating performance. Overall, corporate governance appears to be an effective internal control mechanism that restrains managers’ incentives to either take an SEO issuance decision that does not serve the interests of shareholders or invest the capital raised in value-destroying projects.