Why is China different from Eastern Europe? Perspectives from organization theory

We draw from recent work in organization theory to explain the differences in reform strategies between China and Eastern Europe. An experimentation approach was adopted in China whereas a big bang approach was more favored in Eastern Europe. The explanation is based on differences in the organizational structure of central planning: U-form in Eastern Europe and M-form in China. The M-form is more flexible because it makes local experiments possible, contrary to the U-form where this would give rise to major complications in coordination.     

Do capital flows drive credit growth and consumption in Central and Eastern Europe?

Domestic credit expansion in CEE economies, fuelled in part by foreign capital inflows, helped increase household welfare before the 2008 financial crisis caused a contraction across the region. How strong are the linkages between the current account, domestic credit and consumer spending? This study compiles a quarterly dataset of domestic credit as a share of GDP for 11 CEE European Union members and isolates structural breaks in the series’ growth rates that often align with the 2008 crisis. Vector autoregressive methods, particularly impulse response functions, show that increased current-account deficits lead to increased consumption in six of the 11 countries and increased credit growth in three, and that shocks to credit growth increase consumption in six countries. Capital inflows significantly increase consumption through domestic credit in Slovenia, while the Baltics show a large share of significant effects.     

How far from the Euro Area? Measuring convergence of inflation rates in Eastern Europe

We present a common factor framework of convergence which we implement using principal components analysis. We apply this technique to a dataset of monthly inflation rates of EMU and the Eastern European New Member Countries (NMC) over 1996–2007. In the earlier years, the NMC rates moved independently from an average of the three best performing countries over the past twelve months, while they moved somewhat closer in line with them in the later years. Looking at the sample of the EMU and NMC countries as a whole, there is evidence of a formation of convergence clubs across the two groups.     

Why do growth rates differ? Evidence from cross-country data on private sector production

We estimate standard production functions with a new cross-country data set on business sector production, wages and R&D investment for a selection of 14 OECD countries including the US. The data sample covers years the 1960–2004. The data suggest that growth differences can largely be explained by capital deepening and the ability to produce new technology in the form of new patents. We also find strong evidence of complementarity between patents and openness of the economy, but little evidence of increasing elasticity of substitution over time.     

Democracy and capitalism: Are they compatible in the long-run?

Starting from a discussion of Schumpeter's analysis of the relationships of capitalism, socialism and democracy, it is shown that, in a complex society, democracy is only compatible with a decentralized market economy with safe property rights. But in time democracy shows a tendency to weaken the capitalist system by more and more regulations and an ever-increasing share of government (including the social security system) in GDP. This tendency is a consequence of political competition because of the development of interest groups and the presence of rationally uninformed voters. It leads to a weakening of efficiency, investment, innovation and thus to lower growth rates of GDP. But in time forces opposing this development arise. First, because of the negative consequences of growing government the welfare and regulatory state is bound to move into a crisis in the long run. Thus innovative politicians have a chance to win the support of a majority of voters for reform projects, who perceive finally the ever-increasing burden of higher taxes and regulations and realize that these burdens are not worth the benefits bestowed on them. In doing so, they may face, however, the competition of ideologies. Second, there are other states with lower taxes and less unnecessary regulations which show higher growth rates of GDP, and gain thus relative advantages in international political and military competition since they can command greater resources with the passage of time. To maintain their relative international power position, reforms are thus considered as necessary by rulers. This may be helped by pressure resulting from comparisons of the standards of living done by their citizens.     

Why do firms adopt CEO stock options? Evidence from the United States

This paper examines the determinants of stock option introduction as a part of CEO compensation in listed US firms during the 1994–2004 period. The results are consistent with agency costs and recruiting considerations, suggesting that firms do not adjust CEO compensation in order to address the ‘investment horizon’ problem. The findings also suggest that CEO stock option adoption is not necessarily influenced by the same factors that have been found in the literature to affect the level of CEO stock option compensation and the adoption of broad-based stock option incentives. Overall, the findings provide evidence for several theoretical predictions, thus adding to our understanding of managerial incentives.     

How do the factors determining terrorist groups’ longevity differ from those affecting their success?

This paper distinguishes a terrorist group’s survivability from its success. Terrorist groups succeed if they join the political process or achieve some of their goals. Based on a sample of 470 terrorist groups, we first estimate the determinants of groups’ ending and, conditional on their demise, we identify factors conducive to their success. We find that religious fundamentalist terrorist groups survive longer than left-wing, nationalist/separatist, or right-wing groups; but religious groups are less apt than other ideologies to attain their objectives or to join the political process. Larger groups survive longer and possess a better success prognosis. Within-country group competition is conducive to survival, but harmful to success. Controls include groups’ goals, groups’ strategic choices, and home country’s characteristics. Robustness tests disaggregate our success measure, provide panel estimates, and incorporate other controls.     

When do neoliberal economic reforms cause democratic decline? Evidence from the post-communist Southeast Europe

Do neoliberal reforms (notably, austerity policy) facilitate democratic decline and the gradual deconstruction of democratic institutions? I examine the democratic development of the Western Balkan countries since 2008 by focusing on the two most recent cases of democratic rollback in Macedonia and Serbia. Neoliberal reforms may create a preference to shut down democratic institutions, because such reforms are socially costly and politically risky. However, democratic backsliding is not possible without opportunity. I illustrate this with reference to the examples of Hungary and Croatia. Croatia implemented some neoliberal policies after 2015, but did not see a drop in its democracy score. By contrast, Hungary moved towards centrally planned capitalism, nationalisation and state interventionism (all opposed to the neoliberal concept of reform), and yet saw a significant democratic decline after 2010. The opportunity to dismantle democratic institutions was a consequence of an electoral gap (a difference in vote share between former and new incumbents), which enabled the rise of authoritarian leaders in Macedonia, Hungary and Serbia.     

What explains consumption in the very short-run? Evidence from checking account data

This paper investigates consumption behavior within an intertemporal optimization model of the representative household. Our dataset consists of deposits and withdrawals from individual household checking accounts that received paychecks by direct deposit. We construct samples of panel data for households with weekly, biweekly, and semi-monthly pay-periods and form two different measures of consumption for each sample. GMM estimates of structural parameters provide mixed evidence for habit formation or durability and limited support for the permanent income hypothesis. The results instead point to “rule of thumb” consumption under liquidity constraints, where the household consumes its current disposable income each pay-period with possible debt servicing. These findings are uniform with regard to estimation of sub-samples split according to age or household income.     

An empirical test of the regional innovation paradox: can smart specialisation overcome the paradox in Central and Eastern Europe?

The regional innovation paradox is the greater need of lagging regions to invest in innovation and their relatively lower capacity to absorb funding compared to more advanced regions. Using data on regional public spending, industry composition and economic performance, we test empirically whether there is a differential impact of European funding on regional economic growth between Eastern and Western European regions. We conclude that the paradox is proven and consider the extent to which smart specialisation strategies may help to improve the quality of governance of regional innovation systems.     

Redistribution in the age of austerity: evidence from Europe 2006–2013

We examine the relationship between changes in a country’s public sector fiscal position on inequality at the top and bottom of the income distribution during the age of austerity from 2006 to 2013. We use a parametric Lorenz curve model and Gini-like indices of inequality as our measures to assess distributional changes. Based on Statistics of Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) and IMF data for 12 European countries, we find that more severe adjustments to the cyclically adjusted primary balance (i.e., more austerity) are associated with a more unequal distribution of income driven by rising inequality at the top. The data also weakly suggests a decrease in inequality at the bottom. The distributional impact of austerity measures reflects the reliance on regressive policies and likely produces increased incentives for rent-seeking while reducing incentives for workers to increase productivity.     

The most popular tax in Europe? Lessons from the Irish plastic bags levy

There have been occasional ad hoc efforts to influence consumer behaviour by the imposition of product taxes that reflect external costs imposed by such products that are not initially included in their price. In the spirit of this idea, in 2002 Ireland introduced a 15 Euro cent tax on plastic shopping bags, previously provided free of charge to customers at points of sale. The effect of the tax on the use of plastic bags in retail outlets has been dramatic—a reduction in use in the order of 90%, and an associated gain in the form of reduced littering and negative landscape effects. Costs of administration have been very low, amounting to about 3% of revenues, because it was possible to integrate reporting and collection into existing Value Added Tax reporting systems. Response from the main stakeholders: the public and the retail industry, has been overwhelmingly positive. Central to this acceptance has been a policy of extensive consultation with these stakeholders. The fact that a product tax can influence consumer behaviour significantly will be of interest to many policymakers in this area. This paper analyses the plastic bag levy success story and provides insights and general guidelines for other jurisdictions planning similar proposals.

Why has wage inequality increased more in the USA than in Europe? An empirical investigation of the demand and supply of skill

During the past two decades the wage gap between high and low skill labour has increased more in the USA than in many European countries. In this paper, the correspondence between occupation and education is used to construct aggregates of skill supply, skill demand and unemployment by skill group that are comparable across countries. Using individual data for years 1983–1994, it is found that the relative demand for skilled labour has increased to a similar extent in the USA and in Europe and that wage inequality remained low in Europe partly because the European relative supply of skill increased much faster than in the USA, and partly because European relative wages were rigid, which caused an increase in unemployment among the low-skilled.     

Spillover effects of fiscal policy in a monetary union: Why do fiscal instruments matter?

Using a two‐country DSGE model, we analyse the spillover effects of fiscal policy in a monetary union. Based on a non‐Walrasian labour market with a labour force participation decision and involuntary unemployment and a detailed fiscal sector, we focus on the relative cross‐border effects of different kinds of fiscal shocks (government expenditure and tax shocks). Among the major lessons from this analysis, five general and striking results are worth highlighting : (1) spillover effects differ widely according to the fiscal instrument, (2) all fiscal instruments produce positive spillover effects on foreign GDP except a rise in government consumption, (3) the response of unemployment is not always negatively correlated with the response of output (4) the different fiscal shocks trigger different effects on foreign inflation and the term of trade, which implies heterogeneous interest‐rate and trade channels, and (5) a more accommodative monetary policy and a scenario of ‘fiscal dominance’ alter greatly the effects of fiscal policy shocks.     

Why do immigrant workers in Australia perform better than those in Canada? Is it the immigrants or their labour markets?

Research comparing the labour market performance of recent cohorts of immigrants to Australia and Canada points to superior employment and earnings outcomes in Australia. Examining Australian and Canadian Census data between 1986 and 2006, we find that this performance advantage is not driven by differences in broader labour market conditions affecting all new labour market entrants. Rather, the results from comparing immigrants from a common source country – either the U.K., India, or China – suggest that Australian immigrants perform better, particularly in average earnings, primarily because of a different source country distribution. Moreover, the recent tightening of Australian selection policy, most notably its use of mandatory pre‐migration English‐language testing, appears to be having an effect, primarily by further shifting the source country distribution of immigrants away from non‐English‐speaking source countries, rather than in identifying higher‐quality migrants within source countries.