公司多元化折价:寻租与投资偏差

相对于业务集中的企业来说,多元化公司往往出现市场价值贬损,尽管造成这一现象的原因多种多样,但部门经理寻租引致公司经理配置资源出现偏差,则是产生公司多元化折价的重要根源之一.文章基于这一思想,通过建立模型进行了深入分析,得出多元化公司往往出现折价并给出了影响折价的一些重要因素.     

Rent extraction and incentives for efficiency in recent regulatory proposals

Building on a simple model proposed by Schmalensee (1989), this paper uses simulation techniques to analyze and compare various regulatory schemes including Schmalensee's family of (linear) good regulatory regimes, a price-cap regime allowing for downward price flexibility, and a regime that combines price-cap and profit sharing. The quantitative analysis pays particular attention to measuring the trade-off between rent extraction and incentives for efficiency. The main findings of this study can be summarized as follows. First, it appears that pure price-cap regulation leaves substantial rent to the firm relative to the other regimes. Second, introducing room for downward price flexibility improves efficiency of price-cap over Schmalensee's linear regulatory regimes. Finally, by correcting in part for the distributional distortion of price-cap, the profit-sharing mechanism often yields levels of welfare comparable to optimal regulation levels.     

试论开展辽宁金色旅游

本文从开展辽宁金色旅游的意义及优势入手，分析了辽宁金色旅游开发中存在的问题，并针对性地提出了辽宁发展金色旅游的具体措施。     

行业租金、行业协会与行业自我治理

本文引入行业特质性资源与行业租金概念,指出行业租金消散是行业协会在市场经济中内生产生的根本动因.在行业自律机制、准公共产品机制、俱乐部产品机制、集体行动机制和第三方实施机制的支持下,行业协会的功能主要体现在两个方面:行业自律和行业提升;其中行业自律功能主要体现为对行业租金消散的制止,行业提升功能主要体现为使行业租金的增加.     

董事会领导结构与公司治理——基于上市公司CEO更换的实证研究

本文研究了不同业绩水平下董事会领导结构与CEO更换之间的关系。研究发现,在业绩很好的公司中,CEO兼任董事长有利于避免不正常的CEO强制更换;在业绩一般的公司中,CEO兼任董事长则为业绩较低的CEO提供了保护;在经营亏损的公司中,这一保护不再发生作用。基于不同业绩水平下CEO更换的实质,本文认为,代理理论和现代管家理论在公司治理实践中是相容的,从而为研究两者的关系提供了一个新的框架。此外,本文的研究还为我国的公司治理改革提供了一些有意义的启示。     

Wages,Profits, and Rent‐Sharing in an Open Economy

This paper examines the link between international trade and labor market bargaining power. It reviews simple theories of rent‐sharing in closed and open economies. Earlier studies on the issue of rent‐sharing implicitly assume a closed economy. This assumption may provide some misleading results, especially for studying current developments in the US labor market. Empirical results suggest that the apparent decline in labor’s bargaining power in US manufacturing may be attributable to growing international integration.     

Rent, risk, and replication: Preference adaptation in winner-take-all markets

We study the evolution of an economy where agents who are heterogeneous with respect to risk attitudes can either earn a certain income or enter a risky rent-seeking contest. We assume that agents behave rationally given their preferences, but that the population distribution of preferences evolves over time in response to material payoffs. We show that, in particular, initial distributions with full support converge to stationary states where all types are still present. Although rents are perfectly dissipated in material terms at a steady state, efficiency is greater than if everybody had been risk neutral, since risk lovers specialize in rent seeking.     

Developmental Rent Management Analysis: Learning,Upgrading, and Innovation

In this article, I construct an original analytical framework, called the developmental rent management analysis (DRMA), for the analysis of rents and rent management. This framework is based on the premise that successful rent management depends on political and institutional arrangements to produce incentives and pressures for technical upgrading and innovation. This is because, while rents are created for a variety of purposes, rent outcomes — whether growth-enhancing or growth-reducing — depend on a set of political, institutional, and market conditions that take place formally and informally. Therefore, the key objective of the DRMA framework is to understand how a country’s politics, institutions, and industries are configured to incentivize and compel industrial upgrading. Thus, DRMA enables a broader and more complex understanding of the various factors at play in the process of development. I provide an illustrative application of the DRMA framework using the Vietnamese experience of adopting third-generation technology in the telecommunications industry.     

差别待遇、政策寻租与过渡性资本外逃

过渡性资本外逃是一种特殊的资本流动方式,其动机就是以外籍的身份向国内投资.我国政府对于外商投资给予的超国民待遇和税收优惠是过渡性资本外逃的主要动因.这种政策对于改革开放初期经济的现代化、市场化建设所发挥的历史性作用是毋庸置疑的,但是随着改革开放的进一步深入,政府对于外资的超国民待遇也在产生越来越大的负面效应.因此,我国政府应当对外资的超国民待遇进行重新定位,逐步取消具有明显歧视性的政策,消除内资企业的政策性寻租动机,提高内资企业的投资水平.     

经济一体化、集聚租和区际税收政策协调

区域经济一体化条件下对流动要素的征税使得地方政府在税率与税基之间的取舍变得相当微妙。通过建立渐进一体化背景下反映中国特征的税收竞争模型,本文从新经济地理学视角针对地方政府的税收竞争展开研究。研究表明:(1)在一体化阶段I,高的企业家区际流动税率弹性决定区际税收竞争取"逐底"的竞争形式,长期竞争均衡下区际税率差收敛于零,"政策租"与集聚租均不存在。(2)在一体化阶段II,集聚租亦不存在。企业家间接效用差值曲线波峰形成"税收盾牌"效应,税收竞争转向"逐顶",区际税率差从零开始逐渐扩大,允许周边地区通过适用相对低的税率提供"政策租金"。(3)在一体化阶段III,集聚租取代间接效用差值曲线波峰发挥"税收盾牌"效应,区际税率差在一体化阶段II的基础上随集聚租先上升再下降,集聚租被核心地区政府和企业瓜分。区际税率差失去为周边政府提供"政策租金"操作空间的机能。(4)整个一体化进程中,区际最大税率差沿"钟型"曲线演化,区际税率差边界曲线对竞争初始状态表现出高度路径依赖。(5)在不存在税收政策协调的非合作性竞争情形,区际税收政策的不对称将导致产业分布和经济发展的空间不对称提前发生并随时间放大。     

评级机构竞争、声誉与债券信用评级质量

本文以我国2010—2014年的企业债和公司债为样本,构建了新的声誉指标,分析了声誉机制和评级机构竞争对债券信用评级质量的作用机理。结果表明：高声誉的评级机构出具的债券信用评级具有较高的评级质量;评级机构竞争加剧了评级虚高,降低了债券信用评级质量;声誉机制能够抑制评级机构竞争导致的评级虚高,提高债券信用评级质量。本文为衡量我国评级机构声誉提供了新的视角,有助于辩证地看待评级机构竞争的影响。     

中小民营制造企业员工离职原因的实证研究

目前,中小民营企业员工离职率的上升,给企业的生存和发展带来了巨大威助.作者通过对湖南23家中小民营制造企业的问卷调查,并运用SPSS软件对数据进行处理,研究发现,影响中小民营制造企业员工离职的原因有薪酬福利、晋升发展与培训、工作因素、公司效益与发展前景、人际关系、家庭因素等.根据这些原因的分析,针对性地提出了解决措施.这对中小民营企业的进一步发展和构筑竞争优势具有一定的指导意义.     

Extremism, campaigning and ambiguity

This paper studies a model of how political parties use resources for campaigning to inform voters. Each party has a predetermined ideology drawn from some distribution. Parties choose a platform and campaign to inform voters about the platform. We find that, the farther away parties are from each other (on average), the less resources are spent on campaigning (on average). Thus, if parties are extreme, less information is supplied than if parties are moderate. We also show that if a public subsidy is introduced, we have policy convergence, given some mild technical restrictions on the public subsidy.     

Promising politicians,rational voters,and election outcomes

Overwhelming anecdotal evidence suggests that politicians often promise more during an election campaign than they are willing or able to deliver once elected. In this paper, we present two signaling models to explain this phenomenon. In the first model, two candidates maximize their share of the vote. In the second model both try to convince the median voter. In each model, candidates rationally distort their true policy position. Voters, however, are not fooled. Upon observing election promises, they can rationally infer the true position of each candidate. Hence, the election outcome is not affected.JEL Classification: D72, D82The author thanks Peter Kooreman, Wilko Letterie, Bert Schoonbeek, and two anonymous referees for useful comments. Financial support from The Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) is gratefully acknowledged.     

Campaign Spending with Office-Seeking Politicians, Rational Voters, and Multiple Lobbies

I introduce a microfounded model of campaign finance with office-seeking politicians, a continuum of voters, and a large number of heterogeneous lobbies. Lobbies make contributions to politicians according to a common agency framework. Politicians use contributions to finance their electoral expenditures. Voters are not fooled by electoral expenditures: they are influenced in a way that is consistent with the equilibrium behavior of lobbies and politicians. The model is used to: (i) determine the relation between campaign spending and the deviation from the median voter's preferred policy; (ii) show the informational value of lobbies' contributions; (iii) evaluate the welfare implications of restricting campaign spending; and (iv) interpret the empirical finding that campaign expenditures have a very low effect on election outcome. Although in equilibrium advertising provides voters with useful information, under reasonable parameter values, a ban on campaign contributions makes the median voter better off. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D72, D82, M37.     

Politics,institutions, and outcomes: Electricity regulation in Argentina and Chile

Risk, whether market or political, is an important determinant of private investment decisions. One important risk, subject to control by the government, is the risk associated with the hold-up problem: governments can force utilities to shoulder burdensome taxes, to use input factors ineffectively, or to charge unprofitable rates for their service. To attract private investment governments must be able to make commitments to policies that are nonexpropriative (either to contracts that guarantee very high rates of return or to favorable regulatory policies). These commitments, of course, must be credible.

Judgments about the credibility of commitments to regulatoty policies are based upon two political factors: regulatory predictability and regime stability. Regulatory predictability implies that the regulatory process, in which prices and levels of service are set, is not arbitrary. If the condition of regulatory predictability holds, then investors can forecast their returns over time and hence can calculate the value of their investment. If there is regime stability, then there is minimal risk of wholesale changes in the way the government regulates the industry—the most extreme type of change being the denial of property rights, or expropriation. We argue that three characteristics of the regulatory process are, in turn, important determinants of regulatory predictability: agenda control, reversionary regulatory policy, and veto gates. Moreover, regime stability is also, in part, a function of these three characteristics. We examine our theory of political risk and regulatoty commitment by comparing the cases of Argentine and Chilean electricity investment and regulation.