Entrepreneurship,trust and corruption

I propose a theoretical model where trust towards strangers is a channel through which institutions determine economic outcomes, in particular, entrepreneurship and corruption. More importantly, I show that the role of trust has been overlooked since high levels of trust do not always enhance desirable economic outcomes. Trust helps individuals to participate in economic exchanges aligned with social welfare, but it also facilitates individuals to cooperate for the achievement of corrupt deals. Under this more general view of trust, the model generates a non-trivial new prediction at the individual level. Specifically, the individual-level relationship between honesty and trust changes depending on the institutional quality of a country. Dishonest individuals are the more trusting individuals in countries with poor institutions, and the less trusting in countries with good institutions. Using individual-level data of 80 countries from the World Value Survey and the European Values Study, I present empirical evidence in support of this prediction.     

Social capital and political institutions: Evidence that democracy fosters trust

This paper finds evidence that more democratic political institutions increase trust. Second generation immigrants with ancestries from 115 countries are studied within 30 European countries. Comparing individuals born and residing in the same country, those whose father was born in a more democratic country express higher trust than those whose father was born in a less democratic country. The results are robust to individual, parental, and ancestral country controls.     

DOES BIG GOVERNMENT HURT GROWTH LESS IN HIGH‐TRUST COUNTRIES?

Social trust is linked to both public sector size and to economic growth, thereby helping to explain how some countries combine high taxes with high levels of economic growth. This paper examines if social trust insulates countries against the negative effects of public sector size on growth, documented in several studies. We note that the effect is theoretically ambiguous. In panel data from 66 countries across 40 years, we find no robust evidence of insulation effects: when excluding countries with uncertain trust scores, our results suggest that big government hurts growth also in high‐trust countries, and that the mechanism is by lowering private investments. (JEL H10, O11, P16, Z10)     

Can trust effects on development be generalized? A response by quantile

While the beneficial effects of social trust on economic performance have been largely recognized, we analyze whether these effects can be generalized for economies at different stages of economic development. Contrary to previous studies on this issue based on average effects (mostly considering ordinary least squares estimations), we follow a quantile regression approach that enables us to capture heterogeneous effects of trust for different development levels. By considering data for 80 countries, and using trust indicators from five different waves of the World Values Survey (WVS), our results by quantile indicate that trust is not relevant for the poorest economies, showing the existence of a social poverty trap. In addition, results suggest that the impact of trust on income decreases as an economy becomes richer. This would suggest not only that trust benefits cannot be generalized for all countries, as some previous studies have proposed, but also that the extent of its implications are heavily dependent on the level of development.     

Social integration and subjective wellbeing

Using data from the UK Community Life Survey, we examine the relationship between social integration and subjective wellbeing. We measure social integration along various dimensions, including frequency of interaction with one’s neighbors, perceived strength of belonging to one’s immediate neighborhood and country, length of residence in a neighborhood, and trust in neighbors. Overall, we find that social integration is associated with higher levels of subjective wellbeing. Specifically, our results suggest that an increase in the frequency of interaction with one’s neighbors is associated with an increase in subjective wellbeing. Similarly, an increase in respondent’s perceived strength of belonging to their immediate neighborhood (and country) is associated with an increase in subjective wellbeing. We further discover that an increase in the length of residence in a neighborhood is associated with an increase in subjective wellbeing, and this is also the case for an increase in the level of trust in one’s neighbour.     

信托税收法律制度研究

随着《中华人民共和国信托法》的颁布实施,信托制度在我国得以以立法的形式予以确立。信托制度在我国社会经济发展中将起到越来越重要的作用。信托税制在信托制度中占据重要的地位,我国在这一方面还没有明确的法律规制。作者借鉴英美等发达资本主义国家成熟的信托税收理论,并结合国内信托法和税法的实际情况对信托税收法律制度进行一定的探讨。     

论东亚地区社会信任与经济增长的正相关效应

越来越多的研究表明社会信任是解释经济增长的一个重要变量。不过一般认为华人社会是一个低信任度的社会。但WSV的调查数据证明不仅华人社会，而且整个东亚地区中那些在近40年经历了快速增长的经济体中都有非常高的信任度，这种信任也是这一地区经济增长的源泉。     

社会互动、信任与股市参与

什么影响了居民的股市参与?采用2004年广东省居民调查数据,本文发现,社会互动和信任都推动了居民参与股市。股市低迷造成的普遍性股票投资损失会降低社会互动的积极作用,而社会互动对低学历居民参与股市的正面影响更为明显。此外,高收入、高学历、高年龄的居民股市参与也更积极。我们的研究为资本市场的发展架设了一个新的社会结构和社会特征的政策视角:加强社会互动、提高诚信水平,这些都是推动公众参与股市所不可忽略和或缺的。     

Older or Wealthier? The Impact of Age Adjustment on Wealth Inequality*

Differences in individual wealth holdings are widely viewed as a driving force of economic inequality. However, as this finding relies on cross‐sectional data, a concern is that older is confused with wealthier. We propose a new method to adjust for age effects in cross‐sections, which eliminates wealth inequality due to age, yet preserves inequality arising from other factors. Using a new cross‐country comparable database, we examine the impact of age adjustments on wealth inequality across countries and over time. We find that the most widely used method yields a substantially different picture of age‐adjusted wealth inequality than our method.     

Who benefits from big government? A life satisfaction approach

Which impact does government size have on life satisfaction, and how do effects of bigger government differ between income groups in society? Previous studies typically employed country averages and thus neglected possibly heterogeneous happiness effects between income groups. This paper addresses empirically the effects of government spending on subjective well-being of individuals belonging to different income groups. Our analysis is based on individual data from 25 European countries participating in the European Social Survey. In contrast to most previous studies we take account of the endogeneity between relative income position and reported life satisfaction by an instrumental variable approach. Our results suggest, first, that most government spending categories, including social protection, are on average negatively related to individual well-being. Secondly, estimated marginal effects of health, education and social protection spending at different income levels show that spending increases always have a stronger negative effect on high income groups’ well-being than on low income groups’ life satisfaction. For all government spending categories, marginal happiness effects of higher public spending are clearly negative for income groups at the top.     

Who trusts others more? A cross-European study

Using the European Social Survey, the paper documents the endowments and the individual determinants of trust across Europe. Self-declared trust is higher in northern countries, in particular Scandinavia; it is lower in southern countries, in particular Italy, Portugal and Greece. At the EU-15 level, we find that a number of factors, such as schooling, family background, labor market status, and a recent history of traumatic experiences, are associated with trust. We also find evidence of heterogeneity for some of the determinants across European countries.     

Dividing or uniting Europe? Internet usage in the EU

Using Heckman’s sample selection procedure, we first analyse access to the Internet and then specific Internet usage given individual Internet access, across the EU countries using Eurobarometer data for 2004 and 2005. Internet access varies more within countries than between them. But the reverse is the case for Internet usage given access. Two specific country attributes are identified: first gross national income and the rule of law reflecting the extent to which people have confidence in the security of the Internet. Further variables also emphasize the importance of trust.     

Trade,trust and the rule of law

Well-functioning institutions, both formal (i.e. rule of law) and informal (i.e. trust), facilitate economic exchange. To investigate the nature of the relationship between formal and informal institutions, we analyze bilateral trade patterns in a sample of 16 European countries between 1996–2009. Our results show that trust and rule of law are substitutes, as the positive effect of trust on trade is conditional on the quality of the rule of law. When the rule of law of the importing country increases relative to that of the exporter, the effect of trust on trade decreases. The decline in the effect of trust on trade is less for importers than for exporters, a result that can be attributed to the risk of non-payment that exporters run.     

Social memory,evidence, and conflict

This paper examines an equilibrium model of social memory — a society's vicarious beliefs about its past. We show that incorrect social memory is a key ingredient in creating and perpetuating destructive conflicts.We analyze an infinite-horizon model in which two countries face off each period in a game of conflict characterized by the possibility of mutually destructive “all out war” that yields catastrophic consequences for both sides. Each country is inhabited by a dynastic sequence of individuals. Each individual cares about future individuals in the same country, and can communicate with the next generation of their countrymen using private messages. Social memory is based on these messages, and on physical evidence — a sequence of imperfectly informative public signals of past behavior. We find that if the future is sufficiently important for all individuals, then regardless of the precision of physical evidence from the past there is an equilibrium in which the two countries engage in all out war with arbitrarily high frequency, an outcome that cannot arise in the standard repeated game. In our construction, each new generation “repeats the mistakes” of its predecessors, leading to an endless cycle of destructive behavior.Surprisingly, we find that degrading the quality of information that individuals have about current decisions may “improve” social memory. This in turn ensures that arbitrarily frequent all out wars cannot occur.     

OTHER-REGARDING UZAWA PREFERENCES AND LIVING STANDARD CATCH-UP

This paper provides a new rationale for Uzawa preferences based on social choice; instead of positing that poor people are more patient because they are poor, it posits that poor people should be more patient if they wish their living standards to catch up with richer people. To provide a setting for this new rationale, the present paper studies the socially optimal choice of living standards over time by social planners for countries that, from low levels of total factor productivity (TFP), experience a gradual catch-up of their TFP level with that of the leader country. In the TFP catch-up scenario, the socially optimal choice of consumption and saving based on time additive preferences leads to no catch-up of living standards. To generate living standard catch-up we propose other-regarding Uzawa preferences, in which the rate of time preference is influenced by the gap in living standards between follower country and leader country. This other-regarding specification is consistent with recent findings emphasized in behavioural economics. The other-regarding Uzawa preferences form is illustrated quantitatively by simulating a model of the world economy.     

The autocratic roots of social distrust

This paper presents evidence that autocratic culture adversely affects social trust and political participation. We find that individuals whose ancestors migrated from countries with higher autocracy levels are less likely to trust others and to vote in presidential elections in the U.S. The impact of autocratic culture on trust can last for at least three generations while the impact on voting disappears after one generation. These impacts on trust and voting are also significant across Europe. We further access the robustness of our findings concerning selection into migration and other confounders such as home countries’ economic conditions, human capital stocks, and the strength of family ties.     

National culture and (dis)trust in banks: Cross-country evidence

We examine to what extent a specific aspect of national culture—uncertainty avoidance—can explain cross-country variations in (dis)trust in banks. Relying on data from the World Values Survey, we find that trust in banks is lower in countries that score high for Hofstede's uncertainty avoidance index. Similarly, with Global Findex data, we find that financial exclusion due to a lack of trust in banks is high in high uncertainty avoidance cultures. These results highlight the need for a more culturally aware approach when designing consumer protection measures for the banking sector.     

联结强度与技术创新模式：企业间信任的中介作用

关于合作关系对合作创新的影响,现有研究大多局限于单一的社会网络视角,对网络层次的关系特征如何通过双边层次的关系质量影响技术创新模式的过程欠缺机理性认识。结合社会网络、社会资本和知识转移理论,分析网络联结强度、企业间信任以及技术创新模式三者间关系。利用327份来自全国多地的制造及高新技术企业数据,采用结构方程模型检验方法对研究假设进行检验。结果表明：相对于经济型信任,强联结会带来更多情感型信任;情感型信任更有利于渐进式创新,经济型信任更有利于突破式创新;联结强度对渐进式创新的作用是通过情感型信任传递的,而联结强度对突破式创新的作用是通过经济型信任传递的。     

Social norms, information, and trust among strangers: theory and evidence

Can a social norm of trust and reciprocity emerge among strangers? We investigate this question by examining behavior in an experiment where subjects repeatedly play a two-player binary “trust” game. Players are randomly and anonymously paired with one another in each period. The main questions addressed are whether a social norm of trust and reciprocity emerges under the most extreme information restriction (anonymous community-wide enforcement) or whether trust and reciprocity require additional, individual-specific information about a player’s past history of play and whether that information must be provided freely or at some cost. In the absence of such reputational information, we find that a social norm of trust and reciprocity is difficult to sustain. The provision of reputational information on past individual decisions significantly increases trust and reciprocity, with longer histories yielding the best outcomes. Importantly, we find that making reputational information available at a small cost may also lead to a significant improvement in trust and reciprocity, despite the fact that most subjects do not choose to purchase this information.     

Is the importance of religion in daily life related to social trust? Cross-country and cross-state comparisons

We look at the effect of importance of religion in daily life on social trust, defined as the share of a population that thinks that people in general can be trusted. We make use of new data from the Gallup World Poll for 109 countries and 43 U.S. states. Our empirical results indicate a robust, negative relationship between this measure of religiosity and trust, both internationally and within the U.S. The size of this association increases with the degree of religious diversity.