Optimal ownership in joint ventures with contributions of asymmetric partners

This paper addresses two questions concerning Joint Venture (JV) agreements. We first study the formation and the performance of a JV when the partners’ contribution has a different impact on the JV profits. Then, we check whether the JV is more likely as well as the welfare level improves when the decision on JV profit sharing among partners is delegated to an independent JV management (Management sharing) rather than jointly taken by partners (Coordinated sharing). We find that the firm whose effort has a higher impact on the JV’s profits should have a larger profit share. Moreover, at least in some cases, Management sharing increases both welfare and the probability that the JV is formed.      

Cultural differences,insecure property rights and the mode of entry decision

We develop a theory of a multinational corporation’s optimal mode of entry in a new market. The foreign firm can choose between a licensing agreement, a wholly owned subsidiary or shared control (joint venture). In an environment in which property rights are insecure, opportunism is possible, and the identification of new business opportunities is costly, we show that the relationship between the quality of the institutional environment and the mode of entry decision is non-monotonic. Licensing is preferred if property rights are strictly enforced, while a joint venture is chosen when property rights are poorly enforced. For intermediate situations, the better use of local knowledge made possible by shared control under a joint venture works as a double edged sword. On the one hand, it makes the monitoring activity of the multinational more credible, on the other it offers insurance to both parties, potentially compromising the incentives faced by the local partner. We are grateful to the Centro Studi Luca d’Agliano for providing financial support. For useful comments we would like to thank Klaus Desmet, Cecilia Testa, Henry Wan and Gerald Willmann and seminar participants at Cornell, Ente Luigi Einaudi, Fundacao Getulio Vargas, Kiel, Milano, Universidad de Sao Paolo, the Midwest International Economics Meetings in Indianapolis, SAET VI conference in Rhodes, and the City University of Hong Kong Conference on Intellectual Property Rights.     

Cooperation versus competition in product innovation

This paper analyzes the optimal antitrust policy in the context of a patent race. In a simplified model, we identify the conditions under which allowing cooperation yields greater welfare than imposing competition. In view of our results, we discuss, critically, the current European policy towards R&D cooperation.     

R & D joint ventures and tacit product market collusion

It is shown that R & D joint ventures make it more likely that firms will be able to sustain tacit product-market collusion, all else equal.     

The choice and timing of foreign direct investment under uncertainty

This paper sheds new light on why timing and entry mode should be considered simultaneously in the international investment literature. We derive the profit levels at which it is optimal to switch from exporting to setting up a wholly owned subsidiary, creating a joint venture, or licensing production to a local firm. The preferred entry mode depends on uncertainty about future profits, tax differentials between the home and the foreign country, the cost advantages of local firms, institutional requirements, and the degree of cooperation between partners in a joint venture.     

Joint Ventures versus Contractual Agreements: An Empirical Investigation

In this paper, we empirically investigate the determinants of the governance form of strategic alliances. We use a database with 1,344 worldwide alliances in several industrial sectors. In contrast with previous empirical studies, we find that alliances undertaking R&D activities are more likely to use loose forms of organization (contractual agreements) than more hierarchical ones (joint ventures), and this result is even stronger when the alliance takes place in technologically sophisticated sectors. Moreover, we show that alliances between rival firms tend also to be organized with forms closer to arm’s length transactions. When the scope of an alliance is multidimensional or the alliance is an international one, however, firms prefer more hierarchical organizations such as joint ventures. This paper was partially written while the first author was visiting the University of the Basque Country. We would like to thank Reinhilde Veugelers and the project FWO spillovers 6.0131.98 at the Katholieke Universiteit of Leuven for the use of the K.U. database. Financial support from projects Progetto Giovani Ricercatori – 1999 Universitá di Udine, SEJ 2004-02172/ECON, 9/UPV 00035.321-13560/2001, UPV 00038.321-13503/2001 is gratefully acknowledged. We are also indebted to two anonymous referees for their helpful comments.     

从"201钢铁案"看美国贸易政策中的单边主义

布什政府上台以来。从优先考虑国内政治因素出发。通过“201条款”、“301条款”等单边主义做法对贸易对方国进行经济制裁。背离了WTO的贸易政策，对多边贸易体系和贸易自由化趋势造成严重损害，暴露了美国的经济霸权。     

合资公司控制和学习的关系研究

现有文献在重视合资公司中控制对学习绩效产生影响的同时,却忽视了学习对控制的反作用机制。本文贡献了该领域的文献。本文认为,(1)只有在学习类型和控制方式匹配的条件下,才有助于学习绩效的提高;(2)对合资伙伴的学习将降低伙伴企业强调正式控制的可能性;(3)如果一方的学习使另一方察觉到议价力转移,越有可能强调正式控制;(4)一方的学习导致越来越依赖另一方完成合资公司任务,学习方越有可能要求社会控制。本文最后在结论基础上提出了若干建议。     

Organisational change in new ventures in Chinese context: the open innovation

This paper uses case study method to examine the acquisition process of information and funding through the implementation of open innovation (OI) in new ventures in Chinese context. We find that in the process of accessing to the marketing or technical information through OI, the most important thing for enterprises is to establish trust and cooperation with familiar partners, and trust is derived from existing social relations. In the process of funding acquisition through OI, the most important thing for enterprises is to strike a balance between gains and losses.     

Termination restrictions and investment in general training

Conditional separation payments efficiently increase firms’ investment in general training if the latter is not directly contractible. Since training is vested in the worker on separation, a firm's return to training is zero when a match ends or, more generally, when the firm's outside return is binding. Large enough conditional separation penalties ensure that, independently from outside opportunities, the ex post situation is one of bilateral monopoly. This allows the firm to capture a positive share of the return to the general component of training in all states of nature. A fixed wage contract and large enough separation penalties ensure that the firm's investment decision is fully efficient if training is general in Becker's (1964) sense.     

The Status Quo Analysis of New Ventures in China

New venture has developed as an important topic in entrepreneurship research. In this paper we analyze the status quo of new Ventures in China from four aspects： capital demand scale of new ventures, the characteristics and motivation of entrepreneurs, the attitude of new ventures toward the intervention of venture capital firms and the external environmental factors of hindering new ventures. The data in this research come from 104 ventures in four cities （Peking, Shanghai, Changchun and Shenyang） in China. The empirical analysis indicates that there are many problems in the development of the new ventures in China.     

Bargained shares in joint ventures among asymmetric partners: Is the matthew effect catalyzing?

The impact of asymmetries between partners on the likelihood of establishing successful research and development and production joint ventures relative to the alternative of own development is assessed analytically. The often empirically observed 50/50 sharing rule in asymmetric alliances is compared to a bargained rule, where asymmetries in absorptive capacity, as well as R&D and production efficiency are explicitly taken into account. Industry settings in which successful asymmetric alliances are more likely to occur are pinpointed. The analysis focuses on the influence of the size and format of these asymmetries, the technological appropriability and complementarity between partners on the incentives for both partners to cooperate as well as to cheat on the venture agreement. The results are compared to a setting where the joint venture is only involved in R&D.     

Termination of dynamic contracts in an equilibrium labor market model

In an equilibrium model of the labor market, workers and firms enter into dynamic contracts that can potentially last forever, but are subject to optimal terminations. Upon termination, the firm hires a new worker, and the worker who is terminated receives a termination contract from the firm and is then free to go back to the labor market to seek new employment opportunities and enter into new dynamic contracts. The model permits only two types of equilibrium terminations that resemble, respectively, the two kinds of labor market separations that are typically observed in practice: involuntary layoffs and voluntary retirements. The model allows for the simultaneous determination of a large set of important labor market variables including equilibrium unemployment and labor force participation. An algorithm is formulated for computing the model's equilibria. I then simulate the model to show quantitatively that the model is consistent with a set of important stylized facts of the labor market.     

Output sharing in partnerships as a common pool resource management instrument

Many economic environments are susceptible to either free-riding or overuse. Common pool resources (CPRs) fall in the latter category. Equally sharing the output of a CPR in partnerships introduces a free-riding incentive that may offset overuse. Socially optimal harvesting can be induced by dividing the set of resource users into a number of partnerships in such a way that each resource users’ tendency to over-harvest from the resource is exactly offset by his or her tendency to free-ride on the contributions of others. We conduct a laboratory experiment to assess the performance of this partnership solution by introducing equal-sharing subgroups of size one, four and six into a twelve-person CPR environment. Group assignment is either unchanging throughout a 15 period session or randomly mixed each decision round. Group size significantly affects aggregate effort, while group assignment makes no significant difference. The distribution of total payoffs is more equitable for randomly mixed groups. Implications of our results for voluntary and centralized implementations of the partnership solution are discussed.

米非司酮片联合米索前列醇片在带器宫内早孕中的应用

目的探讨米非司酮片联合米索前列醇片在带器宫内早孕中减少并发症的作用。方法选取2010年2月至2014年2月本院接诊的B超提示带器宫内妊娠6~10周要求终止妊娠且无禁忌证的63例患者,随机将其分为观察组(n=32例)与对照组(n=31例),观察组患者予以米非司酮片联合米索前列醇片后行清宫取环术,对照组患者直接行人工流产取环术,观察两组患者的取环情况。结果观察组宫颈松弛程度、取环难度、人流综合征的发生情况均优于对照组,手术时间、胚囊排出时间均短于对照组,差异有统计学意义(P均<0.05)。结论带器宫内早孕口服米非司酮片联合米索前列醇片再行清宫取环术的效果优于直接行人工流产取环术,患者宫颈松弛效果理想,清宫完全,手术时间短,易取环,人流综合征发生率低。     

FTA中TBT条款对中国全球价值链攀升的影响研究

基于2000—2014年中国签订的自由贸易协定（FTA）中技术性贸易壁垒（TBT）条款文本,使用自然语言文本处理法量化了中国各行业在FTA中TBT条款的合作水平,实证研究FTA中TBT条款对中国各行业全球价值链位置的影响。实证结果表明,FTA中TBT条款分别从降低贸易成本、促进技术创新、提高制度质量三个路径促进了中国各行业在全球价值链中的攀升。进一步分析发现,FTA中TBT条款对制造业和其他行业全球价值链攀升的促进作用明显,对中国服务业全球价值链攀升的影响不显著;相对于高技术制造业,低技术制造业的全球价值链攀升更容易受FTA中TBT条款的影响。中国政府应该更加积极地参与FTA中与贸易伙伴国的高水平TBT条款的谈判协商,充分发挥其对各行业全球价值链攀升的促进作用,同时重点关注对FTA中TBT条款敏感度较高的行业。     

考虑终止权的两阶段研发投资激励和合同设计

针对产品研发过程中的投资激励问题,分别建立了存在终止权和不存在终止权两种情况下的两阶段研发投资决策模型,并利用逆向归纳法讨论了委托方的偿付合同设计。研究结果表明:当第一阶段的研发结果为高质量时,代理人在第二阶段的投资积极性更高,代理人在第一阶段的投资水平和委托方支付的最优偿付都随着低质量时研发成功的比例系数而单调递减;研发活动的终止威胁导致代理人的投资积极性降低;在一定范围内,或有终止权偿付合同能够缓解信息不对称时的投资不足问题、提高双方的研发合作效率。     

Public knowledge partnerships in European research projects and knowledge creation across R&D institutional sectors

This paper investigates the role of public knowledge partnerships in EU-funded framework programmes (FP) on knowledge creation across a sample of European countries. Different from previous studies, we investigate whether the impact of participation in FP on new knowledge (patents) differs across private companies, universities and public research centres. We find that, while all institutional sectors benefit from joint projects, the main benefits (in terms of patenting activity) go to universities and public research centres, while private companies benefit less. We also find evidence of important complementarities between participation in international research projects and internal innovation drivers (researchers), thus highlighting the crucial role of domestic absorptive capacity for fully benefiting from international cooperation in R&D projects.     

Profit sharing in unique Nash equilibrium: Characterization in the two-agent case

Two agents jointly operate a decreasing marginal returns technology to produce a private good. We characterize the class of output-sharing rules for which the labor-supply game has a unique Nash equilibrium. It consists of two families: rules of the serial type which protect a small user from the negative externality imposed by a large user, and rules of the reverse serial type, where one agent effectively employs the other agent's labor. Exactly two rules satisfy symmetry; a result in sharp contrast with Moulin and Shenker's characterization of their serial mechanism as the unique cost-sharing rule satisfying the same incentives property [Moulin, H., Shenker, S., 1992. Serial cost sharing. Econometrica 60 (5), 1009–1037]. We also show that the familiar stand-alone test characterizes the class of fixed-path methods under our incentives criterion [Friedman, E.J., 2004. Strong monotonicity in surplus sharing. Econ. Theory 23, 643–658].     

跨国合资企业形成知识合作剩余的创造动因分析

跨国合资企业的形成有其必然性与合理性。从合作剩余的概念着手,分析了跨国合资企业知识合作剩余产生的源泉,解释了跨国合资企业形成的知识合作剩余创造机理,为我国企业跨国经营与应对外资进入提供了管理思路。