Trade costs and foreign direct investment

This paper focuses on an apparent conflict between the theory of foreign direct investment (FDI) and recent trends in the globalized world. The bulk of FDI is horizontal rather than vertical, and standard theory predicts that horizontal FDI is discouraged when trade costs fall. This seems to conflict with the experience of the 1990s, when trade liberalisation and technological change led to dramatic reductions in trade costs yet FDI grew much faster than trade. Two possible resolutions to this paradox are explored. First, horizontal FDI in trading blocs is encouraged by intra-bloc trade liberalisation, because foreign firms establish plants in one country as export platforms to serve the bloc as a whole. Second, cross-border mergers, quantitatively more important than greenfield FDI, are encouraged rather than discouraged by falling trade costs.     

Welfare Effects of Foreign Direct Investment: Cost Saving vs. Signaling

We compare the effects of two types of foreign direct investment (FDI) (viz., FDI for trade cost saving and FDI for signaling foreign cost of production) on consumer surplus, profit of the host-country firm and host-country welfare. We show that the effects are dramatically different. If the reason for FDI is to save trade cost, FDI (compared to export) always makes the consumers better off and the host-country producer worse off, while the effect on host-country welfare is ambiguous. However, if the FDI is to signal the foreign cost of production, FDI (compared to export) always makes the host-country producer better off and increases host-country welfare, while it makes the consumers almost always worse off.     

Brotherhood of competition: Foreign Direct Investment and domestic mergers

We examine the effects of mergers on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and on shaping national policies regarding FDI. In this work we develop a partial equilibrium model of an oligopolistic industry in which a number of domestic and foreign firms compete in the market for a homogeneous good in a host country. It is assumed that the number of foreign firms is endogenous and can be affected by the government policy in the host country. The government sets the policy (subsidies) to maximise social welfare. We allow domestic mergers. Our main results suggest that when the host country government imposes discriminatory lump-sum subsidy in favor of foreign firms, a merger of domestic firms will increase the number of FDI if the subsidy level is exogenous. With an endogenous level of subsidy, a merger of domestic firms will decrease (increase) the welfare if the domestic firms are more (less) efficient.     

An Assignment Theory of Foreign Direct Investment

We develop an assignment theory to analyse the volume and composition of foreign direct investment (FDI). Firms conduct FDI by either engaging in greenfield investment or in cross-border acquisitions. Cross-border acquisitions involve firms trading heterogeneous corporate assets to exploit complementarities, while greenfield FDI involves setting up a new production division in the foreign country. In equilibrium, greenfield FDI and cross-border acquisitions coexist within the same industry, but the composition of FDI between these modes varies with firm and country characteristics. Firms engaging in greenfield investment are systematically more efficient than those engaging in cross-border acquisitions. Furthermore, most FDI takes the form of cross-border acquisitions when production-cost differences between countries are small, while greenfield investment plays a more important role for FDI from high-cost into low-cost countries. These results capture important features of the data.     

“一带一路”背景下我国跨境并购现状、问题及对策建议

从国际上来看,跨国并购是对外直接投资的主流。随着我国企业"走出去"步伐不断加快,中国跨国企业对发达国家企业发起的跨国并购逐渐增多,已有不少成功案例,但总体来说成功率并不高。与发达国家企业发起的并购相比,新兴国家企业对发达国家企业发起的跨国并购有其独特的特点。基于此,分析我国跨国并购的现状及存在的问题,并提出对策建议。     

Pollution Haven with Technological Externalities Arising from Foreign Direct Investment

This paper presents a two-stage game, in which in the first stage two multinational firms (MNFs) seeking pollution havens choose a location, that is, whether to export to or undertake FDI in the host country, and in the second stage, these two MNFs and a firm in the host country play a Cournot game. The MNFs’ location decisions are influenced by the fixed cost of FDI, the spillover of technologies to a foreign firm, and pollution emission standards in the host and home countries. There exist multiple equilibria in the location pattern because of the technology spillover accompanied by FDI. In addition, the analysis leads to the possibility of an equilibrium based on the Prisoners’ Dilemma. When the host country relaxes emission standards, the MNFs choose FDI, although their profits are higher if both choose to export instead. This provides a rationale for the FDI source country’s intervention to restrict the MNFs’ FDI according to the level of environmental regulation in the host country.     

Cross-border mergers in vertically related industries

We construct a tractable model of an oligopolistic industry that allows us to capture the role of the vertical structure in the incentives for and implications of cross-border horizontal mergers. We show that vertical integration can increase the gains from cross-border mergers. We also demonstrate how market concentration interacts with costs in the decision of a relatively efficient foreign firm located in one country (source) to merge with a disintegrated or an integrated firm in another country (target) when the industry is vertically related. Absent any merger incentives in an autarkic equilibrium, we demonstrate that vertical integration can raise the incentives for diversification in production and add to the gains from cross-border horizontal mergers. Any additional gain from cross-border horizontal mergers, due to the existence of a vertically integrated production structure, is shown to be sensitive to the relative market concentration across countries. Cross-border mergers will be triggered by a relatively cost-efficient source taking over a disintegrated target when pre-merger competition among the disintegrated firms is relatively intense but, otherwise, the initial target will be a vertically integrated firm.     

The Effects of Trade Liberalization On Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergers*

This paper analyzes the effects of tariff reductions on horizontal mergers in a Cournot oligopoly in a two-country world. It is shown that for mergers between two domestic firms and for cross-border mergers which supply both markets from a foreign plant, unilateral tariff reduction encourages mergers which concentrate market power at the expense of mergers which reduce cost, while bilateral tariff reductions have the opposite effect, encouraging mergers which significantly reduce cost. Cross-border mergers which continue to supply each market from a local plant are discouraged by both unilateral and bilateral tariff reduction.     

Cross‐border mergers and acquisitions: does the exchange rate matter? Some evidence for Canada

Abstract.  Theoretical and empirical studies investigating the relationship between the exchange rate and FDI have generated mixed results. Using bilateral Canadian-U.S. industry level count data on cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) and conditioning on industry tariff rates, value added share of industries, industry M&A trend activity, and the number of establishments, we find evidence that a real dollar depreciation of the home currency leads to an increase in the probability of foreign M&As but only in high R&D industries. These empirical results are consistent with Blonigen's asset acquisition hypothesis. Results on European M&As of Canadian firms also lean towards this result.     

The impact of multinational entry on domestic market structure and investment

We model the impact of different modes of multinational entry on the choices of domestic firms. Focusing on the competitive effects of foreign entry for the host country we demonstrate that greenfield investment will increase competition only if it is not countered by anti-competitive reactions on the part of the domestic firms. Together with cross-border mergers and acquisitions the model, thus, provides two alternative explanations for the increase in concentration ratios in industries with mostly horizontal foreign direct investment. Moreover, foreign presence is shown to raise total investment in the local industry at the cost of crowding out domestic investment.     

Welfare and equity impacts of cross-border factor mobility in Bangladesh: A general equilibrium analysis

We develop a dynamic computable general equilibrium model with cross-border factor mobility to assess the impacts of a foreign wage shock and the effects of counteractive policy measures in Bangladesh. The model features migration of workers and foreign direct investment (FDI) in the ready-made garments (RMG) sector. Our simulation results show that returning migrants induced by a foreign wage fall would reduce household welfare by lowering wages and increasing unemployment, particularly for unskilled workers in the domestic labor market. To counteract this negative shock, FDI promotion in the RMG sector and a human-capital development program are considered. The former policy minimizes the negative impacts of the foreign labor market shock, while a combination of both policies is more equitable.     

Measurement and Modeling of the Economic Effects of Trade and Investment Barriers in Services

In this paper, the authors adapt the latest version of the Michigan Model of World Production and Trade to incorporate cross-border services trade and foreign direct investment (FDI). Firms are taken to be monopolistically competitive. Each firm produces products differentiated by the original R&D that defines the basic product and by location of production. Each firm faces a fixed cost in the country where production occurs, and sets an optimal mark-up for sales from each location. Firms locate production for export or for local consumption depending on the type of barriers faced. Barriers to trade in services take the form of an additional cost of employing variable capital and labor. The paper reports the impact on welfare, trade, factor prices, sectoral output, economies of scale, and activities of multinationals following the introduction of national treatment of multinational firms in all countries.     

Unbundling institutional determinants of multinational investments

Previous studies often examined how a broad-based institution affects foreign direct investment (FDI) flows across countries. However, analysis of differential impacts of two or more constituent institutions within a broad-based institution appears to be more useful for policy decision-making. There is a paucity of studies on how constituent institutions within a broad measure of institution affect FDI across countries. Our article constitutes the first attempt in bridging this gap. In this article, we examine the relative effects of property rights institution (PI) and contracting institution (CI) on investment flows. Our results show that PI is much more important than CI in determining the cross-border flows of FDI and affiliate sales. Moreover, PI is found to be more important for FDI than for affiliate sales, indicating that final goods are less of a concern for being expropriated by governments and powerful elites than capital goods. Through unbundling a broad-based institution and examining how the constituent institutions affect investments flows, our article provides practical location decisions for investments in FDI, mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and affiliate sales.     

Opening services markets within Europe: Modelling foreign establishments in a CGE framework

Foreign direct investment (FDI) in services is often more important to supply foreign markets than cross-border trade. A complete analysis of services liberalization therefore requires the modelling of FDI. This paper presents the treatment of FDI in our CGE model WorldScan based on the ideas of Petri [Petri, P.A., 1997. Foreign direct investment in a computable general equilibrium framework. Paper Prepared for the Conference, Making APEC work: Economic Challenges and Policy Alternatives, March 13–14. Keio University, Tokyo] and Markusen [Markusen, J.R., 2002. Multinational Firms and The Theory of International Trade. MIT Press] that firms which establish affiliates abroad also transfer firm-specific knowledge. Consequently, capital owned by suppliers from home and foreign countries are not perfect substitutes. We apply this model to the proposals of the European Commission to open up services markets. Even when FDI in services could increase by 20% to 35%, the overall economic impact is limited. Our assessment suggests that GDP in the EU25 could increase up to 0.4%. These effects could be up to 0.8% higher if foreign capital also increases the overall productivity of the services sector.     

Foreign Direct Investment and Exports with Growing Demand

We explore entry into a foreign market with uncertain demand growth. A multinational can serve the foreign demand by two modes, or by a combination thereof: it can export its products, or it can create productive capacity via foreign direct investment (FDI). The advantage of FDI is that it allows for lower marginal cost than exporting does. The disadvantage is that FDI is irreversible and, hence, entails the risk of creating under-utilized capacity in the case that the market turns out to be small. The presence of demand uncertainty and irreversibility gives rise to an interior solution, where the multinational, under certain conditions, both exports its products and does FDI.     

The regional distribution of foreign investment in Russia

This article conducts a plant‐level study of the factors affecting foreign direct investment (FDI) inflow to a large opening economy endowed with specific factor advantages. We conclude that the distribution of FDI in Russian regions depends on market access and can be most notably described by the knowledge‐capital framework. Factor endowments built by natural resources are more successful in explaining the location decisions of export–platform affiliates. The impact of natural resources depends on how the availability of these resources is measured. The results reject the crowding out effects of resource FDI and prove co‐location mode, when service investments are attracted to resource‐rich regions. Labour cost advantages better explain the preferences of non‐trading service affiliates.     

Who Benefits from Voluntary Export Restraints?

Using a simple Cournot-oligopoly model, the paper examines the effects of voluntary export restraints (VERs) on profits, market shares, consumers' surplus, and domestic welfare when the domestic market is open to foreign direct investment (FDI) or exports from a third country. A VER may induce FDI from the VER-restricted country or exports from the third country. Under certain circumstances, the domestic firm loses from a VER. Even if the domestic firm gains, the increase in the market share of the domestic country induced by the VER could be less than that of the third country.     

Analyzing the effects of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership on FDI in a CGE framework with firm heterogeneity

The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is a free trade agreement (FTA) that is currently under negotiation among China and 15 other Asian countries. It is one of several potential mega-regional FTAs in the Asia-Pacific region. In this paper we investigate the potential effect of RCEP on foreign direct investment (FDI) with a focus on China using an innovative computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. The model is built on the theory of firm heterogeneity extended to FDI. The framework is able to capture FDI increases along both the intensive and extensive margins. Liberalization under RCEP is simulated as impacting on FDI both directly through FDI liberalization and indirectly through trade liberalization. Our simulation results suggest that RCEP would encourage significant increases in FDI to China through both these pathways. While competition from imports drives out the least productive foreign owned firms, export expansion of firms using FDI will lead to an overall increase in foreign investment. In addition, the facilitation of trade in intermediate goods tends to promote vertical FDI. The direct FDI effect from investment liberalization will evidently promote FDI from partners. Projected economic gains to China from RCEP are in the range of US$103–214 billion, or 1.1–2.2% of GDP.     

Buyer groups as strategic commitments

Buyer cooperatives, buyer alliances, and horizontal mergers are often perceived as attempts to increase buyer power. In contrast to prior research emphasizing group size, I show that even small buyer groups composed of buyers with heterogeneous preferences can increase price competition among rival sellers by committing to purchase exclusively from one seller. Without transfer payments, at least one buyer group exists for each pair of sellers and buyer groups membership is chosen to achieve indifference between the two sellers. With transfer payments, and just two sellers, the grand coalition is a coalition-proof subgame perfect equilibrium (CP-SPNE), though equilibria with arbitrarily many buyer groups also exist. With three sellers (and with more sellers when the distribution of buyers is symmetric), a CP-SPNE always exists, all coalition-proof equilibria are payoff equivalent and have at least one buyer group for each pair of firms, so the grand coalition is not an equilibrium.     

污染产业转移视角下FDI环境外部性的跨界效应

通过FDI方式的污染产业转移会产生环境负外部性,在空间上存在跨界效应.这体现在承接污染产业会直接带来环境污染,从而引起居民福利的大量损失,而且还会因为自然因素导致跨界污染.目前,FDI的环境影响主要集中在东部地区,但有向中西部地区转移的趋势.许多地方政府为吸引FDI而进行的环境竞争,对这种跨界效应会起到相当的放大作用.因而需要采取调整政府人员业绩考核机制、鼓励地方政府增加环境投资、中西部地区按照全国主体功能区划要求制定分类的FDI环境管理政策、实行跨区域联合治理等措施,尽可能减少甚至消除FDI环境外部性的跨界效应.