Education, segregation and marital sorting: theory and an application to the UK

This paper presents a model of the intergenerational transmission of education and marital sorting. Parents matter both because of their household income and because their human capital determines the distribution of a child's disutility from making an effort to become skilled. We show that an increase in segregation has potentially ambiguous effects on the proportion of individuals that become skilled in the steady state, and hence on marital sorting, the personal and household income distribution, and welfare. We calibrate the steady state of our model to UK statistics. We find that an increase in the correlation of spouses in their years of education will bring about a small increase in the proportion of skilled individuals when the relative supply of skilled individuals is variable at the family level and a decrease when this supply is fixed. Ex-ante utility (of an unborn individual) increases in the first case and decreases in the second. The welfare effect of increased sorting is negative for unskilled individuals and positive for skilled individuals. Increased segregation always leads to an increase in welfare inequality between skilled and unskilled individuals.     

教育融资体制对代际流动性与不平等程度的动态影响：基于OL G模型的分析

传统的代际流动性研究并没有对代际流动性的短期值和长期值作有效区分,也未考虑人力资本形成中的不确定性,因而“代际流动性越高则不平等程度越低”这一分析结论并未在中国的现实中呈现。文章据此通过构建一个代际交叠模型比较分析了公共教育体制和市场教育体制下的代际流动性。模型动态分析发现：(1)公共教育体制下的不平等程度的长期值比市场教育体制下更低。(2)代际流动性短期值的升高并不总是伴随着不平等程度的下降,当社会受到某种剧烈冲击时可能发生两者同升同降的情况。(3)政府进行激进式的教育体制改革会使人力资本收敛速率发生跃升,并且使不平等程度的短期值和长期值都增大,而代际流动性则会在突降后在逐渐收敛到新的更低的稳态值。(4)人力资本积累不确定性参数值反映了个体不可观测的技能或先天禀赋,是影响代际流动性和不平等程度的重要因素。不确定性的突然上升会使不平等程度的短期值迅速上升,并且会使不平等程度的长期值达到新的高位,虽然代际流动性短期值也会迅速上升,但依旧会逐渐收敛到以前的稳态值不变。文章的研究有益于厘清代际流动性与不平等程度的复杂关系,也能为相关实证研究提供参考。     

Low level equilibrium trap,unemployment, efficiency of education system,child labour and human capital formation

This paper builds an overlapping generations household economy model to examine the impact of adult unemployment on the human capital formation of a child and on child labour, as viewed through the lens of the adult’s expectations of future employability. The model indicates that the higher the adult unemployment rate in the skilled sector, the lesser is the time allocated by an unskilled adult towards schooling of her child. We also find that an increase in the unskilled adult’s wage may or may not decrease child labour in the presence of unemployment. The model predicts that an increase in child wage increases schooling and human capital growth rate only if the adults in the unskilled sector earn less than subsistence consumption expenditure. As the responsiveness of skilled wage to human capital increases, schooling and human capital growth rates increase. The model dynamics bring out the importance of education efficiency and parental human capital in human capital formation of the child. In the case of an inefficient education system, generations will be trapped into low level equilibrium. Only in the presence of an efficient education system, steady growth of human capital is possible. Suitable policies that may be framed to escape the child labour trap are discussed as well.     

Endogenous Persistent Occupations and Inequality

The paper argues that human capital is the leading force determining inequality persistence. We show that, in a context of a perfect capital market where agents inherit human capital and wealth, it is the inherited human capital level that determines agents' occupational choice and investment. The critical assumption is that the entrepreneurial activity is of increasing returns to scale. This creates a higher profile of revenue for entrepreneurs. Although every agent can choose to become an entrepreneur, and although there is no barrier of entry in entrepreneurship, only those who receive a relatively higher human capital will do so. Agents whose inherited human capital is lower than the human capital threshold, endogenously determined, are better off becoming workers. Even in the context of a perfect capital market, which allows less endowed agents to borrow and invest in education, it turns out that the agents who inherit a low level of human capital bear a greater utility cost in their education investment. So they are better off investing less in education, lending their savings, and working as workers. As a result, agents' occupational choice depends on the intergenerational transmission of human capital. In the long run, the population is polarized into the rich entrepreneurs and the poor workers, magnifying inequality persistence in human capital level and revenue.     

The intergenerational transmission of maternal human capital and the gender gap in educational attainment

An intergenerational effect of maternal (and not paternal) human capital on offspring's human capital production is a mechanism that induces males and females to attain different education levels. This mechanism allows for explanations of the reversal in the gender education gap.     

Family linkages,social interactions,and investment in human capital: A theoretical analysis

This paper introduces parent–child interactions into the Beckerian model of human capital. The acquisition of human capital, jointly determined by parental investment and child effort, is an equilibrium outcome of the intergenerational interactions, which is Pareto efficient within the family. We show that the equilibrium output of human capital is not affected by the parental authority over child behavior, but it is usually lower than the level that maximizes the instantaneous aggregate family welfare. In a family with more than one child, siblings not only compete for parental investments but also directly interact with each other in their effort choices. Exploring intragenerational connections and their interplay with intergenerational forces, we present a more complete theory of family linkages in human development and its implications for the rise and fall of families. Social interactions among children from different families induce intragenerational feedback effects that are further amplified by intrafamily interactions and accelerate regression toward the mean in the economic status of families.     

家庭借贷约束、公共教育支出与社会流动性

人力资本投资是增强社会流动性的重要手段,然而借贷约束使得底层家庭无力对子女进行最优的人力资本投资;与此同时,富裕家庭则不受借贷约束的影响,总体结果是社会流动性减弱。利用中国健康与养老追踪调查和全国综合社会调查数据,本文发现,借贷约束确实提高了居民收入和教育的代际传递弹性,降低了社会流动性。在匹配政府公共教育支出数据后发现,公共教育支出可以缓解家庭层面人力资本投资的不足,提高教育水平的代际流动性。     

Management Ability, Long-run Growth, and Poverty Traps

This study establishes an R&D-based growth model that includes the functional difference between labor and human capital in the production of goods. In our analysis, human capital is used by the managers in the manufacturing process. Such an allocation of human capital yields three possible steady states: endogenous growth, poverty traps, and multiple equilibria. Economies are sorted into these steady states according to the endowments of labor, human capital, and knowledge. Thus, the obtained steady states explain some economic growth patterns, such as polarization and leapfrogging of economies.     

The Intergenerational Overlap and Human Capital Formation*

A new microeconomic explanation for the divergent experiences of economies in forming human capital is proposed. It is suggested that the positive effect of a longer life expectancy on human capital formation arises from two separate effects: a life‐expectancy effect and a prolonged intergenerational overlap effect. It is argued that the duration of the overlap between generations and the associated parental support can affect the marginal cost of human capital formation and hence its level: parental support is cheaper than market financing. The strong correlation between the formation of human capital and life expectancy is thus attributed not merely to a higher marginal benefit arising from a longer payback period but also to a lower marginal cost arising from a prolonged intergenerational overlap. Conditions are provided under which a longer overlap results in a higher level of per capita output.     

To draft or not to draft? Inefficiency, generational incidence, and political economy of military conscription

We study the military draft as a form of intergenerational redistribution, taking into account endogenous human capital formation. Introducing the military draft initially benefits the older generation while it harms the young and all future generations. As it distorts human capital formation more severely than an equivalent intergenerational transfer using public debt or pay-as-you-go pensions, the draft can be abolished in a Pareto-improving way if age-dependent taxes are available. In the absence of age-specific taxes, the political allure of the draft can be explained by the specific intergenerational incidence of its costs and benefits.     

PRIVATE AND PUBLIC EDUCATION: HUMAN CAPITAL ACCUMULATION UNDER PARENTAL TEACHING*

This paper examines a simple overlapping generations model of human capital accumulation under both the public and private education regimes. Both young individuals and their parents allocate time to human capital accumulation. Under the public education regime, the government collects tax to finance expenditure for education resources. We show that there exists a level of tax which maximizes the speed of human capital accumulation because of parental teaching; and, if the government chooses tax rates adequately, human capital grows faster and welfare levels become higher under the public education regime than under the private.     

The role of intergenerational mobility in internal migration

This paper investigates the role of intergenerational mobility in the internal migration decisions of families. The geographic variation in intergenerational mobility suggests that if parents value their children's human capital accumulation and future outcomes, they would have an incentive to move to areas with a higher upward mobility. To identify the effect of intergenerational mobility on family migration, we first use an instrumental variable approach, based on a heteroskedastic covariance restriction, which addresses measurement-error and omitted-variable biases. Then, we apply the semiparametric maximum score estimation method to our empirical model, which yields a consistent estimator when families' choice sets are partially observed. We find that highly educated families with school-aged children choose areas that favor upward mobility. Our welfare analysis indicates that a unit increase in the absolute upward mobility of a commuting zone is equivalent to approximately a $722 higher mean wage in the local labor market.     

Parental nurturing and adverse effects of redistribution

This paper suggests that if parental nurturing is a dominating force in human capital formation then income redistribution may not promote economic growth. In particular, if, consistently with empirical evidence, parental human capital complements investment in a child’s education and yields increasing returns in the intergenerational production of human capital, income redistribution may have an adverse impact on the growth rate of average human capital. Redistribution shifts resources towards the less educationally-productive families and thus in the presence of credit markets imperfections and increasing returns, it reduces the aggregate level of investment in human capital. Moreover, if the degree of increasing returns is sufficiently large to produce sustained growth, this adverse effect on human capital formation may outweigh the conventional beneficial effects of redistribution that arises from the interaction between a production technology exhibiting diminishing returns and credit market imperfections.     

Human capital investment,credentialing, and wage differentials

This study considers how individuals determine at what ratio they will invest in two different types of education. The first type contributes to the development of labor skills, while the other does not. We refer to the former as human capital investment and the latter as unproductive investment, which improves test scores but has no beneficial effect on students' human capital. We formulate an overlapping‐generations economy in which the rich and poor households invest in both types of education. We find that the ratio of human capital investment to unproductive investment is lower in the economy with medium size of the wage differentials. In a dynamic analysis, we identify two patterns of stable steady states for the dynamics of the wage differentials, namely, no‐inequality and high‐inequality steady states. Further, we show that a rapid increase in the level of skill‐biased technology may cause a switch from a steady state with no‐inequality to one with high inequality. This causes at least a temporary increase in the ratio of unproductive investment during the transition to the new steady state.     

A model of the optimal allocation of government expenditures

Government expenditures can be used for various socioeconomic objectives, including public education, consumption of public goods and services, and social protection. This paper analyzes the optimal allocation of public expenditures among these competing functions. We establish an overlapping generations model with heterogeneous individuals in which the government optimally chooses income tax, transfer payment, educational spending, and public consumption. Our model characterizes the transitional dynamics and the steady state of each function with and without a pay‐as‐you‐go intergenerational contract. We also conduct a simulation illustrating that the presence of an intergenerational contract may raise public consumption and social welfare in the steady state.     

Intergenerational transfer,human capital and long-term growth in China under the one child policy

We suggest that the demographic changes caused by the one child policy (OCP) may not harm China's long-term growth. This is because of the higher human capital accumulation induced by the intergenerational transfer arrangements under China's poor-functioning formal social security system. Parents raise their children and depend on them for support when they reach an advanced age. A decrease in the number of children prompted by the OCP results in parents investing more in their children's education to ensure retirement consumption. In addition, decreased childcare costs strengthen educational investment through an income effect. Using a calibrated model, a benchmark with the OCP is compared to three counterfactual experiments without the OCP. Output in 2025 without OCP decreases about 4% under moderate estimates. The output gain comes from a greatly increased educational investment driven by fewer children (11.4 years of schooling rather than 8.1). Our model sheds new light on the prospects of China's long-term growth by emphasizing the OCP's growth enhancing role through human capital formation under intergenerational transfer arrangements.     

The taxation of capital returns in overlapping generations models

This paper shows that in the Diamond (1965) overlapping generations economy with production and capital savings, there is a period-by-period balanced fiscal policy supporting a steady state allocation that Pareto-improves upon the laissez-faire competitive equilibrium steady state (whether dynamically inefficient or efficient) without resorting to intergenerational transfers. The policy consists of taxing linearly (or subsidizing, in the dynamically efficient case) the returns to capital, while balancing the budget period by period through a lump-sum transfer (or tax, respectively) in second period. This intervention grants every generation the highest steady state utility attainable through markets (i.e. remunerating factors by their marginal productivities and without transfers) which under laissez-faire is not a competitive equilibrium outcome. A transition from the competitive equilibrium steady state to this other steady state is also Pareto-improving when the former is dynamically inefficient. The result disentangles from redistributive considerations the impact of the taxation of capital returns on steady state welfare, and thus provides a rationale for the taxation of capital returns that is based on efficiency considerations and not on redistributive goals.     

Welfare improving distributionally neutral tax reforms

In a new model with incomplete markets, I quantitatively determine tax reforms that are welfare improving, distributionally neutral, and leave the budget balance unchanged in the long run. I consider a new reform. I eliminate capital income taxation and replace it with progressive consumption taxation, consisting of taxing necessities and luxuries at different rates. I compare steady states under various tax regimes. I find that progressive rather than uniform consumption taxation generates higher welfare gains in the long run and during the transition to the steady state. While this type of reform achieves redistribution neutrality only in the long run, it generates welfare gains for the whole population during the transition.     

Environmental quality,the macroeconomy,and intergenerational distribution

The paper studies the dynamic allocation effects and intergenerational welfare consequences of environmental taxes. To this end, environmental externalities are introduced in a Blanchard–Yaari overlapping generations model of a small open economy. A rise in environmental taxes – taking into account pre-existing distortionary taxes and endogenous labor supply – is shown to yield an efficiency gain if agents care enough for the environment. The benefits are unevenly distributed across generations because agents are heterogeneous in their capital ownership. An accompanying debt policy can be designed – prescribing debt accumulation at impact and debt redemption in the new steady state – to ensure everybody gains to the same extent. With lump-sum recycling of environmental tax revenue, aggregate employment is unaffected in the short run, but falls in the long run. Furthermore, it raises environmental quality more in the long run than in the short run. Recycling revenue through a cut in labor taxes, however, is shown to yield a rise in employment in the short run, which disappears during transition. In the new steady state, environmental quality is higher at the expense of a lower level of employment.     

Educational choice, endogenous inequality and economic development

This paper investigates the mechanics through which wealth may, in the long run, trickle down from the rich to the poor. In the presence of indivisibilities in investment of human capital and impossibility of borrowing money, investment in education is financed through an intergenerational transfer. In an OLG model where aggregate production requires capital and both skilled and unskilled labor, it is shown that the long run equilibrium outcome depends on the values of few key parameters. A complete characterization of the steady state is provided. Under some configurations of the parameter values a unique invariant equilibrium exists where inequality vanishes asymptotically. Under others, multiple equilibria exist and the equilibrium outcome crucially depends on the initial conditions of the system. These equilibria are characterized by a negative relationship between inequality and economic development.