Training and worker effort: a signalling perspective

Abstract This paper analyzes the interaction between firms’ investment in general skills training and workers’ incentives. It shows that when a firm has an informational advantage over its workers, its provision of free general skills training can serve as a signal that there will be a long‐term relationship between the firm and its workers. This signal induces the workers to exert more effort in learning firm‐specific skills, which enhances the firm's profits. In contrast with most of the existing literature, the model implies that firms may provide free general skills training even if there is no labour market friction.     

Entry and growth in a perfectly competitive vintage model

A perfectly competitive vintage-knowledge model of Schumpeterian growth is introduced to study the relation between growth, technology-lifetime, entry, and productivity-dispersion. The incentive to innovate is generated by the productivity-dispersion (latent in traditional vintage models) between new and old plants, rather than by monopoly rents. The model has a unique steady-state REE with endogenous growth. The endogenous extent of entry constitutes a buffer, dampening the effect of research-efficiency and completely neutralizing the effect of population size or population growth rates on per-capita income levels and growth rates. Variations of research-efficiency lead to a negative relation between growth and vintage-lifetime and a non-monotonic relation between growth and productivity-dispersion.     

Cheating to win: Dishonesty and the intensity of competition

We argue that the intensity of competition within a group or organization can have an important influence on whether or not people cheat. To make this point we first work through a simple model of strategic misreporting in the workplace. For low and high levels of competition we show that, in equilibrium, few are predicted to misreport. It is for medium levels of competition that misreporting is predicted to be highest. We test this prediction experimentally and find good support for it. This finding has implications for the design of incentive structures within groups and organizations.     

The Turkish wage curve: Evidence from the Household Labor Force Survey

This paper examines the Turkish wage curve using individual data from the Household Labor Force Survey including 26 NUTS-2 regions over the period 2005-2008. We find an unemployment elasticity of −0.099, with a higher elasticity for younger, less educated, less experienced and female workers.     

Alliances and negotiations

Negotiations often occur not between individuals but among groups (companies, trade unions, political parties, etc.) each representing composite interests, whose bargaining behaviour is regulated by some collective decision mechanism. In this paper we provide a natural model of such circumstances. We formalise the notion of ‘alliance’ and show how different preference aggregation procedures within the alliance affect the bargaining outcome. In particular, we find that unanimity procedures lead to ‘more aggressive’ negotiating tactics than majority procedures.     

Risk capital,private credit,and innovative production

Abstract Although ideas production plays a critical role for growth, there has been only a modicum of research on the role played by financial forces in fostering new inventions. Drawing on Schumpeterian growth theory, this paper tests the roles of risk capital and private credit in stimulating knowledge production. Using panel data for 77 countries over the period 1965–2009, we find that countries with more developed financial systems are more innovative. A stronger patent protection framework, on the other hand, curbs innovative production.     

Economic transition, higher education and worker productivity in China

We investigate the role of education on worker productivity and firms' total factor productivity using a panel of firm-level data from China. We estimate the returns to education by calculating the marginal productivity of workers of different education levels based on estimates of the firm-level production function. We also estimate how the education level of workers and CEO contributes to firms' total factor productivity. Estimated marginal products are much higher than wages, and the gap is larger for highly educated workers. Our estimate shows that an additional year of schooling raises marginal product by 30.1%, and that CEO's education increases TFP for foreign-invested firms. Estimates vary substantially across ownership classes, the effect of schooling on productivity being highest in foreign-invested firms. We infer that market mechanisms contribute to a more efficient use of human capital within firms.     

Competition, human capital and income inequality with limited commitment

We develop a dynamic model with two-sided limited commitment to study how barriers to competition, such as restrictions to business start-up and non-competitive covenants, affect the incentive to accumulate human capital. When contracts are not enforceable, high barriers lower the outside value of ‘skilled workers’ and reduce the incentive to accumulate human capital. In contrast, low barriers can result in over-accumulation of human capital. This can be socially optimal if there are positive spillovers. A calibration exercise shows that this mechanism can account for a sizable portion of cross-country income inequality.     

Are Commodity Prices Driven by Fundamentals?

Physical scarcity is hardly sufficient to explain commodity price swings. However, despite of clues of commodity market inefficiency in the last decade, excess volatility in commodity markets emerges only under strong assumptions. When we allow for non‐stationarity in commodity prices and time variation in commodity‐specific risk premia, evidence of commodity market inefficiency becomes significantly weaker. Moreover, there is some evidence of commodity‐specific regime changes in commodity markets, with negligible or even positive correlation between efficiency and market liquidity.     

Sluggish US employment recovery after the Great Recession: Cyclical or structural factors?

This paper aims at investigating the causes of the observed departure of employment path from the GDP movements occurred in US in the late of 2008 onwards. Starting from a production function approach, and assuming that the TFP growth is explained by variables linked to the business cycle, we are able to formulate an extended version of Okun’s law based on cyclical factors. Out-of-sample forecasting for the period 2008 onward shows that predicted US employment is on average 1.7% above the observed one, meaning that this gap cannot be attributed to identified cyclical factors.     

LAND PRICE,COLLATERAL AND ECONOMIC GROWTH*

This paper extends Kiyotaki and Moore's (1997 ) to an endogenous growth model and investigates the dynamic properties of a growing economy with binding credit constraint when land is used not only as an input of production but also as collateral. There exists a balanced growth path in an economy with binding credit constraint. In response to a once and for all productivity shock, the developed model shows the propagation mechanism among output, capital, bank credit and the land price in terms of the growth rate. The model's tractability allows us to derive interesting qualitative and quantitative findings on business cycles.     

The dynamics of risk-sensitive allocations

This paper describes Pareto optimal allocations when agents have risk-sensitive preferences as formulated by Hansen and Sargent (IEEE Trans. Automat. Control 40(5) (1995) 968-971). Necessary and sufficient conditions are given for the existence and stability of steady states at which Pareto weights are time-invariant. When all agents are risk-sensitive with the same power reward function there is a unique interior steady state which is stable when the power is positive and unstable when the power is negative. When there is at least one agent with time-additive preferences eventually all risk-sensitive agents have zero Pareto weights.     

WAGE DIFFERENTIALS, DISCRIMINATION AND INEQUALITY: A CAUTIONARY NOTE ON THE JUHN, MURPHY AND PIERCE DECOMPOSITION METHOD

This paper shows how difficult it is to study the roles of discrimination and unobserved skills when studying changes in racial and gender wage gaps over time by examining merits and shortcomings of a popular decomposition method by Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (JMP). The JMP method shows that wage dispersion can offer a compelling explanation of the wage gap. However, JMP have to rely on a few strong assumptions in order to derive their decomposition equation, which introduces wage inequality as the price of unobserved skills (the standard deviation of the residuals) into their decomposition equation.