Social norms,cooperation and inequality

This paper analyzes the outcomes that can be supported by social norms in a society of infinitely lived and patient agents that are randomly matched in pairs every period to play a given game. I find that any mutually beneficial outcome can be supported by a self-enforcing social norm under both perfect information and a simple local information system. These Folk Theorem results explain not only how social norms can provide incentives that support cooperation in a community, providing support to the concepts of social capital and corporate culture, but also how they can support inequality and discrimination.I am grateful to David Levine for invaluable guidance and ideas. I also thank Anna Aizer, Hongbin Cai, Walter Cont, Ernesto Dal Bó, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, Federico Weinschelbaun, William Zame, anonymous referees and seminar participants at Universidad de Buenos Aires, UCLA, Universidad T. Di Tella, Harvard Business School and Stockholm School of Economics for very useful comments and discussions     

On social norms and beliefs: A model of manager environmental behavior

A prevailing view in the literature states that social sanctions can support, in equilibrium, high levels of obedience to a costly norm. The reason is that social disapproval and stigmatization faced by the disobedient are highest when disobedience is the exception rather than the rule in society. In contrast, the Bayesian model introduced here shows that, imperfect information causes the expected social sanction to be lowest precisely when obedience is more common. This, amongst other findings, draws a distinct line between social and moral norms, both of which may depend on others’ behavior but not on action observability. The implications of the use of non-Bayesian belief formation rules by society, namely a representativeness rule (overweighting the signals) and conservativism (overweighting the prior), for payoff functions and equilibria are explored.     

Macroeconomic determinants of remittances: evidence from Romania

Given the globalization of the labour market and the promotion of free movement for work, young people are looking for employment opportunities from at least two perspectives – professional careers and socio-economic benefits from employment. In developing countries, such as Romania, the labour market is less attractive, which has led to profound, numerical and structural imbalances, due to external mobility for work. Both new generations of graduates and young people aged up to 40 years, decide to work abroad as a more beneficial individual solution, i.e. remittances. The purpose of this paper is to examine the macroeconomic determinants of remittances to Romania, in order to substantiate public policies on diaspora, to adjust employment policy on the national labour market by promoting incentives to create decent, youth-friendly jobs. Using panel data model we selected several variables with potential influence on remittances level. The results demonstrate that traditional influence’s factors as distance, migration routes diaspora concentration or unemployment rate are, at present, less important than wage gap or tax rate at least for developing origin countries.     

Social norms and female labor force participation in urban China

This study investigates the impact of social norms on the labor supply decision of married women in urban China. Our estimation results indicate that men raised by non-working mothers are more likely to support traditional gender roles, are more averse to having working wives, and tend to be less productive or less willing to engage in housework than other men. Consequently, the labor force participation rate of married women with non-working mothers-in-law is 5–18 percentage points lower than that of married women with working mothers-in-law in urban China.     

Kinked norms of behaviour and cooperation

Using a country panel of domestic terror attacks from 1998 to 2004, we empirically analyze the impact of government decentralization on terror. Our results show that expenditure decentralization reduces domestic terror, while political decentralization has no impact.     

社会资本与技术创新的理论研究——基于企业视角的分析

社会资本对宏观经济发展和增长的影响是多层次、多角度的,它可以通过人力资本存量的提升、金融部门的发展以及企业技术革新等方面来刺激宏观经济又好又快的发展。然而,本文尝试从中微观角度出发,以相关的实证研究结果作为基础和前提条件,构建社会资本与企业技术创新的理论模型,并对其进行探讨和分析。但是,有关二者关系的实证性研究还有待于进一步的分析和探讨。     

Inefficiency and social exclusion in a coalition formation game: experimental evidence

This paper experimentally investigates the impact of reciprocal behavior in multilateral bargaining and coalition formation. Our results show that reciprocal fairness strongly affects the efficiency and equity of coalition formation. In a large majority of cases, inefficient and unfair coalitions are chosen when their coalition values are relatively high. Up to one third of the experimental population is excluded from bargaining and earns nothing. In monetary terms economically significant efficiency losses occur. We find that the interplay of selfish and reciprocal behavior unavoidably leads to this undesirable consequences. We also compare the predictions of recently developed models of social preferences with our experimental results. We find that some of these models capture the empirical regularities surprisingly well.     

Conceptions of property rights and norms

The social norm literature in law and economics fails to account for the differences between the two major conceptions of property rights. The differences between the two conceptions affect people’s utility function by affecting how increases in property rights are perceived. This paper discusses how the modern, in rem, conception evolved from an older, in personam, conception; it also discusses how economics has absorbed the modern, in rem, conception. The paper demonstrates that if people do not perceive the benefits of modern property rights, they will follow their social norms if the government or planner imposes modern property rights on them. In the end, this allows one to make a fuller discussion of why norms economize information. This discussion has various consequences ranging from developmental economics to financial market economics and cannot be ignored.

Social norms and economic growth in a model with labor and capital income tax evasion

Empirical evidence suggests that low-income countries are characterized by high levels of labor and capital income tax evasion while the opposite is true for high-income countries. This paper proposes a model to study the relationship between economic growth and both types of income tax evasion. We show that the existence of a social norm towards tax compliance generates a complementarity between capital and labor income tax evasion which explains the decline of both the share of evaders in the population and the amount of tax evasion when countries accumulate capital. The model predicts that the level of tax morale is positively correlated with both types of income tax evasion and the level of income per capita, consistent with recent empirical evidence. Finally, a higher tax rate increases the share of evaders in the population and aggregate tax evasion.     

Analogies and theories: The role of simplicity and the emergence of norms

We consider the dynamics of reasoning by general rules (theories) and by specific cases (analogies). When an agent faces an exogenous process, we show that, under mild conditions, if reality happens to be simple, the agent will converge to adopt a theory and discard analogical thinking. If, however, reality is complex, analogical reasoning is unlikely to disappear. By contrast, when the agent is a player in a large population coordination game, and the process is generated by all playersʼ predictions, convergence to a theory is much more likely. This may explain how a large population of players selects an equilibrium in such a game, and how social norms emerge. Mixed cases, involving noisy endogenous processes are likely to give rise to complex dynamics of reasoning, switching between theories and analogies.     

Social protection during recessions: evidence from Chile

This article analyzes the main labor market risk management strategies adopted by the Chilean Government during the 1999 recession that was initially related to the Asian financial crisis. Their successes and failures can suggest innovative social protection solutions for other countries. It seems that the 1999–2001 labor reforms and a three-year plan to increase the minimum wage intensified the recession’s effects on unemployment. Probit models indicate that households coped with the recession’s effects by increasing wives’ labor supply but not by withdrawing children from schools. The expansion of employment programs probably helped households to adopt these coping strategies.     

Religion and the sociological critique of political economy: Altruism and gift

Abstract

This article shows that there is a strong connection between the religious component of French sociology and the critique of political economy. In the first section, I consider how selfish behaviour, or egoism, became treated as a major threat endangering the creation of industrial society by those concerned about the diffusion of political economy. I then summarise the methodological critique set forth in the Cours, before connecting this critique to the economic content of the Système and the concept of altruism. In the following section, Spencer's view of altruism is contrasted to that held by Comte, and then I consider the reaction of French political economists, defending the moral value bought about by their science. In the final section, I explain how the Comtean approach was re-enacted by Durkheim and then by Mauss, at the head of the “sociology of religion” section of L'Année sociologique, the Durkheimian journal, to give birth to the theory of gift-giving behaviour that Mauss used to critique political economy in the 1920s.     

Endogenous games and equilibrium adoption of social norms and ethical constraints

We consider a situation in which games are formed endogenously in two senses: (1) there is a pregame in which agents choose to learn a subset of all feasible strategies and can then employ only these strategies in subsequent play, and (2) agents choose their game partners through a costly search process. We show that at any subgame perfect equilibrium, agents will constrain their action sets in the pregame in such a way that a single social norm prevails. Thus, all agents in a society will abide by the same ethical standard, although what standard this will be cannot be predicted. We also show that these are essentially the only SPE outcomes. We suggest that this provides at least a partial explanation for experimental observations that agents apparently choose strategies that do not maximize their payoffs.     

Altruism, equity, and reciprocity in a gift-exchange experiment: an encompassing approach

Considerable experimental evidence suggests that non-pecuniary motives must be addressed when modeling behavior in economic contexts. Recent theories of non-pecuniary motives can be classified as altruism-, equity-, or reciprocity-based. We outline the qualitative differences in prediction these alternative explanations yield in a gift-exchange game. We estimate and compare leading approaches in these categories, using experimental data. We then offer a flexible approach that nests the above three approaches, thereby allowing for nested hypothesis testing and for determining the relative strength of each of the competing theories. In addition, the encompassing approach provides a functional form for utility in different settings without the restrictive nature of the approaches nested within it. Using this flexible form for nested tests, we find that intentional reciprocity, distributive concerns, and altruistic considerations all play a significant role in players' decisions.     

Formal and informal norms: their relationships in society and in the economic sphere

The thesis put forward in this paper is that in social life in general, and in the economic sphere in particular, the relationships between formal norms and informal social norms can be interpreted in terms of either reciprocal complementarity or conflict. The concept of complementarity illustrates how the two kinds of norms cooperate with and reinforce each other, and describes under what circumstances formal norms can or cannot replace informal rules. Conversely, the notion of conflict between different kinds of norms distinguishes two forms of antagonism: prohibition (which occurs when one type of norm prohibits enforcement of the other), and mutual exclusiveness (which occurs when one type of norm crowds out the other, without this entailing prohibition).     

Social norms, information, and trust among strangers: theory and evidence

Can a social norm of trust and reciprocity emerge among strangers? We investigate this question by examining behavior in an experiment where subjects repeatedly play a two-player binary “trust” game. Players are randomly and anonymously paired with one another in each period. The main questions addressed are whether a social norm of trust and reciprocity emerges under the most extreme information restriction (anonymous community-wide enforcement) or whether trust and reciprocity require additional, individual-specific information about a player’s past history of play and whether that information must be provided freely or at some cost. In the absence of such reputational information, we find that a social norm of trust and reciprocity is difficult to sustain. The provision of reputational information on past individual decisions significantly increases trust and reciprocity, with longer histories yielding the best outcomes. Importantly, we find that making reputational information available at a small cost may also lead to a significant improvement in trust and reciprocity, despite the fact that most subjects do not choose to purchase this information.     

Social security and demographic trends: Theory and evidence from the international experience

The worldwide problem with pay-as-you-go, defined-benefits social security systems is not just financial. Through a dynamic, overlapping-generations model where forming a family and bearing and educating children are choice variables, we show that social security taxes and benefits generate incentives to reduce both family formation and fertility, and that these effects cannot be fully neutralized by counteracting inter-temporal or intergenerational transfers within families. We implement the model using calibrated simulations as well as panel data from 57 countries over 32 years. We find that PAYG tax measures account for a non-trivial part of the downward trends in family formation and fertility worldwide, especially in OECD countries.     

Social structure and consumption: on the diffusion of consumer good innovation

This paper presents a simple evolutionary model to study the diffusion patterns of product innovations for consumer goods. Following a Veblenian theme, we interpret consumption as a social activity constrained by social norms and class structure. Societies that allow for more behavioral variety will experience faster adoption of new consumer goods. We also find that the speed of diffusion as well as the saturation levels reached depend greatly on the structure of a society. Combining these two effects, we conclude that a social structure displaying behavioral variety and an even class structure fares better than any other social set-up in terms of the speed of adoption of product innovations and product variety. JEL Classification: D11, O31 This paper has benefited from comments by Robin Cowan and seminar participants at the University of Economics in Vienna, the Maastricht Economic Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT), University of Maastricht, participants of the EMAEE 2003 Conference in Augsburg, Germany as well as the Schumpeter Conference 2004 in Milan, Italy. We also would like to thank two anonymous referees for their constructive criticism and suggestions. The usual disclaimers apply. Correspondence to: A. Reinstaller     

Heterogeneous preferences and in-kind redistribution: Theory and evidence

This paper examines the impact of social heterogeneity on in-kind redistribution. We contribute to the previous literature in two ways: we consider (i) the provision of several public goods and (ii) agents different not only in income, but also in their preferences over the various goods provided by the public sector. In this setting, both the distribution and size of goods provision depend on the heterogeneity of preferences. Our main result is that preference heterogeneity tends to decrease in-kind redistribution, while income inequality tends to increase it. An empirical investigation based on United States Census Bureau data confirms these theoretical findings.