Political capitalism: The interaction between income inequality,economic freedom and democracy

We study the relationship between income inequality and economic freedom for a panel of 100 countries for the 1971–2010 period. Using a panel Granger non-causality approach, we reject the null hypothesis of Granger non-causality running from income inequality to economic freedom, but not vice versa. From a series of dynamic panel estimations we show that the effect of income inequality on economic freedom is negative and robust to the inclusion of additional controls. In particular, inequality is negatively associated with those components of economic freedom related to international trade, domestic market regulation as well as the rule of law and property rights protection. We argue that the negative effect of inequality on economic freedom is due to the economic elite converting its economic power into de facto political power to defend its economic interests; these interests run counter to economic freedom, discouraging innovation and competition as well as protecting the elite's rents. Finally, we show that economic freedom decreases with income inequality even in democratic countries, suggesting that democratic institutions do not prevent economic freedom from eroding. We argue that the latter finding corresponds to a system of political capitalism or captured democracy, where a powerful economic elite can nevertheless exercise de facto political power by cooperating with politicians and other decision-makers for their mutual benefit.     

Labor market institutions and aggregate fluctuations in a search and matching model

This paper explores the influence of labor market institutions on aggregate fluctuations. It uses a dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium model characterized by search and matching frictions in the labor market and nominal rigidities in the goods market. It finds that firing costs and unemployment benefits can have substantial effects on aggregate fluctuations. Increasing firing costs decreases the volatility of output, employment, and job flows due to the reduction in the mass of jobs sensitive to disturbances and lower incentives for firms to hire and fire workers. Hence, firms adjust to shocks mainly through prices, causing inflation to become more volatile. Raising unemployment benefits has the reverse effect on aggregate fluctuations.     

Adam Smith's theory of economic history and economic development

Abstract

The aim of the paper is to show that Smith has a theory of economic history grounded in a politico-economic modeling (as well as a sort of economic theoretical modeling). In terms of the politico-economic approach, in the Wealth of Nations (Book III.ii–iv) Smith tried to offer a systematic account of economic development from feudalism to capitalism in Europe. These lead to suggest that the seeming internal inconsistency between the natural and the actual courses of progress in Book III may be resolved, and that Smith may be treated as a precursor of Douglass North, who stressed an inextricable link between the polity and the economy in economic history.     

"人口红利"效应与中国经济增长

中国经济"增长奇迹"源于多种因素,"人口红利"是其中最重要的因素之一.当前,我国的人口红利主要表现为较高的劳动人口比例和劳动力配置效率.但人口红利并非可持续.长期看,随着我国人口出生率下降,劳动参与率将下降;短期看,我国城乡劳动力流动障碍依然存在,不利于劳动力配置效率的进一步提高.因此,提高劳动力素质和消除城乡劳动力流动障碍,是实现我国"人口红利"效应最大化的重要措施.     

Fiscal devaluation and economic activity in the EU

In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, a fiscal devaluation (hereafter, FD), understood as a shift in taxation from labour to consumption, has been debated as a possible tool for restoring competitiveness, particularly in peripheral countries of the Eurozone. We contribute to this debate. Based on a set of panel and spatial panel models for the EU 27 over the period 1995–2014, we find that FD works, especially where economic activity is heavily subdued and in sectors more exposed on external competition. FD increases value added in exports, improves net exports, accelerates GDP and employment growth, and decelerates growth in labour costs. These effects are nonlinear; they are stronger in the members of the Eurozone and weaker in countries with either more coordinated or more centralised wage bargaining processes or more generous unemployment benefits. The magnitude of these effects is dampened by strict regulatory barriers: they are weaker in countries with higher barriers to entrepreneurship, trade and investment. Most importantly, FD is not a beggar thy neighbour policy, at least in the EU. In our sample, the aggregate demand (‘cooperative’) effect of unilateral FD, which is beneficial for neighbouring countries, outweighs by far the expenditure switching (‘competitive’) effect, which comes at the expense of other countries’ competitiveness. FD implemented in one country can benefit other countries, provided that they are strongly integrated in global value chains. These findings are robust to changes in the estimation methods, the sample composition, the set of explanatory variables and the selection of a spatial weight matrix.