A Simple Model of Contract Enforcement Institutions

We demonstrate that in highly productive economies contract enforcement institutions are endogenously established, and partnership contracts correct inefficient land allocation. In less productive economies, however, such institutions are not established, and partnership contracts are not formed. In economies with intermediate productivity levels, multiple Nash equilibria exist; that is, contract enforcement institutions are established in the high Nash equilibrium whereas they are not formed in the low Nash equilibrium. In this case, institutional quality can be diverse across economies. We also prove that improvement in institutional quality reduces within‐country inequality. All these outcomes are consistent with cross‐country observations.     

Verifiability and Contract Enforcement: A Model with Judicial Moral Hazard

I model the litigation of a contract containing a variable notobservable by courts, hence nonverifiable, unless the rationaland self-interested judge exerts effort. He values the correctruling but dislikes effort. Judicial effort is discretionary.I show that effort cost is inconsequential—"always breach"is equilibrium for any effort cost. But there exists anotherequilibrium where a small breach rate is achieved even withsignificant effort costs. Maximal remedies for breach are notoptimal. Because effort is discretionary, low effort cost increasesbreach. Pretrial negotiations can have a substantial negativeimpact on verifiability under arbitrarily small deviations fromfull rationality.     

Dynamic Law Enforcement with Learning

This article modifies a standard model of law enforcement toallow for learning by doing. We incorporate the process of enforcementlearning by assuming that the agency's current marginal costis a decreasing function of its past experience of detectingand convicting. The agency accumulates data and information(on criminals, on opportunities of crime), enhancing the abilityof future apprehension at a lower marginal cost. We focus onthe impact of enforcement learning on optimal compliance rules.In particular, we show that the optimal fine could be less thanmaximal and the optimal probability of detection could be higherthan otherwise. It is also suggested that the optimal imprisonmentsentence could be higher than otherwise.     

非均衡的经济动态模型

本文旨在按现实世界的本来面目建立一个非均衡的内生经济动态模型。在这个模型中 ,源于部门内和部门间关系的内生变量导致资本市场、消费品市场上产量和价格的波动。市场的非均衡过程、存货调节机制以及经济人的最优行为和适应性行为是基于对现实世界的观察进行模拟的。静态性质及其稳定性是作为一般市场动态过程的特例加以讨论的。     

A Dynamic Model of Network Formation

Network structure plays a significant role in determining the outcome of many important economic relationships; therefore it is crucial to know which network configurations will arise. We analyze the process of network formation in a dynamic framework, where self-interested individuals can form and sever links. We determine which network structures the formation process will converge to. This information allows us to determine whether or not the formation process will converge to an efficient network structure. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: A14, C7, D20.     

基于契约属性研究的人力资本定价模型

从人力资本的特性出发,研究发现人力资本定价的界限是人力资本在企业价值创造中的贡献价值而非其全部价值,还发现人力资本与企业间的契约不仅可以把人力资本的贡献价值从其全部价值中剥离出来,而且决定着人力资本的价值贡献机理.随后,在对企业中人力资本契约属性分析的基础上.创造性地构建出人力资本的契约矩阵,实现了对人力资本价值贡献特征的归类,并最终得出了一种基于契约属性研究的人力资本定价模型.     

A Dynamic Model of Public Opinion Formation

In this paper, we seek to shed new light on the social process of public opinion formation. Drawing on previous contributions in cognition studies and political science, we propose and analyze a model in which heterogeneous agents (citizens) collectively learn and modify their opinions about a specific policy issue. The assumption of nonrationality on the part of agents gives core values, enduring general needs, social interaction, and the combination of the citizens´ intuition and occasional deliberate reasoning a key role in the dynamics of public opinion formation.     

Investment in Tourism Market: A Dynamic Model of Differentiated Oligopoly

We present a theoretical dynamic model in tourism economics, assuming that the market for tourism is an oligopoly with differentiated products. Destinations can invest in order to improve their stock of physical, natural or cultural resources. Tourism flows yield current revenues, but they are usually detrimental for the stock of resources. We find the solution of the dynamic model, and in particular we find the open-loop Nash equilibrium of the game among destinations, under alternative settings, depending on whether the degree of differentiation among destinations is exogenous or endogenous. In particular, under the latter case, an increase of the number of destinations leads to a higher degree of product differentiation in steady state.     

Payoff Assessments without Probabilities: A Simple Dynamic Model of Choice

We develop a model which reflects the tendency of people to simplify the decision problems they face. The decision maker chooses among alternate strategies only on the basis of the payoff she assesses she would obtain from them, and these assessments do not explicitly take into account her subjective judgements regarding the likelihood of alternate states of the world. At each stage, the decision maker chooses the strategy that she assesses to give the highest payoff. She updates her assessments adaptively. We show that such behavior leads to maxmin choices. We also consider the decision maker who experiences shocks. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C7, D8.     

A Dynamic Model for International Environmental Agreements

In this paper we develop a model that uses a dynamic framework to analyze the process through which countries join international environmental agreements (IEAs). In the model, while all countries suffer from the same environmental damage as a result of total global emissions, non-signatory countries decide on their emission levels by maximizing their own welfare, whereas signatory countries decide on their emission levels by maximizing the aggregate welfare of all signatory countries. It is assumed that signatory countries will be able to punish non-signatories, at some cost to themselves. When countries decide on their pollution emissions, they account for the evolution of the stock of pollution over time. Moreover, we propose a mechanism to describe how countries reach a stable IEA. The model is able to capture situations characterized by partial cooperation within an IEA that is stable over time. It also captures situations where all countries participate in a stable agreement, and situations where no stable agreement is feasible. Where more than one possibility coexist, the long-term outcome of the game depends on the initial conditions (i.e., the initial number of signatory countries and pollution level).     

有政府的动态资产定价模型

文章建立了一个有政府的动态资产定价模型.政府被模型化为具有垄断力量的市场参与者,它可以利用自己的税收和交易行为影响市场.我们求解了一个政府先行,私人跟随的均衡,得到了一个资产定价的双因子(总消费因子和税收因子)模型.文章证明:资产的超额收益不但取决于与总消费的相关性,还受与政府税收相关性的影响;资本市场的波动行为依赖于税收的随机模式.我们的模型预言,在一个政府作用比较大的经济体里,如果忽略政府的作用,单因子的ICAPM可能低估均衡的股权超额收益.同没有政府的经济相比,有政府经济中风险资产的波动率会更高.分析还表明:在动态资产定价模型中引入政府行为是可能的.     

区域企业集群动态演化模型分析

通过建立数学模型研究区域企业集群的动态演化规律,探讨集群企业演化的空间动态行为和反馈机制。依据kti-gti/rti与kt(i 1)-gt(i 1)/rt(i 1)之间关系的不同情况,分别对区域企业集群动态演化模型进行系统分析。研究表明:区域企业集群是由区域生态系统和区域经济系统耦合而成的复杂系统,其演化和发展遵循生态学的基本机制,与其他有生命体的增长十分相似。区域企业集群非线性正反馈机制与区域生态集群非线性负反馈机制构成一个以企业为中心的耗散结构。     

A Dynamic Heckscher–Ohlin Model: The Case of Costly Factor Reallocation

The role of the static Heckscher–Ohlin model in providing general equilibrium comparative statics is emphasized. It is shown that (i) market-clearing dynamics can be constructed if and only if the costly reallocation of factors is accommodated, and (ii) the introduction of market-clearing and resource-using dynamics fails to sharpen (and may even blunt) the comparative statics. Thus, a new (non-)Correspondence Principle is derived.     

A Rotated Dynamic Nelson‐Siegel Model

I show how to rotate the factor structure of the well‐known Dynamic Nelson‐Siegel yield‐curve model to enable direct parametrization of the short rate process. This makes it easy to calculate model‐implied term premia and to integrate macroeconomic variables into the model in a Taylor‐rule‐type fashion.     

A Two-Country Dynamic Trade Model with Multiple Groups

The paper addresses a dynamic interdependence between economic growth and trade patterns within a multi-group framework. The labor force of each country is classified into two groups, according to human capital and preferences. We show how difference in preferences and human capital of the four groups affect trade patterns and the world economy. [F11, 041].     

Tax Amnesties In A Dynamic Model of Tax Evasion

We present a dynamic model of tax evasion, where tax liabilities last for two periods and the probability of an inspection decreases with the sum of taxes evaded this period plus taxes evaded last period. We show that a tax amnesty that pardons more than the evasion penalties (an extensive amnesty) can temporarily improve compliance. Whenever the inspection technology improves, steady state compliance also improves, but the economy takes time to transit from one steady state to the other. We show that an amnesty may accelerate this transit, or even make it instantaneous if the amnesty is extensive enough.     

A Dynamic Model of Privatization with Endogenous Post-Privatization Performance

This paper presents a dynamic model of privatization, driven by improved institutional protection of private property rights and constrained by the buyer's financial constraints. Government ownership is more efficient than private ownership when private property rights are insecure. Improved institutional protection of property rights over time creates the need to privatize. The buyer's financial constraints affect the timing of privatization, causing the firm's post-privatization performance either to improve or to deteriorate in the short run. Financial constraints also have the possibility of inducing an underpricing phenomenon during privatization where the firm is priced below both what the buyer is willing to pay and the buyer's ability to pay. Faster institutional development calls for earlier privatization, but it also has the potential to either create or exacerbate deadweight losses associated with inefficient privatization. A host of empirically testable implications are derived.     

考虑基准资产的动态投资组合选取

职业基金经理的目标经常是希望自己的投资组合以稳定的表现能够超越所某一基准资产或组合。因此本文给出一个考虑基准资产的动态均值——方差投资组合选取模型。假设状态之间的转移遵循马氏过程,给定状态转移矩阵,可以得到对风险资产最优投入的解析表达式。此表达式表明对风险资产的投入由三项构成,前两项是不考虑基准资产时对风险资产的投入,最后一项与基准资产有关;在基准资产上的权重由基准资产收益的大小来决定,与积极投资组合管理者的风险厌恶程度无关;随着风险厌恶程度的增加,管理者会减少在风险资产上的投入。数值分析显示考虑基准资产的投资组合是一个积极的投资组合。     

A SAM-CGE Demonstration Model for Indonesia: Static and Dynamic Specifications and Experiments

In this article it will be demonstrated how a simple static Computable General Equilibrium model of the Indonesian economy can be constructed using the Social Accounting Matrix as a database. It will be shown that under a few assumptions the constant labour force and capital stock in the static model can be elaborated to dynamic specifications. In both static and dynamic versions the effects of productivity increases are investigated, leading to the conclusion that with respect to income and employment generating effects innovating sectors are worse off than non-innovating sectors due to low elasticities of demand. [D58, O33]