如何加强企业财权安排

企业财权是企业所有权的核心内容.企业所有权是企业剩余索取权和控制权.从企业所有权安排的性质和内容看,无论是企业剩余索取权还是企业控制权,其核心都表现在财务方,即企业剩余的表现形式是财务收益,企业控制权的核心是财务控制权.     

高技术企业经营者的权利与责任——兼评我国高技术企业创业型CEO“辞职”与“下岗”

企业合约的不完全性,是企业合约不同于一般市场合约的最显着特征,因此企业利益由固定权益和剩余权益组成。企业剩余权益是相对于企业固定权益而言的权益,由剩余索取权和剩余控制权构成,二者合称为企业所有权,其中剩余索取权是对企业收入在扣除所有固定合同支付后（如利息费用等）的余额的要求权,而剩余控制权指的是企业合约没有特别规定的活动的决策权。从企业权益配置的角度看,由于固定权益的分配是事前确定的,那么,由谁以何种方式取得企业所有权则成为企业责权配置的核心问题。     

如何加强企业财权安排

企业财权是企业所有权的核心内容。企业所有权是企业剩余索取权和控制权。从企业所有权安排的性质和内容看,无论是企业剩余索取权还是企业控制权,其核心都表现在财务方面,即企业剩余的表现形式是财务收益,企业控制权的核心是财务控制权。     

现代公司制企业中剩余控制权和剩余索取权的配置

一、剩余控制权和剩余索取权的概念界定 传统观点认为企业所有权就是企业剩余索取权和剩余控制权。剩余索取权是指企业收入在扣除所有固定的合同支付的余额后的要求权；剩余控制权是指在合约中没有特别规定的活动的决策权，有时也把剩余控制权称为控制权。需要指出的是，剩余控制权不能简称为控制权，因为两者是不完全相同的概念。控制权是指契约中规定的决策权和没有特别规定的决策权，     

资本结合失效分析及其治理建议

近代企业理论认为,市场经济中的企业是相关经济资源所有者的一个合约。企业的所有权包括企业剩余索取权和企业剩余控制权。现代企业之所以采用与传统业主企业不同的剩余索取权分享的企业治理形式,在于为企业人力资本所有者提供一条与企业生产资本所有者目标一致的激励途径,以减少在两权分离情况下人力资本所有者“逆向选择”而产生的风险,     

会计舞弊的契约理论分析

现代企业是一系列要素使用权交易契约的联结,会计是企业契约的一个组成部分,它在本质上是企业契约履行程度与履行效果的度量。现代企业契约安排规定经营者享有企业剩余索取权,而会计契约安排规定经营者享有剩余会计规则制定权与会计规则执行权,这种经营者既分享企业剩余又控制剩余计量的制度安排,构成了会计信息失真的制度逻辑。要根本扭转会计信息失真的玩疾,必须从会计契约设计的制度安排入手,对现行剩余会计规则制定权与会计规则执行权契约安排进行重构。     

会计合约安排与会计信息失真

现代企业是一组合约关系的联结,会计是企业合约的一个组成部分,它在本质上是企业合约履行程度与履行效果的度量.现代企业合约安排规定经营者享有企业剩余索取权,而会计合约安排规定经营者享有剩余会计规则制定权与会计规则执行权,这种经营者既分享企业剩余又控制剩余计量的制度安排,构成了会计信息失真的制度逻辑.要根本扭转会计信息失真的顽疾,必须对现行剩余会计规则制定权与会计规则执行权合约安排进行重构.     

中间性组织存在的合理性与稳定性分析

市场是产品所有权交易合约，是各种所有者的人格化独立交易。企业则是要素使用权的转让合约，是各要素使用权的让渡。而中间性组织是通过企业与市场的相互渗透，在信息技术的支持下，基于企业核心能力的，企业之间建立在信用基础上的、以合作为目的的相对稳定并普遍存在的一种契约安排。简单地讲，它是一种规制结构，其具体形态表现为虚拟企业、战略联盟、企业集群、企业网络等多种形态。     

控制权与剩余索取权分离及公司购并的可行条件与区域

控制权与剩余索取权分离给现代公司带来了委托代理问题,反映在公司购并中,即控制权与剩余索取权的不同安排对公司购并产生了不同影响。在试图分析控制权与剩余索取权在完全对称、对控制权具有一定约束激励机制以及对控制权缺乏约束激励机制三种情况下,公司购并的可行条件与区域,目的在于探讨控制权与剩余索取权分离程度对公司购并效率的影响。     

要素间相对稀缺程度的变化与企业产权演进逻辑

现有的企业产权配置理论是在不完全契约框架下通过比较要素的“特性”展开讨论的,然而从要素间在质的规定性上进行比较,本身具有不可比性。如果将企业看成是由多个要素所有者为取得合作收益而结成的特别合约,那么,各个要素所有者博弈企业的权益,其“谈判势力”的大小不在于他们各自所拥有的要素在性质上的特别之处,而在于供求量对比中显现出的各个要素的相对稀缺程度高低。要素的相对稀缺程度决定要素所有者间“谈判势力”大小,由此决定企业“剩余索取权”和“剩余控制权”的分配。这一结论能够逻辑一致性地、历史地、动态地解释企业的产权结构及其演进逻辑。     

Towards an economic theory of the multiproduct firm

This paper outlines a theory of the multiproduct firm. Important building blocks include excess capacity and its creation, market imperfections, and the peculiarities of organizational knowledge, including its fungible and tacit character. A framework is adopted in which profit seeking firms are seen to diversify in order to avoid the high transactions costs associated with using various markets to trade the services of various specialized assets. Neoclassical explanations of the multiproduct firm are shown to be seriously deficient.     

Core and equilibrium in incomplete markets

Conclusions The classical foundation of general equilibrium analysis by the cooperative concept of the core has been extended to an economy with incomplete trading possibilities. This has been accomplished by restricting the exchange possibilities of coalitions of traders in accordance with the available market structure. However, compared with the classical result, the present foundation of rational expectations equilibria may appear much weaker. The reason is that in reality consumers may sign contracts which are more complex than the existing market structure. Therefore, it may happen that prices cannot decentralize all cooperative transactions by markets, in spite of perfect competition. With an incomplete set of markets, therefore, a cooperative exchange of commodities by individual contracts may coexist with trading in non-cooperative, competitive markets.I wish to thank Martin Hellwig for helpful comments and suggestions. Of course, I remain responsible for all shortcomings of the paper.     

Hold-up and externality: the firm as a nexus of incomplete rights?

The Coasean theory of the firm (Coase in Economica 4:386–405, 1937) has flourished with the theory of incomplete contracts. Transaction costs in the form of enforcement costs have been deemed to be the main determinants of the decision to ‘make’ versus ‘buy’. Surprisingly, this stream of literature has almost neglected that transaction costs may also generate incomplete property rights (Coase in J Law Econ 3:1–44, 1960). As firm’s activities entail both contractual and property rights, these two domains interfere each other on the decision to carry out a transaction within the firm. When property rights are incomplete, potential externalities may increase the cost of using the price mechanism to procure the assets needed in a given transaction. The resulting ‘Coasean firm’ would not only centralize incomplete contracts under a unified governance system, but it will also aggregate incomplete property rights under a unified ownership structure.     

企业与市场:相关关系及其性质——一个基于回归古典的解析框架

通过对科斯替代逻辑的反思 ,重新考察了企业与市场的相关关系。认为交易费用的提出虽然打开了新古典企业的“黑箱” ,但是由此来解释企业的性质 ,其结论与现实相悖。本文提出了一个趋于古典的分析框架 ,发现企业与市场是分别建立在两种不同但有紧密相关性的分工基础上的 ,因而 ,它们各自的性质及其相互关系源于一般分工与个别分工各自的性质及其相关关系———企业是要素所有者为分享“合作剩余”而达成的合约 ,而市场则是商品所有者交换比较优势的制度安排。两者互补而不相互替代。这一结论较好地解释了实体经济中不论是企业规模 ,还是企业数量都在不断扩张 ,同时市场范围随之不断扩展 ,两方面相互促进、正相关推进发展的现实。     

企业会计契约:动态过程与效率

企业是利益相关者之间相互缔约形成的利益共同体 ,企业会计契约是企业契约的主要组成部分。利益相关者之间的利益冲突与协调是通过会计契约来实现的 ,而企业契约的执行所需要的计量与监督功能则具体落实在会计契约的动态运行与优化上。优化会计契约机制的经济途径是从决策行为的角度 ,将其剩余控制权配置给决策效率最大的参与者 ;而法律途径则是运用格式化方法将经过长期实践检验、对促使会计契约机制运行有效的惯例加以总结 ,以此节约会计契约结构的规范成本     

Building Core Competencies in Crisis Management Through Organizational Learning: The Case of the French Nuclear Power Producer

Drawing from the resource-based theory of the firm, we develop a conceptual framework to show how organizational learning helps companies build a set of embedded knowledge assets (core competencies). The evolution of the core competencies over time depends on the ability of the firm to maintain a high level of organizational learning. In this article, we take the case of the French nuclear industry to illustrate how the most powerful French electricity producer and supplier, EDF, had succeeded, for 20 years, in building a core competence in nuclear risk and crisis management. Referring to the future deregulation of the European electricity market and the fierce competition of substitute resources of energy, the article shows that nuclear safety is a crucial issue for the survival of EDF and the European nuclear industry. We explore how EDF has learned from Three Mile Island in 1979 and Chernobyl in 1986 to improve and enrich continuously its core competence in risk and crisis management. We distinguished three phases in the learning process of EDF: the technical phase (1977–1982), the human phase (1982–1989), and the cultural phase (1989–1995). Each phase is analyzed as a step toward a greater awareness of the multidimensional nature of risk and crisis management.     

Limited liability and the underlying-asset constraint: on the use of share-derivative contracts to resolve agency problems

The issue of whether agency problems can be resolved by using standard derivative contracts continues to interest students of incentive structures of organizations. In this paper, we identify under limited liability a necessary and sufficient condition for standard share-derivative contracts to resolve moral hazard problems. This condition is remarkably simple: in addition to having large enough expected profit, the insiders of the firm must be able to hold combinations of call and put options in excess of the available underlying assets. Feasibility of delivery makes this condition not credible in the capital markets. Therefore, to circumvent this constraint one must have resort to private arrangements. This explains why incentive contracts often involve elements such as bonuses, penalties, and promotions, that are not able to be mimicked by standard derivative contracts.     

Did Open Access Integrate Natural Gas Markets? An Arbitrage Cost Approach

Several studies, using analyses that measure the correlation between prices in various markets, have argued that deregulation of natural gas pipeline contracts has reduced the transaction costs between natural gas markets. Correlations approaches, however, have potentially serious problems. Given these problems, this article estimates transactions costs directly. Deregulation is found to have lowered transactions costs to and from the Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas regions, but increased transactions costs from the Rocky Mountain area. Deregulation of pipeline contracts, by lowering the cost of using the market and therefore increasing demand for pipeline capacity, may therefore have differential impacts upon transactions costs between markets. This study implies that the transactions cost approach may be able to overcome several difficulties inherent in the correlations approach.     

The Competence Pyramid: A Framework for Identifying and Analyzing Firm and Industry Competence

The core capability and competence perspective is respected by both academics and practitioners. The efficacy of this strategic orientation is dependent on a firm's ability to identify its specific technological competencies and managerial capabilities and match these strengths with the assets necessary to gain competitive advantage in the firm's chosen markets. Here a systematic process for the identification of competencies and capabilities present within a firm and those competencies and capabilities needed for development of competitive advantage in an industry is presented. This system uses a pictorial representation referred to as the competency pyramid. The competency pyramid assists with the implementation of a strategy based on the core competency perspective; by assisting a firm in understanding which competencies they currently posses and which they require for success in the markets they have targeted. The use of the competency pyramid is illustrated using both service and manufacturing examples.     

人力资本分享企业剩余的相关问题分析

随着知识经济的到来,人力资本已成为经济增长的关键因素。人力资本同物质资本一样,是企业生存发展不可或缺的要素;人力资本是企业风险的真正承担者,是企业财富的真正创造者,所以人力资本分享企业剩余是合情合理的。在实践中,人力资本股权化是对人力资本分享企业剩余的有益探索。