中国人寿保险公司人力资源竞争力外部影响因素分析

我国保险业的发展自改革开放以来十分迅猛,寿险业的增长更是快于GDP和人均可支配收入的增长,也快于非寿险业的增长,我国寿险市场蕴藏的巨大发展潜力不容小觑。对于中国人寿保险公司来说,解决如何适应当前的保险市场竞争环境,如何在明确公司优劣势的前提下进一步提升自身的人力资源竞争力问题,具有十分重要的意义。就此,从影响人力资源竞争力外部影响因素的角度如政府法律法规、市场环境、行业规则、行业诚信制度等方面进行分析和论述。     

如何选择死亡保险的投保期限

当购买死亡保险时,投保人需要选择投保的期限。以平均收益与风险的和为目标函数,讨论了在给定年龄x和安全载荷p的条件下,如何选择投保期限才能使得目标函数达到最大值。同时,利用数值计算结果讨论了年龄对最优投保期限的影响。     

刍议我国保险中介的制度安排与创新

在保险业日渐繁荣，保险市场逐步完善的现阶段，保险中介也在飞速发展，但如何解决我国保险中介在发展过程中出现的问题，进一步规范保险中介人的行为，建立并完善我国的保险中介制度，是目前迫切需要解决的一个问题。应针对保险中介发展初期的特点及存在的缺陷，研究其制度安排与创新。     

我国保险资金的运用渠道及其风险管理

保险资金运用渠道如何拓宽,以及如何建立保险资金投资风险管理体系,一直是我国保险理论界和实务部门研究和关注的热点问题。随着我国保险业的迅速发展和保险业总资产的快速增长,保险资金的运用已经成为保险公司稳定发展的关键性因素,而其核心问题是保险资金运用风险的管理。因此,本文对目前我国保险资金可能选择的主要运用渠道进行了风险分析,并提出了一些加强我国保险资金运用风险管理的对策。     

The politics of redistributive social insurance

This paper analyses the political support for a social insurance that includes elements of redistribution when there exists an imperfect private insurance alternative. Individuals differ both in their income and risk. The social insurance is compulsory and charges an income-related contribution with pooling of risks. The private insurance is voluntary and charges a contribution based on individual risks. However due to the adverse selection problem, private insurance companies provide only partial insurance. Adopting a non-expected utility model, we show that there is a general majority support for social insurance and that this support is increasing with risk aversion. We also show that a mixed insurance is politically impossible, regardless of the degree of redistribution of social insurance and the joint distribution of risk and income in the population. Lastly, we analyse how the political support for social insurance is affected by any change in its redistributive component and the possibility of using genetic tests.     

Corporate insurance with optimal financial contracting

Summary. This paper attemps to rationalize the use of insurance covenants in financial contracts, and shows how external financing generates a demand for insurance by risk-neutral entrepreneurs. In our model, the entrepreneur needs external financing for a risky project that can be affected by an accident during its realization. Accident losses and final returns are private information to the firm, but they can be evaluated by two costly auditing technologies. We derive the optimal financial contract: it is a bundle of a standard debt contract and an insurance contract with franchise, trading off bankruptcy costs vs auditing costs. We then analyze how this optimal contract can be achieved by decentralized trading on competitive markets when insurance and credit activities are exogenously separated. With additive risks, the insurance contract involves full coverage above a straight deductible. We interpret this result by showing how our results imply induced risk aversion for risk-neutral firms. Received: December 14, 1998; revised version: August 11, 1999     

LOVE,TOIL, AND HEALTH INSURANCE: WHY AMERICAN HUSBANDS RETIRE WHEN THEY DO

The provision of health insurance has previously been shown to be an important determinant of retirement timing among older Americans, but the existing literature has largely ignored some aspects of the interspousal dependence of health insurance benefits. Specifically, the literature examines only how retirement may affect the health insurance available to the potential retiree but not how it might affect a spouse's options. Using data from the Health and Retirement Study, I find that the impact a husband's retirement might have on a wife's health insurance options has a statistically significant impact on a husband's rate of retirement that is independent of considerations of his own health insurance options. In households where the wife is the only one at risk of losing affordable health insurance if the husband retires, the husband is 30% less likely to retire than if neither spouse is at risk (a 5 percentage point decrease in the retirement rate). Based on these findings, prior research is missing one avenue that changes to the Medicare eligibility age and health insurance policy changes through the Affordable Care Act might impact the labor supply of older workers. (JEL I13, J26, J32)     

Life Insurance,Human Capital Accumulation and Economic Growth

We compare growth rates in the absence and presence of life insurance using an overlapping generations framework with human capital accumulation to clarify how life insurance contributes to economic growth through the education investment of individuals depending on economic circumstances. Our results show that, as expected, the growth rate is higher when there is life insurance if the rate of time preference or the productivity of human capital accumulation is sufficiently low and if the income loss induced from lifetime uncertainty is moderate. However, if the income loss is sufficiently large, the growth rate is lower when there is life insurance.     

Social Insurance and Redistribution with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection*

Rochet (1991) showed that with distortionary income taxes, social insurance is a desirable redistributive device when risk and ability are negatively correlated. This finding is re‐examined when ex post moral hazard and adverse selection are included, and under different informational assumptions. Individuals can take actions influencing the size of the loss in the event of accident (or ill health). Social insurance can be supplemented by private insurance, but private insurance markets are affected by both adverse selection and moral hazard. We study how equity and efficiency considerations should be traded off in choosing the optimal coverage of social insurance when those features are introduced. The case for social insurance is strongest when the government is well informed about household productivity.     

Health insurance and consumption: Evidence from China’s New Cooperative Medical Scheme

We exploit a quasi-natural experiment arising from the introduction of a health insurance program in rural China to examine how the insurance coverage affects household consumption. Results show that, on average, the health insurance coverage increases nonmedical-related consumption by more than 5%. This insurance effect is observed even in households with no out-of-pocket medical spending. In addition, the insurance effect is stronger in households with worse self-reported health status. These results are consistent with the precautionary savings argument. The insurance effect also varies by household experience with the program. In particular, the effect is significant only in villages where some households have actually obtained reimbursement from the insurance program. The program within these villages stimulates less consumption among new participants than among households that have participated in the program for more than a year.     

失业保险金与再就业行为

现有的失业理论及实证研究都认为失业保险金的提高会增加失业者的失业持续时间。在本文中,我们试图从失业者面临工作机会的工资分布结构出发,对失业保险金与失业者再就业工资分布的关系进行描述。通过对传统工作搜寻理论模型的扩展,我们证明失业保险金对失业持续时间的影响存在三种不同的传导路径,同时我们得到两个推论:失业保险金的增加一方面将提高失业者接受"高"工资工作机会的概率;但另一方面对失业者从事"低"工资工作机会的影响是不确定的。如果将正式工作视为"高"工资的工作机会,而将非正式工作视为"低"工资的工作机会;则基于微观层面的数据所进行的实证研究结果验证了我们的推论。     

农民工社保难的原因分析与对策思考

越来越多的农民工已成为城市建设和发展的生力军。在社保覆盖面不断扩大的今天,让农民工参加社会保险,与城镇人员一样享有社会保障就成为一个新课题。由于多方面的原因,农民工社保依然困难重重。解决农民工社保难问题,必须从体制、制度等多方面着手解决,尽快建立起与经济发展水平相适应的社会保障体系     

论我国保险基金进入资本市场的策略选择

本文从三个方面论述了中国保险基金必须加快和更大规模地进入资本市场,这既是保险业摆脱困境的必然选择和惟一出路,更是中国金融市场体系得以完善的必然要求和客观规律。最后在认真分析中国证券市场,特别是股票市场严重缺陷的基础上,提出在当前一段时期,中国保险基金如何进入证券市场的六条可行性的对策思路。     

Pitfalls and potential of institutional change: Rain-index insurance and the sustainability of rangeland management

Rain-index insurance is strongly advocated in many parts of the developing world to help farmers to cope with climatic risk that prevails in (semi-)arid rangelands due to low and highly uncertain rainfall. We present a modeling analysis of how the availability of rain-index insurance affects the sustainability of rangeland management. We show that a rain-index insurance with frequent payoffs, i.e. a high strike level, leads to the choice of less sustainable grazing management than without insurance available. However, rain-index insurance with a low to medium strike level enhances the farmer's well-being while not impairing the sustainability of rangeland management.     

美日互助保险公司监管及其对中国的启示

美国和日本对互助保险公司的监管立法相对都比较完善,但两国监管重心有所不同,监管程度也存在明显差异。借鉴美日互助保险公司监管的经验,中国对互助保险公司的监管应基于规定互助保险公司的设立条件、限制互助保险公司的经营范围,明确互助保险公司的资金运用及盈余分配等方面进行考虑。     

Culture,financial crisis and the demand for property,accident and health insurance in the OECD countries

Culture has been known to play an important role in explaining differences in consumption behaviour across countries. Yet, we know very little how it affects spending on non-life insurance products. This paper attempts to shed some light on how cultural characteristics impact the demand for property, accident and health insurance, focusing on the OECD countries in the period 2000–2017. We find, via the system generalized method of moment estimations, that cultural characteristics such as individualism, long-term orientation, masculinity and uncertainty avoidance were the drivers of the expenditure on property insurance, whereas long-term orientation, uncertainty avoidance and hypometropia explained accident and health insurance spending across the OECD countries. In the presence of the global financial crisis, cultural effects on property insurance spending turned out to be relatively minor, with the exception of individualism. These findings provide valuable information for non-life insurance companies, consumers and policy makers in the OECD countries.     

医疗保险与消费:来自新型农村合作医疗的证据

本文利用农村引入新型农村合作医疗这一政策变化来研究医疗保险的获得对农村居民消费的影响。结果表明,新农合使得非医疗支出类的家庭消费增加了约5.6个百分点。这一正向作用随医疗保险保障水平的提高而增强,而且在没有医疗支出的家庭中仍然存在。同时,新农合对消费的正向影响在收入较低或健康状况较差的家庭中更强。这些结果都与医疗保险减少了预防性储蓄的假说相一致。另外本文发现,新农合的效果随农户在这个项目中的经历而变化。实际上只有在那些有村民获得保险补偿的村子,保险对消费的正向影响才显著,而且在这些村子中,新农合对新加入农户的消费的影响明显小于对参合一年以上农户的消费的影响。     

论存款保险制度的设计

存款保险制度在维护金融体系稳定的同时也降低了存款人对银行风险的关注,并导致"道德风险"和"逆向选择"。分析了存款保险制度的三个主要目标以及如何在这三个目标之间取得平衡,并借鉴主要国家和地区的存款保险制度特征,提出了我国设计存款保险制度的相关建议。     

Health insurance and labor market outcomes: Joint decision-making within households

Most Americans obtain access to health insurance through an employer. In this paper, we ask how the link between health insurance and employment affects labor market choices such as whether to work full-time. To understand the effect of the incentives embedded in the employer-based insurance system, we study the joint decision-making of husbands and wives that determines the household's access to health insurance. We estimate the effect on a wife's (husband's) labor market outcomes of husband's (wife's) health insurance, allowing the health insurance of both spouses to be endogenous. Obtaining unbiased estimates of such effects is complicated by the likelihood that positive assortative mating creates correlations between a couple's characteristics and the possibility that there are important unobservable household income effects. Our innovation is to measure these biases by examining a second fringe benefit, paid sick leave, in addition to health insurance. We find that, as predicted, spouse's insurance has statistically significant negative effects on being offered own employer insurance as well as on the probability of working full-time with health insurance.     

ESTIMATING WELFARE IN INSURANCE MARKETS USING VARIATION IN PRICES

We provide a graphical illustration of how standard consumer and producer theory can be used to quantify the welfare loss associated with inefficient pricing in insurance markets with selection. We then show how this welfare loss can be estimated empirically using identifying variation in the price of insurance. Such variation, together with quantity data, allows us to estimate the demand for insurance. The same variation, together with cost data, allows us to estimate how insurer's costs vary as market participants endogenously respond to price. The slope of this estimated cost curve provides a direct test for both the existence and nature of selection, and the combination of demand and cost curves can be used to estimate welfare. We illustrate our approach by applying it to data on employer-provided health insurance from one specific company. We detect adverse selection but estimate that the quantitative welfare implications associated with inefficient pricing in our particular application are small, in both absolute and relative terms.