From rent seeking to human capital: a model where resource shocks cause transitions from stagnation to growth

Abstract.  We present a growth model where agents divide time between rent seeking in the form of resource competition and working in a human capital sector. The latter is interpreted as trade or manufacturing. Rent seeking exerts negative externalities on the productivity of human capital. Adding shocks, in the form of fluctuations in the size of the contested resource, the model can replicate a long phase with stagnant incomes and high levels of rent seeking, interrupted by small, failed growth spurts, eventually followed by a permanent transition to a sustained growth path where rent seeking vanishes in the limit. The model also generates a rise and fall of the so-called natural resource curse: before the takeoff, an increase in the size of the contested resource has a positive effect on incomes; shortly after the takeoff, the effect is negative; and on the balanced growth path the growth rate of per capita income is independent of resource shocks.     

Government size and economic growth in an endogenous growth model with rent‐seeking

We explore the relationship between government size and economic growth in an endogenous growth model with human capital and an unproductive capital which facilitates rent‐seeking. With exogenous as well as endogenous time discounting, we find a non‐monotonic relationship between the size of government and economic growth. We find that with very high (low) discounting, there is a unique low (high) growth equilibrium, regardless of the size of government. For the intermediate range of discounting, there are multiple equilibria and the growth outcome depends on the size of government. With endogenous time discounting, the growth outcome is path dependent and depends on the level of inherited human capital. However, there is only one stable growth regime and the economy endogenously switches to it. When the institutional constraints on rent‐seeking are not extremely high, the stable regime is the one in which there is a high‐growth equilibrium for a smaller size of the government and for larger size, both the high‐growth and the low‐growth equilibrium coexist. When the institutional constraints on rent‐seeking are extremely high, there exists only a unique high‐growth equilibrium irrespective of the size of government. Furthermore, economies with bigger size of the government and/or with poor quality institutions will take longer to endogenously switch to this stable growth regime.     

On The Allocative Effects of Rent Seeking

We consider the effects of rent-seeking activities on resource allocation. Before rent-seeking activities take place, there are prior probabilities that an object will be given to one of several agents. The posterior probability depends on prior probabilities and the expenses incurred by all agents. In the case of two agents who equally value the object, prior and posterior probabilities coincide, and thus rent seeking has no effect on resource allocation. If there are two agents with different valuations of the object or we have more than two agents, rent seeking matters and posterior probabilities reflect the valuations of the agents.     

The Finnish Corporate Income Tax Reform and the Financial Strategy of Firms: A General Equilibrium Approach

This paper simulates the effects of the recent Finnish corporate tax reform with a computable general equilibrium model. It shows that the impact of the reform on the capital stock depends on the reactions of firms. If the financial strategy is changed to prefer dividend distribution and share issues, the cost of capital falls and the capital stock increases. On the other hand, if the criterion of financial policy is to minimise the welfare loss of current shareholders, the earlier financial behaviour should be continued. In that case,the induced higher cost of capital leads to a lower capital stock. The overall welfare evaluation of the tax reform is not sensitive to the regime shift: the reform should not have been implemented. This is because the increase in interest income taxation distorts saving decisions, expands the net foreign debt of the economy and weakens the terms of trade.     

RENT SEEKING AND TAX REFORM

Tax reform can either increase or reduce the amount of rent seeking, depending essentially on what is done. If tax reform involved eliminating special treatment of special groups and using the money saved either to lower the general tax rate or to discontinue government activities that most people would be better off without, then it would reduce the amount of rent seeking. Savings may, however, be used to reduce the degree of generally beneficial government activity. This is rather apt to increase the amount of rent seeking in the long run.     

The Distributional and Allocative Impacts of Virtual Labor Mobility across Time Zones through Communication Networks

Using a specific‐factors' model, with two goods (a shift‐working good and a non‐shift‐working good), three factors (capital specific to shift‐working, land specific to non‐shift‐working and labor) and two countries (Home and Foreign), which are located in different time zones, we highlight the impact of trade in labor services via communication networks on factor prices and production patterns. If two countries are identical in size, then under free trade in labor services, all workers work only in their local daytime, and night shift in each country is performed by imported labor services supplied by residents of the other country in their local daytime. Night‐time wage becomes the same as daytime wage (a wage equalization result). Other factor prices are also equalized. In both countries, capital rental rate increases, while land rent decreases. However, if two countries are different in size, trade in labor services does not equalize wages: in the large country, wages for night‐shift workers are higher than daytime wages and some residents work at night; in the small country, daytime wages become higher than night‐time wages and no one works at night, and night‐shift work is done by imported labor services from the large country. Land rent in the small country decreases. Land rent in the large country may or may not decrease, but it is always higher than in the small country. Capital rental rates in both countries are equalized and increase.     

The incidence of a tax on pure rent in a small open economy

This paper analyzes the effects of a land rent tax on capital formation and foreign investment in a life-cycle small open economy with endogenous labor-leisure choices. The consequences of land taxation critically depend on how the tax proceeds are used by the government. A land tax depresses capital formation, crowds out foreign investment and increases national wealth and consumption when the land tax revenues are distributed as lump-sum payments. If the proceeds from land taxation are used to finance unproductive government expenditure, the land tax will be neutral in its effects on the capital stock, nonhuman wealth and labor. When the tax revenues are used to reduce labor taxes, the land rent tax spurs nonhuman wealth accumulation and ambiguously affects the capital stock and labor.     

Rent, risk, and replication: Preference adaptation in winner-take-all markets

We study the evolution of an economy where agents who are heterogeneous with respect to risk attitudes can either earn a certain income or enter a risky rent-seeking contest. We assume that agents behave rationally given their preferences, but that the population distribution of preferences evolves over time in response to material payoffs. We show that, in particular, initial distributions with full support converge to stationary states where all types are still present. Although rents are perfectly dissipated in material terms at a steady state, efficiency is greater than if everybody had been risk neutral, since risk lovers specialize in rent seeking.     

SEEKING RENT IN THE INFORMAL SECTOR

Rent seeking within the vast informal segment of the developing world is a relatively under‐explored topic in the interface of labor market policies and public economics. Moreover, how rent seeking and corruption within the informal segment gets affected by economic reforms targeted for the formal sector is rarely discussed in the literature. This paper fills the gap. We identify conditions under which economic reform in the formal segment will increase the rate of corruption or rent seeking in the informal sector and raise the pay‐off for those involved in rent‐seeking activities. When the formal sector contracts due to reforms, rent seeking in the informal sector may increase and lower the level of welfare unconditionally. Economic reforms may increase corruption instead of reducing it, unlike standard conjectures.     

INTENSITY OF COMPETITION, ENTRY AND ENTRY DETERRENCE IN RENT SEEKING CONTESTS

In rent seeking contests agents compete over a given amount of resource a prize. To increase the likelihood of winning the prize, the agents expend efforts. This paper addresses the issue of entry to and entry deterrence from rent seeking contest. The main purpose of the analysis is to provide an explanation for the empirical fact that the number of participants in contests is usually small. I also obtain results on the relationship between the intensity of competition in a contest and the amount of the contenders'expenditures.     

贸易开放和人力资本形成的非线性关系——理论和基于我国省际动态面板数据的实证研究

本文通过理论模型分析了贸易开放影响人力资本积累的两种途径:改变人力资本相对报酬和国外知识溢出,贸易开放能否促进人力资本形成取决于两种途径的相对大小。同时本文使用中国省际动态面板数据对贸易开放如何影响人力资本形成进行了实证研究,发现贸易开放和人力资本之间存在U型非线性关系,即当贸易开放度比较低时,贸易开放度的提高不利于人力资本形成;而当贸易开放度达到一定程度后,贸易开放度的提高则有利于人力资本形成。     

资源诅咒传导机制的研究述评

资源诅咒是开发自然资源引起的一系列经济、社会问题的统称,比如经济增长缓慢、贸易保护、教育投资不足、物质资本积累下降、创新不足、不平等、寻租、腐败、体制不健全、内战等问题。因其明显的政策含义,资源诅咒传导机制成为研究的重点。本文以经济增长源泉为线索,区分经济学和政治学,从理论和实证两方面给出资源诅咒传导机制的全面说明,以帮助找出我国资源诅咒的关键因素,制定相应政策提高资源开发绩效。     

汇率调整对中国就业的影响--基于理论与经验的研究

汇率变动影响出口产品的价格 ,改变出口企业的投资决策 ,从而使出口企业的生产规模发生变化 ,劳动力需求也受到影响。当出口在一国经济中占有重要地位时 ,汇率的调整就会影响就业。本文通过理论和实证方法 ,分析人民币汇率调整对就业的实际影响。研究结果表明 ,人民币升值将抑制就业的增长 ,并加重就业负担。因此 ,目前人民币汇率不宜大幅上升 ,但有必要对外汇管理和外贸体制进行适时的调整 ,以适应日益开放的竞争性市场体系     

要素市场扭曲对企业家寻租及创新的影响

Baumol认为企业家行为模式受到所在制度环境的影响，良好的制度环境会促进企业家从事增加社会福利的生产性活动，比如创新；而制度环境不佳会导致企业家从事攫取社会利益的非生产性活动，比如寻租。Baumol的企业家才能配置理论在中国具体情境中，是否有其适用性？以我国2009-2014年省级层面面板数据，利用各省份人均土地出让面积作为地区要素市场扭曲的工具变量，在有效控制内生性可能导致的模型估计偏误后，实证考察了要素市场扭曲对企业家寻租活动的作用效应。研究发现，转轨时期我国地区要素市场扭曲程度越深，企业家寻租活动就越多。进一步通过系数检验以及Bootstrap方法考察企业家寻租活动在地区要素市场扭曲和企业创新强度之间的中介效应，证实了“要素市场扭曲→企业家寻租活动增多→企业创新强度减弱”传导机制的存在，可为深化中国要素市场机制改革提供理论和实证支持。     

The Economics of Tenancy Rent Control

We consider a rent control regime where rent increases on, and eviction of, a sitting tenant are forbidden. When apartments become vacant landlords may negotiate new rents. If inflation exists, landlords prefer to rent to short-staying tenants. Since departure-date-contingent contracts are forbidden and landlords cannot tell whether tenants are short-stayers, an adverse selection problem arises, with a Pareto inefficient equilibrium. When tenant types are determined endogenously, multiple equilibria can arise where one equilibrium is Pareto dominated. Abolition of the rent control regime, cannot only shift the equilibrium out of this inferior outcome, but also result in across-the-board lowering of rents.     

Granger causality tests among openness to international trade,human capital accumulation and economic growth in China: 1952–1999

Abstract

This study examines Granger causality among openness to international trade, human capital accumulation and economic growth in China using time series data over the period from 1952 to 1999 and a sub-period, i.e. a period from 1978 to 1999. For the 1952–1999 period, economic growth is found to Granger cause human capital accumulation and not vice versa. For the 1978–1999 period, economic growth and openness to international trade, economic growth and human capital accumulation, and human capital accumulation and openness to international trade are found to have bidirectional Granger causality, respectively. Thus, there is a dynamic relationship among openness to international trade, human capital accumulation and economic growth. The experience of economic reform in China could be an example to other developing countries.     

Trade barriers,multinational involvement and intra-industry trade: panel data evidence from India

The article analyses the effects of trade barriers and multinationals on the intensity of intra-industry trade (IIT) in a panel of Indian manufacturing industries from 1988 to 1999. We find that the intensity of IIT increases with the reduction of trade barriers. This is expected as greater competition from imports leads individual plants in the domestic industry to specialize in the manufacturing of unique varieties. The analysis suggests that horizontal (market seeking) multinational activities in the domestic industries exert a negative influence on IIT. This is consistent with the view that horizontal multinationals displace exports to the host country. At the same time, our results indicate that IIT will be stimulated to the extent that the entry of multinationals induces intra-industry specialization. We also analyse the role of product differentiation and plant level scale economies in determining IIT.     

The Economics of Bipartisan Campaign Reform

This essay evaluates two provisions in the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA): raising contribution limits and banning soft money. The model highlights the importance of marginal cost ratios for candidates and their parties. The results suggest that raising contribution limits protects incumbents. Importantly, this generates efficiency gains that come at the expense of electoral competitiveness. When a party has an advantage in a large number of districts, the soft money ban may also reduce rent‐seeking effort while exacerbating existing advantages. Ultimately, the two provisions underscore an “equity‐efficiency” trade‐off. While restricting rent‐seeking effort, they probably lead to less competitive elections.     

Comparative Trade Policy

Current research has found ambiguous theoretical and empirical results with respect to the effects of the type of electoral regime on trade policy. The present paper aims to reconcile the different views within a theoretical model. It is shown that the equilibrium level of trade protection can be relatively higher, as well as lower, under a majoritarian electoral rule compared with proportional representation. Trade policy is more (less) protectionist under proportional electoral regimes, as compared with majoritarian institutions, if swing districts are populated by relatively more (less) factor owners with stakes in the exporting sector. It is also shown that politicians optimally apply a lower (higher) level of rent seeking under the majoritarian electoral rule if there are relatively more factor owners in the swing districts with stakes in the exporting (import‐competing) sector.     

Cross-border rent shifting in international telecommunications

While scholars have questioned the merits of strategic trade policy, such policies have played a major role in international telecommunications. Countries have traditionally linked bilaterally their termination prices for international telephone calls. I show that this linkage can be rationalized as a mutually beneficial constraint on rent seeking. Linkage becomes more challenging to maintain with telecommunications liberalization, competition, and the growth of alternatives for terminating traffic. I consider possible policy approaches to such developments. Overall, this case study suggests that constraining cross-border rent shifting will present a major transitional challenge in international efforts to liberalize services.