Efficient Contests

In their seminal contribution, Lazear and Rosen (1981) show that wages based upon rank induce the same efficient effort as incentive‐based reward schemes. They also show that this equivalence result is not robust toward heterogeneity in worker ability, as long as ability is private information because it is not possible to structure contests to simultaneously satisfy self‐selection constraints and first‐best incentives. This paper demonstrates that efficiency can be achieved by a simple modification of the prize scheme in a mixed (heterogenous) contest where contestants learn their type after entry. If contestants know their type before entering the contest, rent extraction becomes an issue. Implications for optimal contest design are also explored. Finally, the relationship between effort maximizing contests and profit maximizing contests are discussed.     

Contest success function with the possibility of a draw: Axiomatization

In imperfectly discriminating contests the contestants contribute effort to win a prize but the highest contributed effort does not necessarily secure a win. The contest success function (CSF) is the technology that translates an individual's effort into his or her probability of winning. This paper provides an axiomatization of CSF when there is the possibility of a draw (the sum of winning probabilities across all contestants does not add up to one).     

“Reverse” nested lottery contests

This paper proposes a multi-prize “reverse” nested lottery contest model, which can be viewed as the “mirror image” of the conventional nested lottery contest of  Clark and Riis (1996a). The reverse-lottery contest model determines winners by selecting losers based on contestants’ one-shot effort through a hypothetical sequence of lotteries. We provide a microfoundation for the reverse-lottery contest from a perspective of (simultaneous) noisy performance ranking and establish that the model is underpinned by a unique performance evaluation rule. We further demonstrate that the noisy-ranking model can be interpreted intuitively as a “worst-shot” contest, in which contestants’ performances are evaluated based on their most severe mistakes. The reverse-lottery contest model thus depicts a great variety of widely observed competitive activities of this nature. A handy closed-form solution for a symmetric equilibrium of the reverse-lottery contest is obtained. We show that the winner-take-all principle continues to hold in reverse-lottery contests. Moreover, we find that a reverse-lottery contest elicits more effort than a conventional lottery contest whenever the prizes available to contestants are relatively scarce.     

Entry regulations and optimal prize allocation in parallel contests

Review of Economic Design - In parallel contests, the contest organizer controls the entry of heterogeneous contestants by regulating access to the contests and determining the prize allocation...     

Performance feedback in a group contest: A field experiment on electricity conservation

We conduct a field experiment on electricity conservation to study whether revealing both the competitive state and the social state in a group contest affects individual beliefs and efforts. Our experiment randomizes group composition, participation, and types of information received in the contest. We find that contestants without feedback about relative performance had difficulty assessing their group's competitive status, and laggards within a group tended to be overconfident about their relative contribution. In addition, we find that contestants receiving both competitive and social information were more likely to have correct beliefs about their positions during the contest and exerted the most effort. Meanwhile, contestants receiving no performance feedback did not behave differently from those who did not participate in the contest. Overall, contestants reduced their energy use by 10% during the contest. Our results support the notion that providing feedback is important in a group contest.     

Time Discounting in Strategic Contests

In many contests, such as political campaigns or R&D expenditures, there is at least some trade‐off between immediate money outlay and potential future benefits. This timing aspect has mostly been ignored by the contest literature. If contestants exhibit a strong present bias, such as that shown by past individual choice experiments, then benefits that are deferred to the future will lead to a significant drop in investment. This paper uses controlled laboratory experiments to explore how the timing of prize payment impacts behavior in a contest with a unique Nash equilibrium strategy. We find no evidence that people significantly discount future prizes in our contests, despite the fact that we do replicate present bias in a separate individual choice experiment.     

Cultural values and definitions of career success

This paper examines how national culture relates to the ways that individuals define career success. Data are drawn from interviews with 269 professional services employees in 15 countries. Interviews are content coded and linked with country‐level Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness measures of cultural values. We test our hypotheses using a multilevel multinomial logit model. The results demonstrate that the ways in which employees define career success vary across countries, due in part to differences in cultural values after controlling for gender, occupation, job level, and national economic development. We find that employees from countries high in future orientation, uncertainty avoidance, and performance orientation are more likely to define career success in terms of interpersonal outcomes, and those from countries high in collectivism (institutional and in‐group), humane orientation, and gender egalitarianism are more likely to prefer intrapersonal outcomes. We find that employees from countries that are high in assertiveness, uncertainty avoidance, and performance orientation are more likely to define career success in terms of achievement‐oriented outcomes. Finally, we find that employees from countries high in power distance report career success definitions in terms of safety and security outcomes. We discuss the implications of these findings for theories of cultural differences in careers across countries.     

Contests with investment

Perfectly discriminating contests (all pay auctions) are widely used as a model of situations where individuals devote resources to win some prize. In reality such contests are often preceded by investments of the contestants into their ability to fight in the contest. This paper studies a two stage game where in the first stage, players can invest to lower their bid cost in a perfectly discriminating contest, which is played in the second stage. Different assumptions on the timing of investment are studied. With simultaneous investments, equilibria in which players play a pure strategy in the investment stage are asymmetric, exhibit incomplete rent dissipation, and expected effort is reduced relative to the game without investment. There also are symmetric mixed strategy equilibria with complete rent dissipation. With sequential investment, the first mover always invests enough to deter the second mover from investing, and enjoys a first mover advantage. I also look at unobservable investments and endogenous timing of investments. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A process approach to understanding multiple open source innovation contests – Assessing the contest structures,execution, and participant responses in the android developer challenges

As organizations recognize the importance of open innovation, understanding emerging mechanisms for soliciting outside participation is a growing area of academic interest. Strategies can be as diverse as hosting innovation contests, sponsoring open source software (OSS) communities, or engaging in bilateral partnerships. While these have been studied as distinct strategies, more recent work has identified the possibility for combining these approaches, or deploying different methods at different times. Because each of these open innovation strategies are characterized by different incentive systems as well as different work and social practices, the combination of these can reveal unexpected participant responses (e.g., collaboration in innovation contests, competitive behavior in OSS communities). This study examines an explicit attempt to combine these strategies, to host an open source innovation contest. Through the case of Google's Android Developer Challenge, a series of multi-million dollar innovation contests used to launch an OSS community over several years, this study utilized a process approach to understanding open source innovation contests to understand how participants responded and also how the contest conditions changed over time. We found several practices of competition and collaboration that worked around the short term and long term incentives and constraints posed by the contest. We also followed the contest through various transition phases and found that participants reacted strongly to changes in structure, execution, and shifting conditions over time. Through this case, we extend our understanding of innovation contests as a process and specifically the promises and pitfalls of open source innovation contests.     

On optimal favoritism in all-pay contests

I analyze the optimal favoritism in a complete-information all-pay contest with two players, whose costs of effort are weakly convex. The contest designer could favor or harm some contestants using one of two instruments: head starts and handicaps. I find that any given player’s effort distribution is ranked in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance according to how (ex post) symmetric the players are in terms of competitiveness. Consequently, as long as the designer values effort from both contestants, “leveling the playing field” is optimal regardless of which instrument is used.     

The national innovation policy effect according to firm location

The regional nature of innovation and innovation policy was investigated. The aim of this study was to determine whether the specific economic and institutional conditions of a region had an influence on the results of a national policy intended to support entrepreneurial innovation. The analysis compared the effect of the national R&D subsidies on the innovation effort of firms located in central regions, which concentrate an important percentage of the national innovation activity, together with those firms located in periphery regions. Significant regional differences were detected with regard to the national R&D subsidies’ effect and distribution. The central regions manifested a higher subsidy effect compared to the periphery regions. The results of this study have allowed us to conclude that the region plays an important differentiating role in connection with the final result of the innovation policy aimed at the entire national territory. Therefore, this study recommends including the geographical location of the firm in future evaluations.     

Information Sharing in Contests

We study the incentives to share private information ahead of contests, such as markets with promotional competition, procurement contests, or research and development (R&D). We consider the cases where firms have (i) independent values and (ii) common values of winning the contest. In both cases, when decisions to share information are made independently, sharing information is strictly dominated. With independent values, an industry‐wide agreement to share information can arise in equilibrium. Expected effort is lower with than without information sharing. With common values, an industry‐wide agreement to share information never arises in equilibrium. Expected effort is higher with than without information sharing.     

Discrimination in contests: a survey

The objective of this paper is to provide a comprehensive answer to some fundamental questions related to discrimination within the context of contests. For example, what forms of discrimination are possible? Can discrimination be justified? What mode of discrimination is expected? Does discrimination necessarily result in the elimination of polarization? How effective are the different modes of discrimination in inducing efforts (revenue)? How do the most widely studied contests based on an all-pay-auction and on a lottery compare under different modes of discrimination? Applying a contest-design approach, we examine four alternative types of discrimination that can be selected by a contest designer who maximizes the contestants’ efforts (his revenue). Our survey focuses on the leading principles of the separate and joint effective application of the alternative modes of direct, overt covert and head starts-discrimination that are assumed to be exercised under the widely studied family of (logit) contest success functions (CSFs). Whereas direct discrimination refers to differential taxation of the contested prize subject to a balanced-budget constraint, overt, covert and head starts-discrimination relate to structural discrimination that involves the parameters of the CSF. While the direct mode of discrimination is legally feasible, the structural modes of discrimination are more subtle and more difficult to implement and, sometimes, may even involve legal barriers.     

Contests with endogenous deadlines

This paper analyzes the problem of a contest designer who chooses a starting time and a deadline of the contest to maximize discounted total effort by the contestants. Each contestant secretly decides how much effort to exert between the starting time and the deadline. At the deadline, the contestant who exerted most effort wins a prize, which consists of the endowment of the designer and collected interest. The contest has a unique Nash equilibrium. In the main model, the designer should announce the contest immediately with a short deadline to promote intense competition. I analyze how the optimal starting time and deadline change for a variable contest prize, different types of asymmetries, a Tullock lottery contest success function, and different goal functions of the designer.     

The retention of CEOs that make poor acquisitions

Does the failure to replace CEOs following a bad takeover represent a cost-effective strategy or a failure of boards of directors and the market? We study 104 white knight contests to examine why poorly performing firms retain their CEOs. We find the majority are poor performers before they enter the control contest (q?相似文献   

Innovation contests with entry auction

We consider innovation contests for the procurement of an innovation under moral hazard and adverse selection. Innovators have private information about their abilities, and choose unobservable effort in order to produce innovations of random quality. Innovation quality is not contractible. We compare two procurement mechanisms—a fixed prize and a first-price auction. Before the contest, a fixed number of innovators is selected in an entry auction, in order to address the adverse selection problem. We find that–if effort and ability are perfect substitutes–both mechanisms implement the same innovations in symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium, regardless of whether the innovators’ private information is revealed or not. These equilibria are efficient if the procurer is a welfare-maximizer.     

Emotions in litigation contests

This paper introduces the concept of emotions into the standard litigation contest. Positive or negative emotions emerge when litigants either win or lose at trial and depend in particular on the level of defendant fault. Our findings establish that standard results of litigation contests change significantly when emotions are taken into account. We show that emotions may increase or decrease individual and total equilibrium contest effort, introduce an asymmetry into the contest, and reinforce or weaken a plaintiff’s incentives to bring a suit. In addition, we consider how emotions impact on justice.     

Employee stock ownership and financial performance in European countries: The moderating effects of uncertainty avoidance and social trust

This study investigates how the effect of employee stock ownership on financial performance may hinge on the diverse cultural and societal contexts of European countries. Based on agency and national culture theories, we hypothesize that the positive relationship between employee stock ownership and return on assets (ROA) is stronger in those nations with lower uncertainty avoidance and higher social trust. Using a multisource, time‐lagged, large‐scale dataset of 1,741 firms from 21 countries in Europe, our multilevel, random coefficient modeling analysis found evidence for these hypotheses, suggesting that uncertainty avoidance and social trust serve as important contextual cues in predicting the linkage between employee stock ownership and financial performance. Our supplemental analysis with distinction between the managerial and nonmanagerial employee stock ownership further indicates managerial employee stock ownership has a direct positive effect on ROA. Although nonmanagerial employee stock ownership had a nonsignificant association with ROA, the relationship was positive and significant when uncertainty avoidance was low and social trust was high. This research contributes to the existing literature by illuminating some of the contextual influences altering the effectiveness of employee stock ownership. Our findings also offer practical suggestions for effectively using employee stock ownership.     

Allocation of Prizes in Contests with Participation Constraints

We study all‐pay contests with an exogenous minimal effort constraint where a player can participate in a contest only if his effort (output) is equal to or higher than the minimal effort constraint. Contestants are privately informed about a parameter (ability) that affects their cost of effort. The designer decides about the size and number of prizes. We analyze the optimal prize allocation for the contest designer who wishes to maximize either the total effort or the highest effort. It is shown that if the minimal effort constraint is relatively high, the winner‐take‐all contest in which the contestant with the highest effort wins the entire prize sum does not maximize the expected total effort or the expected highest effort. Rather, a random contest in which the entire prize sum is equally allocated to all the participants yields a higher expected total effort as well as a higher expected highest effort.