The influence of relational experience and contractual governance on the negotiation strategy in buyer–supplier disputes

This paper theoretically refines and empirically extends the debate on the type of interplay between relational experience and contractual governance in an under-researched area: supply chain disputes. We define relational experience as either cooperative or competitive; distinguish between control and coordination functions of contractual governance; and assess their interplay on the negotiation strategy used in disputes. Using a unique data set of buyer–supplier disputes, we find, in particular that increasing contractual control governance weakens the positive effect of cooperative relational experience on cooperative negotiation strategy. However, increasing contractual control governance for a buyer–supplier dyad with competitive relational experience will increase cooperative negotiation strategy. Contractual coordination governance reinforces the positive effect of cooperative relational experience. Through this study, we reach a better understanding of how and when contractual and relational governance dimensions interact; rather than whether they act as substitutes or complements as has been studied in prior research. We discuss the implications of these findings for the field of supply chain management.     

Governing buyer–supplier relationships through transactional and relational mechanisms: Evidence from China

Building on economic and social exchange theories, this study investigates the different roles transactional and relational mechanisms have in hindering opportunism and improving relationship performance in an emerging economy. Our study applied to manufacturer–distributor dyads in China and used matched survey data (225 paired sample firms) to test our hypotheses. Our hierarchical multivariate regression and semipartial correlation analyses suggest that transactional mechanisms are more effective in restraining opportunism while relational mechanisms are more powerful in improving relationship performance. This performance is improved more significantly when both contracts and relational norms are used jointly than when used separately. Likewise, opportunism is curbed more effectively when both contracts and trust are used jointly than when used individually.     

Relationship governance mechanisms and collaborative performance: A relational life-cycle perspective

Governance mechanisms protect the investments involved in transactions and thereby facilitate and promote sustainable and cooperative relationships; however, the empirical results of prior research concerning the relationship between governance mechanisms and collaborative performance are inconsistent. Based on transaction cost economy (TCE) and social exchange theory (SET), a relational life-cycle framework that considers the dynamic evolution of collaborative relationships and re-examines the relationship between governance mechanisms and collaborative performance was developed in this study. Evidence from 124 manufacturers in Taiwan indicates that the effects of governance mechanisms on collaborative performance differ according to the current life-cycle phase. In the exploration phase, contractual control exerts a positive impact on cooperative performance. In the buildup and maturity phases, relational control remains positively associated with collaborative performance, whereas the impact of contractual control is insignificant. In the decline phase, both contractual control and relational control have an insignificant impact on collaborative performance. Herein, we discuss the implications of our empirical findings and their relevance to managers.     

The effect of cross-organizational governance on supply chain resilience: A mediating and moderating model

This study examines the effect of a novel antecedent, namely cross-organizational governance (which can be further divided into contractual and relational governance), on supply chain resilience. Additionally, it explores the mediating and moderating effects of supply chain collaboration and institutional environment, respectively, on the relationship between cross-organizational governance and supply chain resilience. Accordingly, a research model, together with four hypotheses, is constructed based on institutional theory. These are further tested based on data collected from a single-respondent survey of 358 Chinese manufacturing companies. The results reveal that contractual and relational governance have significant positive effects on supply chain resilience; supply chain collaboration plays a partially mediating role and institutional environment plays a moderating role in the effects of contractual and relational governance on supply chain resilience. This study enriches the understanding of the relationships between cross-organizational governance, supply chain collaboration, supply chain resilience, and institutional environment. It also provides a reference for supply chain managers’ decision-making activities.     

Trust and formal contracts in interorganizational relationships — substitutes and complements

We hypothesize that trust is a moderator of the direct relationship between control and coordination concerns and contractual complexity. Our results suggest that high trust weakens the positive relationship between control concerns and contractual complexity and reinforces the positive relationship between coordination concerns and contractual complexity. By highlighting the dual role of contracts (i.e. a controlling and coordinating function) and the moderating role of trust in this regard, our paper provides a new focus to the current discussion on the relationship between trust and contracts (i.e. substitutes or complements) that may help reconcile some divergent perspectives in the literature. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Performance Implications of IJV Boards: A Contingency Perspective

This study draws from the corporate governance literature to investigate the implications of board involvement for international joint ventures (IJVs). We extend recent corporate governance research on the value of board involvement by investigating unique sources of complexity related to the nature of the IJV. We argue and find that board involvement can enhance the performance of IJVs, particularly for collaborations that are complex in nature due to their broad functional scope as well the level of market overlap between IJV parents. We complement recent research on joint venture control that has focused on the antecedents and types of control, as well as studies on formal (e.g. contractual safeguards and monitoring) and informal governance mechanisms (e.g. trust) by providing empirical evidence that IJV board involvement is valuable when directors undertake their control and coordination responsibilities. We advance corporate governance research by providing evidence that joint ventures possess several unique characteristics that shape the value of board involvement, thereby showing that applications of corporate governance theory to joint ventures are useful, but should be made with care.     

The interplay of governance mechanisms in complex procurement projects

Although many studies have investigated governance in inter-firm relationships, little is known about the simultaneous use of several governance mechanisms in complex procurement projects and their impact on project outcomes. In a case study about a complex procurement project in the Norwegian oil and gas industry, we investigate the interplay of contractual incentives, authority and relational governance. The project faced many problems with cost overruns and schedule delays. The study clearly illustrates the interrelationships between governance mechanisms and their effect on project outcomes. The findings suggest that relational governance (trust) is only beneficial for project outcomes when it is accompanied by contractual incentives and control systems (authority). Relational governance in itself does not guarantee an effective and beneficial interplay of all three mechanisms in a way that positive project outcomes are generated.     

The bright side and dark side of trust: The mediating effect of franchisor trust on performance

Previous literature has not examined the dual role of trust in franchise relationships. We extend the franchise and relational governance literature by showing that trust has both a “bright side” and a “dark side” in franchisor–franchisee relationships. Based on transaction cost and knowledge-based reasoning, we argue that intangible knowledge assets and environmental uncertainty have an indirect effect on performance via trust, due to its relational risk and knowledge exchange effect. Using data from the franchise sector in Germany, we show that trust positively mediates the impact of intangible knowledge assets and negatively mediates the impact of environmental uncertainty on franchisor performance. The first effect refers to the “bright side” of trust showing that intangible brand name assets increase trust which, in turn, has a positive effect on performance. Conversely, the second effect refers to the “dark side” of trust highlighting that environmental uncertainty diminishes trust resulting in a negative effect on performance.     

The dynamics of contractual and relational governance: Evidence from long-term public–private procurement arrangements

This paper investigates the detail and dynamics of how contractual and relational governance mechanisms are deployed in managing complex, long-term public–private supply arrangements. Using empirical data from two UK Private Finance Initiative (PFI) cases, the paper analyses the interplay of governance mechanisms along a timeline of project phases. Conceptual and practical findings confirm that relational and contractual mechanisms are indeed complementary forms of exchange governance but also that the relational intentions of all parties frame whether the contract is interpreted as a written sign of distrust or commitment. Equally, relational and contractual governance follow different development paths: both follow cumulative trajectories but (a) inter-personal relational mechanisms are more incremental and fragile, whereas (b) contractual mechanisms move with fewer degrees of freedom and ‘anchor’ the exchange throughout the life cycle. Finally, the different development characteristics of relational and contractual mechanisms mean that their dynamic interplay does not follow consistent patterns. The paper concludes with suggestions for more longitudinal studies.     

Contract Formalization and Governance of Exporter–Importer Relationships

abstract    Exporting relationships between manufacturers and foreign importers pose unique coordination problems because, on the one hand, transactions are recurrent and both firms make non-trivial relationship-specific investments, but at the same time, the exchange partners maintain separate legal entities with individual profit claims. This study examines the role of contracts as a governance mechanism in these relationships that are neither market-based discrete transactions, nor can be governed through ownership-based hierarchies. Drawing upon recent research on contract law and interorganizational relationships, we develop and empirically test a model that incorporates both the antecedents and performance implications of the nature of contract governing exporter–importer relationships.     

The influence of contractual and relational factors on the effectiveness of third party logistics relationships

Outsourcing has become popular in both management literature and practice, but few studies have examined the effects of two important and potentially complementary elements – contractual and relational elements – on the effectiveness of logistics outsourcing relationships. It is theorized that contract formality, the thoroughness of contract negotiations, trust and commitment increase the effectiveness of 3PL provider–client relationships. For empirical validation a survey was carried out in the 3PL industry among both 3PL providers and clients. Using PLS path modelling, we observed that for both LSPs and clients, contract formality, trust and commitment are all positively related to relationship effectiveness. The results for negotiation thoroughness are mixed. The model explains 59% (LSPs) and 60% (clients) of the variance in relationship effectiveness. It is concluded that both ‘hard’ contractual aspects and ‘soft’ relationship aspects are important for effective supply chain collaboration. Theoretical and managerial implications are provided.     

Governance of complex procurements in the oil and gas industry

This study focuses on the use of contracts and governance mechanisms for handling complex procurements involving several actors. We develop a contractual framework arguing that different combinations of incentives, authority and trust should be used to govern such procurements. The framework is applied to two complex procurement cases in the Norwegian oil and gas industry. The empirical findings show that incentives, authority and trust complement each other, and furthermore, that there is a complex interplay between the specific uses of the different mechanisms. We denote this interplay a multiplier effect. Multiplier effects have not previously been addressed in the literature, and this study contributes to our knowledge about inter-firm governance by showing that governance mechanisms affect each other. Proper use of one mechanism improves the use of other mechanisms, while inadequate use of one mechanism hampers the use of other mechanisms.     

In search of alliance-level relational capabilities: Balancing innovation value creation and appropriability in R&D alliances

In order to advance our knowledge of alliance-level relational capabilities, this paper investigates how searching across different knowledge domains affects both innovation value creation and appropriability in R&D alliances. Focusing on the alliance level of analysis, we advance that, in R&D strategic alliances, search span has a curvilinear (inverted U-shape) relationship with value creation and a positive relationship with value appropriability. Our analysis on a sample of 1515 interfirm dyadic R&D alliances confirms these hypotheses. We find that, after a threshold level of search span, joint value creation decreases. Conversely, the allied firms’ ability to appropriate the value of their jointly developed inventions grows exponentially as the alliance search span increases. Thus, value creation and appropriability may have conflicting exigencies. We argue that firms involved in R&D strategic alliances should develop the interorganizational relational capability to jointly manage the process of search that occurs at the interorganizational level, and specifically the span of their search, in ways that balance the needs of value creation and appropriability.     

Public–Private Partnerships in Health Services Delivery

Abstract

In this article, we conceptualize public–private partnerships (PPPs) from a network organizations perspective, and apply interorganizational relations (IOR) to study fifteen PPPs in a district health system in the state of Rajasthan in India. We find that the Government occupies a dominant position in the network because of the centrality of its functions, authority and control over resources and information. There is greater reliance on formal mechanisms of co-ordination. For effective network governance, it is imperative to reduce the power asymmetry, develop horizontal co-ordination, trust and social capital, and enhance public managers’ capacity for effectively managing interorganizational relationships.     

Separating contract from governance

This paper contends that there is an important distinction between governance structure and contractual form, and that organizational boundaries, defined by governance structures, need not explain contractual form. The basic idea is that governance refers to the general environments and instruments that structure and ‘govern’ specific terms of trade negotiated in ‘contracts’. Problems of verifiability and observability of contractual performance are hypothesized to drive the differential effects on governance structure and contractual form. Specifically, transaction cost factors known to result in employment as a general governance structure do not automatically result in contracts characterized by the payment of fixed‐wages. Instead, incentive pay and the delegation of decision‐making authority to workers may be preferred by firm owners. The paper proposes that the relationship between a firm and a worker involves a two part decision‐making framework in which one choice is the type of governance that structures the second choice regarding the specific characteristics of the contract linking the worker to the firm. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Strategic interdependence, governance effectiveness and supplier performance: A dyadic case study investigation and theory development

Inter-organizational exchange governance approaches are often characterized as two broad types: relational and transactional. However, in fast changing business contexts, the contextual contingencies do not present ideal conditions for practicing purely relational or transactional approach. Understanding the dynamic of key contextual factors and their effects on a firm's resource capabilities and inter-organizational power structure is crucial for identifying the appropriate governance structure over time. In this paper we explore the exchanges between an OEM and five of its strategic suppliers that operate in high-end, short product life cycle motorbike industry, to understand the key contextual factors and the relationships among business context, governance structure, and exchange practices in a dyadic context. It is observed that firms deviate from the conventional choices of either transactional or relational governance to a combination of contractual and relational aspects to make the governance structure effective. Based on case studies, a theoretical framework is proposed to explain the rationale, feasibility and effectiveness of combining contractual and relational aspects in different contexts. The framework suggests that the degree of strategic interdependence between the trading partners fundamentally drives the effectiveness of governance structure and exchange practices.     

Impact of relational norms, supplier development and trust on supplier performance

Supplier relationship management and supplier development initiatives assume a fundamental role in enterprise supply chain management. An important aspect of effective supplier relationship management is the role of trust. This paper seeks to understand whether supplier relationship management or supplier development initiative should be emphasized as a firm strives to achieve superior supplier performance. The analysis and discussion draws upon sourcing strategy literature and is based on empirical survey-data of mid to upper level managers with responsibility for supply management initiatives in their respective organizations in Denmark and in the USA. It examines the interrelationships among “relational norms”, “trust”, “supplier development initiatives” and ensuing “supplier performance”. The data analysis shows that firms must emphasize relation and trust building activities before investing in supplier development initiative. Supplier perception audits must be routinely performed to gauge the level of trust and strength of relational norms.     

Determinants of contractual restraints in franchise contracting

Although an efficient design of franchise contracts requires from the franchisor to choose a bundle of contractual restraints as safeguarding and control mechanism, previous research has not explored the antecedents of contractual restraints as a bundle of contractual clauses. To address this gap, the aim of this study is to explain the determinants of the most important contractual restraints (i.e., exclusive dealing, exclusive territory, tying, resale price maintenance, call option, leasing, alienation, and noncompetition clauses), using transaction cost and relational governance reasoning. The regression results based on primary data from German and Swiss franchise systems provide support of hypotheses.     

Governance, Negotiations, and Alliance Dynamics: Explaining the Evolution of Relational Practice

This paper explores relational practice in strategic alliances. Focusing on how governance mechanisms and negotiation strategies evolve and form patterns of interaction that are under influence of both recursive and adaptive forces, four modes of relational practice are discussed: recursively integrative, recursively distributive, adaptive toward integrative, and adaptive toward distributive. Three longitudinal cases are examined. I find that different contractual conditions enable (or restrain) interaction patterns. Negotiation behaviour, in turn, affects future contractual conditions and their combination and recombination form the evolution of relational practice. As relationships progress, initial governance mechanisms are complemented and negotiation behaviours change. I explain how perceptions of both process and relational outcomes influence relational practice. In addition, I explicate why relational practices have both recursive and adaptive characteristics, and identify conditions that cause relational practices to move towards more integrative or distributive modes.     

Scale development and validation of Transaction Cost Economics typology for contracts: A systems thinking approach

A variety of contract typologies that exist in the literature are helpful in the exploration of different approaches in contractual relations, but only when measured with the right instruments. Although Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) has a distinct, high-level, and abstract typology for contracts, it still lacks a measurement scale. In this paper, a measurement scale for the TCE contract typology (classical, neo-classical, and relational contracts) was developed and validated, using systems thinking approach and experimental design to contribute to the empirical tests of TCE within the contracting realm. First, the antecedents of contract selection within the TCE literature were analyzed using the systemigram technique to visualize and parse out complex relationships that lead to contract selection. The analysis of the TCE Systemigram helped the development of the scale and revealed the need to revisit the risk neutrality assumption embedded in TCE. Second, a measurement scale for the TCE contract typology (classical, neo-classical, and relational contracts) was developed adhering to the original texts of seminal papers and reviews from the TCE literature. Third, the 14-item measurement scale was validated using a series of three vignette-based experimental studies.Key messageThis research explores the antecedents of the TCE contract typology and develops a measurement scale for essential characteristics of classical, neo-classical, and relational contracts, as defined in TCE, using systems thinking approach and a novel vignette-based experimental design.