How Persistent Is the Impact of Market Timing on Capital Structure?

This paper examines the capital structure implications of market timing. I isolate timing attempts in a single major financing event, the initial public offering, by identifying market timers as firms that go public in hot issue markets. I find that hot‐market IPO firms issue substantially more equity, and lower their leverage ratios by more, than cold‐market firms do. However, immediately after going public, hot‐market firms increase their leverage ratios by issuing more debt and less equity relative to cold‐market firms. At the end of the second year following the IPO, the impact of market timing on leverage completely vanishes.     

An Analysis of the Financing Decisions of REITs: The Role of Market Timing and Target Leverage

This paper examines the role of capital market conditions and target leverage on the marginal financing decisions of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), which include both capital raising and capital reduction activities. We investigate the relevance of a hybrid hypothesis whereby REITs have target leverage, but they also choose and time their marginal financing decisions according to the capital market conditions. The empirical results suggest that target leverage behavior plays a secondary role to market timing behavior in the financing decisions of REITs. In particular, we find strong and consistent evidence that REITs exhibit market timing behavior in terms of when and what type of capital to issue or reduce. Such market timing practices, motivated by attempts to take advantage of capital market conditions, may shift the firms away from their target leverage. However, we observe that in the long run, most REITs do move their capital structure towards the target debt level.     

Equity market timing and capital structure: International evidence

We investigate the equity market timing hypothesis of capital structure in major industrialized (G-7) countries. As claimed by its proponents, we find that leverage of firms is negatively related to the historical market-to-book ratio in all G-7 countries. However, this negative relationship cannot be attributed to equity market timing. We find no association between equity issues and market-to-book ratios at the time of equity financing decisions by Japanese firms. Firms in all G-7 countries, except Japan, undo the effect of equity issuance and the impact of equity market timing attempts on leverage is short lived. This is inconsistent with the prediction of the equity market timing hypothesis and more in line with dynamic trade-off model.     

The Effects of Ownership Structure and Intragroup Loans on Leverage: Evidence from Family Firms in Chile

This article examines the effects of family control and pyramidal ownership on firms’ capital structure decisions. After studying a sample of listed family and nonfamily firms in Chile, we find that families take a conservative approach to debt and financial risk exposure. We test the hypothesis that family firms restrict the use of debt in order to avoid the monitoring role of creditors, which could limit their enjoyment of the private benefits of control. In keeping with this hypothesis, we find a U-shaped relationship between leverage and the degree of pyramidal ownership that is more pronounced among family firms than nonfamily firms. We do not find any evidence that is consistent with the hypothesis that family-controlled firms have low leverage ratios due to their access to internal capital markets. In fact, conversely, we find that listed family firms provide more loans to related companies than comparable nonfamily firms.     

Asymmetric adjustment toward optimal capital structure: Evidence from a crisis

We employ dynamic threshold partial adjustment models to study the asymmetries in firms' adjustments toward their target leverage. Using a sample of US firms over the period 2002–2012, we document a negative impact of the Global Financial Crisis on the speed of leverage adjustment. In our subperiod analysis, we find moderate evidence of cross-sectional heterogeneity in this speed, which seems more pronounced pre-crisis and provides little support for the financial constraint view. Over the pre-crisis period, more constrained firms, such as those with high growth, with large investment, of small size, and with volatile earnings, adjust their capital structures more quickly than their less constrained counterparts. These firms rely heavily on external funds to offset large financing deficits, suggesting that their higher adjustment speeds may be driven by lower adjustment costs that are shared with the transaction costs of accessing external capital markets. During the crisis, the speed of adjustment varies with the deviation from target leverage: only firms with sufficiently large deviations attempt to revert to the target, albeit slowly. Overall, our results provide new evidence of both cross-sectional and time-varying asymmetries in capital structure adjustments, which is consistent with the trade-off theory.     

The effect of corporate sustainability performance on leverage adjustments

We examine the impact of corporate sustainability performance (CSP) on the speed at which firms adjust their leverage ratios to the target levels for a large sample of 31 countries from 2002 to 2018. Using two proxies of CSP, we find that firms with superior CSP tend to adjust faster toward their target leverage ratios. In exploring the potential underlying economic mechanisms through which CSP affects leverage adjustments, we find that better CSP helps firms to ease information asymmetry, enhance stakeholder engagement, push up stock prices in the stock market, and improve competitive advantage in the product market. In the cross section, the positive association between CSP and leverage adjustment speed is less pronounced in countries with high-quality institutions. The results remain unchanged in robustness tests. Overall, this paper highlights the important role of CSP in shaping corporate capital structure dynamics and suggests implications for corporate strategic planning on the privately optimal levels of CSP activities.     

‘Hot’ Debt Markets and Capital Structure

This paper examines the motives of debt issuance during hot‐debt market periods and its impact on capital structure over the period 1970–2006. We find that perceived capital market conditions as favourable, an indication of market timing, and adverse selection costs of equity (i.e., information asymmetry) are important frictions that lead certain firms to issue more debt in hot‐ than cold‐debt market periods. Using alternative hot‐debt market issuance measures and controlling for other effects, such as structural shifts in the debt market, industry, book‐to‐market, price‐to‐earnings, size, tax rates, debt market conditions and adjustment costs based on debt credit ratings, we find that firms with high adverse selection costs issue substantially more (less) debt when market conditions are perceived as hot (cold). Moreover, the results indicate that there is a persistent hot‐debt market effect on the capital structure of debt issuers; hot‐debt market issuing firms do not actively rebalance their leverage to stay within an optimal capital structure range.     

Does the Source of Capital Affect Capital Structure?

Prior work on leverage implicitly assumes capital availabilitydepends solely on firm characteristics. However, market frictionsthat make capital structure relevant may also be associatedwith a firm’s source of capital. Examining this intuition,we find firms that have access to the public bond markets, asmeasured by having a debt rating, have significantly more leverage.Although firms with a rating are fundamentally different, thesedifferences do not explain our findings. Even after controllingfor firm characteristics that determine observed capital structure,and instrumenting for the possible endogeneity of having a rating,firms with access have 35% more debt.     

Ultimate Ownership and Adjustment Speed Toward Target Capital Structures: Evidence from China

We investigate whether ultimate ownership affects firms’ adjustment speed toward target capital structures for Chinese publicly listed companies over the period 1999–2009. We divide our sample into state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-SOEs according to their ultimate ownership. We find that SOEs have higher leverage ratios and slower adjustment speeds toward target capital structures. Our results are consistent with the trade-off theory, implying that the political resources of SOEs can lead to a higher persistence and slower leverage adjustment speeds in comparison to non-SOEs. Finally, our results also raise a question: Why do Chinese companies adjust their capital structure so fast?     

Conglomerate investment under various capital market conditions

This paper studies the investment of diversified and focused firms under various capital market conditions. When external capital becomes more costly at the aggregate level, investment declines in focused firms but remains unchanged in diversified firms. This investment advantage enjoyed by diversified firms could attribute to both their easy access to external capital and their ability to substitute internal capital markets for costly external markets. Consistent with the internal capital market argument, our findings show that the investment advantage exists for diversified firms even after we control for their easy access to external markets. We also find that the role of internal markets in financing investment is more important for diversified firms that are more financially constrained in external markets. Finally, we find that the segment-level investment becomes more efficient in conglomerates’ internal capital markets under depressed external capital market conditions. Overall, our findings suggest that internal capital allocation functions as a valuable and efficient substitute for diversified firms in a tightened external capital market.     

Capital structure under collusion

We analyze the financial leverage of firms that collude to soften product market competition by forming a cartel. We find that cartel firms have lower leverage during collusion periods. This is consistent with the idea that cartel firms strategically reduce leverage to make their cartels more stable, because high leverage makes deviations from a cartel agreement more attractive. Given that cartels have a large economic footprint, their study is also relevant for the capital structure literature, which has largely ignored the role of anti-competitive behavior.     

Agency costs,taxes and debt: The UK evidence

This paper provides an empirical examination of the impact of the corporation tax and agency costs on firms' capital structure decisions. Our evidence suggests that the agency costs are the main determinants of corporate borrowing. Consistent with the agency theory, we find that firms that have fewer growth options have more debt in their capital structure. Moreover, our results show that debt mitigates the free cash flow problem and that firms that are more likely to be diversified and less prone to bankruptcy are highly geared. the negative effect of insider shareholding on leverage disappears, however; when all the agency mechanisms are accounted for. In addition, we find that, in the long run, companies that are tax exhausted exhibit significantly lower debt ratios than tax-paying firms. However, in the short run, firms' capital structure decisions are not affected by taxation.     

Capital Structure Decisions: Which Factors Are Reliably Important?

This paper examines the relative importance of many factors in the capital structure decisions of publicly traded American firms from 1950 to 2003. The most reliable factors for explaining market leverage are: median industry leverage (+ effect on leverage), market-to-book assets ratio (−), tangibility (+), profits (−), log of assets (+), and expected inflation (+). In addition, we find that dividend-paying firms tend to have lower leverage. When considering book leverage, somewhat similar effects are found. However, for book leverage, the impact of firm size, the market-to-book ratio, and the effect of inflation are not reliable. The empirical evidence seems reasonably consistent with some versions of the trade-off theory of capital structure.     

Financial market frictions and diversification

We find new facts that relate the evolution of firm scope to the changing frictions in external capital markets over the last three decades. We find that large, diversified publicly traded firms increase their scope during times of high external capital market frictions, such as in the recent Great Recession. Moreover, during these times firms diversify their investment needs and cash flow across industries. We also find similar phenomena outside diversified public firms. Examining the mergers and acquisitions activity of stand-alone and diversified private firms, we uncover similar patterns. In aggregate data, we find that the composition of mergers shifts from focused to diversifying and back with changes in external market conditions. Our evidence is broadly consistent with the notion that firms diversify their scope in response to tightening in external capital markets.     

Internal capital markets and the partial adjustment of leverage

Prior literature provides support both for the existence of target capital structures and internal capital markets (ICM). The issue of whether firms use internal capital markets to reduce deviations from target capital structures, however, has yet to be examined. We provide the first empirical evidence of a link between deviations from target leverage and ICM activity. Based on data that allow us to trace intra-group capital market transactions for property–casualty insurers, our findings provide the first joint evidence that affiliated insurance companies have target leverage ratios and that ICM activity is used to manage deviations from target leverage.     

Determinants of target capital structure: The case of dual debt and equity issues

We examine whether market and operating performance affect corporate financing behavior because they are related to target leverage. Our focus on firms that issue both debt and equity enhances our ability to draw inferences. Consistent with dynamic trade-off theories, dual issuers offset the deviation from the target resulting from accumulation of earnings and losses. Our results also imply that high market-to-book firms have low target debt ratios. On the other hand, consistent with market timing, high stock returns increase the probability of equity issuance but have no effect on target leverage.     

How Entrenchment, Incentives and Governance Influence REIT Capital Structure

Although recent literature has confirmed the importance of viewing a firm??s capital structure choices of leverage and debt maturity as jointly determined, to date there has been little analysis of the importance of traditional governance variables on a firm??s capital structure decisions using a simultaneous equations approach. We examine the influence of managerial incentives, traditional managerial monitoring mechanisms and managerial entrenchment on the capital structure of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs). Using panel data, we estimate a system of simultaneous equations for leverage and maturity and find that firms with entrenched CEOs use less leverage and shorter maturity debt. This is consistent with the expectation that managers acting in their own self interest will choose lower leverage to reduce liquidity risk and use short maturity debt to preserve their ability to enhance their compensation and reputations by empire building. We also find evidence that traditional alignment mechanisms such as equity and option ownership have an offsetting effect; and that firms where the founder serves as CEO choose higher leverage and longer maturity debt. The results also provide evidence that leverage and maturity are substitutes, firms with high profitability and growth opportunities use less leverage and firms with liquid assets use more leverage and longer maturity debt.     

Evaluating corporate credit risks in emerging markets

Corporate leverage among emerging market firms went up considerably after the 2007–09 Global Financial Crisis (GFC). We investigate how the increased emerging market corporate leverage in the post-GFC period (2010–15) impacted the underlying credit risk, compared to the pre-GFC (2002–2006) and GFC (2007–09) periods. Using firm-level credit risk, financial, and balance sheet data for 350 firms in 23 emerging markets, we find that leverage growth leads to a significant increase in corporate credit default swap (CDS) spreads only in the post-GFC period, and the incremental effect is mainly evident among risky firms (firms with high leverage and idiosyncratic volatility). In contrast, emerging market CDS spreads during the GFC period are mainly driven by global market risk factors. The post-GFC corporate debt vulnerability is mitigated for high growth prospect firms and firms domiciled in countries with high net capital inflows and superior governance. While corporate leverage growth impacts aggregate corporate credit risk, there is no evidence that it increases sovereign credit risk. Our paper contributes to the recent literature on potential sources of default risk in emerging markets.     

Investor sentiment and firm capital structure

We provide novel evidence of the role of investor sentiment in determining firms' capital structure decisions from three perspectives: leverage ratio, debt maturity and leverage target adjustment. We find that when investor sentiment is high, firms increase their leverage ratios, supporting our contention that high investor sentiment increases firms' debt capacity and facilitates the use of an aggressive leverage policy. Debt maturity is shorter in high sentiment periods, implying that firms are confident about future earnings and use shorter debt maturity to signal their financial solvency. Leverage target adjustment is slower in low sentiment periods, indicating higher costs of external finance. Furthermore, the sentiment-leverage relationship sensitivity is greater for financially constrained firms. Our extended analysis determines that leverage-increasing firms generate lower stock returns subsequent to a period of high sentiment, offering practical insights into the economic consequences of increasing leverage in high sentiment periods on corporate value for investors. Our research advances the understanding of the impact of investor sentiment on firms' financing decisions and stock returns.     

Macroeconomic conditions and capital structure adjustment speed

Using two dynamic partial adjustment capital structure models to estimate the impact of several macroeconomic factors on the speed of capital structure adjustment toward target leverage, we find evidence that firms adjust their leverage toward target faster in good macroeconomic states relative to bad states. This evidence holds whether or not firms are subject to financial constraints. Our results are robust to an alternative method of calculating states and to omitting zero-debt boundary firms and are not driven by firm size, deviation from target, or leverage definitions.