价格与进入管制下的边缘性进入--一个理论模型分析

本文从产业组织和企业行为的视角 ,探讨了二元 (价格与进入 )管制下边缘性进入发生的技术、需求和结构性条件 ,从而对管制放松的初始诱因提出了一个新的解释 ,即管制放松是技术进步 (在本文特指新产品的出现 )、需求结构变化和原有管制下的产品特制、产业组织结构及权力结构安排的内生现象。由边缘性进入引发的放松是一个渐进性的“多赢”结局 ,不会导致由强制性管制放松所引起的管制无序甚至缺失现象。     

市场经济条件下的“价格大战”辨析

价格大战是市场竞争条件下的必然产物。本文以上海“明牌银楼”13家黄金饰品企业联合限价为案例,研究表明,政府应当制裁企业为避免价格大战而采取的价格串通行为,进而探讨了价格竞争中行业协会的功能定位问题。     

Market Entry Regulation and International Competition*

We analyze a non‐cooperative two‐country game where each government decides whether to allow free market entry of firms or to regulate market access. We show that a Pareto‐efficient allocation may result in equilibrium. In particular, if the cost difference between home and foreign production is “significant,” production will be located in the cost‐efficient country exclusively; and if this cost difference is even “substantial,” the induced allocation is also Pareto efficient. Only if the cost difference is “insignificant,” production may take place in both countries and the allocation is inefficient.     

Strategic Choice of the Price Structure and Entry Deterrence Under Price Cap Regulation

This paper shows that a price‐capped firm under the threat of entry in some of the markets it serves can strategically manipulate its price structure to deter entry. In doing so, the regulated firm uses the price cap constraint as a commitment device to an aggressive pricing behaviour in case of entry. A (dynamic) price cap generally entails that the prices allowed today are a function of the previous‐period prices and that the tighter is the constraint on each price, the larger is the quantity sold of this good in the previous period. Hence, the regulated firm may strategically choose its price structure before entry to place a tighter regulatory control on the prices set in the (potentially) competitive markets and to make it optimal to charge in these markets – in case of entry – prices so low that entry is unprofitable.     

Asymmetric Regulation of Access and Price Discrimination in Telecommunications*

Suppose that a strong and a weak operator compete in a telecommunications market. To terminate a call operators need access to the competitor’s network if the call is off-net. Operators set two-part tariffs and price-discriminate according to termination of a call. Suppose as a benchmark that access prices are regulated at costs. I show that the weak operator’s profit and consumer welfare increase if the regulator sets a higher price to access the weak operator’s network. However, total surplus decreases even locally. *I received helpful comments from Mark Armstrong, Toker Doganoglu, Tommaso Valletti, Julian Wright, and, in particular, two referees and the editor Michael Crew. I gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (Heisenberg Fellowship).     

The Effects of Regulation and Regulatory Risk in the UK Electricity Distribution Industry

This paper examines the impact of regulation of the UK electricity industry on expectations of investors in the shares of regional electricity companies (RECs). This is done using event-study methodology where the movements of RECs' returns are compared to movements in the stock market as a whole. We then test for the presence of regulatory risk by modelling the conditional volatility of equity returns before and after 30 significant regulatory events using an ARCH process. Our results show no evidence of regulatory capture in this sector but suggest that regulatory risk does exist.     

Regulatory Choices and Commitment: Challenges for Electricity Market Regulation in Kosovo

Since 1990 the Cuban economy has faced a crisis comparable with those in Eastern Europe. However, since 1995 approximately, the Cuban reform has been showing significant results in terms of economic recovery and financial adjustment. As is the case with the Chinese reform, the stabilising, privatising and liberalising measures taken in Cuba point to a reform strategy essentially different from that followed in Eastern Europe. This article shows two relevant aspects of the Cuban case: first, the Cuban reform is a transition process toward the market although forced by external circumstances and still at an early developmental stage; second, the Cuban transition is in line with the evolutionary conception of a transition.     

Tax Evasion,Corruption and Market Entry

We analyze the impact of tax policy on the market entry of firms in the presence of corruption and tax evasion. In a world with corruption, firms must bribe corrupt officials to enter the market. For a given level of bribes, higher tax rates and stricter enforcement of taxation decrease tax evasion but typically reduce market entry. However, when the level of bribes reacts to tax policy, higher taxes and stricter enforcement of taxation can have a double benefit. Up to a certain threshold, for which we develop a simple rule, stricter enforcement increases market entry and reduces tax evasion.     

An Application of the Hedonic Price Model to the Perth Residential Land Market*

This paper presents the results of an application of the Rosen-Freeman hedonic price model to the Perth (Western Australia) residential land market. A sample of over two thousand market transactions is used to estimate the value of residential land attributes. Major emphasis is given to those particular land attributes that are subject to public regulation and to the policy implications that follow.     

市场进入壁垒、进入管制与中国产业的行政垄断

本文在对中国产业行政垄断研究的基础上,从产业组织理论的角度对该问题给予了较全面的论述.其基本逻辑过程是:如果不存在市场的进入壁垒,那么,没有外力干预的市场竞争机制将导致最优的社会福利结果.如果存在市场进入壁垒,则可能是技术进入壁垒、企业战略性进入壁垒和政府进入管制,如果这些进入壁垒的效应有利于市场竞争机制的有效发挥及社会福利,那么政府对此就无需进行干预;反之,就应存在着政府干预,而且这种干预的程序和方法都应该具有有效性和公平性.如果我们将这种干预称作政府管制的话,就不应该存在所谓政府对产业的行政垄断.本文从上述分析逻辑给出行政垄断的定义,并对在我国建立完善有效的产业政府管制以及消除产业的行政垄断提出建议.     

技术进步、价格调整与制造业电力需求

电力需求快速增长引发的碳排放问题日益严重,中国环境容量能否承载未来电力需求持续高速增长的压力备受关注。不同产业部门电力需求存在直接和间接的经济技术联系,基于东部11个省份2007年投入产出表,测算生产过程中某一部门技术进步引致的经济系统中所有产业部门电力需求的变化幅度,以此判断对电力需求影响较大的制造业部门,并利用投入产出价格模型计算各产业部门生产成本对电力价格增加的敏感度,识别出价格效应显著的各制造业部门。综合技术进步效应与价格效应后,比较各产业部门在电力需求上的节能减排潜力的结果显示：在经济发展水平相似的东部各省份,非金属矿物制品业、金属冶炼及压延加工业、化学工业、通用、专用设备制造业4个产业的技术进步效应、价格效应均能显著抑制电力需求增加,具有较大的节能减排潜力。但实践上通过价格效应实现降低碳排放的目标,还需考虑碳成本转化率、市场结构、替代品替代效应、产品需求弹性等因素的影响。     

价格歧视理论中的若干问题

价格歧视理论在传播和应用中存在着含糊不清甚至是谬误的问题,文中重新界定了价格歧视的概念,规范了实施价格歧视的前提条件,对价格歧视中的社会利问题进行了分析,同时指出了价格歧视理论中的两个常见错误。     

价格歧视和网络营销

本文运用经济学理论对价格歧视的种类、必要条件和依据进行了分析 ,并在此基础上论证了网络营销中也能对消费者实行价格歧视。最后阐述了网络营销中的二部定价方法。     

中国电价扭曲与电力强度的影响因素

利用改进的C-D生产函数,估算了1978—2012年中国的电价扭曲程度。以电力强度为被解释变量,以电价扭曲程度、要素结构、城市化水平、产业结构等为解释变量,构建了协整模型,基于此对截至2020年中国电力强度的变化趋势进行了情景分析预测。研究结果表明:改革开放以来,中国电力能源价格发生了明显的负向扭曲,20世纪90年代初扭曲程度最大,此后整体上呈缓慢下降态势,但扭曲现象仍非常明显;电价扭曲程度每变化1%,中国电力强度同向波动约0.2155%,重工业发展对中国电力强度的刺激作用最强,推进城市化进程和优化产业结构可明显抑制中国的电力强度;2020年中国的电力强度将下降至约150千瓦时/千元。     

Residential Mobility, Housing Equity and the Labour Market

UK commentators have noted that the UK housing market may hinder labour market flexibility. The present paper uses UK household longitudinal data (BHPS) for the early 1990s, and estimates single and competing risk discrete time duration models of residence duration to investigate the impact of negative housing equity on residential moves. Strong evidence for an adverse impact on mobility is found, along with results to suggest that the home-owners do not move in response to changing labour market conditions. Negative equity in the early 1990s therefore exacerbated housing market related rigidities in the job matching process     

煤电关系与电力"软短缺":一个产量约束模型

构建了一个具有产量约束的伯特兰价格竞争模型来研究中国电力短缺的问题,模型结论表明,即使在电力企业装机容量充足的情况下,由于煤炭产量的约束,电力需求的外生冲击仍有可能导致电力“软短缺”。同时,本文进一步探讨了旨在解决煤电矛盾的煤电一体化和煤电价格联动问题,认为这些措施只能暂时缓解煤电关系紧张和电力“软短缺”的问题,这些问题的解决需要进一步深化电力体制改革。     

Trade, Entry Barriers, and Home Market Effects

This paper re‐examines the relationship between entry barriers and home market effects and departs from recent work by using returns to scale as a direct measure of entry barriers as opposed to relying on the level of product differentiation as an indirect proxy for barriers to entry. In contrast to earlier work, results of this study do not indicate a significant relationship between home market effects and entry barriers. In addition, examination of trade costs reveals the importance of these costs in the numéraire sector. These two observations are consistent with the theoretical prediction that home market effects are insignificant in the presence of symmetric trade costs across sectors. Consequently, a more direct measure of barriers to entry and an explicit consideration of trade costs indicate that the link between home market effects and barriers to entry is not as strong as predicted by previous work.     

Seasonality, Cointegration, and Forecasting UK Residential Energy Demand

Much of the short‐run movement in energy demand in the UK is seasonal, and the contribution of long‐run factors to short‐run forecasts is slight. Nevertheless, using a variety of techniques, including a recently developed estimation procedure that is applicable irrespective of the orders of integration of the data, we obtain a long‐run income elasticity of demand of about one third, and we are unable to reject a zero price elasticity. An econometric model is shown to provide superior short‐run forecasts to well‐known seasonal time series models ex post , but is inferior to Box‐Jenkins SARMA models when the determinants themselves have to be forecast. However, the relatively short data sample and small number of forecasts suggest caution in generalising these results.     

垄断、竞争与市场规制：美国的经验与中国的实践

经济学上的垄断是指对市场的控制和干预,它包括企业垄断和政府垄断,垄断的危害极大,各国法律对其限制严格。我国现有的《反不正当竞争法》不足以限制垄断行为,尤其是政府经济垄断;美国《反托拉斯法》的经济与法律思想及其实施给我们提供了一个很好的参考模式,因此,借鉴美国的经验,修订和完善《反不正当竞争法》规范政府垄断行为,是建立完善的市场经济秩序的重要保证。