Supply contract with options

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of an option contract for two companies of a supply chain: retailer and supplier. With an option contract the retailer orders a quantity of units and has the right to modify his order if necessary. A model to calculate the performance of an option contract in terms of contract value for the two companies engaged is presented. The two considered cases are multiple suppliers and one retailer, and one supplier and one retailer. The performance improvement obtained using this kind of contract is compared by simulation.     

零售商主导的创新成本共担期权契约研究

本文在不确定市场环境中,考虑期权契约在零售商主导的单周期二级供应链成员间创新投入的协调,分别讨论在是否允许期权信用违约情形下,要实现供应链协调各决策主体的决策模型。研究发现单纯的期权契约难以实现供应商单方面创新投入行为,为此引入创新投入成本共担机制,对原契约加以修正则可以实现供应链协调。研究表明在创新成本共担下的期权契约机制可以满足零售商主导的供应链协调,能够提高供应商和零售商的期望收益,实现帕累托改进。     

基于收益共享的供应链中断协调研究

本文假定市场需求不确定和供给存在中断危机，同时考虑订货过剩损失和缺货成本，研究了由零售商、主供应商和备份供应商组成的供应链网络，构建了收益共享合同协调模型，通过相关参数的设定达到供应链协调。供应链协调时的供货量及整体利润均大于分散模型；备份供应商的供货量及利润随着中断危机的增大而增加，零售商利润也随之增加。     

A centralized/decentralized design of a full return contract for a risk-free manufacturer and a risk-neutral retailer under partial information sharing

We consider the design of full return contract in a simple supply chain with a risk-free manufacturer and a risk-neutral retailer. In this problem, the ordering quantity and the rebate price for unsold products are determined by the retailer and the manufacturer, respectively. We propose an optimal solution procedure in centralized and decentralized decision making environments considering when the information sharing among the retailer and the manufacturer is partial. We provide numerical examples to explain the proposed solution procedures.     

Optimal pricing and order quantity for the newsvendor problem with free shipping

To attract and keep customers, companies, especially those in e-business, are increasingly offering free shipping to buyers whose order sizes exceed the free shipping quantity. In this paper, given the supplier offers free shipping and the retailer faces stochastic demand, we determine the retailer's (i.e., the newsvendor's) optimal order quantity and the optimal selling price simultaneously. We consider two different ways in which price affects the demand distribution, namely price only affects the location or scale of the demand distribution. We explicitly incorporate the supplier's quantity discount and transportation cost into the models. The transportation cost function is very general, which includes those most commonly used in the literature. We numerically examine the impacts of free shipping, quantity discount, transportation cost, and demand variance on the retailer's optimal order quantity and pricing decisions. We find that even though the retailer faces uncertain demand, free shipping can effectively encourage the retailer to order more of the good and can benefit the supplier, the retailer, and the end customers. An increase in transportation cost or a decrease in purchase price will induce the retailer to order more of the good and decrease the retail price. With increasing demand variance, the retailer should order more of the good. We also find that the newsvendor can cope with demand variance by taking advantage of free shipping.     

基于CVaR的第三方回收闭环供应链的优化与协调

利用条件风险值理论研究了第三方回收闭环供应链的优化与协调问题。在随机需求与收益共享———费用共担契约下,建立了由单个风险规避零售商、单个风险规避制造商和单个风险中性第三方回收商组成的三阶闭环供应链的条件风险值模型和基于条件风险值的最优订购与定价决策模型。在对模型进行分析的基础上,揭示了制造商和零售商的风险规避水平对最优订购量、最优定价、条件风险值及闭环供应链协调性的影响。最后通过一个算例验证了研究结论。     

考虑质押物损耗的存货质押融资决策模型

质押物的完整性是关系存货质押融资业务能否顺利开展的重要问题,质押物损耗长期困扰各参与方,阻碍了存货质押融资业务的顺利开展。考虑质押物损耗和第三方物流企业对质押物监管所带来的损耗节约的基础上,研究了存货质押融资最优决策。研究表明:当零售商的初始现金余额很低时,零售商的最优订购数量随着初始现金余额的增加而减少,之后零售商最优订货量保持不变,直到初始现金余额大于某一水平时,零售商的最优订货量开始增加;在零售商贷款且不存在破产风险时,银行的收益随着零售商初始现金余额增加而减少;当风险估值是需求的增函数时,零售商的最优订货量随利率减少。     

Structuring and contracting in competing supply chains

This paper considers two competing supply chains, each with multiple upstream suppliers producing complementary products and selling to a single buyer (e.g., assembler or retailer), who then sells the finished assembled product to a market that involves both demand uncertainty and competition. Our main research questions focus on what supply chain structure (integration vs. decentralization) and which contracting strategy a business should choose. We find that supply chains that decentralize perform better under strong market competition (i.e., high degree of product substitution between supply chains). However, when a large number of suppliers exist, supply chains that integrate perform better. When decentralized structures are used for both supply chains, a consignment with revenue sharing contract generally outperforms a wholesale price contract from the downstream retailer's point of view. Interestingly, for a supplier, a wholesale price contract, which pushes all demand risks to the downstream retailer, might not be preferred. For the entire supply chain, one contract strategy can outperform another depending on the degree of competition, the cost share of the buyer, and the number of suppliers.     

Which one is more valuable in coordinating the online and offline distribution? Service support or online price coordination

Nowadays effective mechanisms to coordinate the online and offline distribution become increasingly important in the business market. In this research, we first propose two mechanisms (i.e. the offline service to the retailer and the online price coordination) for the manufacturer and the retailer to employ. Our results show that the online price coordination does help coordinate the online and offline distribution and bring higher profits to the manufacturer-retailer supply chain and thus both the manufacturer and the retailer, while the offline service to the retailer does not; comparing to the offline service to the retailer, the online price coordination is a better strategy to be utilized to alleviate the online to offline competition. Furthermore, we investigate if a novel coordination mechanism, which combines the offline service to the retailer with the online price coordination, can help coordinate the online and offline distribution better and becomes the optimal coordination mechanism. Surprisingly, our results show that compared to both the offline service to the retailer and the online price coordination, this combination coordination mechanism does show a dominant competitive advantage to bring highest profits to all parties.     

VMCI 下基于批发价决策权转移的供应链效率改进研究

本文在VMCI 模式下,考虑销售努力水平对市场需求的影响,研究批发价决策权由供应商转移至零售商的两级供应链效率改进问题。假定零售商决策批发价和销售努力水平,供应商决策寄售量,建立了零售商主导的Stackelberg 博弈模型,证明了集中决策下的最优解和分散决策下的均衡解均存在且唯一,集中决策下的寄售因子大于分散决策下的对应值。随后,引入收入共享与销售努力成本共担契约,论证了系统中寄售因子保持不变、批发价降低,且当契约参数满足一定条件时,可实现帕累托改进,实现供应链的效率改进。最后,分析了契约参数对于系统决策变量及利润的影响。     

Mobile channel and channel coordination under different supply chain contexts

The paper proposes different supply chain contexts where one manufacturer sells the same product to two retailers, one traditional and one online. The first context is when two retailers are distinct entities and the second context is when a dominant manufacturer owns and controls the traditional retailer. In each context, we study a no cooperation scenario versus various cooperation strategies (namely the minimum pricing strategy, the whole channel price, and the revenue sharing cooperation). Besides, we investigate the use of a dual channel by the online retailer via a mobile channel and a computer channel. The online retailer could use the same price online or a price differentiation (called also personalized pricing) depending on where the purchase is done. Our results show the crucial role of the product compatibility to the web and the mobile baseline incremental sales in influencing the performance of each channel member.     

传统品牌与网货品牌竞争下的多渠道供应链定价研究

基于传统制造商品牌的双渠道供应链,引入网货品牌的网络直销渠道,构建了两个品牌竞争下的多渠道供应链定价模型。并考虑了两条网络渠道的双重搭便车行为,通过Nash博弈得到供应链成员在分散和集中式决策下的均衡策略。研究表明各博弈方的最优定价和利润是关于渠道间及品牌间交叉价格弹性系数的增函数,且渠道竞争的影响显著于品牌竞争;两个制造商的搭便车行为与自身的最优定价和利润呈正相关,但它们的相互影响取决于直接价格弹性系数;搭便车行为对零售商是不利的。最后采用价格加成契约来协调多渠道供应链,以弥补分散决策下双重边际效应带来的损失。     

A centralized/decentralized design of a full return contract for a risk-free manufacturer and a risk-neutral retailer under partial information sharing: A discussion

This paper discusses some aspects of the centralised version of the supply chain coordination method that uses the so-called Alternating Direction Method (ADM) presented by Jeong (2012, A centralized/decentralized design of a full return contract for a risk-free manufacturer and a risk-neutral retailer under partial information sharing. International Journal of Production Economics 136 (1), 110–115). We show that the method requires both from the retailer and the manufacturer to faithfully follow the proposed algorithm, without any attempt to follow their own interests in gaining higher profits. We also warn that the condition of the information privacy is violated also in partial information sharing model. Furthermore, we correct an error in one of the equations.     

Managing inventory with two suppliers under yield uncertainty and risk aversion

In this paper, we consider a single-product single-period inventory model in which the retailer can source from two suppliers. The primary supplier is cheaper but unreliable in the sense that it generates supply yield uncertainty, whereas the secondary supplier is perfectly reliable but more expensive. The reliable supplier's capacity is fixed and the retailer cannot order more than the quantity reserved in advance. We study the problem in the context of a risk-averse retailer who has to determine the optimal order quantity from the primary supplier and the optimal reserved quantity from the secondary supplier. We develop the model in the perspective of a low risk averse retailer and quantify the risk via an exponential utility function. We show by numerical experiments how the resulting dual sourcing strategies differ from those obtained in the risk-neutral analysis. We also examine the sensitivity of some model-parameters on the optimal decisions.     

Coordination of a supply chain with one manufacturer and multiple competing retailers under simultaneous demand and cost disruptions

This paper develops a coordination mechanism for a supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and n Cournot competing retailers when the production cost and demands are simultaneously disrupted. This differs from traditional supply chain coordination models under a static case and the case with only demand or cost disruption. The coordination mechanism with revenue sharing is considered, and the effects of production cost and demand disruptions on revenue sharing contract are discussed to investigate the optimal strategies of players with disruptions. The penalty cost is introduced explicitly to obtain the production deviation cost caused by the disruptions. In this study, it is obtained that the coordination contract considering the production deviation cost differs from that without disruption. Besides that, the disruptions may affect the order quantities, wholesale prices as well as revenue sharing contract. Then, the optimal strategies for different disruption levels under the centralized decision-making mode are proposed. Concerning the decentralized mode, the improved revenue sharing contract can be used to coordinate the decentralized decision-making supply chain effectively. Finally, the theoretical results are illustrated by conducting some numerical examples.     

考虑损失厌恶者参与的一对多型供应链回购契约研究

本文在多个相互竞争的零售商具有损失厌恶偏好的假设下，研究了单个供应商和多个零售商组成的二级供应链的回购契约协调模型，研究发现：相互竞争的零售商之间存在唯一的一组使其期望效用最大化的最优订货量和最优零售价格组合，并进一步论证了回购参数和损失厌恶程度及销售价格之间的关系，在此基础上，通过数值分析验证了回购契约的有效性。     

Coordination in retailer-carrier channels for long term planning

We study a retailer-carrier channel for the purpose of long term planning and coordination. Here, the term channel represents the business interaction between the retailer and the carrier. The retailer sells a particular item with price-dependent demand, whereas the carrier is responsible for transporting the item to the retailer's site. We characterize the profit functions of each channel member as well as the total channel profit. We consider two specific channel structures: (i) the centralized channel and (ii) the decentralized channel. Under the first channel structure, the goal is to set the retail price so as to maximize the total channel profit. Under the latter, the carrier and the retailer choose their own policy parameters, i.e., the freight rate for the carrier and the retail price for the retailer, so as to maximize their individual profits. We model the decentralized channel as a Stackelberg Game and propose a coordination mechanism between the retailer and the carrier in which the retailer signals a price multiplier to the carrier. We illustrate that this mechanism could provide win-win solutions for both parties and present analytical and numerical results on the efficiency of channel coordination. We demonstrate that coordination in retailer-carrier channels can be as promising as supplier-retailer channels. We also discuss the effects of retailer-carrier coordination on inventory levels.     

Sequential price and quantity decisions under supply and demand risks

Firms need to deal with not only risks from stochastic demand but also risks from supply side. The supply side risk may be due to parts/service outsourcing, third party logistics, or random yield in production processes. In this paper, we study how firms sequentially make price and quantity decisions under these two risks. The first question we try to answer is how these two risks affect the decisions and profits of the firm. We find that increased supply risk usually causes increased quantity/stocking decision, however, there exists a threshold level of supply risk above which the firm reduces quantity/stocking amount as supply risk increases. This observation may be used in a supply chain setting, where reduction of the supply risk can cause higher delivered quantity and improve supply chain performance. This observation also provides support and insights on prioritizing the risk reduction efforts from marketing and operations to achieve better coordination. At the same time, reduction of the risks help not only firms but also consumers as the optimal price decreases. To further improve decision making process under both uncertainties, we study the impact from information revelation and postponement of decisions. We compare results from different sequential decision making cases. As illustrated in the paper, firms gain competing advantage when decision postponement is available and this advantage becomes further significant as the risks increase. Our numerical examples also indicate that price postponement strategy is usually preferred but the relative profit difference between price postponement and quantity postponement become smaller as consumers become more sensitive to the price.     

供应中断下双源采购的供应链契约设计

考虑由一个制造商和两个供应商构成的两级供应链契约设计问题,将可靠性服从随机分布的供应商作为主供应商,将完全中断供应商作为次供应商,建立以利润最大化为目标的签约和执行两阶段博弈的动态规划模型,得到制造商的最优契约设计。制造商根据产品零售价格的变化灵活做出只与一个供应商签约、与两个供应商同时签约或都不签约的决定,供应商根据契约设计内容决定自己的最优生产规模。研究表明：供应商最优生产规模与产品的单位生产成本呈负相关,与单位变动支付和单位惩罚成本呈正相关;次供应商的订货量与其本身的可靠性呈正相关,与主供应商的可靠性呈负相关;供应商的固定支付与其相应的可靠性呈负相关。     

Solutions for flexible container leasing contracts with options under capacity and order constraints

The container–shipping market becomes prosperous with the development of the global economy. As shipping networks become more complex and heterogeneous, container capacity planning becomes more difficult. This paper tackles the container planning problem from the carrier’s perspective in a two-echelon container shipping service chain (CSSC), which includes one carrier and one upstream rental company. A flexible contract with options is introduced into the one-period container planning mechanism. With the flexible options contract, the rental company requires the carrier to make a commitment or place an order in advance. Options give buyer the right to modify the initial orders to better match the supply with the demand. Based on the carrier’s decision tendency, i.e., aggressive or conservative, we analyze the application strategies of the unilateral options and the bidirectional options in different practical scenarios. In particular, for the applicability of the decision models, we further consider the shipping capacity and the minimum order constraints and formulate the carrier’s option policies with constrained nonlinear programs. Numerical examples show that the proposed decision strategies with option contract cannot only effectively increase the container trading quantity between the rental company and the carrier, but also significantly reduce the carrier’s container capacity risk while increasing its profit.