基于议价博弈论的无线协作中继网络性能改进算法

针对自私性无线协作中继(CR)网络中的放大再中继(AF)和解码再中继(DF)协议,分别给出 公平且有效率的协作中继功率分配方案。两种方案虽然具体研究内容有差别,但有着共同 的研究策略。首先,将节点间的协作功率选择问题建模为纳什议价博弈问题(NBP);然后, 通过求取其纳什议价解(NBS)获得协作节点的共赢策略;最后,针对AF和DF协议分别给出计 算机仿真。仿真结果表明,所提出协作中继性能改进算法的效率性体现在所有协作节点在AF 和DF协议中均获得信号接收质量的提高,其公平性则体现在任意节点为其协作伙伴所贡献的 转发功率大小仅取决于对方为其带来的性能增益大小。     

Allocating Profit Among Rational Players in a Fuzzy Coalition: A Game Theoretic Model

In this paper, the problem of allocation of the profit, obtained from a fuzzy coalition, among its players is considered. It is argued that this allocation is influenced by satisfaction of the players in regards to better performance and success within a cooperative endeavour. Our model is based on the real life situations, where possibly one or more players compromise on their payoffs in order to help forming a coalition. We have developed a dynamic approach to obtain a suitable solution to the corresponding cooperative fuzzy game. Further, the notion of a penalty among the bargaining players is introduced. This would inflict them to reasonable demands only.     

Contracting in dynamic games

We study the bargaining problem in the dynamic framework. The classical way of solving a dynamic bargaining problem is to transform the extensive form game into the normal form and then apply the theory of bargaining well developed for normal form games. This means that the parties sign a binding contract in the beginning of the game which defines their actions for the full duration of the game. In this article, we consider the setting where the players monitor the contract as the game evolves. The main purpose of the article is to study conditions under which the players do not have a rationale to renegotiate a new contract at any intermediate time period; i.e., the contract is time consistent. Time consistency restricts the set of bargaining solutions in dynamic games. We will show that time consistency of the contract is guaranteed if the bargaining solution satisfies the controversial independence-of-irrelevant-alternatives property.     

The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations Under Incomplete Information

In our model two divisions negotiate over type-dependent contracts to determine an intrafirm transfer price for an intermediate product. Since the upstream division’s (seller’s) costs and downstream division’s (buyer’s) revenues are supposed to be private information, we formally consider cooperative bargaining problems under incomplete information. This means that the two divisions consider allocations of expected utility generated by mechanisms that satisfy (interim) individual rationality, incentive compatibility and/or ex post efficiency. Assuming two possible types for buyer and seller each, we first establish that the bargaining problem is regular, regardless whether or not incentive and/or efficiency constraints are imposed. This allows us to apply the generalized Nash bargaining solution to determine fair transfer payments and transfer quantities. In particular, the generalized Nash bargaining solution tries to balance divisional profits, while incentive constraints are still in place. In that sense a fair profit division is generated. Furthermore, by means of illustrative examples we derive general properties of this solution for the transfer pricing problem and compare the model developed here with the models existing in the literature. We demonstrate that there is a tradeoff between ex post efficiency and fairness.     

Disagreement points in trade negotiations

This paper analyzes trade negotiations between two large countries in the framework of an alternating-offer bargaining model with endogenous interim disagreement actions. Despite of the flexibility in disagreement tariff selection, the countries would keep the status quo tariffs in disagreement periods as far as the country which benefits from keeping the status quo tariffs compensates for the other country’s foregone gains from deviating in disagreement actions. Each equilibrium outcome converges to a corresponding Nash bargaining solution whose disagreement point reflects the status quo tariff rates as well as the threat of raising the tariff to the Nash tariff rate.     

A Model of Bargaining over Hazardous Waste Cleanup

We put forward a formal model of a bargaining problem in which two parties suspected of contaminating the environment are responsible for clean-up costs. If the parties do not negotiate an agreement on a cost allocation, one will be imposed by the government. This process is commonly used in environmental cleanups performed under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA or Superfund). Passed by the US Congress in 1980 and administered by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), CERCLA provides the U.S. government with authority to manage releases (or threatened releases) of hazardous substances that may endanger public health or the environment. We conclude that potentially responsible parties will be induced to settle only in the face of specific allocations of clean-up and explicit threats. For example, at the Middlefield–Ellis–Whisman Superfund site in Mountain View, California, the responsibilities of the different parties for soil and groundwater contamination are understood by all, yet our negotiation model predicts that without the threat that additional costs will be imposed, agreement on the allocation of clean up costs will never be reached.     

The effects of relationships and justification in an interdependent allocation task

Two factors, the type of relationship between the involved parties and the justification of the decision maker for being in his or her position, are predicted to influence resource allocation decisions. These predictions are based on a synthesis of several forces, including self-interest, a politeness norm, and a norm of reciprocity, that we argue underlie the selection of allocation norms that guide interdependent resource allocation decisions. An ultimatum bargaining game, in which player 1 divides a resource ($10) and player 2 decides to either reject or accept this division, is employed in a laboratory study to test the hypotheses. For subjects in the player 1 position, subjects with friends as player 2 or those assigned to their position randomly allocated lower amounts of money to themselves than did subjects with strangers as player 2 or those who earned their position. Friends in the player 2 position demanded significantly less to reach an agreement than strangers. These and other results are discussed in terms of the various allocation norms, particularly equity and equality, that appeared to influence subjects' decisions.     

How Does “3-D Negotiation” Move Beyond in a Dimension of a Win–Win–Win Approach for Integrated Bargaining Solution Analysis of Vertical Cooperative Advertising Campaigns?

The research aim of this study was to examine the possibility to investigate win–win–win Spais-Papakonstantinidis model in order to develop an integrated bargaining solution analysis for vertical advertising campaigns under the prism of the “3-D Negotiation.” First, the author provided some summary points of the critical case of Proctor & Gamble (P&G) and Wal-Mart. Second, the utility functions were extended based on author's previous works and the findings of the critical case study. The author considered a simplified situation where a brand manufacturer and an independent retailer are renegotiating, assuming that the negotiations occur in an incomplete and asymmetric information environment.     

并购交易价格形成探析

目标企业选择是并购成功的前提条件,并购谈判、实施是并购的核心,并购整合结果是衡量并购成功的重要标志。在企业并购过程中对并购双方利益影响最大的问题就是目标企业交易价格的确定问题。并购双方的动机和考虑因素不同,并购交易的价格也有所不同。     

Asset Allocation of Two‐Person Households under Different Longevity Expectations

This study examines asset allocations of near‐elderly couples when spouses have different longevity expectations. Since the risk‐adjusted return on equities increases with investment horizon, a spouse who expects longer retirement period has an incentive to hold riskier portfolio. Using data from the Health and Retirement Study, we show that portfolio riskiness increases with the subjective survival probability of the decision‐making spouse. As predicted by the bargaining model, portfolio outcomes are uncorrelated with the horizon of the spouse who has less bargaining power. Results also show that the extent expected horizon is incorporated into asset allocation depends on the decider's gender. The share of equities depends on the husband's expected horizon when he leads decision making but not on the wife's horizon when she has more power. These findings contradict the prediction that wife‐led households may hold more equities than do husband‐led households because of their longer lifespan.     

毫微微小区中一种基于分组的资源分配方法

为有效解决毫微微小区间（Femtocell）干扰,采用分布式方式对毫微微小区进行资源管理。首先,对毫微微接入点（FAPs）进行分组。基于Lingo数学建模的思想,提出了一种解决分组优化问题的算法。该算法在使用分支定界算法寻找最优解的同时,通过建立单纯形表剪去偏离最优解方向的分支;其次,每组选择一个簇头为本组内FAPs分配资源,为此,提出了新的子信道分配方法,该方法根据干扰指示矩阵修正子信道分配的情况。仿真结果表明：和其他算法相比,提出的算法不仅能找到分组优化问题的最优解,并且效率更高;另外,提出的资源分配算法不仅减小了用户间干扰,而且提高了户间速率公平。     

The impact of core labour standards on exports

Developed countries contend that trade in goods whose production is not in conformity with internationally recognized basic labour standards should be restricted, while developing countries view any attempt to link trade and labour standards as a form of protectionism that intends to end their comparative advantage. This paper provides an empirical examination of the relation between trade and core labour standards. It develops an export supply function and uses OLS techniques to test it for 58 non-OECD countries. It finds that only one core standard, the right to organize and collective bargaining, has a statistically significant negative impact on exports. The results are insensitive to the level of development of the countries included in the study. The main conclusion that emerges is that, ignoring the right to organize and collective bargaining, core labour standards do not play a significant role in trade performance.     

中国国有企业集团财务治理问题探析

财务治理是公司治理的财务方面的内容,其核心是解决财权的配置效率问题,研究财务治理在国有企业集团治理中的核心地位和重要作用,从而构建国有企业集团的财务治理结构。     

International negotiations on carbon dioxide reductions: A dynamic game model

Is there is a warming trend in the earth's climate caused by an increase in concentrations of greenhouse gases in the upper atmosphere, it may be sensible to try to slow down that process by reducing emissions of greenhouse gases and, in particular, the emissions of carbon dioxide produced by the energy sector of world economies. For a number of reasons, a consensus on such reductions is difficult to reach. In this article, we model the problem as a dynamic game with national governments, or coalitions of such governments, as players. Clearly, the negotiations on worldwide reductions in CO₂ emissions can succeed only if there exists a cooperative solution superior to the noncooperative one. According to our model, the existence of a collectively preferable cooperative solution depends on the degree of concern among national governments about negative impacts of increased CO₂ concentrations. In addition to this unsurprising conclusion, the model can provide insights as to whose concerns will count most for the success of the negotiations and who will have to be induced by side payments to participate.     

Toward a Resource-Based Theory of Bargaining Power in International Joint Ventures

Political, cultural, industrial, and firm-specific factors comine to make the bargaining relationship between international joint ventures partners a particularly complex one. This study focuses on one aspect of the problem: the relationship between the resources that a partner contributes and the bargaining power that it achieves in the venture. It traces ideas of bargaining power in the literature, to elicit what types of resource are likely to lead to dominance, the identifies several resources generally thought to be important contributions to a joint venture. The resources are ranked according to criteria of tacitness and appropriability, then displayed in matrix form to illustrate the expected outcome of bargaining in two-party international joint ventures.     

Cooperative Solutions for Large Economies with Asymmetric Information

A proof of the existence of private core allocations is provided for an exchange economy ε where consumers and commodities are both infinite in number, supposing however that only finitely many types can be distinguished among traders. It is obtained passing through the Edgeworth equilibrium notion considered for a suitably associated discrete setting. For this setting a preliminary result—which is interesting in itself—is proved: in every discrete economy E with asymmetric information and unequal numbers of traders with the same characteristics there is a private core allocation which treats agents of the same type equally.     

物流经济中对股份公司权力中心的剖析

物流经济作为一种新兴的经济形态,物流经济中股份公司权力中心的确定是公司法人治理结构的主要问题与核心问题。本文通过对股份公司权力中心定位的现状分析,以此来剖析在我国物流经济中股份公司权力中心的治理结构。     

EVOLUTION IN IMPERFECT COMMITMENT BARGAINING—STRATEGIC VERSUS IGNORANT TYPES

To commit in bargaining is crucial: in the ultimatum game with its one‐sided commitment power the ‘proposer’ (almost) receives the whole pie while the ‘responder’ is left with (almost) nothing. When bargaining parties commit simultaneously the symmetric Nash (Econometrica, 1950, vol. 18, pp. 155–162) bargaining solution predicts equal shares. Continuously connecting these two games yields a one‐parameter family of games ( Fischer et al. , Experimental Economics, 2006, vol. 9, pp. 17–33) for which we distinguish two behavioral dispositions, namely (1) neglecting commitment power and (2) reacting to it strategically. Their pay‐off implications define the evolutionary set‐up for which we derive the evolutionarily stable behavioral disposition. Our analysis sheds light on the hypothesis that in experiments participants neglect strategic aspects such as commitment power.     

How Good Are You at Getting a Lower Price? A Field Study of the US Automobile Market

Many large ticket items, such as cars and real estate, involve extensive bargaining on the part of consumers. From a consumer protection perspective, it is thus important to understand the determinants of bargaining outcomes and identify ways in which consumers can improve their bargaining performance. This research identifies several situational factors, including the information available to the consumer, the promotional environment, and a customer??s trade-in, that may have an impact on the bargaining outcome. A unique dataset is created from the US automobile market that combines actual vehicle transaction data with survey data on buyer search and bargaining behaviour. The results show that these situational variables indeed have an impact on the price a consumer pays. Specifically, on average, consumers who used the Internet and those that were offered a manufacturer rebate saved $481 and $2,126, respectively, while consumers who traded-in their old vehicle ended up paying $159 more on the new car compared to consumers who did not trade-in. Interestingly, the impact of some of these situational variables differed depending on the consumers?? ability to bargain and their enjoyment of bargaining. For example, high ability bargainers achieved more price reductions than low ability bargainers, given more information and a more active promotional environment, but this advantage did not extend in overcoming the negative impact of a trade-in. On the other hand, while buyers who enjoy bargaining do not possess a better position in a bargaining situation, they have greater tendency to search for price information and thus are better at identifying suppliers that offer a lower initial price. From a policy perspective, these results suggest that information search should be encouraged and made easier, particularly for consumers who dislike bargaining. Furthermore, even if some consumers have a high bargaining ability, there are still circumstances where their ability to get a lower price is limited. Education that highlights these pitfalls is likely to improve the final bargaining outcome and thus enhance consumer welfare.