The Pilots' Compensation Scheme: A Study in Arbitration, Interpretation and Causation

This article considers nine cases dealt with by ACAS arbitration in the period from September1991 to July 1993 under the statutory compensation scheme for marine pilots whose engagements were terminated in consequence of the major changes made to the provision of pilotage services by the Pilotage Act 1987. It explains the background to those changes and the problems that arose in the nine cases (problems of interpretation of the scheme, particularly in sickness cases, and then of proving causation in individual cases), and comments on the use of the arbitration procedures in circumstances such as these.     

The Determinants of Stock Option Compensation: Evidence from Finland

A new, long, and rich panel data set consisting of all Finnish publicly traded firms is used to study how firm characteristics and stock market developments influence the adoption and targeting of stock option compensation. Stock option adoption is found to be a procyclical phenomenon. Findings from firm‐level econometric analysis often corroborate those based on U.S. data, but important differences also emerge. Findings include: (i) firms with higher market value per employee are more likely to use stock option compensation; (ii) share returns from the past year affect the adoption of targeted stock options, but not broad‐based plans; (iii) our results are consistent with the hypothesis that selective and broad‐based plans arise as solutions to differing monitoring difficulties. Broad‐based schemes are observed when production is human capital‐intensive and employee performance is hard to monitor, while selective schemes are adopted when ownership is dispersed and therefore owners may have weak incentives to monitor management.     

Wages, Nonwage Compensation, and Municipal Unions

This study demonstrates that union power in municipal labor markets depends upon the form of unionization within each municipal department and on municipal bargaining policies, holding constant the legal environment. Bargaining units achieve larger increases in total compensation than unrecognized organizations, which are themselves stronger than unorganized departments. Compensation levels for unorganized and organized departments are higher in cities that bargain with other departments than in cities which do not bargain. Union wage effects understate total compensation effects regardless of the degree of unionization     

Corporate Social Responsibility and Governance: The Role of Executive Compensation

This article examines the relationship between corporate governance and corporate sustainability by focusing on an essential component of companies' governance structure: executive compensation programs. We propose an original empirical strategy based on a large set of the biggest capitalizations in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries over the period 2004–2018, with explicit measures of how companies integrate into executive managers' remuneration precise criteria of corporate social responsibility, an incentive scheme called corporate social responsibility (CSR) contracting. Our results show that proposing executive compensation programs including CSR criteria has a negative impact on financial performance, and a large positive impact on extra-financial performance based on the following dimensions: relationship with customers and suppliers, and community involvement. Second, we explore the moderating role of the corporate governance model by distinguishing the impact between firms with a shareholder or stakeholder corporate governance model and reveal significant differences in the impact of CSR contracting. For firms with a stakeholder corporate governance model, CSR contracting is no longer associated with a fall of financial performance and has a large positive impact on human resources, environmental, and human rights performance. On the other hand, CSR contracting has a negative impact on financial performance but no impact on extra-financial performance for firms with a shareholder corporate governance model.     

Teachers’ Unions,Compensation, and Tenure

In this paper I show that school districts in which teachers negotiate via collective bargaining have greater returns to experience and grant tenure earlier than districts without collective bargaining. Districts that are unionized, either with or without legal collective bargaining protections, have higher returns to degrees and higher starting salaries than districts without a union. Unionization is not strongly correlated with the existence of output‐based pay for performance but is correlated with the use of output‐based measures in tenure decisions. Unionization is positively correlated with the number of junior teachers dismissed for poor performance but not strongly correlated with the number of senior teachers dismissed for poor performance.     

Measurement of Compensation: Union and Nonunion

For many purposes, the economic impact of unions is better measured by the proportion of union wages in total payrolls rather than by the proportion of unionized employees in the overall workforce. We use recently available Current Population Survey data to generate estimates of the former. We also show that published data from the Survey on median union and nonunion wages produce substantially larger estimates of the union 1 nonunion wage differential than figures based on mean wages. Finally, we note that the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Employment Cost Index gives undue weight to the union sector because of its Laspeyres methodology.     

Product Market Competition,Executive Compensation,and CEO Family Ties

Review of Industrial Organization - This paper analyzes the interaction between product market competition and family ties on the structure of CEO pay, in a panel of publicly listed family firms....     

Unionization,Compensation, and Voice Effects on Quits and Retention

This study explores the relationships among unionization, compensation practices, and employee attachment (quit rates and tenure) among trucking companies to assess the applicability of Freeman and Medoff's exit/voice argument. Unionization was associated with lower quit rates, higher tenure, a better compensation package, and stronger voice mechanisms. The relationship of unionization to quit rates and tenure becomes nonsignificant after accounting for compensation (pay and benefits), and voice mechanisms do not add explanatory variance.     

Some Opening Words for The Special Issue

Review of Industrial Organization -     

Race,Compensation and Contract Length in the NBA: 2001–2002*

We study race and pay in the NBA for 2001–2002. For players who were neither free agents nor on rookie scale contracts, there were large, statistically significant ceteris paribus nonwhite shortfalls in salary, total compensation, and contract duration. But for players under the rookie salary scale (first‐round draft picks) and free agents, race effects were small and insignificant. These results suggest discrimination against marginal nonwhite players.     

高管薪酬激励、产权性质与企业绩效——基于股权集中度的调节效应

本文以高管薪酬激励为视角,将高管薪酬激励、股权集中度与企业绩效放在一个统一的分析框架下,以产权性质为依据,收集了 2007~2015 年国有企业与民营企业的面板数据,分别实证检验了高管薪酬激励与企业绩效的关系,以及股权集中度是否在其中发挥调节作用。研究发现：高管薪酬激励对企业绩效有显著的促进作用,并且国有企业中的促进作用要强于民营企业;股权集中度在国有企业中对于高管薪酬激励与企业绩效之间的关系有显著的负向调节作用,而在民营企业中不存在显著调节作用。     

Executive perks: Compensation and corporate performance in China

Many studies have examined CEO compensation in developed countries, where a long tradition of disclosure renders data readily available. In emerging economies, particularly in China, where market-based compensation is a relatively new phenomenon, there are few studies of CEO compensation. In addition, information on the use of non-cash compensation is almost absent. Building on the general literature on CEO compensation, and Chinese economic and management studies, this article singularly contributes to the extant literature by (1) examining the motivational determinants of CEO perk compensation, on the one hand, and (2) exploring the relative contribution of perks to performance. We anticipate that perks can serve two roles in China: (1) to provide incentives to deter managerial shirking, and (2) to facilitate work and improve production. We find that perks are positively associated with current and future returns on assets, supporting the view that some types of perks may improve firm profitability and/or that perks are paid as a bonus to reward performance. Our findings from stratified samples suggest that perks may incentivize managers, even after controlling for firm fundamentals, such as firm size, growth opportunity, and leverage.     

攻坚厂网分开遗留问题——专访国家电监会政策法规部副主任 孙耀唯

根据电改办梳理，2002年厂网分开资产划转中的遗留问题多达100多项，一直未能得到妥善解决，从2006年8月起，电改办投入极大精力，在半年左右的时间里，形成了解决思路，取得了重要进展，这是一场意义重大的攻坚战，为此，本刊专访了电改办专门负责此项工作的孙耀唯副主任。