Optimal retirement with unemployment risks

This paper investigates the optimal retirement of an individual in the presence of involuntary unemployment risks and borrowing constraints in a complete market with frictions. We use an intensity model and loading factors to illustrate the involuntary unemployment risks and frictions in unemployment insurance markets. Using reasonably calibrated parameters, we observe that high involuntary unemployment intensity and loading factors could be important explanations for the empirical findings emphasized in recent studies. We also find that an individual with high leisure demand after retirement reduces consumption during retirement and increases stockholdings as retirement time approaches.     

Labor tax reform, unemployment, and search

A key obstacle to reducing payroll taxes in many industrialized and transition countries is the direct revenue loss to the government that it implies. This paper studies a simple and practical labor tax reform of reducing a payroll tax and increasing a progressive wage tax that keeps the marginal tax wedge unchanged. Such a strategy increases employment, reduces the equilibrium unemployment rate, and increases public revenue as long as workers do not have all the bargaining power in wage negotiations. Moreover, welfare rises if workers’ bargaining power is sufficiently large to exceed a critical value determined by the second-best Hosios condition.      

Managerial Self-Interest, Pension Financial Slack and Corporate Pension Funding

This paper examines the impact of managerial self-interest on corporate pension funding decisions. It is postulated that managers with no ownership stake in the firm will have incentives to maintain financial slack in the form of excess pension funding. Pension funding slack may be viewed as a managerial perquisite that decreases the probability of necessary future debt financing. Such a strategy may increase the value of undiversified human capital to the detriment of maximizing shareholder wealth. As managerial ownership increases, the incentives to consume such a perquisite will decrease since the interests of managers and shareholders become more aligned. The results presented in this study strongly support this proposition.     

Job search,unemployment and savings

This paper examines optimal search policies on the basis of two alternative assumptions, first that individuals consume income as it is received, and second, that individuals can save and subsequently draw from their savings. In this model workers search for heterogeneousjobs, which are characterized by fixed wages and random duration of employment spells. Workers choose jobs which will maximize the total expected lifetime utility of consumption. The optimal steady-state job acceptance policy in both cases takes the form of a fixed partition of the set of all job offers into acceptable and unacceptable ones. In the absence of a capital market, employment duration appears to be irrelevant for the marginal job offer and all jobs offering wages which exceed the marginal one are also acceptable independent of the distribution functions of employment duration. Nevertheless, the dispersion of employment duration at inframarginal acceptable jobs affects job choice. It is shown that when individuals can save, and if current utility and probability density functions are exponential, then steady-state rates of saving during periods of employment, and of dissaving during periods of unemployment, are independent of wealth and constant. The model developed is then used to examine the determinants of unemployment and the properties of optimal savings rates, and to obtain a number of testable hypotheses about savings behavior and job security.     

Liquidity provision,interest rates,and unemployment

The effective liquidity supply of the economy—the weighted-sum of all assets that serve as media of exchange—matters for interest rates and unemployment. We formalize this idea by adding an over-the-counter market with collateralized trades to the Mortensen–Pissarides model. An increase in public liquidity through a higher supply of real government bonds raises the real interest rate, crowding out private liquidity and increasing unemployment. If unemployment is inefficiently high, keeping liquidity scarce can be socially optimal. A liquidity crisis affecting the acceptability of private assets as collateral widens the rate-of-return difference between private and public liquidity, also increasing unemployment.     

Social welfare effects of tax-benefit reform under endogenous participation and unemployment: an ordinal approach

This paper analyzes the social welfare effects of tax-benefit reforms in a framework integrating endogenous labor supply and unemployment. We adopt an ordinal approach to social welfare comparisons by searching for “socially desirable” reforms that would improve social welfare for an entire class of social welfare functions. In the model, there is a discrete distribution of individuals’ productivities and individuals are heterogeneous with respect to leisure preferences (or disability of work). Labor supply decisions are limited to the participation decision. Unemployment is modeled in a search and matching framework with individual wage bargaining. For the social welfare analysis, the model is calibrated for Switzerland. Starting from a situation with an unemployment benefit scheme, the introduction of in-work benefits is shown to be a “socially desirable” reform: it would be unanimously preferred to the current situation according to all social welfare functions based on the criteria of Pareto, anonymity, and the principle of transfers. This result holds for two different types of preference heterogeneity (leisure preferences or disability of work) and also for the case where job search effort cannot be monitored.     

Environmental policy,pollution, unemployment,and endogenous growth

The paper develops a model of endogenous economic growth with pollution externalities and a labor market distorted by union monopoly power and by taxes and transfers. We study the optimal second-best pollution tax and abatement policy and find that a shift toward greener preferences will tend to reduce unemployment, although it will hamper growth. We also find that greater labor-market distortions call for higher pollution tax rates. Finally, we show that a switch from quantity control of pollution combined with grandfathering of pollution rights to regulation via emission charges has the potential to raise employment, growth, and welfere without damaging the environment.     

Heterogeneous life-cycle profiles, income risk and consumption inequality

Was the increase in income inequality in the US due to permanent shocks or merely to an increase in the variance of transitory shocks? The implications for consumption and welfare depend crucially on the answer to this question. We use Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) repeated cross-section data on consumption and income to decompose idiosyncratic changes in income into predictable life-cycle changes, transitory and permanent shocks and estimate the contribution of each to total inequality. Our model fits the joint evolution of consumption and income inequality well and delivers two main results. First, we find that permanent changes in income explain all of the increase in inequality in the 1980s and 1990s. Second, we reconcile this finding with the fact that consumption inequality did not increase much over this period. Our results support the view that many permanent changes in income are predictable for consumers, even if they look unpredictable to the econometrician, consistent with models of heterogeneous income profiles.     

Pension Prefunding, Ageing, and Demographic Uncertainty

Pension prefunding can be used to smooth contribution rates in economies where ageing will increase pension expenditure. But how extensive should prefunding be in a defined benefit pension system when there is considerable uncertainty concerning future mortality, fertility, and migration? We study the prefunding rules in the Finnish earnings-related pension system with an OLG simulation model. The results show that increasing the degree of prefunding could yield a more even intergenerational outcome and make future generations' position better, but it is quite possible to overshoot and harm current generations too much. Making the degree of prefunding fertility-dependent appears to be a useful alternative. With declining fertility, current large cohorts would pay modestly increased contributions. The accumulated funds, however, will be huge in relation to the wage bills of smaller future cohorts.     

Comparative advantage and unemployment

Worker heterogeneity in productivity and labor supply is introduced into a matching model. Workers who earn high wages and work high-hours are identified as those with strong market comparative advantage—high rents from being employed. The model is calibrated to match separation, job finding, and employment in the SIPP data. The model predicts a big drop in employment for workers with weak comparative advantage during recessions. But the data show that workers with strong comparative advantage also display sizable employment fluctuations, implying that aggregate employment fluctuations are not explained by the responses of workers with small rents to employment.     

Politics, Insurance Regulation, and Unfunded Pension Liabilities

ABSTRACT: Insurance regulators operate in an environment in which resources are scarce and issues are most often complex and not salient to affected persons. Consequently, regulatory agencies, such as the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), need to use resources efficiently by making issues salient and not complex if regulatory goals are to be attained. To further its goal of full funding of defined benefit pension plans, the PBGC annually published a list of the Top Fifty Companies With the Largest Underfunded Pension Liability (LIST). This article investigates the issue of the economic effects of pension plan disclosure by measuring the share price response of the companies included on the LIST; then policy implications are drawn. The event study findings show that, on average, publication of the LIST did not have a negative effect on firm value. However, cross-sectional analysis provides some support for the contention that publication of the LIST had an economic cost on LISTed firms. The authors' results show that the value of large firms on the PBGC's list is less negatively affected at arrival (ARRIVAL) than smaller LISTed firms. Conversely, when firms leave the list (DEPARTURE), the value of large growth-oriented firms is more negatively affected than the value of other firms that reduce their unfunded pension liability. From a policy perspective, as hypothesized by Meier (1991), the PBGC used its scarce resources effectively by publishing the LIST. The issue of unfunded pension liability became less complex and more salient to interested parties. Consequently, consumer groups and political elites provided their support to further the regulatory agency's stated goal, which was the full funding of defined benefit pension plans. Furthermore, increased awareness of the underfunding problem contributed to the passage of the Retirement Protection Act of 1994.     

Pension Regulation,Firm Borrowing,and Investment Risk

This article builds a new model of capital structure and nonpension investment decisions to show that regulatory and investment incentives created by accrued pension obligations exacerbate traditional agency problems between stockholders and bondholders. The article identifies conditions under which firms with accrued pension liabilities have an incentive to choose an overly risky capital structure, invest in risky projects with negative net present value, and/or under-fund their pension accounts.     

Dynamic incentives and retirement

This paper examines multi-period compensation contracts when retirement is anticipated. Short-term contracts in long-term employment relationships are equivalent to a long-term renegotiation-proof contract. The dynamic of incentive rates is determined by (i) how and in which periods managerial effort affects the contractible performance measures; and by (ii) the time-series correlation of error terms in performance reports. The model explains why long-term investments can decrease while incentive rates increase as managers approach retirement. Earnings persistence is negatively associated to earnings-based incentive rates but, towards retirement, high earnings persistence implies increasing earnings-based incentive rates.     

城乡养老保险关系转移接续问题研究

随着新农保试点的扩大和城镇企业职工基本养老保险制度的完善,城乡养老保险关系转移接续问题,尤其是解决农民工交替参加城乡养老后的权益保护问题,日益成为完善城乡养老保险制度的重要问题。本研究通过对新农保和城镇养老制度体系分析,以及城乡养老关系转移接续现状研究,提出了采取＂折算年限＂、＂补差＂或＂分段计算＂方法解决我国城乡养老保险关系转移接续的解决思路和具体方案,并就具体实施问题提出政策建议。     

Stagflation,persistent unemployment and the permanence of economic shocks

When changes occur, people do not know how long they will persist. Using a simple stochastic structure that incorporates temporary and permanent changes in an augmented IS-LM model, we show that rising prices and rising unemployment — stagflation is likely to follow a large permanent reduction in productivity. All markets clear and all expectations are rational. People learn gradually the permanent values which the economy will reach following a permanent shock and gradually adjust anticipations. In our model, optimally perceived permanent values take the form of a Koyck lag of past observations.     

Borrowing constraints,the cost of precautionary saving and unemployment insurance

When it is costly for individuals to save or to borrow, unemployment insurance (UI) provides an alternative source of liquidity that smooths consumption over time and leads individuals to spend longer unemployed searching for a suitable job. We show in a tractable life-cycle model how the optimal unemployment replacement ratio and the fall in consumption on job loss depend on the cost of self-insurance and the cost of borrowing. This implies that the value of UI depends on age at job loss, consumption needs (such as the presence of children), discount rates, the return on saving, access to credit and the presence of other social insurance programmes. Optimal replacement rates vary substantially with plausible variation in these factors (from less than 20 percent to almost 60 percent).     

职工养老保险、隐含税收与提前退休激励

本文借鉴隐含税收理论构建职工养老保险退休激励精算模型,同时利用CFPS (中国家庭追踪调查数据)建立退休决策计量模型,考察我国职工养老保险制度对劳动者提前退休的激励效应。结果表明:养老保险存在显著的提前退休激励,代表性"中人"的最优退休年龄早于53岁;"视同缴费"是促发提前退休激励的重要制度原因;"缴费挤出效应"和"待遇拉动效应"是养老保险诱导劳动者提前退休的两个核心机制;男性、低收入、低教育水平、非党员劳动者面临更强的提前退休激励;降低缴费率、规范养老金增长机制、提高个人账户投资收益率是缓解养老保险制度提前退休激励的有效举措。