Information production, banking industry structure and credit allocation

We analyse credit allocation when limited-liable banks can engage in costly information production about borrowers. When perfectly diversified credit portfolios cannot be constructed, we show that credit allocation depends on bank capital and the number of banks that can operate in the same market. A concentrated banking industry, one where bank capital is held by few banks, is shown to lead to credit allocation closer to the social optimum. Moreover, in the absence of banking industry consolidation, we find that the removal of intra-state entry barriers reduces welfare and not all independent banking organizations that were viable in formerly protected markets remain so when markets are integrated.     

Competition and risk in South East Asian commercial banking

This article investigates the effects of competition on bank risk taking behaviour in four South East Asian countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Vietnam). Our main finding is that competition does not increase bank risk-taking behaviour and the results appear robust to different model specifications, estimation approaches and variable construction. We also find that concentration is inversely related to bank risk whereas regulatory restrictions positively influence bank risk-taking.     

Free banking and the stability of early joint-stock banking

Proponents of free banking argue that systems adopting theirpolicies will be stable. In this paper, we present evidencesuggesting that, in general, early joint-stock banking systemsdid not adopt free banking, and those that did proved to beunstable. In particular, we demonstrate that those systems imposingregulations were generally stable. We rationalise the successof regulation as a pragmatic solution to the time-inconsistencyproblem arising from the peculiar nature of the banking firm.Notably, we find that the ‘golden age’ of free bankingstability can be attributed to restrictions on the organisationalform of the early banking firm.     

Creditworthiness and thresholds in a credit market model with multiple equilibria

Summary. The paper studies creditworthiness in a model with endogenous credit cost and debt constraints. Such a model can give rise to multiple candidates for steady state equilibria. We use new analytical techniques such as dynamic programming (DP) with flexible grid size to find solutions and to locate thresholds that separate different domains of attraction. More specifically, we (1) compute present value borrowing constraints and thus creditworthiness, (2) locate thresholds where the dynamics separate to different domains of attraction, (3) show jumps in the decision variable, (4) distinguish between optimal and non-optimal steady states, (5) demonstrate how creditworthiness and thresholds change with change of the credit cost function of the debtor and (6) explore the impact of debt ceilings and consumption paths on creditworthiness.JEL Classification Numbers: C61, C63, D91, D92, E51, G12, G32.An earlier version of this paper has been prepared for the 1998 North American Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society, January 1998, Chicago. We want to thank Jess Benhabib, Buz Brock, Gustav Feichtinger, Franz Wirl, Michael Woodford, Wolf-Jürgen Beyn and Thorsten Pampel for helpful discussions and comments on various versions of the paper. We also want to thank participants in a workshop at the University of Technology, Vienna, the Macroeconomic Workshop at Columbia University, and the SCE conference, at Yale University, June 2001. We are also grateful for comments from a referee of the journal.     

Financial development and financial openness nexus: the precondition of banking competition

We examine the dynamic relationship between financial development and financial openness using the pooled mean group estimator developed by Pesaran et al. (1999). Our results show that financial openness has a positive effect on financial development in the long run, but may have a negative effect in the short run. Using estimates of country-specific short-run coefficients, we also find that the adverse short-run effects of financial openness are associated with a lower degree of banking competition. The system GMM estimator also supports these findings, suggesting that the financial development and financial openness nexus is contingent on the degree of banking competition. A key policy implication is that a higher degree of banking competition is a precondition for financial openness to promote financial development.     

Branch banking, entry deterrence, and technology decisions

The paper sets up a theoretical model of banking firms to investigate the relationship between oligopolistic competition and technology structure by using the concept of decentralized operating decisions and centralized investment decisions. It concludes that the representative branch and the new entrant will choose the technology which is deviated from its cost-minimization level if neither of them acts as a quasi-competitive deposit demanders in the case of costless reversibility of capacity decision. In the case of capacity reversed not costlessly, the representative branch will choose the cost-minimizing technology level and the entrant's technology decision depends on its rival's conjectural variation.     

Banking structure and financial stability: a comparison of Chinese and German banking systems

In the process of financial globalization and diversification, the issue of financial stability has become heated all over the world. This paper attempts to uncover the delicate relationship between banking structure and financial stability by comparing and analyzing the situation of the Chinese and German banking systems. This paper suggests that (i) the trade-off between competition and concentration in banking industry is a vital factor to maintain financial stability and (ii) concentration is not always a bad thing for financial stability, especially in banking systems with discontent bank performance.     

Review article. Kalecki on imperfect competition, inflation and money

This paper reviews the final two volumes of Kalecki's CollectedWorks. It first discusses, based on the papers in Vol. VI, hiscontributions on cartels, on Nazi Germany, the development ofindices of business fluctuations and of national income accounts,and the movement of prices and costs over the business cycle.Drawing on the papers reproduced in Vol. VII, this paper continuesby discussing Kalecki's writings on rationing, inflation, imperfectcompetition and unemployment, money and finance, the nationaldebt and the welfare state, international economic arrangements,the post-war American economy and econometrics and methodology.     

Tracing the causes of the banking crisis

We add the Bernanke–Gertler–Gilchrist model to a modified version of the Smets–Wouters model of the U.S. in order to explore the causes of the banking crisis. The innovation of this article is estimating the model using unfiltered data allowing for non-stationary shocks in order to replicate how the model predicts the crisis. We find that ‘traditional shocks’ account for most of the fluctuations in macroeconomic variables; the non-stationarity of the productivity shock plays a key role. Crises occur when there is a ‘run’ of bad shocks; based on this sample they occur on average once every 64 years and when they occur around 10% are accompanied by financial crisis. Financial shocks on their own, even when extreme, do not cause crises – provided the government acts swiftly to counteract such a shock as happened in this sample.     

Path modelling to bankruptcy: causes and symptoms of the banking crisis

This article studies the bankruptcy of US banks since 2009. It first analyses the financial symptoms that precede bankruptcy, such as low profitability, insufficient revenue or low solvency ratios. It also goes into the causes of these symptoms. It poses several hypotheses on causes of failure, such as loan growth (some of them risky), specialization (in this case concentration in real estate) and the pursuit of a turnover-driven strategy neglecting margin. It presents and tests a structural equation modelling based on partial least squares path modelling (PLS-PM) and logistic regression. Results show that, 5 years before the crisis, failed banks had, compared to solvent banks, the following: higher loan growth, higher concentration on real estate loans, higher risk ratios, higher turnover, but lower margins. A relationship is found between symptoms and causes. Failed banks present a significant relationship between the percentage of real estate loans and risk. This relationship is negative in excellent banks, confirming that they allocated less real estate loans with a high quality. Nonfailed banks compensated increases in risk by strengthening their core capital.     

中外银行业有效竞争的外部性比较

从银行业竞争的沿革、监管体制、稳定性等方面比较分析我国银行业和外国银行业的竞争格局的外部性特征,对中国银行业国内银行与外资银行竞争格局态势作对比分析,由此提出优化银行业竞争环境的政策建议。     

Imperfect competition and capital accumulation: the role of price normalization

We consider a capital-accumulation model with infinitely lived households and two production sectors. The intermediate-good sector is characterized by perfect competition, a constant-returns-to-scale technology, and production externalities. The final-good sector is a monopoly operating under constant returns to scale. We analyze the general equilibrium in the sense of Gabszewicz and Vial [Journal of Economic Theory (1972) 4: 381–400] for this economy and different price-normalization rules. It is shown that the qualitative behavior of the equilibrium paths depends crucially on the chosen normalization rule. In particular, whether equilibria are monotonic or oscillating and whether indeterminacy occurs or not may depend on the choice of the numeraire.     

银行业放松管制的理论分析与宏观效果——兼论中国加入WTO对大陆和香港的影响

本文建立了一个包含银行、消费者和生产者的三部门一般均衡模型 ,获得了短期均衡和长期均衡条件 ,分析了存贷差扩大和国有银行改革的关系。本文有两个重要理论发现 :一个是发现了用于短期分析的D 曲线和G 曲线。另一个是发现了长期稳定均衡状态对国有银行体制改革和长期经济增长的含意。理论分析表明 ,银行业实行资产负债比例管理与利率的严格控制存在矛盾 ;中国加入WTO后 ,银行业放松管制 ,引入竞争 ,不仅能推动中国大陆的GDP、投资、消费和储蓄的增长 ,而且可以缓解通货紧缩压力 ;但是国有银行的垄断利润将下降。中国加入WTO将给香港的银行部门带来新的发展机会。     

Regulating the banking industry in transition economies: Exploring interactions between capital and reserve requirements

This paper examines the ‘prudential' role of reserve requirements in transition economies using a general-equilibrium banking model. The analysis stresses the role that reserve requirements may play in enforcing an adequate level of bank capitalization in a context in which it is difficult to assess the true value of bank assets. The paper also explores the interactions that exist between capital and reserve requirements and the effect of these regulations on the financial structure of banks and on the level of credit and interest rates.     

外部性对银行业有效竞争的影响

外部性对银行业有效竞争的影响显著。在存在外部性的条件下,同样的资本和要素难以通过市场竞争获得同样的报酬,以利润函数作为切入点,分析某一银行的投入和产出之比发生的变化。金融产品的成本组成包含外部边际成本,选取税收负担、营业费用作为外部边际成本关键因素,分析外部性对银行业有效竞争的影响程度,由此提出优化银行业竞争外部环境的政策建议。     

Specific versus ad valorem Taxation and Externalities

Received December 15, 2000; revised version received September 10, 2001     

Use of social networks in banking: a study in the Czech Republic

Social networks are becoming more and more important nowadays. Apart from regular users of the Internet, companies have started to use them in their business. Their potential is that a great number of people, future clients of big companies, use them on a daily basis. Thus, the aim of this article is to analyse the use of social networks in the banking sector of the Czech Republic, particularly with respect to customer support. The methods of this study include common data analysis and professional analysis. Common data analysis consists of the evaluation of public data from social networks and web pages of the selected bank institutions. The professional analysis is conducted by paid professional analytical tools that provide more detailed statistics. The findings of the study show that social networks are now well-established tools for the Czech banks to attract both their current and potential clients. The Czech banks seem to care about their clients by trying to meet their needs. Customer care and services provided, however, differ with type of bank.     

The impact of China's accession to the WTO on its economy: an imperfect competitive CGE analysis

To examine the impact of trade barrier reductions on the Chinese economy following its WTO accession, a single‐country, static CGE (Computable General Equilibrium) model is constructed, which incorporates certain elements of imperfect competition in China's current economic situation. China's real GDP and total employment are expected to rise by small degrees, while the general price level may decline by a few percentage points. Total imports would rise by more than 10%, whereas total exports would increase far less. China's trade surplus is, therefore, likely to shrink substantially and its dependence upon foreign trade is likely to rise by a few percentage points. A sensitivity analysis confirms the robustness of the simulation results. A comparison with other CGE studies on China's trade liberalization also shows the plausibility of this study's predictions.

JEL Classification: F17, C68     

Financial deregulation,credit allocation across sectors,and economic growth: evidence from China

This paper investigates whether financial deregulation causes economic growth through financial development. Financial development is measured by two channels: (1) changes in the allocation of credit across sectors, and (2) changes in savings and investment rates. We measure financial deregulation in China at the provincial level from 1981 to 1998. Our results suggest that financial reform causes economic growth in China. Further, its effect largely comes through the reallocation of credit across sectors, rather than changes in savings and investment rates.     

Externalities,communication and the allocation of decision rights

The assignment of authority entitles the decision maker to undertake decisions that impose externalities on the payoffs of other members of the organization. This paper studies how the optimal allocation of decision rights depends on the preferences of the organization’s members. It adopts a mechanism-design approach to show how the communication of private information affects the efficient allocation of authority. An extension to multiple decision areas shows that decentralized control rights may enhance organizational efficiency unless there exist strong complementarities between different decisions.