税收征管中的信息不对称研究

信息不对称尤其是纳税人与税务机关之间的信息不对称给税收征管带来很大的危害。结合我国的实际情况,解决此问题的有效手段包括:加大检查和惩罚力度;畅通信息渠道;改善信用制度。     

信息不对称规则的税收运用

信息不对称不仅广泛存在于市场领域，在非市场领域及非市场领域和市场领域间也存在着大量的信息不对称。税收领域中的信息不对称主要表现为：偷逃税、税收欺诈、税收腐败等。我们应从信息不对称原理出发加以研究解决。     

浅析保险业中的信息不对称及其对策

信息经济学认为，市场交易双方拥有的市场信息是不对称的。在这种市场中，拥有更充足信息的一方为了自身的利益将损害另一方的利益，导致资源配置的无效率，引发一系列的社会问题。本文以保险业为例．分析信息不对称如何影响保险业的健康发展，以及应该采取的相应对策。     

不对称信息与银行逆向选择

现实的商业银行经营管理经验说明,由于信息的不对称,导致银行作逆向选择,是银行风险增大的主要原因.所谓信息的不对称性,是指交易的一方拥有某一(些)信息,而交易的另一方不拥有相应的信息,或者说是交易的一方对另一方不充分了解,因而影响其作出准确决策,一般情况下,发生在当事人签约之前的事前不对称信息,当事人隐藏知识信息的可能性比较大,而发生在当事人签约之后的不对称信息,当事人隐藏行动信息的可能性比较大,它们将使得当事人作出逆向选择,使得另一方当事人可能遭受损失.     

信息不对称与金融脆弱性

我国金融业存在较严重的脆弱性。本文运用信息经济学相关理论分析我国信贷市场与证券市场脆弱性原因,并提出若干减少信息不对称、防范金融风险的措施。     

信息不对称与我国商业银行经营管理

信息不对称是导致金融运行效率低下的重要原因.通过对产权制度、组织结构和经营管理体制的分析,发现我国商业银行经营管理中存在着严重的信息不对称.为此,商业银行应从再造信息载体、理顺信息通道、建立信息控制系统和完善信息表现形式四个方面来纾解信息不对称之现象.     

信息不对称与上市公司融资政策选择

信息不对称是现代企业理论中的一个主要概念，也是适当设计与选择契约的根本原因。本文就信息不对称导致的企业融资过程的逆向选择行为，以及克服逆向选择行为而进行的融资政策的选择进行了分析，并对我国上市公司的融资行为进行了考察，并提出了相应的政策建议。     

浅析信息不对称对保险经营的影响

信息经济是21世纪经济的主要特征,保险市场的一个固有的特征是信息不对称,如果没有其他机制来克服信息不对称问题,逆向选择将造成保险经营成本的不断上升,而道德风险的存在,又限制了风险的可保性。本文通过对保险经营中逆向选择和道德风险的成因分析,提出了一些简单的解决方法。     

信息不对称与上市公司股权再融资偏好

大量理论和实证研究表明：上市公司应该避免采用股权再融资方式筹集资金，以减少对公司价值产生的负面影响。但是国内外仍有不少上市公司采用股权再融资，我国还呈现强烈的股权再融资偏好，这说明上市公司采用股权再融资存在一定理论依据。运用信息经济学理论，从信息不对称角度对此现象进行解释，结论为信息不对称产生的“逆向选择”和“道德风险”给上市公司采用股权再融资方式找到充分的理由。我国不合理的制度背景，产生更加严重的信息不对称，造成我国上市公司强烈的股权再融资偏好。     

Asymmetric Information in the IPO Aftermarket

Using the adverse selection component of the spread as a measure of asymmetric information, we investigate how asymmetric information evolves after firms go public. We find that the level of asymmetric information is lower immediately after the initial public offering (IPO) compared with its level after a period of seasoning. In addition, we test the hypothesis that the greater the underpricing of an IPO, the more information is produced in its aftermarket, and the lower the aggregate level of asymmetric information. Our results are consistent with the hypothesis and are robust after controlling for other factors.     

Tax Havens,Tax Evasion and Tax Information Exchange Agreements in the OECD

Using data on Foreign Portfolio Investment (FPI), we find a positive relationship between higher tax burden and OECD residents’ tax evasion, especially via tax havens. Contrary to established investor preference for certain country characteristics, we find they are less important to tax evaders who value privacy and want to remain undetected by their home tax authorities. We find very limited evidence that OECD Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAS) reduce tax evasion, controlling for other determinants of overall OECD FPI. Without the US in the OECD sample, tax havens play a lesser role and OECD policies appear to make a marginal impact.     

税收信息化:基于学习型组织理论的多视角分析

税收信息化不是单纯的信息技术在税收管理领域的应用和推广,它还是一个改革税收管理观念、税收文化、税收组织机构、税收管理体制和管理技术等方面的系统工程。学习型组织理论是当今管理学最前沿的管理理论之一,用学习型组织理论和方法来引导和推进我国税收征管改革和征管实践,实现税收信息化,是税收理论和实践工作者的历史性任务。     

Incentives and Information Exchange in International Taxation

The exchange of taxpayer-specific information between national tax authorities has recently emerged as a key and controversial topic in international tax policy discussions, most notably with the OECD's harmful tax practices project and the EU's savings tax initiative. This paper analyzes the effects of information exchange and withholding taxes, recognizing that countries which agree to exchange information do not forfeit the ability to levy withholding taxes, and also focusing in particular on the effects of innovative revenue-sharing arrangements. Amongst the findings are that: (i) the transfer of withholding tax receipts to the residence country, as planned in the European Union, has no effect on equilibrium tax rates, but acts purely as a lump-sum transfer; (ii) in contrast, allocating some of the revenue from information exchange to the source country—counter to usual practice (though no less so than the EU agreement)—would have adverse strategic effects on total revenue; (iii) nevertheless, any withholding tax regime is Pareto dominated by information exchange combined with appropriate revenue sharing; and, in particular, (iv) sharing of the additional revenues raised from information provided, while efficiency-reducing, could be in the interests of large countries as a means of persuading small countries to provide that information voluntarily. JEL Code: H77, H87, F42     

Mortgage Default with Asymmetric Information

This article analyzes mortgage-market equilibrium when borrower default costs are private information. By applying the approach of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), it is shown that asymmetric information regarding default costs distorts the contract choices available in the mortgage market, preventing safe borrowers (those with high default costs) from fully satisfying their demand for mortgage debt. Large loans are available for a substantial interest-rate premium, but only risky borrowers find this premium worth paying. The article builds on an empirical literature designed to test the ruthless-default principle from option-based models of mortgage pricing. That literature provides evidence against ruthless behavior, suggesting that default costs play an important role in borrower decisions. The article takes a further step by arguing that such costs are private information, which has important implications for market equilibrium.     

The Capital Tax and Welfare Effects from Asymmetric Information on Equity Markets

This paper explores the implications of informational asymmetries between domestic and foreign investors for optimal capital tax rates and welfare. It adopts a model in which asymmetric information implies a home bias in equity. The paper finds that asymmetric information may raise capital tax rates by reducing the marginal cost of taxation. Furthermore, it shows that investors may gain from informational asymmetries. Although asymmetric information increases the uncertainty as perceived by investors, it may also increase tax rates and allow for a higher consumption of public goods. This reflects that asymmetric information may reduce the distortionary effects of competition among governments.     

Simultaneous Public and Private Provision of Services, Asymmetric Information and Innovation

Public and private provision of a service coexist. There is asymmetric information between the government and the agency providing the public service with respect to the costs, the quality of the service and the innovation effort of the agency. We examine the optimal government design of the funding contracts to induce the agency to reveal its costs and exert high innovation effort. The optimizing behaviour of consumers and private firms generates observable information, which can be used by the government to reduce its information problem. In the optimal contracts, the informational rents of the agency increase with the level of innovation effort that the government induces from the agency. Correlation between public and the private sector costs results in a trade-off in the government's policy between inducing innovation and extracting the informational rent of the agency. To increase the redistribution inherent in the public provision of the service, the government will manipulate the expected profits of the private firms to induce higher innovation effort.     

依托增值税转型改革机遇促进中小企业发展

增值税转型改革于今年1月1日起在我国全面推开。本文选择作为经济发展中不可缺少的一部分-中小企业为研究对象,采用规范与实证相结合的分析方法,对增值税转型方案本身如何将不同行业的企业享受政策的差异性加以考虑、增值税转型后如何对待实行简易征收的小规模纳税人的税率问题、因增值税转型而对企业资金管理上产生的影响、过度投资对企业资金管理上的负面效应及风险控制等问题进行探讨。     

保险市场逆向选择与顺向选择共存研究

保险市场存在着逆向选择。经典逆向选择模型认为,风险高的人会购买更多的保险,但大多数实证研究表明保险市场还存在顺向选择。本文认为,逆向选择和顺向选择虽然对立,但共存于保险市场,在此基础上构建保险市场均衡模型,并进行了仿真研究。