Another Look at the Radner-Stiglitz Nonconcavity in the Value of Information

This paper revisits the well-known result of R. Radner and J. Stiglitz (1984, in “Bayesian Models of Economic Theory,” Elsevier, Amsterdam) which shows that, under certain conditions, the value of information exhibits increasing marginal returns over some range. Their result assumes that both the number of states and the number of signal realizations are finite, assumptions which preclude most analyses of optimal information acquisition. We provide sufficient conditions that yield this nonconcavity in the value of information in a general framework; the role that these conditions play is clarified and illustrated with several examples. We also discuss the robustness of the nonconcavity result, and the difficulties involved in getting the value of information to be globally concave. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: D83.     

Co-ordination, Spillovers, and Cheap Talk

We analyze the role of cheap-talk in two player games with one-sided incomplete information. We identify conditions under which (1) players can fully communicate and coordinate on efficient Nash equilibria of the underlying complete information game; and (2) players cannot communicate so cheap-talk does not alter the equilibrium set of the Bayesian game. We present examples that illustrate several issues that arise when there is two-sided incomplete information. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D82.     

Information Processing Hierarchies

This paper characterizes optimal stationary hierarchies based on an information processing model introduced by Radner. We show how the delay, size (number of processors), capacity (the size of each cohort processed), and throughput (frequency of cohort arrival) are related and determine a feasibility frontier in the space of these variables. The structure of efficient hierarchies implementing the points on the feasibility frontier is also specified. These structures are always nonregular; i.e., every agent has subordinates from several different levels. The nature of the long accepted maxim of decreasing returns to scale in management hierarchies is demonstrated. When the production function of the hierarchy is taken to be the number of information items it can process, we find that returns to size and delay are always decreasing in efficient hierarchies, but these variables are complementary in the design problem. Finally, we discuss how the underlying abilities of the processors affect the marginal returns to size and delay. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: L22, D83.     

On the continuity of equilibrium and core correspondences in economies with differential information

Summary. We study upper semi-continuity of the private and coarse core and the Walrasian expectations equilibrium correspondences for economies with differential information, with Boylan (1971) topology on agents information fields.Received: 16 January 2004, Revised: 28 October 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D50, D82, C70. Correspondence to: Ezra EinyWe wish to thank Carlos Herves, Nicholas Yannelis, and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments.     

A characterisation of the perfect equilibria of infinite horizon games

This paper builds on the work of Fudenberg and Levine (J. Econ. Theory31 (1983), 251–268). It shows that the perfect equilibria of any game in which events become uniformly unimportant as their distance into the future increases can be characterised as limits of sequences of perfect approximate equilibrium points of finite horizon approximations to the game. The result holds both for a strong and for a weak topology. The topologies are tractable, and the nature of convergence relative to them is transparent. Finally, the weak topology is probably the weakest tractable topology in which the result holds.     

On Monopolistic Licensing Strategies under Asymmetric Information

Consider a research lab that owns a patent on a new technology but cannot develop a marketable final product based on the new technology. There are two downstream firms that might successfully develop the new product. If the downstream firms' benefits from being the sole supplier of the new product are private information, the research lab will sometimes sell two licenses, even though under complete information it would have sold one exclusive license. This is in contrast to the standard result that a monopolist will sometimes serve fewer, but never more buyers when there is private information. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: L12, D45, D82     

Implementation without incentive compatibility: Two stories with partially informed planners

We consider two stories, Typhoon by Conrad and Traveler's Dilemma by Basu, 1994, Basu, 2007, as implementation problems under incomplete information without incentive compatibility, but where the planner has some private information regarding the state. If social choice functions do not satisfy incentive compatibility, full implementation is unattainable via existing approaches. For each story, we construct a direct mechanism that relies on the planner's private information. We provide a sufficient condition on players' beliefs regarding the state under which every player has a unique rationalizable action, namely, telling the truth. Thus, in these stories, the planner's information can bypass the lack of incentive compatibility.     

Garbling of signals and outcome equivalence

In a game with incomplete information players receive stochastic signals about the state of nature. The distribution of the signals given the state of nature is determined by the information structure. Different information structures may induce different equilibria.Two information structures are equivalent from the perspective of a modeler, if they induce the same equilibrium outcomes. We characterize the situations in which two information structures are equivalent in terms of natural transformations, called garblings, from one structure to another. We study the notion of ‘being equivalent to’ in relation with three equilibrium concepts: Nash equilibrium, agent normal-form correlated equilibrium and the belief invariant Bayesian solution.     

Information Advantage in Cournot Oligopoly

Consider an oligopolistic industry where firms have access to the same technology but are asymmetrically informed about the environment. Even though it is commonplace to think that in this context superior information leads to higher profits, we find that under Cournot competition this is not generally the case: It holds when firms' technology exhibits constant returns to scale, but it does not necessarily hold otherwise. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D43, L13.     

Information structure and equilibrium asset prices

In a continuous trading economy, it is shown that if information is revealed continuously and if agents' preferences are continuous in a certain topology, then equilibrium asset price processes must have continuous sample paths. Except for uninteresting cases, the sample paths of price processes will be of unbounded variation. In particular, if the information is generated by a Brownian motion,then equilibrium asset price processes are Ito integrals. When information is not revealed continuously, the times (which may be random) at which prices can have jumps are identified.     

A Unifying Pair of Cournot-Nash Equilibrium Existence Results

For games with a measure space of players a tandem pair, consisting of a mixed and a pure Cournot-Nash equilibrium existence result, is presented. Their generality causes them to be completely mutually equivalent. This provides a unifying pair of Cournot-Nash existence results that goes considerably beyond the central result of E. J. Balder (1995, Int. J. Game Theory24, 79-94, Theorem 2.1). The versatility of this pair is demonstrated by the following new applications: (i) unification and generalization of the two equilibrium distribution existence results by K. P. Rath (1996, J. Math. Econ.26, 305-324) for anonymous games, (ii) generalization of the equilibrium existence result of T. Kim and N. C. Yannelis (1997, J. Econ. Theory77, 330-353) for Bayesian differential information games, (iii) inclusion of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium existence results of P. R. Milgrom and R. J. Weber (1985, Math. Oper. Res.10, 619-632) and E. J. Balder (1988, Math. Operations Res.13, 265-276) for games with private information in the sense of J. C. Harsanyi (1967, Manage. Sci.14, 159-182). Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72.     

信息成本与企业家的融资决策

在项目的融资过程中,企业家可能面临两种选择:非市场融资与市场融资。尽管信息不对称是非市场融资的主要约束,但是市场融资可以改善彼此的信息结构。文章分析了企业家(内部人)与投资者(外部人)在不同信息结构下的不完全金融合同。分析后发现,投资者可以榨取的信息租与企业家的信息披露成本构成两种融资方式的主要融资成本;而项目所需的外部资本以及资本市场要求的回报率构成了企业家融资决策的决定性元素。事实上,若项目所需的外部资本越高,信息披露成本越低,市场融资要求的回报率越低和信息租越高,则企业家越有可能选择市场融资;反之,企业家可能选择非市场融资。此外,合谋与私人收益的存在也可能影响到企业家的融资决策。     

The value of information for auctioneers

An auctioneer wants to sell an indivisible object to one of multiple bidders, who have private information about their valuations of the object. A bidder's information structure determines the accuracy with which the bidder knows her private valuation. The main result of the paper is that the auctioneer's revenue is a convex function of bidders' information structures. One implication is that assigning asymmetric information structures instead of symmetric information structures to bidders is always revenue-enhancing. This paper generalizes a result of Bergemann and Pesendorfer [D. Bergemann, M. Pesendorfer, Information structures in optimal auctions, J. Econ. Theory 137 (2007) 580–609], who show that revenue-maximizing information structures are asymmetric.     

Designing REDD+ contracts to resolve additionality issues

To address the issue of potential information asymmetries inherent in the estimation of deforestation baselines required by the current Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation+ (REDD+) scheme, we offer a theoretical analysis of an extended scheme relying on the theory of incentives. We compare two types of contracts: a deforestation-based contract and a policy-based contract. Each of them implies a dramatically different information rent/efficiency trade-off due to domestic implementation and transaction costs. If the contract is deforestation-based (resp. policy-based), information rents are awarded to countries with the ex ante lowest (resp. highest) intended deforestation. We show that a general contract can be offered to recipient countries in which the type of instrument proposed is endogenous, independent of the historical trend, unlike the current REDD+ mechanism. Dividing countries into two groups corresponding to the deforestation-based instrument and the policy-based instrument helps the donor country to obtain efficient deforestation and avoided deforestation levels.     

Status Quo Bias in Bargaining: An Extension of the Myerson-Satterthwaite Theorem with an Application to the Coase Theorem

We generalize the Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem to study inefficiencies in bilateral bargaining over a divisible good, with two-sided private information on the valuations. For concave quasi-linear preferences, the ex ante most efficient Bayes equilibrium of any mechanism always exhibits a bias toward the status quo. If utility functions are quadratic every Bayes equilibrium is ex post inefficient, with the expected amount of trade biased toward the disagreement point. In other words, for the class of preferences we study, there is a strategic advantage to property rights in the Coase bargaining setup in the presence of incomplete information. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C78, D23, D62, D82.     

创新驱动背景下我国信息通信能力评价研究

在 界定信息通信能力概念的基础上，构建了信息通信能力评价体系，并对2013-2018年我国信息通信能力进行了评价与深入探讨。研究结果表明：①在创新驱动发展战略背景下，基建能力、服务能力、创新能力是当前及未来我国信息通信能力提升的“三驾马车”；②创新能力已取代基建能力，成为我国信息通信能力持续增长的新引擎，而服务能力存在很大改进空间；③未来我国应巩固信息通信基建能力，抓实信息通信服务能力，强化信息通信创新能力。     

A note on the existence of Pareto optima in topological vector spaces

In a previous paper we have shown that in l_∞ the existence of Pareto optima and equilibria are essentially equivalent to impatience behaviour on the part of agents. In this note we prove a result showing that in general spaces we need agents to be continuous with respect to a topology that makes the commodity space sub-reflexive.     

Prices, Delay, and the Dynamics of Trade

We characterize the dynamics of trading patterns and market composition when trade is bilateral, finding a trading partner is costly, prices are determined by bargaining, and preferences are private information. We show that equilibrium is inefficient and exhibits delay as sellers price discriminate between buyers with different values. As frictions vanish, transaction prices are asymptotically competitive and the welfare loss of inefficient trading approaches zero, even though the trading patterns continue to be inefficient and delay persists. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D40, D50.     

ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ABOUT PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION

We introduce asymmetric information about consumers’ transportation costs (i.e., the degree of product differentiation) in the model of Hotelling. When transportation costs are high, both firms have lower profits with asymmetric information than with perfect information. Contrarily, if transportation costs are low, both firms may prefer the asymmetric information scenario (the informed firm always prefers the informational advantage, while the uninformed firm may or may not prefer to remain uninformed). Information exchange is ex‐ante advantageous for both firms, but ex‐post damaging if transportation costs turn out to be low. If the information is unverifiable, the informed firm does not represent a reliable source of information, since it always prefers to announce that transportation costs are high and there is no contract that induces truthful revelation.     

Policy Positions, Information Acquisition and Turnout

This paper explores the relationship between policy positions, information acquisition and turnout. In particular, information acquisition and turnout choices are characterized as a function of citizens' policy positions. It is found that middle‐of‐the‐road citizens are the most likely to both acquire political information and abstain. Comparative‐statics analysis of the information technology indicates that an increase in the effectiveness of information has a higher (positive) impact on information and turnout than a comparable decrease in the cost of information. Furthermore, following a polarization, information and abstention are found to increase.