央行替美联储“加息” 增大汇率调整契机

3月17日央行下调了金融机构超额准备金利率．此次下调对3年以内债券券种的影响相当于美联储再次加息25个基点所产生的效果。虽然我们无法羊断央行在金融体系资金已相当充裕的情况下出人意料地下调超额存款准备金利率的真实用意，3月22日美联储又一次加息25个基点．但事实上，当前已经成为调整汇率形成机制的较好时期。     

美联储吹泡泡解毒

2009年3月，美国经济仍看不到好转的迹象，急于立功赎罪的美联储急了，出一个狠招：3月18日，美联储决定将在未来6个月购买至多3000亿美元国债，外加1．45万亿美元抵押贷款支持证券，后者将在年内完成。     

美联储加息下中国应该如何进一步推动人民币汇率改革

<正>一、美联储加息(一)美联储加息近况美国联邦储备局在去年12月份宣布将联邦基准利率提高25个基点,这次美国加息是自2006年以来正式开始加息,结束零利率政策,使得联邦基准利率维持在0.25%-0.50%之间。也是从此时起,美联储决定于今年持续加息。在去年美联储官员预计今年将加息4次,但是在今年3月16日美联储宣布维持联邦基金利率0.25%-0.50%不变,     

低利率金融威胁经济安全

从美联储第十五次加息说起2006年3月29日,美联储利率政策会议决定,将美元基准利率再次提高25个基点,由4．50%增至4．75%。这是美联储自2004年6月以来,以同样幅度,连续第15次提息。美联储同时暗示,还会“循序渐进”的继续加息。此次加息后,美元的一年期的基准利率(4．75%),已高出一年期人民币的基准利率(2．25%)2．5个     

美国量化宽松政策对我国价格水平的影响

为促进经济更强劲复苏和避免通缩的出现,美联储于去年底的11月3日宣布了新一轮的量化宽松货币政策,表示将在2011年年中前购买总额为6000亿美元的长期国债以提振经济,并对资产负债表中的债券资产到期回笼资金进行再投资。这是继2008年12月到2010年3月间购买价值1.725万亿美元的资产后,美联储第二次采用量化宽松政策。     

浅析美联储降息对中国的影响

由于去年美国房地产次级债危机的影响,2008年全球经济开局不利,截至至2008年3月18日,美联储在短短的不到半年的时间里,将联邦基金利率即商业银行间隔夜拆借利率从5.25%降低到2.25%,一共降低300个基点,此次大幅降息已默认了美国经济正趋于衰退,而美联储的降息和美国政府的大规模注资以挽救逐渐走下坡路的美国经济,却需要全球经济为其付出沉重的代价。 本文首先对美联储降息的原因进行分析、进而阐述了降息对美国经济和中国经济的影响。     

美联储货币政策走势及效果分析

为应对疫情带来的金融市场动荡及对经济带来的压力,美联储自2020年3月15日开始陆续出台多项货币政策。进入6月,美联储货币政策由大幅宽松趋于缓和,同时不断调整货币政策工具,保障实体经济和金融市场的资金供应。目前看,虽然5月美国经济数据环比有所好转,但整体仍面临较大压力,可见美联储的货币政策对实体经济的带动效果有限。在全球宽信用的货币政策走势下,我国更应坚守“以我为主”的货币政策,不断加强货币政策与财政政策的协调。     

外刊

<正>华尔街危机《经济学家》2008年3月22日在历经多年建立起来的雄伟的"现代金融大厦"快要倾覆之际,解救措施随之而来:3月16日,美联储果断出招,为救第五大投行贝尔斯登于水火,重新制定了收购规则,并同意由摩根大通直接收购。几天之后,美联储再次降息,短贷利率重回2.25%。尽管如此,华尔街的惨况还是传达出两个令人不安的信号:一是整个世界都需要找到解决金融风险问题的新思维;二是危机已进入一个新的危险阶段。     

如何应对“最后的疯狂”——著名经济学家对美联储买国债的讨论

美联储3月18日会议后宣布,将收购3000亿美元的长期美国国债和至多1．25万亿美元两房发行的抵押贷款支持证券。     

美联储为何突然降息?

2001年4月18日,美联储出人意料地降低银行隔夜拆借利率目标0.5%至4.5%,是6年多以来的最低点。具象征意义的贴现率也同时降低0.5%至4%。这是美联储今年以来第4次降低利率,共降低利率2个百分点。这也是今年以来美联储第2次在两次例会之间突然降息,上一次是1月3日。原本预期美联储会在5月15日的集会上再次降息,此次提前1个月降息,市场颇为意外。美联储此次降息后,5月15日例会上降息的可能性极微。美联储宣布降低利率以后。美洲银行、JP 摩根曼哈顿以及其他美国大银行均将其优惠贷款利率下调0.5个百分点至7.5%。     

Preparing for a Smooth (Eventual) Exit

One aspect of the U.S. Federal Reserve's efforts to mitigate the financial crisis was the accumulation of unprecedented levels of assets. As financial and economic conditions become healthy and sustainable, the U.S. Federal Reserve will wind down these positions. Doing so without disruption poses serious challenges, but they are challenges that the U.S. Federal Reserve has considered carefully and that can be managed successfully. The approach features caution and transparency and must be coordinated with traditional monetary policy. This paper describes the potential effects of the U.S. Federal Reserve's exit activities and how it will control them.     

An Interview With Ben S. Bernanke

In this interview, Dr. Bernanke recounts the concerns of his early days as chairman of the Federal Reserve in 2006 and the onset of the 2007–09 financial crisis. He then turns to the collapse of Lehman Brothers and AIG and its fallout. He emphasizes how important it is for the public to understand the Federal Reserve and what it does and the consequent importance of clear communication. Turning to postcrisis policies, he discusses unwinding quantitative easing, the global low-interest rate environment, and the importance of the Federal Reserve in maintaining financial stability. He expresses his confidence that recent measures make the U.S. economy less vulnerable to financial shocks than before the crisis. He also makes comments on income inequality and the housing market and discusses the statistics that he monitors regularly on the U.S. and global economies.     

The Federal Reserve's Mandate: Long Run

Given the slow recovery of the U.S. economy, quantitative easing of monetary policy in the form of U.S. Federal Reserve asset purchases has been attractive. However, it is not clear that the current and likely future economic environment warrants this policy, given its long-term risks. This paper outlines these risks and makes the case for a return to conventional policy by allowing currently held assets to roll off the Federal Reserve's balance sheet as they reach maturity and by resuming more conventional monetary policy. This is not a quick fix, but it is less risky than current policy in achieving the Federal Reserve's long-run dual mandate of price stability and maximum employment.     

Racing to the exits: International transmissions of funding shocks during the Federal Reserve's taper experiment

In May 2013, the U.S. Federal Reserve announced the beginning of the end of the program of monthly security purchases, the so-called “tapering.” The announcement was associated with large investor outflows from EM funds and large fund re-allocations across countries and stocks. Unexpected flow-implied fund upward (downward) allocations are associated with positive (negative) individual security returns following the announcement. The effect is pronounced in EM stocks that had positive cumulative abnormal returns around earlier Federal Reserve asset-purchase announcements leading up to the taper. It is concentrated in more liquid, smaller capitalization stocks and is stronger for forced trades among funds with more active country bets.     

Further Evidence on the Firm-Size Relation and Stock Market Responses to Changes in Federal Reserve Margin Levels

The virtually monotonic firm-size/price-reactions observed following changes in U.S. Federal Reserve market margin requirements over the post-1962 period provide dramatic new evidence in support of the hypothesis that changes in margin levels are associated with changes in security return behavior. Variance tests of the 1970 and 1971 margin decreases also produce evidence consistent with this hypothesis.     

Systemic risk in global volatility spillover networks: Evidence from option-implied volatility indices

With option-implied volatility indices, we identify networks of global volatility spillovers and examine time-varying systemic risk across global financial markets. The U.S. stock market is the center of the network and plays a dominant role in the spread of volatility spillover to other markets. The global systemic risks have intensified since the Federal Reserve exited from quantitative easing, hiked interest rate, and shrank its balance sheet. We further show that the U.S. monetary tightening is an important catalyst for the intensifying global systemic risk. Our findings highlight the pernicious effects of monetary tightening after an era of cheap money.     

A Tale of Two Crises: One We Missed and One We Can’t Afford To

The current economic crisis seems to be waning, largely due to effective federal government and Federal Reserve responses. Economists deserve credit for helping to avoid the abyss, but we failed to predict the crisis and warn policymakers so that the crisis could have been mitigated or avoided. We must not miss predicting the next crisis, however, as it is staring us in the face. We can see clearly that federal debt will severely damage the U.S. economy within several decades under current policy. Moreover, simulations that take into account the effect of debt on interest rates indicate that the depressing effect on the U.S. economy will be even worse than official projections suggest.     

Labor Markets and Monetary Policy

Headline employment numbers have been consistent with previous recoveries from recession. Behind the headlines, however, there are troubling data that suggest that the recovery of labor markets is weaker than what would be suggested by prior experience. In particular, labor force participation is weaker than expected, and the duration of unemployment has been longer. This paper describes the dimensions of the problems, their implications, and issues concerning whether the U.S. Federal Reserve could have done more to forestall them—particularly with respect to its Large Scale Asset Purchases program.     

Robert P. Bremner. Chairman of the Fed: William McChesney Martin, Jr., and the Creation of the Modern Federal Reserve System. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2004. vi + 357 pp. ISBN 0-300-10508-8, $38.00.

Two men headed the Federal Reserve System for 40 percent ofits history. One was Alan Greenspan, who served from 1987 to2006. The other was William McChesney Martin, Jr., who chairedthe U.S. central bank from 1951 to 1970. Although there areother contenders, both Martin and Greenspan have their backersfor designation as America’s greatest central banker.Hence, as the Greenspan era at the Fed ends, it is more thanappropriate that Robert Bremner’s excellent biographyof Martin appears. Because it contains insights into     

Inflation Targeting

There is substantial positive interest within the Federal Reserve in an explicit price level objective as a focus for evaluating Federal Reserve performance. Setting such an explicit objective would raise the question of whether price stability might acquire primacy among the mandates the Federal Reserve has received over the years.JEL Classification E31,E58