2002年全球最大200家国际工程设计公司业绩评述

2003年7月出版的《工程新闻记录》公布了2002年全球最大200家国际工程设计公司的经营情况。2002年,全球最大200家国际工程设计公司营业额总计为509亿美元,比2001年增长6.5%。其中,国际市场营业额达189亿美元,比2001年增长7.4%;国内市场营业额为320亿美元,比2001年增长0.3%。200     

在风险和挑战中抓住机遇在激烈竞争中稳步增长--2003年全球最大200家国际工程设计公司业绩评述

2003年,国际工程设计市场呈良性发展态势。全球经济复苏,各国经济环境都有所改善,国际工程设计公司的经营状况也有明显好转。美国《工程新闻记录》最新公布的数据显示,2003年全球最大200家国际工程设计公司营业额总计为533亿美元,比2002年增长4.7%。其中,国际市场营业额210亿美     

因地制宜 随机而动——2011年全球最大200家国际工程设计公司业绩述评

2011年,国际工程设计市场总体向好,但局部地区的市场环境充满了变数。美国市场持续低迷,欧债危机尚未解决,中东和北非的一些国家政局动荡,包括中国在内的"金砖国家"经济降温。在市场大环境不甚明朗的背景下,多家国际工程设计公司及时调整市场布局,采取行业重组、扩大规模、强化内部管理、增强技术实力、提高融资能力、有效整合资源等多种应对措施,取得了不俗的业绩。作为全球建筑界的权威刊物,美国《工程新闻记录》杂志(ENR)于今年7月发布2011年全球最大200家国际工程设计公司排行榜。     

国际2OO家工程设计公司再创佳绩

<正> 据《国际工程新闻记录》(ENR)报道,1991年国际最大的200家工程设计公司获得的与工程设计有关的服务合同额达101亿美元,比1990年的88亿美元增长15%,创历史最高水平。一、合同额的地区分布纵观1991年国际工程设计市场的发展,世界200家最大设计公司几乎在所有地区市场都取得了两位数的增长。按增长速度,非洲市场居首位,比1990年增长了19%,拉美15%,美国13%,中东8%,唯有加拿大市场的发包额继1990年下跌了33.3%之后再次出现7%的负增长。按市场规模,欧洲地位首次超过亚     

国际承包工程市场转旺全球225强座次排定

国际承包工程市场转旺全球２２５强座次排定张宁湘（外经贸部经研所）业绩与名次１９９３年，国际工程承包市场高速发展；亚洲市场繁荣、活跃，成为国际工程承包市场发展的火车头。１９９４年８月２９日出版的《国际工程新闻记录》统计的资料表明，全球最大的２２５家承包...     

并购之风盛行竞争日趋激烈--2000年全球最大225家国际工程承包公司述评

2000年的国际工程承包市场略显萧条。根据美国《工程新闻记录》（《ENR》）杂志最新统计，全球最大225家国际工程承包公司2000年的国外营业额仅为1159亿美元（见表1），比1999年的1187亿美元下降了2.4%。营业额出现负增长的主要原因是英国的克瓦纳公司未能列入排名。克瓦纳公司曾以65.4亿美元的国外营业额在1999年全球最大225家国际工程承包公司排行榜上位居次席。由于克瓦纳公司被斯勘斯卡公司并购，《工程新闻记录》杂志今年未将其列入统计。上述案例仅仅是全球兼并浪潮中的一个浪花而已，业内的兼并和重组之风盛行于国际工程承包界。通…     

金融危机影响下的国际建筑市场——2008年全球最大225家国际工程承包商业绩述评

美国《工程新闻记录》杂志(ENR)历年公布的全球最大225家国际工程承包公司业绩是反映国际建筑市场发展状况的一个重要指标。2008年,全球最大的225家国际工程承包商的国际市场营业额为3900.1亿美元,仍然保持了自2003年以来快速增长的态势,且增幅达到了25.7%。     

释放市场需求 力求发展突破——2011 年全球最大 225 家国际工程承包商业绩述评

2012年8月,美国《工程新闻记录》杂志(ENR)发布了2011年度全球最大225家国际工程承包商排名。中国52家内地企业入选本届榜单,合计完成国际市场营业额627.8亿美元。ENR全球最大225家国际工程承包商排名依据的是企业在国际建筑承包市场的营业收入,较为全面地反映了年度国际工程市场的发展状况,在国际工程承包业具有较高     

全球建筑业:进入快速增长期--2004年全球最大225家国际工程承包商业绩述评

2004年,世界经济的发展速度为5.1%,达到了近二十年来的最高点。随着全球经济的持续增长,国际建筑市场的资本投入呈现出持续增长的趋势,2004年全球建筑业投资规模已达4.2万亿美元。据美国《工程新闻记录》2005年8月公布的统计数据显示,2004年全球最大225家国际工程承包公司的国际市场营业总额比2003年增长了19.8%,达到1674.9亿美元,国内市场营业额为3348亿美元,增长13.4%。225家国际工程承包公司的国际、国内市场营业总额合计达5023亿美元,增幅为15.5%。回顾2004年,国际工程承包市场呈现出如下特点:从行业市场来看,基础建设项目需求旺盛,成为…     

美国工程设计公司：业绩增长缓慢 面临激烈竞争

美国工程设计公司：业绩增长缓慢面临激烈竞争金锐（外经贸部国际经济合作研究所）进入９０年代以来，美国工程设计市场出现衰退迹象，竞争变得越来越激烈。据美国《工程新闻记录》杂志统计，美国最大５００家设计公司１９９５年全年营业额达２９４亿美元，比１９９４年的...     

Contest design and heterogeneity

I show that the effect of heterogeneity on contest investments depends on the structure of the competition, which implies that heterogeneity matters for optimal contest design. This insight helps to explain empirical evidence on the comparison of different contest structures.     

Network design and defence

Infrastructure networks are a key feature of an economy. Their functionality depends on the connectivity and sizes of different components and they face a variety of threats, from natural disasters to intelligent attacks. How should networks be defended and designed to ensure the best functionality?We develop a model to study this question. There are two players, the Designer and the Adversary. The Designer forms costly links among n given nodes and chooses to protect some of them at a cost. The Adversary then allocates resources to attack nodes. Successful attack on a node leads to its elimination. We study sub-game perfect equilibria of this game.Our main finding is that if defence is affordable and reliable, then the network is sparse and heterogeneous, and either centrally or fully protected. On the other hand, if defence is relatively costly compared to linking, then dense and homogeneous networks arise in equilibrium.     

Entrepreneurship and organization design

We model entrepreneurship and the emergence of firms as an outcome of simultaneous bidding for labor services among heterogeneous agents. What distinguishes our approach from prior work is that occupational choice and job matching are determined simultaneously, so that the opportunity costs of entrepreneurs are accounted for. Those who are relatively unmanageable, while possibly excellent managers themselves, become entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs compete and create value by building efficient organizations and offering potentially well-paid jobs to others. While the entry of an additional entrepreneur typically reduces some individual wages, we show that it always raises the average wage and depresses the average income of incumbent entrepreneurs. This result may help explain the empirically low returns to entrepreneurship.     

Model design and simulation

The purpose of this paper is to illustrate some of the uses of simulation in building econometric models. By its means we can solve complicated non-linear systems and discover how sensitive the solutions are to changes in the parameter values and in the form of particular relationships. These uses are exemplified in a simple model of cyclical growth, whose stability depends on the speed with which the wage rate is kept adjusted to the marginal product of labour.     

Mediated contracts and mechanism design

The framework of incentive compatible finite direct coordination mechanisms in the sense of Myerson (1982) [5] is isomorphic to a framework of incentive compatible stochastic mediated contracts in the sense of Rahman and Obara (2010) [11] and Rahman (2009) [10]. The equivalence follows because the framework of Myerson (1982) [5] allows for a correlation between recommendations and transfers. The literature has hitherto not recognized the importance of this correlation for the structure of optimal contracts and for extending the revelation principle to address agency (moral hazard) problems.     

Structural stability and model design

The paper introduces the concept of structural stability and proposes that it should be considered a necessary property of scientifically valid models. Formalization of the concept is considered in both linear and non-linear models. A strong preference in favour of the wider use of non-linear models is supported by consideration of the dangers of linearization in dynamic models. The importance of structural stability is demonstrated with reference to dynamic rational expectations models which exhibit the saddle-point property. In such cases convergence to equilibrium is shown to be a structurally unstable property which can be forced by restrictive auxillary assumptions, which are highlighted.     

Reciprocal relationships and mechanism design

We study an incomplete information game in which players can coordinate their actions by contracting among themselves. We model this relationship as a reciprocal contracting procedure where each player has the ability to make commitments contingent on the other players' commitments. We differ from the rest of the literature on reciprocal contracting by assuming that punishments cannot be enforced in the event that cooperation breaks down. We fully characterize the outcomes that can be supported as perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcomes in such an environment. We use our characterization to show that the set of supportable outcomes with reciprocal contracting is larger than the set of outcomes available in a centralized mechanism design environment in which the mechanism designer is constrained by his inability to enforce punishments against non‐participants. The difference stems from the players' ability in our contracting game to convey partial information about their types at the time they offer contracts. We discuss the implications of our analysis for modelling collusion between multiple agents interacting with the same principal.     

Hard evidence and mechanism design

This paper addresses how hard evidence can be incorporated into mechanism-design analysis. Two classes of models are compared: (a) ones in which evidentiary decisions are accounted for explicitly, and (b) ones in which the players make abstract declarations of their types. Conditions are provided under which versions of these models are equivalent. The paper also addresses whether dynamic mechanisms are required for Nash implementation in settings with hard evidence. The paper shows that static mechanisms suffice in the setting of “evidentiary normality” and that, in a more general environment, one can restrict attention to a class of three-stage dynamic mechanisms.     

Constitutional design and economic performance

This paper is motivated by the belief that some cultural traits favor economic performance more than others. One trait examined is the ease with which individuals in a community drift away from the spirit of the law for their own benefit; this, it is argued, generates verbose legislation and high-transaction-cost institutions with deleterious effects on economic performance. An empirical comparison between the number of articles in a country's constitution, as a proxy for length and lack of simplicity, and economic performance as measured by GDP per capita finds that no country with a high GDP per capita has a long constitution or, restated, that long constitutions are invariably associated with low levels of GDP per capita.     

Informational control and organizational design

This paper focuses on issues of allocating authority between an uninformed principal and an informed expert. We analyze the benefits of informational control—restricting the precision of the expert's information (without learning its content). In this case, the result of Dessein (2002) [8] that delegating decisions to a perfectly informed expert is better than communication when preferences between the expert and the principal are not too far apart is reversed. We demonstrate that these organizational forms—informational control and delegation—can be either complements or substitutes, depending on the principal's ability to affect the expert's discretion about the set of allowed policies.