Indra-Industry Trade,Endogenous Technical Change,Wage Inequality and Welfare

By using alternative intra-industry trade models (1. New goods cannot be introduced into the economy; 2. The possibility for a set of capital goods available in the economy to vary; the models consider the existence of intersectoral linkages), I show by means of Applied General Equilibrium (AGE) analysis that trade rises wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers; but the impact on wage inequality is far larger, when countries are assumed to exchange differentiated capital goods. The latter result has been obtained by using an imperfect competitive model, which embodies a sector bias technological change that arises from trade. In addition, the gains from trade, insignificant under the standard trade hypotheses, are extraordinarily large when endogenous technological change is taken into account. The main policy conclusion is that if policy makers of flexible wage economies introduce trade barriers to reduce wage inequality, these protective measures, by affecting the diffusion of technology, would cause a large welfare loss. [D58, f12, F43, J3, O3]     

Open-access renewable resources and pollution: Trade and policy implications in a two-country model

We examine the interaction between the relative inter-industry pollution externality and resource stock externality of harvesting in deciding trade patterns and welfare gains from trade in a two-country model (less-developed countries) with renewable resources in the absence of resource management. This paper focuses on the impacts of trade policies on resource conservation and welfare outcomes in two countries with different environmental management regimes. Differences in pollution management standards between both countries determine the direction of trade flow and gains from trade in a diversified production case. The country with a lower pollution intensity parameter, an exporter of resource goods, certainly experiences welfare loss in the post-trade steady-state and may also suffer a decline in utility throughout the transition path. However, a country with higher pollution intensity and importers of resource goods tend to gain from trade. Under national open-access resources, given that pollution is regulated up to a certain point in both countries, this study finds that implementing better restrictions on only one externality factor is not optimal from a post-trade welfare perspective. Lastly, from the point of view of policy suggestion, this paper offers an optimal trade policy that the economic and environmental effects of enforcing import tax on resource goods are likely to be Pareto-improving consequences compared to the implications of using an export tax.     

Gains and losses from potential bilateral US–China trade retaliation

Two closely related numerical general equilibrium models of world trade are used to analyze the potential consequences of US–China bilateral retaliation on trade flows and welfare. One is a conventional Armington trade model with five regions, the US, China, EU, Japan and the Rest of the World, and calibrated to a global 2009 micro consistent data set. The other is a modified version of this model with monetary non-neutrals and including China's trade surplus as an endogenous variable.Who may gain or loss from global trade conflicts spawned by adjustment pressures in the post crisis world is much debated. In a US–China trade conflict, Europe and Japan would seem gainers from preferential access to US and Chinese markets. The loss of markets would hurt the US, but moving closer to an optimal tariff could be the source of terms of trade gains. And the ease of substitution across trading partners' practices would determine costs for China.Results from the conventional model suggest that retaliation between the two countries can be welfare improving for the US as it substitutes expenditures into own goods and improve its terms of trade with non-retaliatory regions, while China and non-retaliatory regions may be adversely affected. Results in the endogenous trade surplus model from the central case model specification, however, suggest that both the US and the EU (the deficit regions) have welfare losses in most cases, while the surplus region, China, and the ROW have welfare gains. In both models, when the bilateral tariff rates are very high, gains accrue to the EU and Japan from trade diversion if the substitutions elasticities of imports are high. Costs are borne by the US and China in lost exports, lowered terms of trade and adjustment costs at home.     

Tariffs in a Ricardian Model with a Monopolistically Competitive Sector: the Role of Nontradables

It is shown that for a small open economy the welfare effects of a tariff on the import of the brands of a differentiated good depends crucially on the pattern of trade. The literature has shown that welfare rises when the domestic brands are nontraded. But when the domestic brands are traded, the imposition of a tariff lowers welfare by shifting demand towards the nontraded homogeneous good which causes exit from the differentiated goods industry.     

Environmental Policies, Comparative Advantage and the Gains/Losses from International Trade

A multihousehold economy with multilateral nondepletable externalities, environmental (output) taxation and governmental production of pure, nonexclusive and nonrivalrous public goods is assumed. Modelling many different households the "almost perfect" isomorphism between the normative analysis of public goods and environmental policies is highlighted. Globally valid necessary and sufficient conditions for gains from international trade are derived and interpreted. A simple yet general environmental policy rule ensuring trade gains is put forward. The law of comparative advantage is generalized to economies with multilateral nondepletable externalities and over or underproduced pure public goods.     

Preferential Trade and Welfare with Differentiated Products

We consider analytically and numerically the welfare tradeoffs inherent in a preferential trade area (PTA) with products differentiated by region of origin. For a small open economy in such a setting, welfare gains are associated with higher trade volumes within the PTA. However, welfare losses are induced by declining tariff revenues on trade with non‐member countries. We show that both effects are concave, while one is a non‐monotonic and the other a potentially non‐monotonic function of pre‐PTA partner trade shares. Therefore, the relationship between initial partner import shares and direct static welfare impacts of a PTA are theoretically ambiguous. This finding contrasts with conventional results in the homogeneous‐goods case, whereby the smaller is the pre‐agreement trade volume with a potential partner the more beneficial is a PTA.     

Growth and Trade: The North Can Lose

Several models of growth and trade concludethat a country grows more when trading with a less developedcountry. This article shows that this conclusion depends cruciallyon the assuming homothetic preferences and/or having just twogoods with respect to learning-by-doing. The article presentsa model where the more advanced country (North) can be worseoff after trading with a less developed country (South) becausethe demand pattern of the South is biased toward Northern productswith less learning-by-doing potential. Trade can worsen the welfareif the South is large with respect to the North and/or the preferencefor low-technology goods is high; necessary conditions are thatthe preferences are nonhomotheticity and that the North exportsat least two types of goods. In this context, the article studiesthe welfare of North and South, separating the static from thedynamic gains from trade.     

Measuring the gains from trade under monopolistic competition

Abstract .  Three sources of gains from trade under monopolistic competition are (i) new import varieties available to consumers; (ii) enhanced efficiency as more productive firms begin exporting and less productive firms exit; (iii) reduced markups charged by firms due to import competition. The first source of gains can be measured as new goods in a CES utility function for consumers. We argue that the second source is formally analogous to the producer gain from new goods, with a constant-elasticity transformation curve for the economy. We suggest that the third source of gain can be measured using a translog expenditure function for consumers, which, in contrast to the CES case, allows for finite reservation prices for new goods and endogenous markups.     

Learning How To Export

In this paper, we present a standard quality ladders endogenous growth model with one significant new assumption: it takes time for firms to learn how to export. It is known that the welfare gains from trade liberalization implied by a large class of models like the Armington gravity model, the Krugman model, and the Melitz model are small. Our quality ladders model is consistent with a number of firm‐level stylized facts from the heterogeneous firms trade literature and is, in addition, capable of generating very large welfare gains from trade liberalization.     

VEHICLE CURRENCY*

Historically, the world economy has been dominated by a single currency accepted in the exchange of goods and assets among countries. In recent decades, the U.S. dollar has played this role. The dollar acts as a “vehicle currency” in the sense that agents in nondollar economies will generally engage in currency trade indirectly using the U.S. dollar instead of using direct bilateral trade among their own currencies. A vehicle currency is desirable when there are transactions costs of exchange. This article constructs a dynamic general equilibrium model of a vehicle currency. We explore the nature of the efficiency gains arising from a vehicle currency and show how it depends on the total number of currencies in existence, the size of the vehicle currency economy, and the monetary policy followed by the vehicle currency’s government. We find that there can be significant welfare gains to a vehicle currency in a system of many independent currencies. But these gains are asymmetrically weighted toward the residents of the vehicle currency country. The survival of a vehicle currency places natural limits on the monetary policy of the vehicle currency country.     

Early adopters of new supermarket products

New goods and expanding product variety are thought to provide enormous welfare gains. New products can influence the pricing of competing products, but often the most important way that new products improve the welfare is through their direct consumption value. The demographic profile of the buyers of new goods suggests those welfare gains are unequally distributed. For supermarket products in the US, expenditures on new goods are disproportionately concentrated among high earners and younger consumers.     

Welfare change and the elimination of the shortage economy in Russia: some representative-household results1

The welfare consequences of eliminating the shortage economy for the representative Russian household are quantitatively assessed. Before price liberalization, households either bought goods and services at state prices and paid searching and queuing costs, or they bought on parallel markets at higher monetary prices. An equation is derived that permits empirical evaluation of the extent to which welfare gains from eliminating searching and queuing costs offset welfare losses from falling real consumption. Available data suggest that when regime change was initiated in Russia in 1992, welfare gains from eliminating shortage were substantial and may have completely offset welfare losses from falling real consumption.     

Trade Gains, Paretian Transfer and the Tragedy of the Commons

Consider trade liberalization between two countries, each of which produces two private goods and provides on a voluntary basis one public good (the common). In these circumstances, what are the consequences of trade liberalization on the production of the public good and on welfare in both countries? Using a Ricardian framework, we first show that the opening of trade increases the opportunity cost of producing the public good in both countries and will therefore reduce the aggregate supply of the public good. On the other hand, at the autarky equilibrium, only one country supplies the public good, the other “free rides”. The analysis of the welfare incidence of the opening of trade then reveals that the country which provides the public good under autarky always enjoys a welfare gain from trade while the free rider under autarky does not unless the terms of trade are sufficiently in its favour to compensate for the reduction in the supply of the common. Finally, if all countries involved in trade liberalization can without cost coordinate their supplies of the common, then the implementation of the first-best outcome is shown to be possible with a conditional Paretian transfer scheme.     

Renewable Resources,Pollution and Trade

Detrimental spillovers from industrial activity onto resource‐based productive sectors are very common, yet their effects remain understudied. While international trade often creates conditions for the over‐exploitation of open‐access renewable resources, it also provides opportunities for separating different productive sectors spatially. The existing literature suggests that a diversified exporter of the renewable resource good tends to lose from trade in both welfare and conservation terms as a result of over‐depletion, while the exporter of the non‐resource good gains. However, the resource stock externality of harvesting and the inter‐industry pollution externality often coexist in reality. In a small open economy framework, this paper shows that acknowledging their interaction changes the nature of the autarkic equilibrium and enriches the set of resource conservation and welfare outcomes from trade. Depending on the relative damage inflicted by the two industries on the environment, which in turn are functions of the pollution intensity and bioeconomic parameters, it is possible that the inter‐sectoral pollution externality persists and specialization in manufacturing is not optimal from a welfare perspective.     

Product differentiation and the gains from trade under Bertrand duopoly

Abstract.  In the literature on the welfare effects of free trade under imperfect competition, one important case seems to have been overlooked, and that is the Bertrand duopoly model with differentiated products. Although many authors have analysed the welfare effects of free trade under Cournot duopoly and demonstrated the possibility of losses from trade, there has been no thorough analysis of the welfare effects of free trade under Bertrand duopoly. In this article we present a thorough analysis of the welfare effects of free trade under Bertrand duopoly with differentiated products, and it is shown that there are always gains from trade. JEL Classification: F12     

Does Preferential Trade Benefit Poor Countries? A General Equilibrium Assessment with Nonhomothetic Preferences

We develop a Ricardian model of trade with nonhomothetic preferences to analyze preferential trade agreements (PTAs) among countries of different stages of economic development. The richer a country is, the more likely will PTAs improve its terms of trade, also when it is a non‐member. Rich non‐member countries are also less likely to incur welfare losses from PTAs. PTA membership only guarantees welfare gains for countries that are too poor to import the goods rich countries produce. For all other countries, the welfare effects of joining PTAs depend on the world income distribution and on the strength of comparative advantages.     

Increasing Returns and International Trade

The paper develops a model of international trade with increasing returns toscale by taking into account the possibility of cooperation among agents in an egalitarian economy. It is shown that each country gains from trade in a trading world in which there are arbitrary numbers of increasing-returns-to-scale goods, constant-returns-to-scale goods, factors of production, and countries.     

The Welfare Synergy of Bundling International Environmental Agreements with International Trade Treaties

This paper examines whether linking environmental cooperation with international trade agreements improves the welfare of the participating countries and allows countries to move closer to free trade compared with trade‐only agreements. The model is an infinitely repeated game with the threat of reversion to Nash equilibrium if an economy deviates from the cooperative agreement. It is found that such a synergy exists in a symmetric two‐country model with two goods, both emitting pollutants even when the externalities have local impact. A combination of analytic and numerical simulation analysis is used to derive the conclusions.     

The macroeconomic impact of foreign labour influx into the industrialized nation state and the complementary policies

This paper makes a numerical assessment on the macroeconomic impact of foreign labor influx into the industrialized nation state allowing free trade in goods but imposing an immigration quota on labor, and then explores the complementary policies for the impact of foreign labor influx. One of the main findings is that immigration itself brings welfare gains only if prices are flexible, but a skill-biased intake policy can bring a much larger welfare gain. The complementary policy options to boost welfare gains by immigration increase are monetary expansion, adopting foreign components more, and influencing foreign demand for intermediate goods indirectly by inviting foreign direct investment. For these policies to cope, the destination country should try to correct the market structure so that prices can be flexible.