Shared Renewable Resources: Gains from Trade and Trade Policy

This paper examines the effects of international trade and trade policy in a two‐country, two‐good model with an open‐access renewable resource that is internationally shared. We show that both countries may still benefit from trade when they specialize in the production of their comparative advantage good, although the shared resource is reduced by trade. In addition, we demonstrate that the steady state utility of a resource‐good importing country may be reduced by trade, even if it specializes in the production of a non‐resource good. Import tariffs and export taxes on a resource good may increase or decrease the shared stock level depending on the production patterns in a trading steady state. The trade policy is likely to be Pareto‐improving when the shared stock rises, while both countries may be made worse off by the trade policy when the shared stock falls.     

Second-Best Linkages and the Gains from Global Reform of Manufactures Trade

The Uruguay Round's built-in agenda for future WTO negotiations omitted further liberalization in manufactures, yet this paper shows that there are large potential gains to be had from such tariff cuts, especially in the developing countries. In order to fully estimate the benefits of adding industrial products to a future multilateral trade round, we need to take into account the levels of protection in other sectors—most notably agriculture and services—in which many trade flows are highly distorted. This paper examines the nature of the second-best linkages among sectors using a balance-of-trade function approach. The importance of these linkages is evaluated using a numerical general equilibrium model. It is found that, in most cases, the second-best spillovers do not greatly affect the results, implying that the estimated gains from manufacturing reforms will be largely independent of their sequencing. However, in a few regions, most notably the EU, the second-best effects play a significant role.     

Why Do the Gains from Trade Reform Vary Between Countries?

This paper assesses, both theoretically and empirically, the determinants of differential gains from trade policy reform across countries. The theoretical model shows that asymmetrical features of the world economy, including the relative size of the differentiated products sector in each country, the dominance of domestic markets by indigenous producers, trade costs, and the relative importance of exports, all play an important role. Results from a multi-region computable general equilibrium model substantiate the proposition that the initial pattern of asymmetry is relatively more important than scale and varietal effects, despite the fact that the latter have received more attention in the literature.     

Marshall's Scissors: The Gains and Losses from Trade

In a Ricardian two‐factor endowment model with Cobb–Douglas tastes and many goods, this paper describesthe interaction of the demand and supply sides to determine the gains and losses from trade. If the abundant factor has a sufficiently rich profile of comparative advantages, trade causesthe proportionate gain to the abundant factor to be smaller than the proportionate loss to the scarce factor. However, if the abundant factor has sufficiently skewed comparative advantages toward the best goods, then the opposite will hold. Some examples suggest that these patterns may have something to do with the selection of trade regimes. In the usual one‐factor Ricardian model the gains from trade to a country are enhanced by higher demand shares for imports, but such gains from trade from imports to a country is not the case in a factor endowment model.     

Gains from Trade with Lump-sum Compensation

This paper analyses the use of lump-sum compensation to ensure a Pareto improvement under free trade. It first shows how households, which are aware of the free-trade and compensation policy, may falsify autarkic consumption to get larger transfers. Despite consumption falsification, however, trade could still be gainful using lump-sum compensation under certain conditions. This paper also suggests a case in which an incentive-compatible lump-sum compensation scheme exists.     

Strategic R&D Commitment and the Gains from Trade

This paper examines how trade liberalization affects innovation, profits and welfare in a model of reciprocal markets when firms pre‐commit to research and development (R&D). We establish that the equilibrium is not always unique and show that, with trade, R&D commitment leads to higher levels of innovation, lower profits, higher consumer surplus and higher welfare than when R&D is chosen simultaneously to output levels. Furthermore, if the effectiveness of R&D is sufficiently high, trade always yields higher welfare than autarky, implying that R&D commitment may significantly enhance the welfare gains from trade liberalization.     

Comparative Advantage With and Without Gains from Trade

In 1980, Deardorff, and Dixit and Norman, generalized the law of comparative advantage to show that the value of net imports at autarky prices (or "DDN index") is nonnegative, so that net imports are correlated with autarky prices. The DDN index can be decomposed into the sum of (i) the equivalent variation of gains from trade, and (ii) the difference in GNP at autarky prices between autarky and trade. Several examples are given of classical and neoclassical economies where (i) or (ii) can be zero. Hence gains from trade are sufficient but not necessary for the existence of comparative advantage.     

Gains from Trade versus Gains from Migration: What Makes Them So Different?

Would unrestricted “economic” migration enhance the potential gains from free trade? With free migration, consumers' feasible sets become non‐convex. Under standard assumptions, however, Walrasian equilibrium exists for a continuum of individuals with dispersed ability to afford each of a finite set of possible migration plans. Then familiar conditions ensuring potential Pareto gains from trade also ensure that free migration generates similar supplementary gains, relative to an arbitrary status quo. As with the gains from customs unions, however, wealth may have to be redistributed across international borders.     

US Security Strategy and the Gains from Bilateral Trade

We explore the geo‐strategic determinants of bilateral trade flows between the USA and the rest of the world. We develop a three‐party model of security and trade patterns and use data on military assistance and troop deployments over the 1950–2009 period to validate its predictions. We find that security assistance has significant, positive impacts on the shares of bilateral trade between the USA and the recipient country, results that are robust to issues of reverse causality and hold across different sectors.     

International Economies of Scale and the Gains from Trade

In this paper, we present a two-country trade model with external economies of scale that emerge on an international level but are partially localized in each country. First, we show that the larger country exports the good produced in an industry with external economies of scale in the trading equilibrium. Second, we investigate the welfare effects of trade for the following two cases: (I) the case where external economies are completely localized in autarky; (II) the case where external economies are internationally effective in autarky. In case (II), it is shown that trade can be welfare-decreasing for both countries.     

Strategic Environmental Policies and the Gains from Trade Liberalization

The literature on strategic environmental policy has not fully addressed welfare effects of trade liberalization from autarky. In a reciprocal market model of duopoly with transboundary pollution, we study how reductions in transport costs and import tariffs affect the Nash‐equilibrium welfare of an environmental policy game as compared to any initial state including autarky. We show three patterns of gainfulness of trade depending on the interaction between marginal damage from pollution and the degree of transboundary pollution.     

Trade Gains and Public Goods

This paper proves that in a multicountry general‐equilibrium model of international trade with local public goods, free trade is beneficial if the governments in the trading world behave strategically with respect to the provision of public goods.     

Trade and Gains from Trade Between Profit-maximizing and Labour-managed Countries with Imperfect Competition

This paper offers a theoretical analysis of trade and the gains from trade in general equilibrium under imperfect competition by assuming that all firms in one country are of the labour-managed type (maximizing the income of labour) while those in the other country are of the profit-maximizing type. Our main conclusion is that if the labour-managed country is larger than or equal to the profit-maximizing country, the profit-maximizing country exports the imperfectly competitive commodity and gains from trade while the labour-managed country exports the perfectly competitive commodity and may lose from trade.     

Water on Fire: Gains from Electricity Trade

In light of the ongoing liberalization of electricity trade in the Nordic countries, and perhaps in Northern Europe, we argue that gains from electricity trade may be different from those traditionally associated with comparative advantages and economies of scale. In particular, we consider gains arising from the exploitation of technological complementarities between hydro and thermal systems. Our theoretical framework highlights essential features of the two systems and allows for an analysis of effects of trade. We study three trading regimes, which may arise either endogenously or because of trade regulations: day–night power exchange, seasonal energy banking and unbalanced trade. The analysis suggests that gradual trade liberalization may be costly.     

International Trade with a Public Intermediate Good and the Gains from Trade*

This paper presents a one‐primary factor, two‐consumer good, and two‐country model of international trade where each country’s government supplies a country‐specific public intermediate good so as to attain efficient production. By introducing the Marshallian adjustment process, it is demonstrated that the country with larger factor endowment exports the good whose productivity is more sensitive to the public intermediate good. Our normative analysis of free trade shows the following results. First, at least one country gains from trade. Secondly, if a country incompletely specializes in the trading equilibrium, the country necessarily loses from trade.     

The Gains from Trade in a Cournot–Nash Trading Equilibrium

It has recently been suggested by several authors that a Cournot–Nash free‐trade equilibrium might leave each country worse off than under autarky, in apparent contradiction of earlier findings. In the present note it is shown that the suggestion is typically based on self‐contradictory assumptions and is therefore unacceptable.     

Pre-commitment Mechanism and Policy Credibility in African Trade Reform

In the absence of a binding pre-commitment mechanism, a government has an incentive to renege on announced policy. This is a well-established result in the literature. The paper applies this theory to tariff policy by developing a two-game model to analyze the credibility of government tariff reform announcements. The pre-commitment solution is subgame-imperfect; therefore, government's announcement of tariff reforms is time-inconsistent. Using a sample of African countries operating under IMF structural adjustment programs, the study finds only weak evidence that countries implemented their announced tariff reforms. However, SAP agreements seem to enhance private sector confidence in government reforms.     

Trade Gains in Chaotic Equilibria

It is shown by means of an overlapping-generations (OLG) example that free international trade may be both deterministically chaotic and gainful in the sense of Pareto to a participating country.     

新贸易理论：证据再反思

产业内贸易常被作为支持“新贸易理论”的一个关键因素。然而本文从理论和实证两个方面对这一观察提出了若干质疑。建立在68个国家数据基础上的静态和动态计量模型结果显示，经济规模、消费者偏好、地理位置、贸易不均衡以及贸易环境（国家的经济开放程度）等因素，在短期和长期都对产业内贸易产生影响。这些发现促使“新贸易理论”重新去审视支持它的“证据”。