Fair Accumulation under Risky Lifetime

Individuals save for their old days, but not all of them enjoy the old age. This paper characterizes the optimal capital accumulation in a two‐period OLG model where lifetime is risky and varies across individuals. We compare two long‐run social optima: (1) the average utilitarian optimum, where steady‐state average welfare is maximized; (2) the egalitarian optimum, where the welfare of the worst‐off at the steady‐state is maximized. It is shown that, under plausible conditions, the egalitarian optimum involves a higher capital and a lower fertility than the utilitarian optimum. Those inequalities hold also in a second‐best framework where survival conditions are exogenously linked to the capital level.     

Time Consistent Optimal Redistribution Policy in an Overlapping Generations Model

This paper analyzes optimal redistribution policy in a two‐period version of the overlapping generations model with heterogeneous individuals and asymmetric information between the government and the private sector. The government of the first period determines redistribution transfers for the first period but is not able to set the policy variables for the second period. With respect to savings the paper considers two scenarios: In the first scenario savings are observable and the government can set individual savings levels in addition to redistributive transfers. In the second scenario savings and capital incomes are not observable. In both cases the redistribution equilibrium is not second‐best efficient.     

Endogenous market incompleteness without market frictions: Dynamic suboptimality of competitive equilibrium in multiperiod overlapping generations economies

In this paper, we show that within the set of stochastic three-period-lived OLG economies with productive assets (such as land), markets are necessarily sequentially incomplete, and agents in the model do not share risk optimally. We start by characterizing perfect risk-sharing and find that it requires state-dependent consumption claims which depend only on the exogenous shock realizations. We show then that the recursive competitive equilibrium of any overlapping generations economy with weakly more than three generations is not strongly stationary. This then allows us to show directly that there are short-run Pareto improvements possible in terms of risk-sharing and hence, that the recursive competitive equilibrium is not Pareto optimal. We then show that a financial reform which eliminates the equity asset and replaces it with zero net supply insurance contracts (Arrow securities) will implement to Pareto optimal stochastic steady-state known to exist in the model. Finally, we also show via numerical simulations that a system of government taxes and transfers can lead to a Pareto improvement over the competitive equilibrium in the model.     

Self-enforcing exchange among generations: Implications for consumption and mobility

A three-generation OLG model with one-directional altruism and two-directional intra-family transfers is presented. Adults invest in their children's education and make transfers to their elderly parents. However, due to lack of altruism, adults with high earnings do not share consumption equally with their elderly parents but spend a larger share of their earnings on own consumption and on their children's education. This allows the model to be consistent with three empirical observations that are difficult to reconcile with traditional altruistic frameworks of intergenerational social interactions and mobility: (i) consumption is not perfectly shared between members of an extended family, (ii) consumption is not equally persistent over the lifecycle as across generations, and (iii) the intergenerational persistence of earnings is particularly high at the top end of the earnings distribution.     

Consumption adaptation,anticipation‐bias,and optimal income taxation

Adaptation is omnipresent but people systematically fail to correctly anticipate the degree to which they adapt, leading them to make irrational intertemporal decisions. This paper concerns optimal income taxation to correct for such anticipation‐biases in a framework where consumers adapt to earlier consumption levels. The analysis is based on a general equilibrium OLG model with endogenous labor supply and savings where each consumer lives for three periods. The results show how a paternalistic government may correct for the effects of anticipation‐bias through a combination of time‐variant marginal labor income taxes and savings subsidies/taxes. The optimal policy mix remains the same, irrespective of whether consumers commit to their original life time plan for work hours and consumption or reoptimize later on when realizing that they have already adapted more than expected.     

POSITIONAL CONCERNS IN AN OLG MODEL: OPTIMAL LABOR AND CAPITAL INCOME TAXATION*

This article concerns optimal income taxation under asymmetric information in a two‐type OLG model when individuals’ relative consumption matters. Positional concerns affect the policy choices via two channels: (i) the average degree of positionality and (ii) positionality differences between the low‐ability type and the mimicker. Under plausible empirical estimates, the marginal labor income tax rates become substantially larger, and the absolute value of the marginal capital income tax rate of the low‐ability type becomes substantially smaller, than in the conventional model. In addition to measures of reference consumption based on average consumption, we also address within‐generation and upward comparisons.     

A Dynamic Incentive‐Based Argument for Conditional Transfers*

We compare the long‐run effects of replacing unconditional transfers to the poor by transfers conditional on the education of children. Unlike Mirrlees’ income taxation model, the distribution of skill evolves endogenously. Human capital accumulation follows the Freeman–Ljungqvist–Mookherjee–Ray OLG model with missing capital markets and dynastic bequest motives. Conditional transfers (funded by taxes on earnings of the skilled) are shown to induce higher long‐run output per capita and (both utilitarian and Rawlsian) welfare, owing to their superior effect on skill accumulation incentives. The result is established both with two skill levels, and a continuum of occupations.     

Ramsey,Pigou, Heterogeneous Agents,and Nonatmospheric Consumption Externalities

This paper analyzes the effects of nonatmospheric consumption externalities on optimal commodity taxation and on the social cost and optimal levels of public good provision. A negative consumption externality, by lowering the social cost of public good provision, may require the second‐best level of public good provision to exceed the first‐best level. If those households who are most important for building up the consumption reference level respond the least to commodity taxation, the second‐best commodity tax rate may fall short of the first‐best rate. Moreover, in this case, heterogeneity may imply an equity‐efficiency tradeoff. This tradeoff is present only if the consumption externality is of the nonatmospheric type.     

Consumption tax and economic growth in an overlapping generations model with money holdings

This paper examines the effect of a consumption tax on economic growth using an overlapping generations (OLG) model with money holdings. We show that the neutrality of the consumption tax does not hold in the money-in-the-utility-function model, because a change in consumption taxation induces the substitution of money holdings for consumption, and the money is the net wealth within the OLG structure. An increase in the consumption tax rate lowers (raises) the growth rate under a low (high) monetary expansion rate. On the other hand, in the cash-in-advance model and the money-in-the-production-function model, the neutrality of consumption taxation holds even within the OLG structure, because in these models there is no substitution of consumption and money holdings.     

Demographic structure and capital accumulation

This paper develops an overlapping-generations (OLG) model to analyze the consequences of demographic structure changes induced by an exogenous shift in the birth rate. We first show that a finite growth rate of the population that maximizes long-run capital per capita exists. Then, we examine the theoretical properties of this growth rate by showing that: (i) it corresponds to the demographic structure such that the average ages of capital holders and workers are equal; (ii) it is associated to an efficient steady state; (iii) it increases with compulsory transfers from younger to older generations. Finally, we explain why standard OLG models do not exhibit such a growth rate.     

International Technology Transfer: Who Gains and Who Loses?*

When one country has a superior technology in all commodities, a Ricardian model with two goods and two countries is used to examine uncompensated transfers of superior technology in one or both goods. A transfer of the superior but second‐best technology always benefits the advanced country because it was improting that good initially and now gets it cheaper. But the free gift of the first‐best technology can also benefit the advanced country if a certain productivity condition is satisfied because that country may now export its former import good at an even better terms of trade.     

Time-consistent taxation in a dynastic family model with human and physical capital and a balanced government budget

Abstract .  This paper analyzes optimal, time consistent taxation in a dynastic family model with human and physical capital and with a balanced government budget. When tax revenue is used for publicly provided consumption or lump-sum transfers, leisure would be higher than its social optimum. Pareto optimal taxation requires taxing capital income more heavily than labour income and subsidizing investment at the same rate of the tax. Also, it requires either subsidizing labour at the same rate as a consumption tax or subsidizing consumption at the same rate as a labour income tax, and hence it is not a practical guide to policy. Further, a consumption tax, or equivalently a uniform income tax with investment subsidies at the same rate, can be improved on by taxing capital income more heavily than labour income.     

Informal Institutions, Consumption Custom, and Assumption of OLG Model—A Theoretical Analysis on Households’ Consumption Decisions in the Oriental Culture and Belief

Orthodox consumption theories have not incorporated the overlapping-generations (OLG) model and wealth-stock model, whereas this article explains households’ characters in consumption and savings in countries such as China and some other regions from the viewpoints of social convention, moral formation, ethics, and other informal institutions. The authors exploit and extend the OLG model, introduce the concepts of bequest, gift, and wealth preference to the economic agent’s utility function, then apply optimal conditions to analyzing the characters and problems concerning consumption and savings behavior. Furthermore, they deliberate on the effects of this analysis on government macroeconomic policies and suggest some relevant theoretical thinking and solutions. Translated from Economic Research Journal, 2005, 4 (in Chinese)     

Social Security and Old Age Unemployment Risk with Efficient Wage Bargaining

I analyze a life‐cycle economy with old age productivity risk where wages, employment, and severance payments are set through efficient bargaining between risk averse unions and risk neutral firms. Allocations with limited union membership are second‐best inefficient as they generate too little labor supply in young age, too much consumption before retirement, too little employment of older workers (early retirement), and too little insurance against old age unemployment. Providing public transfers to early retirees (disability benefits or early pensions) might help to increase the degree of risk sharing at the cost of lower old age employment. Depending on whether absolute risk aversion is increasing or decreasing in consumption, these policies might or might not produce efficiency gains at equilibrium.     

How much to share: Welfare effects of fiscal transfers

Recent sovereign debt crisis has challenged policy makers to explore the possibility of establishing a fiscal transfer system that could alleviate the negative impact of asymmetric shocks across countries. Using a simple labour production economy, we first derive an analytically tractable solution for optimal degree of fiscal transfers. In this economy, fiscal transfers can improve welfare by moving the competitive equilibrium with fiscal transfers closer to the social planner's solution. We then extend the model to a DSGE setting with capital, international bond and linear taxes, and we analyze how implementation of a simple revenue sharing rule affects welfare and macroeconomic variables over time. Simulation results show that risk sharing through fiscal transfers always improves welfare in the long run. However, under certain model specifications, short‐run transitional welfare loss can outweigh the long‐run benefits. These results suggest that, in designing fiscal transfers across countries, government should take into consideration the intertemporal nature of welfare gains.     

The Optimal Tax Treatment of Housing Capital in the Neoclassical Growth Model

Should housing capital be taxed like other forms of capital? We analyze this question within a version of the neoclassical growth model. We derive the optimal tax treatment of housing capital vis‐à‐vis business capital allowing for relatively general household preferences. In the first‐best, the tax treatment of business and housing capital should always be the same. In the second‐best, in contrast, the optimal tax treatment of housing capital depends on the elasticities of substitution between nonhousing consumption, housing, and leisure. This is because housing taxation may be used to alleviate the distorting effect of taxing labor. As a result, the optimal tax treatment of housing capital may be different from that of business capital. We complement these analytical results with a numerical analysis.     

Conspicuous consumption and generation replacement in a model of perpetual youth

This paper investigates household decisions in an overlapping generations model in which individual utility depends on a weighted average of consumption of one's peers. In contrast to representative agent economies, the consumption externality generally affects savings and growth rates. The effects critically depend on the rate at which labor productivity changes with age. For a high (low) rate, the externality lowers (raises) the steady state propensity to consume out of total wealth. The optimal allocation can be decentralized by a (reverse) unfunded social security system if the rate of labor productivity decline is high (low). In contrast to discrete time OLG models, the optimal steady state capital income tax is zero, in spite of the externality.     

On the Provision of Insurance against Search‐Induced Wage Fluctuations*

Should workers be provided with insurance against search‐induced wage fluctuations? To answer this question, I rely on the numerical simulations of a model of on‐the‐job search and precautionary savings. The model is calibrated to low‐skilled workers in the United States. The extent of insurance is determined by the degree of progressivity of a non‐linear transfer schedule. The fundamental trade‐off is that a more generous provision of insurance reduces incentives to search for better‐paying jobs, which increases the cost of providing insurance. I show that progressivity raises the search intensity of unemployed workers, which reduces the equilibrium rate of unemployment, but it lowers the search intensity of employed job seekers, which reduces the output level. I also solve numerically for the optimal non‐linear transfer schedule. The optimal policy is to provide little insurance up to a monthly income level of $1350, so as to preserve incentives to move up the wage ladder, and nearly full insurance above $1450. This policy reduces the standard deviation of labor income net of transfers by 34 per cent and generates a consumption‐equivalent welfare gain of 0.7 per cent. The absence of private savings does not fundamentally change the shape of the optimal transfer function, but tilts the optimal policy towards more insurance, at the expense of a less efficient allocation of workers across jobs.     

Like Father,Like Son: Inheriting and Bequeathing

This paper incorporates indirect reciprocal behavior in the context of bequeathing decisions into an otherwise standard OLG model. We provide conditions for the existence of a unique steady state with operative bequests. Contrary to standard OLG models, we show that taking into account such behavioral interactions allows one to rationalize both an increasing and U‐shaped pattern of the inheritance to GDP ratio over time, consistent with recent empirical evidence. Moreover, the model predicts a nonlinear (U‐shaped) relationship between the size of an unfunded social security program and the long‐run stock of per capita capital, which in turn provides a novel explanation of the inconclusive empirical findings on the relationship between social security, savings and long‐run growth. Ricardian equivalence is shown to hold in a special case of the model     

Educational Financing and Lifetime Earnings

This paper formulates and estimates a dynamic programming model of optimal educational financing decisions. The main purpose of the paper is to measure the effect of short-term parental cash transfers, received during school, on educational borrowing and in-school work decisions, and on post-graduation lifetime earnings. The estimated parameters of the model imply that parental cash transfers do not significantly influence post-graduation lifetime earnings. Long-term factors such as family background and prior human capital investments are more important. Parental cash transfers do, however, significantly determine the decision to borrow or work during school and the level of lifetime consumption.