中外企业兼并动因的比较研究

研究中外企业兼并的动因，我们发现，历史上每次购并浪潮发生的原因，都在于企业生存的外部环境的发展变化对企业购并动机的普遍刺激。企业购并就是在内因和外因的交互作用下产生和发展起来的。研究比较中外企业兼并的动因，在通过兼并，实现企业资源合理配置的今天，对于我们把握企业兼并的时机和条件，具有十分重要的现实意义。一、企业兼并动因的理论分析西方一些学者对企业兼并的动因问题作了广泛和深入的研究。研究结果表明，从兼并方来看，主要有以下几个方面的因素：1．企业兼并的经营和财务协同效应所谓协同效应，就是1＋1＞2的效应…     

论企业自组织兼并

随着我国社会主义市场经济体制的逐步确立和发展 ,企业兼并已成为优化经济结构、提升企业竞争力的一种重要方式。但是 ,在企业兼并的理论和实践中 ,一直存在两个问题 :一是强调国家是国有资产的所有者 ,政府应成为国有企业兼并活动的主体 ,于是政府的行政干预过多 ,忽视企业兼并是一种自组织活动 ;二是强调市场经济体制下 ,企业是兼并活动的主体 ,从而又忽视政府的调控作用。本文试图回答这两个问题 ,重新构建适合中国国情的企业兼并理论。一、企业是一种自组织系统现代科学表明 ,客观世界存在的系统可分为两大类 :一类是“自组织”系统(Ｓ…     

谋取协同价值——一种常见的企业兼并动机——兼并企业兼并中的“协同效应”

<正> 企业兼并动机是“一只看不见的手”。这只手有力地推动着企业走入兼并市场,这只手也引导着企业从事目的迥异的兼并活动。在西方有关企业兼并动机的文献中,“协同效应”(Synergy)一词频频出现,但很少有人对其作出明确的解释。据笔者考察,“协同效     

基于兼并成本和协同效应的横向并购研究

进入新世纪后,中国企业的并购活动越来越频繁。本文基于SSR模型,引入兼并成本和协同效应,研究并购厂商的并购动机以及并购行为对社会福利的影响,分析协同效应与兼并成本之间的关系。得出结论:当协同效应使厂商增加的利润大于兼并成本时,并购厂商总是愿意并购;并购后,福利在消费者和非并购厂商之间转移。当协同效应和兼并成本满足一定条件时,横向并购才可以增加社会福利。     

中国企业兼并的“四化”

一、兼并行为市场化在中国以往的企业兼并中 ,政府是企业兼并行为的主要主体 ,企业兼并的实质是一种政府行为而非市场行为 ,它主要以优化社会资产配置 ,减少亏损企业为取向。随着社会主义市场经济体制的确立与发展 ,企业应该成为兼并行为的真正主体 ,以优化配置企业内部资源 ,提高企业市场竞争力为取向 ,以追求利润最大化和增强市场竞争力为原始动因。因此 ,政府对企业兼并的管理重点应该转向间接干预 ,通过产业政策 ,运用多种间接调控手段 ,诱导企业兼并向有利于优化社会资源配置的方向发展。二、兼并手段证券化在美国等西方发达国家中 ,企…     

兼并—瞄准全球经济竞争

企业兼并在西方已有100多年的历史。它作为一种市场经济高度发展的产物和企业经营有效手段,推动了各国经济的发展。进入90年代,随着世界经济全球化和统一大市场的形成,兼并已形成一种挡不住的潮流。根据美国纽约商业信息公司统计,1997年全球企业兼并总额高达12023亿美元,创造了新的纪录,大大推动了全球化经营进程。企业之间兼并高潮迭起,涉及的领域和规模都比以前有所扩大,兼并的主要目的不是为了扩大经营范围和追求短期效益,而是为即将到来的21世纪全球经济竞争作战略准备。兼并的形式不外乎有以下几种：一、强强兼并。伴随全球市…     

企业兼并失败的原因及启示

文章分析了企业兼并失败的原因,同时指出了我国企业在兼并中应注意的问题.     

对企业兼并有关问题的探讨

兼并是企业优胜劣汰的重要途径,已被中、外经济发展实践所证明。企业兼并在西方国家的经济发展历程中涌现过数次,但近年来。企业兼并呈现范围广、数量大、力度大、巨额化、跨国化等一系列全新的特点。特别是1997年全球企业兼并总额高达12023亿美元,创造了新的记录。其中,仅美国一国就占了全球企业兼并总额的百分之五十八点一。企业兼并潮对各国乃至世界的经济结构和全球市场态势正在产生不可低估的影响。在我国,尽管企业兼并起步较晚,但它给企业、给社会经济发展带来的积极效应已被     

企业兼并的法律主体及其权利义务

要保证企业兼并顺利进行 ,必须依法办事。而研究《企业兼并法》 ,不能不涉及企业兼并的主体及其权利义务。企业兼并活动中的行政管理主体、交易主体和中介服务主体共同构成了企业兼并法律关系的主体体系 ,它们之间的各种权利义务关系和相互作用 ,反映了整个企业兼并活动。一、行政管理主体及其权利义务行政管理主体指的是国家授权的对企业兼并活动 ,包括企业兼并双方和相关服务机构实施监督管理的有关部门或机构。从目前我国现行的法律、法规、制度看 ,企业兼并行政管理主体在立法和实践中确实并不十分清晰。《关于企业兼并的暂行办法》中规…     

我国反垄断法对企业兼并的规制

兼并是市场集中和企业成长的途径之一。反垄断法中的企业兼并,也有人称之为合并,它并非一般经济意义上的兼并,而是指从数家独立的企业组成一个永久性统一体的过程,并且这一统一过程在实质上限制竞争。企业兼并经历了横向兼并、纵向兼并和混合兼并三个阶段、三种形式。经济意义上的兼并并非法律禁止的对象。由于企业兼并可以扩大生产和经营规模,实现规模经济,提高市场竞争力,因而适当的企业兼并是法律允许的,它对宏观经济和微观经济都是有利的。一、西方发达市场经济国家反垄断法中企业兼并的内涵对企业兼并进行法律规制的思想来源于西方。在…     

The use of stock market returns in antitrust analysis of mergers

One of the most promising recent innovations in merger analysis has been the attempt to predict the effects of horizontal mergers by examining the share prices of the rivals to the merging firms. In this paper we describe the standard procedure, discuss some of the major criticisms of that procedure, and propose a modification, apply it to a sample of recent mergers, contrast the results with those from the standard procedure, and discuss the appropriate uses and remaining limitations of the model for antitrust analysis.The views expressed in this paper reflect those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of their employer. We wish to thank the referees and Mary Streitwieser for helpful comments, and Becky Carr for excellent typing services.     

The impact of firm cost and market size asymmetries on national mergers in a three-country model

This paper studies the impact of firm cost and market size asymmetries on merger decisions. I consider a model where a small and a large country compete in a third (world) market. Each of the two countries has two firms (with potentially different costs) that supply the domestic market and export to the third market. Merger decisions in the two countries are modeled as a simultaneously move game. The paper finds that firms in the large country have more incentives to merge than firms in the small country. In contrast, the government of the large country has more incentives to block a merger than the government of the small country. Thus, the model predicts that conflicts of interest between governments and firms concerning national mergers are more likely in large countries than in small ones.     

An econometric analysis of the European Commission's merger decisions

Using a sample of 96 mergers notified to the European Commission and logit regression techniques, we analyse the Commission's decision process. We find that the probability of a phase-2 investigation and of a prohibition of the merger increases with the parties' market shares. The probabilities increase also when the Commission finds high entry barriers or that the post-merger market structure is conducive to collusion. We do not find significant effects of “political” variables, such as the nationality of the merging firms.     

Endogenous Mergers of Complements with Mixed Bundling

This paper studies endogenous mergers of complements with mixed bundling, by allowing both for joint and separate consumption. After merger, partner firms decrease the price of the bundled system. In addition, when markets for individual components are sufficiently important, partner firms find it strategically advantageous to raise the prices of stand-alone products, thus making substitute ‘mix-and-match’ composite products less attractive to consumers. Even though these effects favor the profitability of mergers, merging is not always an equilibrium outcome. The reason is that outsiders respond by cutting their prices to retain their market share, and mergers can be unprofitable when competition is intense. From a welfare analysis, we observe that the number of mergers that are observed in equilibrium may be either excessive (when markets for individual components are important) or suboptimal (when markets for individual components are less important).     

An Empirical Analysis of Mexican Merger Policy

A newly created dataset including 239 decisions made by the Mexican Federal Competition Commission on horizontal mergers is used to estimate the different factors affecting the Commission’s resolution decisions. The decision-making process has been approximated by two different discrete choice models. Our results indicate that, contrary to the Commission’s objective, the presence of efficiency gains increases the probability of a case being challenged. We also find that factors different from the ones explicitly mentioned by the Commission have a significant effect upon the Commission’s final decision. In particular, the presence of a foreign company among the would-be merger firms significantly increases the likelihood of observing an allowed merger.      

EFFICIENCY GAINS AND STRUCTURAL REMEDIES IN MERGER CONTROL*

This paper studies the role of structural remedies in merger control in a Cournot setting where (endogenous) mergers are motivated by prospective efficiency gains and must be submitted to an Antitrust Authority (AA) which might require partial divestiture for approval. From a merger policy perspective, this paper's main contribution is two‐fold. First, it shows that if mergers do not involve all firms in the industry, then merger remedies help the AA to increase consumer surplus only if assets are divested to competitors already in the market. Second, it presents a model which clarifies that there can only exist social costs to ‘over‐fixing’ the anticompetitive effects of a merger if merger review policy treats mergers as one‐time events. When a more dynamic view is taken of sequential merger review, then there can never be an ‘over‐fixing’ problem. In this case, however, remedies are shown to be needed to make myopic merger review optimal.     

Preemptive mergers under spatial competition

Mergers for market power generally benefit outsider firms more than participating firms. Hence, outsiders should welcome such mergers between their competitors but, frequently, this is not the case. Under spatial competition some outsiders gain more than the participating firms but others might benefit less. Thus, if the number of admissible mergers is limited, firms may decide to merge to preempt rival mergers. This paper studies the incentives for preemptive merger by firms engaged in spatial competition.     

The success of mergers in Germany

This paper presents empirical evidence of the success of mergers in the Federal Republic of Germany. In general, the results show that the mergers are not successful. The shareholders of acquiring firms have to accept cumulative abnormal losses of −9.38 per cent. Returns on assets show also significant declines. According to the pattern of diversification it was found that product extending acquiring firms performed best. High cash flow enables to limit losses. Firms that have frequent experience of mergers tend to gain from their mergers.     

Who's acquiring whom? — Experimental evidence of firm size effect on B2B mergers and marketing/sales tasks

A recent study has revealed a marked growth in global mergers and acquisitions between firms from developed and developing countries. Unlike previous merger waves, however, companies in emerging markets are playing an increasingly important role. This highlights the need for greater scrutiny of more, and diverse, aspects of mergers. In particular, the size difference between firms involved in mergers and its impact on merger outcomes are of interest. This paper examines whether the involvement of differing numbers of employees (either from the acquiring firm or from the acquired firm) may influence merger success. Drawing on previous work in understanding organizational culture and merger dynamics, we conduct a laboratory experiment that not only confirms the presence of learning and conflict in organizational cultures in mergers but also presents new findings in relation to the relative size of the firms involved.     

Hold-up of anti-competitive mergers

We construct a model of endogenous mergers and study some issues of whether and how to control mergers, taking into account firms equilibrium response to policy. Anti-competitive mergers benefit competitors more than the merging firms. We show how such free-riding reduces firms incentives to merge (holdup). Firms delay merger proposals, hoping other firms will merge instead. The final result, however, is an overly concentrated market. Merger control may thus preserve competitive markets. In the presence of holdup, even reasonable policies such as requiring divestiture or using cost-benefit analysis, may be worse than not controlling mergers at all.