完善生态补偿机制促进西部可持续发展——《西部资源开发与生态补偿机制研究》评介

维护环境生态,已是全球共同关注的重大课题。我国在《十一·五规划纲要》中,早就明确提出:谁开发、谁保护、谁受益、谁补偿的原则,和有限开发、有序开发、有偿开发的资源开发原则。党的十     

知识经济与西部大开发

当今，以知识创新和高新技术产业化为核心的知识经济的兴起，对世界各国提出了严峻的挑战，同时也带来了难得的发展机遇。我国西部地区的开发也面临着知识经济的挑战和机遇。西部地区的经济发展一旦和知识经济结合起来，起点就会更高，发展速度就会更快。因此，必须从西部地区实际出发，量力而行，发展知识经济。 　　一、西部地区面临的机遇与挑战 　　知识经济的兴起对我国的挑战和带来的机遇，从区域发展的角度看是不平衡的。我国东部地区自改革开放以来，凭借自身良好的经济基础、优越的地理位置和享受种种优惠政策，成为中国经济腾飞…     

西部开发战略谈

一、战略构想 　　1.从经济角度讲,实施西部开发战略,可以增强我国经济发展的后劲。改革开放以来,我国经济飞速发展,但经济发展已面临着能源、原材料短缺问题。对于我国这样一个社会主义大国,经济发展应主要依靠本国资源,而不能像一些中小国家可以高度依赖进口原料,因此,西部丰富的能源和原材料资源,在很大程度上反映了它在国家今后经济发展战略全局中的重要地位。同时,西部开发战略的实施本身也可以增强西部发展能力,减轻国家负担,从而带动国民经济的发展。 　　2.从政治上讲,加速西部开发,有利于加强民族团结,巩固边防。一…     

外部性校正之争与建立退耕还林还草补偿机制

退耕还林还草是一项具有“积极的”或“正的”外部性经济活动，作在分析了庇古等人的利益调整观点和科斯等人的改变利益调整的初始条件的观点这两种相对立的解决外部性问题观点以后，指出外部性问题解决的办法就是让政府找到一种内生交易费用与外生交易费用两难冲突的最优折衷方案，在解决退耕还林还草的外部性问题时保护产权模糊生是非常有利，因而应采取利益调整的办法，为此，作建议和加快建立退耕还林还草补偿机制。     

西部开发与云南开发

国家经济发展战略重点向西部的转移，标志着区域性经济结构调整中对资源的优化配置已成为缩小地区差别、推进国民经济协调发展的重要任务。云南是西部的一部分，具有的自然资源优势，同时又是经济相对落后的省份，正确分析和认识自身现存在地利弊条件，选择具有云南特色的开发模式，是云南实施西部开发战略的关键。     

基于外部性特征的农田防护林生态补偿研究

农田防护林生态系统的存在不仅关乎平原地区粮食安全、农民增收问题,更关系社会主义新农村建设及农业生态文明.文章在阐述农田防护林现状及问题的基础上,分别对农田防护林的正、负外部特征进行分析,认为直接成本、机会成本和生态服务功能效益是生态补偿的主要部分,尝试运用外部性理论对生态补偿标准的核算问题进行分析.     

论西部开发的生态视角与产权激励

西部开发的首要问题是生态环境的建设与保护,这是可持续发展的必然要求。坚持以市场为主的开发原则,政府应当转变观念与职能,在物权法基础上深入产权制度改革与创新,建立产权激励和保护机制,动员社会力量进入西部生态环境的开发建设中去。     

西部地区城市化发展与西部开发

对西部地区进行城市化的意义和可行性以及道路选择进行理论上和实际上的分析，针对西部城市化存在的制约因素制定了相应的对策，得出西部城市化发展是西部开发的一条行之有效的发展道路。中国城市化应该选择大城市圈为中心的发展模式，西部地区也应该走以大城市包围农村、小城镇为主、兼顾发展小城市的发展道路。     

FDI的技术外溢性与我国的可持续发展

可持续发展对科技创新提出了更高的要求,实证分析表明FDI为了保持技术上的垄断地位提高了新技术进入的成本,使我国的技术被锁定在了低水平的陷阱中。从产业分布可以看出,FDI对外输出的是高耗能、高污染的生产能力,阻碍了技术外溢。我国可持续发展所依存的技术条件必须通过自我有意识投资的提高来实现;同时,只有贯彻科学的发展观,提高利用FDI的质量和水平,优化其产业布局,才能最终实现发展的可持续性。     

“交易外部性”:外部性的重新理解及系统整合

基于对外部性和交易本质的理解,当前生产外部性和消费外部性两分的观点有失偏颇。研究提出交易外部性概念,即产权交易过程中,交易一方或交易以外的行为主体的权利(束)或权利部分职能被交易另一方强制利用而未被定价或实现对等补偿的现象。据此,按照发生领域和作用主体的不同,外部性可以划分为生产外部性、消费外部性和交易外部性三类,其中,交易外部性进一步包含一类交易外部性、二类交易外部性和三类交易外部性。此处的二类交易外部性与史普博的内部性具有相同的本质内涵,即内部性实质是交易外部性范畴下的一个子分类。     

Revisiting Externalities

For economies with one-sided externalities between firms, four types of results are presented and discussed: (i) the impossibility of decentralized finite-dimensional mechanisms guaranteeing Pareto optimality; (ii) the possibilities for Pigou taxes in situations where Arrovian markets cannot function; (iii) that mergers may be able to internalize "weak" externalities but not "strong" ones; and (iv) that "parallelism" of indifference curves (quasi-linear utilities, absence of income effects) is necessary, and not merely sufficient, for the validity of the Coase Invariance Theorem (asserting that alternative institutional arrangements do not change the level of externality). The paper builds on the seminal contributions of Starrett, Calsamiglia, Baumol, Bradford, Oates, Boyd, and Conley.     

Intersectoral Externalities and Indeterminacy

We consider a two-sector economy with positive intersectoral external effects and nonincreasing social returns. We show that if the discount factor ρ is close to 1 then local indeterminacy may be obtained with mild market imperfections. Moreover, with additional conditions, when ρ is made smaller the steady state becomes totally unstable and quasi-periodic cycles, along which equilibrium paths are indeterminate, may appear through a Hopf bifurcation. This will be proved even if the investment good is capital intensive at the private level while this condition guarantees local determinacy in the sector specific case. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C62, E32, O41.     

Externalities and optimal taxation

This paper reexamines the optimal tax design problem (income and commodities) in the presence of externalities. The nature of the second–best, and the choice of the tax instruments, are motivated by the informational structure in the economy. The main results are: (i) environmental levies (linear or nonlinear) differ in formula from Pigouvian taxes by the expressions for the optimal tax on private goods; (ii) externalities do not affect commodity tax formulas (linear and nonlinear) for private goods; (iii) externalities do not affect the income tax structure if commodity taxes are nonlinear and affect it if commodity taxes are linear; and (iv) a general income tax plus strictly Pigouvian taxes are sufficient for efficient taxation if individuals of different types have identical marginal rates of substitution (at any given consumption bundle).     

Externalities in migration

"The paper presents a model which shows that the probability of migrants being mobile after migration depends on the number of previous waves. The model concludes that low order waves provide positive externalities to higher order waves. This conclusion is empirically tested by comparing the interindustry mobility of two sequential waves of political migrants to Israel."     

Dynamic Externalities and Policy Coordination

The paper introduces trade into dynamic models with externalities and capital accumulation, and evaluates the efficiency of the Cournot–Nash equilibrium. It considers mixed economies characterized by a blend of strategic and nonstrategic sectors. Also, there are two sources of interdependence: the existence of production externalities and the endogenous determination of market prices. It is shown that policy coordination is not needed when preferences are the same. In this case, the production externalities are internalized, so that an inefficient solution becomes the efficient integrated world equilibrium due to trade.     

Negative Externalities and Evolutionary Implementation

We model externality abatement as an implementation problem. A social planner would like to ensure efficient behaviour among a group of agents whose actions are sources of externalities. However, the planner has limited information about the agents' preferences, and is unable to distinguish individual agents except through their action choices. We prove that if a concavity condition on aggregate payoffs is satisfied, the planner can guarantee that efficient behaviour is globally stable under a wide range of behaviour adjustment processes by administering a variable pricing scheme. Through a series of applications, we show that the concavity condition is naturally satisfied in settings involving negative externalities. We conclude by contrasting the performance of the pricing mechanism with that of a mechanism based on direct revelation and announcement dependent forcing contracts.