How to reduce opportunism through contractual governance in the cross-cultural supply chain context: Evidence from Chinese exporters

Opportunistic behavior has been the main threat in cross-cultural supply chains. Drawing on institutional theory, we investigated how Chinese export firms facing cultural differences reduce foreign distributors' opportunism through differentiated contract governance strategies. Based on both a survey dataset of 206 Chinese export firms and a secondary dataset, our results suggest that cultural distance increases opportunism by inhibiting contract application but also decreases opportunism by enhancing detailed contract design. In addition, we found that both indirect effects of cultural distance on opportunism via contract governance strategies depend on the surrounding institutional environment in cross-cultural supply chains. Regulatory uncertainty strengthens the positive impact of cultural distance on detailed contract design and strengthens the negative impact of cultural distance on contract application. Moreover, regulatory uncertainty also strengthens the negative impact of detailed contract design on opportunism and weakens the negative impact of contract application on opportunism.     

Uniting in the letter but breaching in the spirit: Contract flexibility and interfirm collaboration based on the Contracts as Reference Points Theory

Contracts are generally assumed to be farsighted and effective in governing ex post trading behaviors. However, we know little about why not all the ex post trading behaviors can be contractible under conditions of contract flexibility. Drawing on Contracts as Reference Points Theory, this study focuses on contract flexibility which is viewed as an essential ingredient for success in long-term oriented Eastern cultures. We examine the trade-off between uncertainty coping and opportunism induced by contract flexibility, which is conceptualized as a reference-dependence decision problem. Using the dyadic survey data of supplier and buyer relationships, we find that contract flexibility facilitates uncertainty coping. The positive effect of contract flexibility on uncertainty coping is enhanced by buyer political ties and supplier power. The effect of contract flexibility on opportunism is mitigated by supplier power. Moreover, uncertainty coping increases relationship performance, whereas opportunism inhibits relationship performance.     

The effects of distributor relationship commitment and relationship exploration on opportunism: The moderating roles of exchange uncertainties and network factors

Channel management entails both the evaluating of incumbent business partners and simultaneously seeking potential new partners. In supplier–distributor exchanges, distributors can explore alternative suppliers while still committing to incumbent suppliers. While the current literature has demonstrated the importance of relationship commitment, the consequences of relationship exploration and whether that exploration is harmful to any incumbent relationships remain unclear. Drawing from relational governance and social network theories, this study thus examines how distributor dual relationship strategies of commitment and exploration influence their opportunistic behavior. The findings from a survey of 328 distributor firms indicate that relationship commitment leads to reduced opportunism; yet relationship exploration exerts no significant main effect on opportunism. More interestingly, these effects are subject to two types of uncertainty and two characteristics of distributor network wherein the focal exchange relationship resides. Specifically, behavioral uncertainty—an internal source of uncertainty—aggravates the opportunism that arises from both strategies, whereas, environmental uncertainty—an external source of uncertainty—alleviates both these effects. The distributor's network density weakens the effect of relationship commitment on opportunism, but network centrality strengthens this effect. By contrasting relationship commitment with relationship exploration under multiple moderating conditions, this study advances the extant channel relationship management literature and practice.     

Tripartite role of communications in channel relationships: Mitigating exchange hazards,reducing opportunism,and curtailing its ill effects on relationship performance

Mitigating channel members' opportunism is critical for supplier firms to maintain superior channel relationships and sustain relationship performance. Research in marketing channels suggests that supplier-channel member communication is vital for reducing information asymmetry and developing relational bonds in channel relationships. Building on that, in this research, we integrate information asymmetry and relationship-based views to articulate how communication, directly and indirectly, influences channel members' opportunism and curtail its ill effects on relationship performance. Based on the matched data from 239 supplier-distributor dyads, we find that communications (instrumental and social) have tripartite effects on channel outcomes, i.e., a) it directly reduces channel members' opportunism, b) weakens (negatively moderate) the positive effects of exchange hazards (antecedents) on opportunism and c) curtail the ill effects of opportunism on relationship performance. Additionally, we find that instrumental and social communications can have nuanced effects on channel members' opportunism. We provide newer insight into the role of communications in managing channel outcomes and present important theoretical and managerial implications.     

The impact of culture on the relationship between governance and opportunism in outsourcing relationships

To address concerns of opportunism, outsourcing firms are encouraged to deploy contractual and relational governance. The individual and collective effects of these mechanisms have been previously examined but not in specific contexts. This study examines the effects of contractual and relational governance on provider opportunism, incorporating the moderating influence of a “shift parameter”—national culture. Our results reveal that contractual governance is more effective in individualistic and low uncertainty avoidance cultures. Relational governance is more effective in collectivist and high uncertainty avoidance societies. The individualism–collectivism dimension also moderates the joint effect of these mechanisms. While the mechanisms are generally complementary in mitigating opportunism, a singular focus on either contractual or relational can be just as effective under situations of high individualism and collectivism, respectively. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How to inhibit a partner's strong and weak forms of opportunism: Impacts of network embeddedness and bilateral TSIs

This study investigates the moderating effects of a firm's network embeddedness and a partner's transactional specific investments (TSIs) on relationships between the firm's TSIs and its partner's strong- and weak-form opportunism, and compares the efficiency among these moderator variables. The regression results suggest that (1) a firm's TSIs are positively related to partner's opportunism when network embeddedness and the partner's TSIs are relatively low; but (2) a firm's TSIs are negatively related to partner's opportunism when network embeddedness and the partner's TSIs are relatively high. Furthermore (3) network embeddedness is more effective in inhibiting partner's weak-form opportunism than in inhibiting strong-form opportunism resulting from the firm's TSIs. Finally (4) with regard to the relationship between TSIs and weak-form opportunism, the negative moderating effect of network embeddedness is greater than the negative moderating effect of partner's TSIs. This study explains reasons why conflicting views exist about the relationship between TSIs and partner's opportunism, reveals the differences in the moderating effects of network embeddedness and partner's TSIs, and makes new contributions to both transaction cost theory and embeddedness literature. It also provides, for firms involved in TSIs in a buyer–supplier relationship, insightful managerial suggestions about ways to reduce their partner's varying forms of opportunism.     

Relational norms and collaborative activities: Roles in reducing opportunism in marketing channels

Reducing opportunism is a critical task to support channel performance and channel member satisfaction. Recent research into marketing channels focuses on the role of relational governance in curbing opportunism; this study advances this thesis by positing that relational governance encompasses both relational norms and collaborative activities (i.e., joint planning and joint problem solving). In turn, the current research investigates how these two aspects of relational governance independently and jointly check opportunism in marketing channels. The tests of the hypotheses involve 149 Chinese manufacturer–distributor relationships. The results show that relational norms have a negative effect on opportunism, but the effect of collaborative activities is contingent on the level of consistency between the relational norms and collaborative activities that mark the relationship. A low level of relational norms prompts joint planning to inhibit opportunism and joint problem solving to exacerbate it. However, a high level of relational norms reverses these effects: Joint planning fosters opportunism, and joint problem solving curbs it. Thus collaborative activities have different properties that need to be devised in accordance with relational norms if the goal is to reduce opportunism.     

Formalization,Communication Quality,and Opportunistic Behavior in R&D Alliances between Competitors

For technology ventures (and also other firms), R&D alliances provide great learning opportunities and access to scarce resources. However, R&D alliances, in particular between competitors, also involve the concomitant threat of opportunistic behavior, which many firms attempt to manage by formalizing the partnership. Yet, prior research provided mixed findings suggesting that formalization alleviates opportunism, fails to do so, or, ironically, even promotes it. The questions of whether and, if so, when formalization can deter opportunism remains topical. This study differentiates two forms of opportunistic behavior, strategic manipulation and knowledge appropriation, and examines how they are affected by formalization per se and in combination with communication quality. Findings from 82 R&D alliances between competitors indicate that extensive formalization promotes opportunistic behavior. In contrast, communication quality mitigates the dysfunctional effect on strategic manipulation and also alleviates both forms of opportunism directly. Most effects vary with the type of opportunistic behavior. Our findings add to the literature by demonstrating a positive formalization–opportunism relationship in the context of R&D alliances and by suggesting that relational governance (communication quality) compensates for the dysfunctional effects of formal governance (formalization), rather than both having complementary relationships. The results also support the call for more research into nuances of opportunism: they show that differentiating forms of opportunism matters for understanding the efficacy of safeguards against opportunism. Managers are warned against over‐formalizing alliances, which spurs opportunism. Instead, they should cultivate an atmosphere of open communication while they can still maintain some “healthy distrust.” This attenuates the adverse effects of formalization, which is important since a certain level of formalization is often inevitable in R&D alliances.     

How contract enforcement reduces opportunism? The paradoxical moderating effect of interfirm guanxi

This study investigates the hitherto largely neglected effects of contract enforcement in interfirm relationship. Based on contract functions, we conceptualize contract enforcement as a two-dimensional construct comprising contractual control enforcement and contractual coordination enforcement. We examine how the effects of these two enforcements differ as the level of interfirm guanxi varies. The findings from a survey of 190 buyers in China suggest that both contractual control enforcement and contractual coordination enforcement mitigate sellers' opportunism. Moreover, contractual coordination enforcement is more effective in reducing opportunism when the interfirm guanxi is strong, whereas contractual control enforcement is more effective in reducing opportunism when the interfirm guanxi is weak. Our research contributes to both theory and practice by revealing the complex and paradoxical moderating role of interfirm guanxi.     

Is collaboration a better way to develop trust after opportunism? Distinguishing firm and boundary spanner opportunism

Building on equity theory, we integrate trust-repair and response-to-opportunism studies to distinguish individual boundary spanner opportunism from firm opportunism and examine how these two types of opportunism influence the effect of collaboration on post-opportunism trust restoration, a crucial yet challenging context for trust development. We further examine the effect of two alternative strategies to collaboration: tolerance, and aggression on post-opportunism trust restoration. Using 574 confidential reports of senior managers working for 287 industrial buyers, we find that collaboration is the most effective strategy for post-opportunism trust restoration. More importantly, our findings show that although collaboration restores trust under both types of opportunism, it fits better with individual boundary spanner opportunism than with firm opportunism. In comparison, tolerance has a positive effect on trust restoration under boundary spanner opportunism but negatively affects trust under firm opportunism, while aggression hinders trust restoration even more under firm opportunism than it does under individual boundary spanner opportunism.     

Partner-based opportunism,interface structure,and performance efficiency in upstream and downstream alliance activities contexts

Few alliance studies have theorized that opportunisms effect on performance efficiency is contingent on other factors. Our study posits that alliance partner size and no end-point serve as interface structure mechanisms that condition the efficiency outcomes of partner-based opportunism in alliances. We argue that the direct effect of partner-based opportunism, and the moderation effects of alliance partner size and no end-point, differ according to the alliance activities context (i.e., upstream vs. downstream). Our hypotheses were tested using a survey of 361 alliances. We observe that partner-based opportunism is indeed associated with performance inefficiencies. Further, while alliance partner size has a nonsignificant moderating effect, no end-point has a positive moderating effect, on the relationship between partner-based opportunism and efficiency; that is, the negative link becomes less negative for no end-point alliances. We find that the negative performance relevance of partner-based opportunism remains significant among upstream alliances, but drops to nonsignificance for downstream ones. We show that alliance partner size has a negative moderating effect on the link partner-based opportunism to performance efficiency among downstream, but not upstream, alliances. Lastly, we find that the positive moderating effect of no end-point is significant among upstream, but not downstream, alliances. Our results generate important implications for managers' efforts to design and govern alliances.     

Buyer opportunism in business-to-business exchange

A phenomenon of significance in buyer–supplier relationships is opportunism. In lieu of the known negative effects of opportunistic behavior on buyer–supplier relationships, the circumstances in which a sourcing professional engages in acts of opportunism are unclear. Combining theories from multiple disciplines, a comprehensive model tested buyer–supplier relationship-specific factors, environmental factors, an individual-difference factor, and situational factors likely to affect a buyer's decision to use opportunistic tactics. Results reveal how these different theories combine to provide a more comprehensive explanation of buyer behavior than existed in prior literature. Using structural equation modeling of a sample of 328 procurement transactions, factors found to affect buyer opportunism included buyer power, corporate ethical values, honesty/integrity, leader opportunism, willful ignorance, and subjective expected utility. This study also provides empirical support for distinguishing between two types of opportunism — strong and weak. The research concludes with implications for theory and practice, limitations, and areas for future research.     

Exercised power as a driver of trust and commitment in cross-border industrial buyer-seller relationships

The article reports the findings of a study conducted among 151 U.S. export manufacturers of industrial goods regarding their working relationships with foreign customers. Specifically, the emphasis is on the sources of power exercised and how these affect trust and commitment in the relationship through the mediating role of conflict and satisfaction. Using structural equation modelling, it was confirmed that the exercise of power derived from coercive sources increases conflict and reduces satisfaction, while the exercise of non-coercive power sources leads to lower conflict (but not significantly increasing satisfaction). Conflict was found to be negatively associated with trust, as opposed to satisfaction which enhances trust. Trust was subsequently revealed to foster commitment in the relationship. Conclusions and implications are derived from the study findings and directions for further research are provided.     

Managing opportunism in a developing interfirm relationship: The interrelationship of calculative and loyalty commitment

This research develops a framework for investigating associations among the duration of an exchange relationship, the interrelationship between a supplier's calculative and loyalty commitment, and opportunistic behavior on the part of a buyer. The findings indicate that (1) calculative commitment and loyalty commitment by suppliers function as substitutes; (2) a supplier's loyalty commitment increases gradually as a developing exchange relationship endures, whereas calculative commitment increases and then decreases; and (3) a supplier's calculative commitment leads to an increase in a buyer's opportunism, whereas the supplier's loyalty commitment leads to a decrease, and a supplier's loyalty commitment decreases the positive impact of calculative commitment on opportunism. These findings provide insights into how relationship duration affects buyers' opportunism through the interrelation between suppliers' calculative and loyalty commitment.     

Understanding the links between technological opportunism, marketing emphasis and firm performance: Implications for B2B

The capability of firms to sense and respond to changes in technologies, called technological opportunism, is of growing importance to managers as a source of competitive advantage. However, exactly how technological opportunism impacts firm performance is still not clearly understood. Furthermore, the role of marketing in this relationship, if any, has yet to be examined. Understanding this relationship is critical for marketing managers not only for determining strategic investments of resources but also for demonstrating marketing return on activities. This paper explores the links between technological opportunism and firm performance. The results show that technological opportunism has a strong positive impact on key measures of performance such as firm sales, profits and market value. Importantly, marketing emphasis is the mechanism through which the technological opportunism-performance relationship is achieved. Finally, the impact of marketing emphasis on B2B firms is different than that for B2C firms, highlighting the importance of these activities for B2B marketing managers.     

Are joint venture partners more opportunistic in a more volatile environment?

This study examines how joint venture partners' opportunism is influenced by environmental volatility in a drastically changing emerging economy. Building on transaction cost and information‐processing theories, we develop the hypothesis that opportunism increases to cope with industry structural instability, information unverifiability, and law unenforceability, the three interrelated yet distinct characteristics that jointly describe environmental volatility in an emerging economy. Our analysis of 188 foreign joint ventures in an emerging market suggests that opportunism increases with information unverifiability and law unenforceability. These relationships are even stronger when joint ventures depend more on the host country environment, but weaker when joint ventures operate in faster‐growing industries. Finally, opportunism is found to play a mediating role in the relationship between environmental volatility and joint venture performance. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The dual effects of perceived unfairness on opportunism in channel relationships

Opportunism has long-term negative consequences for channel relationships. The extant research has traditionally focused on economic forces in studying opportunism. However, social exchange theory stresses the role of social forces in shaping opportunistic behavior. In this study, we integrate transaction cost economics and justice theory to theorize and examine the impact of ‘perceived unfairness’ on distributor opportunism. We uncover the ‘dual’ effects of perceived unfairness on opportunism, i.e., 1) directly enhancing opportunism and 2) aggravating (positively moderating) the effects of economic forces on opportunism. Matched data on 247 supplier-distributor dyads in India provide empirical support for our theoretical model and research hypotheses. We find differential effects of the three dimensions of perceived unfairness (distributive, procedural, and interactional) on opportunism. We discuss the implications of our findings for theory and practice and present avenues for future research.     

Mitigating the Challenges of Partner Knowledge Diversity While Enhancing Research & Development (R&D) Alliance Performance: The Role of Alliance Governance Mechanisms

This article explores the answers to the following unresolved research question: How do firms mitigate the collaboration challenges associated with partner knowledge diversity and enhance alliance performance? The study provides an alliance performance enhancing framework by identifying two types of partner knowledge diversity: (1) technology base diversity and (2) R&D process experience diversity, and links them with R&D alliance performance. Additionally, the moderating effects of the two types of alliance governance mechanisms (i.e., interactive and contractual mechanisms) were examined to investigate which alliance governance mechanism is conducive to mitigate the collaboration challenges and enhance alliance performance. Using a data set of 316 alliances in the biopharmaceuticals industry, the study found that a moderate degree (not too low or high) of technology base diversity between alliance partners contributes more to R&D alliance performance. Similarly, there was also an inverted U-shaped relationship between R&D process experience diversity and alliance performance; too much diversity in R&D process experience may increase the likelihood of partner opportunism, and therefore negatively affect alliance performance. Additionally, the results showed that alliance governance mechanisms played different roles in alliance collaboration; while the contractual alliance mechanisms help reduce relational uncertainty (e.g., opportunism), the interactive mechanisms promoting a more intensive interaction between partners mitigates task difficulty and facilitates complex technology activities. These findings extend the knowledge-based view (KBV) of strategic alliance and advance research on alliance governance design.     

Revisiting exercise of power strategies from the perspective of information processing

The digitization of channel management changes how firms acquire, interpret, and analyze information, which needs to be considered when evaluating the efficacy of exercising power strategies on interfirm cooperation. Drawing insights from the three mechanisms of interorganizational information processing capability, we identify contingent factors that may affect the relationship between firms' exercise of power strategies and interfirm cooperation at the firm (i.e., IT capability), dyadic (i.e., relationship quality), and network (i.e., network density) levels. We analyzed data sampled from 288 manufacturing firms and found that manufacturers' IT capability weakens the negative effect of exercising coercive power and the positive effect of exercising noncoercive power on interfirm cooperation. At the dyadic level, relationship quality between manufacturer and distributor weakens the negative effect of exercising coercive power on interfirm cooperation. Finally, at the network level, distributors' network density strengthens the positive effect of exercising noncoercive power on interfirm cooperation. Our findings contribute to the marketing channel literature by shedding new light on the effects of the exercise of power on interfirm cooperation in this digital era and offer actionable managerial insights.     

经营绩效反馈、环境不确定性与企业广告投入

基于2012～2015年深沪两市A股上市公司样本数据,对经营绩效反馈和企业广告投入之间的关系进行了理论分析和实证检验,并进一步考察了环境不确定性的调节作用。研究结果表明：（1）当企业未实现资本市场经营预期时,随着实际绩效低于经营预期程度的增大,企业广告投入将减少;（2）当企业实现资本市场经营预期时,随着实际绩效高于经营预期程度的增大,企业广告投入将增加;（3）当企业未实现资本市场经营预期时,与低不确定性环境相比,高不确定性环境中企业经营绩效负反馈对广告投入的负向影响将增强;（4）当企业实现资本市场经营预期时,与低不确定性环境相比,高不确定性环境中企经营绩效正反馈对企业广告投入的正向影响将增强。