Political aspects of household finance: debt,wage bargaining,and macroeconomic (in)stability

The recent literature has shown that income inequality is one of the main causes of borrowing and debt accumulation by working households. This article explores the possibility that household indebtedness is an important cause of rising income inequality. If workers experience rising debt burdens, their cost of job loss may rise if they need labor-market income to continue borrowing and servicing existing debt. This, in turn, will reduce their bargaining power and increase income inequality, inducing workers to borrow more to maintain consumption standards, and so creating a vicious circle of rising inequality, job insecurity, and indebtedness. We believe that these dynamics may have contributed to observed simultaneous increases in income inequality and household debt prior to the recent financial crisis. To explore the two-way interaction between inequality and debt, we develop an employment rent framework that explicitly considers the impact of workers’ indebtedness on their perceived cost of job loss. This is embedded in a neo-Kaleckian macro model in which inequality spurs debt accumulation that contributes to household consumption spending and hence demand formation. Our analysis suggests that (a) workers’ borrowing behavior plays a crucial role in understanding the character of demand and growth regimes; (b) debt and workers’ borrowing behavior play an important role in the labor market by influencing workers’ bargaining power; and (c) through such channels, workers’ borrowing behavior can be a decisive factor in the determination of macroeconomic (in)stability.     

Capitalists,workers, and the burden of debt

Abstract

This paper analyzes the burden of debt in a growth model that combines overlapping generations of workers who save for life-cycle reasons and dynastic agents who save for bequest reasons (‘capitalists’). Ricardian Equivalence prevails, but capitalists regard the debt serviced out of taxes on workers as net wealth. In the long run, the Cambridge Theorem holds: the relationship between the rate of profit and rate of growth is determined by the capitalist saving function, independently of worker or government saving. Two alternative closures are considered. Under exogenous growth constrained by a fully employed labor force, debt and deficits result in temporary effects on the distribution of income but permanent effects on the distribution of wealth. Under endogenous growth constrained by a fully utilized capital stock, debt and deficits result in temporary effects on the growth rates of the components of wealth and permanent effects on the level and distribution of capital.     

Optimal Lending Contracts and Firm Dynamics

We develop a general model of lending in the presence of endogenous borrowing constraints. Borrowing constraints arise because borrowers face limited liability and debt repayment cannot be perfectly enforced. In the model, the dynamics of debt are closely linked with the dynamics of borrowing constraints. In fact, borrowing constraints must satisfy a dynamic consistency requirement: the value of outstanding debt restricts current access to short-term capital, but is itself determined by future access to credit. This dynamic consistency is not guaranteed in models of exogenous borrowing constraints, where the ability to raise short-term capital is limited by some prespecified function of debt. We characterize the optimal default-free contract—which minimizes borrowing constraints at all histories—and derive implications for firm growth, survival, leverage and debt maturity. The model is qualitatively consistent with stylized facts on the growth and survival of firms. Comparative statics with respect to technology and default constraints are derived.     

A costly state verification model with diversity of opinions

Summary. In simple models of borrowing and lending with ex-post asymmetric information, Gale and Hellwig (1985) and Williamson (1986) have shown that optimal debt contracts are simple debt contracts where borrowers repay a fixed interest rate whenever possible and lenders seize all the profit when borrowers default. In this note, we depart from their works by assuming that borrowers and lenders have heterogeneous beliefs, and show that simple debt contracts do not necessarily survive as optimal contracts.JEL Classification Numbers: G3, D8.     

有限责任效应下的公司负债刚性

本文提出并论证了在公司负债的有限责任效应下,财务经理具有只愿意增加负债资本而不愿只增加权益资本的动机,导致实践中公司确定的最优负债水平一般高于传统模型下的负债水平且公司负债融资具有刚性倾向的结论,从另一个角度解释了资本结构理论的相对于权益融资为什么财务经理更偏好干负债筹资的现象。     

Dollarization and financial integration

How does a country's exchange rate regime impact its ability to borrow from abroad? We build a small open economy model in which the government responds to shocks by adjusting monetary policy and foreign borrowing. Sovereign borrowing is subject to endogenous limits, which ensure repayment when the default punishment corresponds to financial autarky. Dollarizing implies renouncing monetary policy, but can make access to international debt markets more valuable, thereby loosening borrowing constraints. This mechanism linking dollarization to financial integration is consistent with observed declines in spreads on foreign-currency debt in countries adopting the dollar or the euro.     

MONETARY POLICY,FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS,AND REDISTRIBUTION

This article examines how financial constraints affect redistribution via monetary policy. We explore a novel mechanism of monetary nonneutrality, which is based on debt limits imposed in nominal terms. Specifically, when debt is constrained by current income, monetary policy can alter the real terms of borrowing. Changes in inflation exert ambiguous effects, depending on the initial debt/wealth position and the willingness to borrow. We show analytically that borrowers can benefit from increased debt limits under lower inflation rates. This novel effect can dominate conventional debt deflation effects. We find that particularly less indebted borrowers as well as potential future borrowers gain and that aggregate welfare can be enhanced under a permanent reduction in inflation.     

Credit quality, the intensity of regulation and the segmentation of debt markets

Some debt markets have a “competitive advantage” over others due to easier regulatory requirements. Our model explains changes in the market shares of different debt markets. In particular, borrowers may choose between highly regulated and relatively unregulated placement of debt so as to minimize borrowing costs. Borrowers in the highly regulated market incur higher regulatory cost, but are also able to signal accurately their true risk class. In unregulated markets there is an asymmetric information problem. This results in an equilibrium where the debt market is segmented between less regulated and other, more strictly regulated, placements. Raising regulatory costs will lead to an expansion of the market share of unregulated debt. It will also lead to an increase in the overall default rate on corporate debt.     

On the determinants of household debt maturity choice

This article jointly analyses a behavioural and a cultural concept to explain household debt portfolio choice. The behavioural approach explores the role of time preferences on household debt maturity in a theoretical model and a numerical analysis. We derive a positive relationship between the long-term discount factor δ and the optimal maturity of household loans. The cultural approach examines whether national culture is a reasonable predictor for household debt maturity. We show that culture is an important factor for households’ borrowing decisions and has even more predictive power than time preferences. Countries with higher scores on the Hofstede dimension of long-term orientation tend to have shorter household debt maturity. Time preferences incur a primarily mediating role, because the effect of national culture on the borrowing decision is reduced, as the long-term discount factor δ increases.     

Economic Analysis and the World Debt Problem

The world debt problem continues to pose the greatest threat to international financial stability since World War II. This article reviews the contribution of economic theory to analysis of the debt problem. The textbook model of country borrowing is found to identify limits on borrowing that are considerably weaker than those likely to be faced in the real world. In particular, too little attention has been paid in the literature to uncertainty about key assumptions, to limits on the ability of governments to tax domestic resources and to the ability of debtor countries to generate foreign exchange. The article also looks at the application of banking models to country lending.     

Profit sharing and firm size: The role of team production

This paper presents a model showing that profit sharing is subject to the 1/N problem in the case of independent worker productivity but not in the case of interdependent worker productivity. This implies the role of firm size on the likelihood of profit sharing will differ by the nature of the underlying technology. We test this implication using German establishment data and using a proxy for interdependent worker productivity. The results conform to the theory showing that firm size is associated with reduced profit sharing use when technology is independent but not when technology is interdependent.     

Country risk and political instability

A model of country risk for foreign borrowing is proposed and estimated which incorporates a political instability variable. The model predicts historically high probabilities of default for most of the actual default dates for six countries. This is suggestive of how to understand the phenomenon of foreign debt default.     

CAPITAL CONTROL AND DOMESTIC INTEREST RATES: A GENERALIZED MODEL

This article addresses the question of capital control (inflow) and its varied effect on interest rates and real-side economy. The moral hazard problem causes interest rates to increase as a function of external debt. Decreased capital inflow (external debt) can reduce moral hazard and outweigh the effect of costly capital transactions, with capital control decreasing interest rates and increasing output. This result runs counter to other theoretical works on capital control. The policy implication is that a government can generate national gains from capital inflow control by prohibiting new external debt (borrowing from abroad). With old debt retired and no new borrowing from abroad, external debt is reduced. This will reduce the moral hazard problem and lead to a drop in interest rates and an increase in output. (JEL F32 , F41 , E43 )     

Environmental liability and the capital structure of firms

This paper analyses the impact of environmental liability regimes on the capital structure of firms. We show that imposing environmental liability only on polluting firms, with limited liability, increases use of bank debt. Extending environmental liability to banks lowers bank borrowing relative to liability only on firms, with an ambiguous effect relative to no liability. Using US industry-level data we estimate a reduced-form model of bank borrowing by firms and show that the introduction of environmental liability only on firms increased bank borrowing by 15–20%, but when liability was extended to banks, borrowing returned to a level slightly higher than with no liability.     

Hamiltonian Approaches to The Analysis of External Debt

This paper investigates the borrowing aspect of LDC's debt problems from a short run and a borrower's perspective, taking “Hamiltonian” approaches. In analyzing a dynamic external debt problem, other studies have adopted a single-objective of maximizing intertemporal utility. This paper explores the optimum rate of external borrowing with different objectives and assumptions that may be more realistic for the economic planners of the developing countries. Altogether four cases are analyzed. The important finding is that even though all four cases exhibit the so called “bang-bang” phenomena, all four cases produce a different optimum rate of external borrowing with different policy implications. [400]     

Empirical models of short-term debt and crises: Do they test the creditor run hypothesis?

A positive correlation between short-term debt and crises has been interpreted as evidence in favor of self-fulfilling creditor runs, which have been blamed for financial crises in developing countries. We show that this correlation can also be explained by a standard model of optimal borrowing without creditor runs. In such a model, imposing capital controls on short-term external debt is not Pareto-improving.     

A note on public debt, tax-exempt bonds, and Ponzi games

By issuing tax-exempt bonds, the government can incur debt and never pay back any principal or interest, even if the economy without public debt evolves on a dynamically efficient growth path. The welfare effects of such a Ponzi type borrowing scheme are mixed. The current young will unambiguously benefit. Depending on preferences and the aggregate technology, a finite number of subsequent generations may also benefit. However, the welfare of all generations thereafter will be lower than in the economy without public debt.     

Imports, Status Preference, and Foreign Borrowing

This paper considers the implications of consumption and borrowing externalities in a small open economy framework. The former reflect the assumption that status conscious agents care about the relative consumption of imported goods, while the latter arise because agents do not take into account the effects of their borrowing decisions on the interest rate on debt. We analyze in the paper the impact of an increase in the degree of status preference on the saddlepath adjustment of the decentralized economy. In addition, the contrasting steady‐state and dynamic properties of the social planner’s economy are derived, along with the corresponding optimal tax and subsidy policies.     

The eurozone financial crisis: debt,credit ratings and monetary and fiscal policy

This paper discusses the eurozone financial crisis. It argues that it was largely the result of a common monetary policy not being suitable for individual countries which led to excessive private and public borrowing and a debt crisis. Neither borrowing rates nor credit ratings anticipated the crisis. Fundamental changes to eurozone governance are being proposed. The paper examines whether instead there might be a market solution if financial markets priced risk better. Accordingly, a more timely way of obtaining credit ratings is shown.