温州民间借贷危机与金融改革——温州金融改革启示之一

<正>温州模式是中国民营经济发展的一个典型,在改革开放的30年里一马当前,取得了很大的成绩。之所以温州个体经济能够迅速发展,是因为在很大程度上得力于民间金融。温州人乡土观念重,好面子,讲究诚信,具有很强的互助精神。温州地区的民间金融非常活跃。可以说,没有民间金融就没有温州的市场经济。可是,自2011年7月以来,温州资金链突然断裂。多米诺骨牌效应牵连了一大片,不少企业家跳楼、跑路,许多     

温州的金融改革时分——民间借贷危机催生金融改革

2011年年末,《国际融资》焦点话题栏目以“民间借贷的危急时分”为题,刊登了一组文章,从多种角度谈论了温州的民间借贷危机的形成原因,也对金融改革有一种期待。如今,金融改革终于在温州拉开序幕,请看本栏目文章《民间借贷危机催生金融改革》;国务院批准的《浙江省温州市金融综合改革试验区总体方案》全面反映此次温州金融改革内容,那么,这次改革有哪些突破？请看本栏目文章《温州金融改革有望突破》;对这场可以说是被逼出来的改革,叫好的大有人在,也有人忧心忡忡,因为在中国,这毕竟是一场深层次的改革,既然是改革,风险和机遇自然会并存,所以,必须对风险有足够的认识,请看本栏目文章《温州金融改革试点的风险有多大？》     

温州金融综合改革的意义

国务院批准实施《浙江省温州市金融综合改革试验总体方案》,决定设立温州市金融综合改革试验区。这项改革涉及地方金融机构改革、新型金融组织发展、民间融资规范等多个领域,是我国金融改革的重要尝试。温州民营经济发达,中小企业较多,民间资本充裕,民间金融活跃,经济运行中深层次矛盾暴露得比较     

由温州民间借贷危机引发的地方金融创新思考

经济发展过程中存在着这样的矛盾:一方面正规金融不能满足民营中小企业资金需求,另一方面民营中小企业发展急需新的融资渠道。在适宜的环境下,这就催生了非正规金融的民间借贷,并使其如火如荼的发展。而民间借贷如缺少有效的监管就会导致可能的危机,温州民间借贷危机的爆发就是一个很好的案例。文章分析了温州民间借贷危机的形成机理,探讨了其造成的影响,并就此提出了地方金融创新的思考。     

温州金融综合改革试验区成立

2012年3月28日,国务院常务会议决定设立温州市金融综合改革试验区,提出包含12项任务的《浙江省温州市金融综合改革试验区总体方案》,7个月后,2012年11月23日,又正式公布了《浙江省温州市金融综合改革试验区实施方案》。从方案出台到实施细则公布,温州金融综合改革方案主要围绕12项任务展开,主要的内容中包括规范发展民间融资、加快发展新型金融组织、     

民间借贷危机对现代金融服务业的启示

加快金融体系改革,建立合理的金融秩序,完善信用评估体系,使银行有足够的信息来判断,以便于更好地向中小微企业提供融资支持。     

民间借贷与普惠金融改革"新政"

文章分析了民间借贷兴起的逻辑,总结了普惠金融改革"新政"下温州市金融综合改革试验区、珠江三角洲金融改革创新综合试验区、泉州市金融服务实体经济综合改革试验区三大试验区金融改革的举措,从中提出了积极争取中央的优惠政策、强化顶层设计理念、加大普惠性金融组织体系创新力度、借助优惠财税政策引导民间资本深度参与金融扶贫工作、借助大数据手段降低普惠金融的服务成本等对甘肃省发展普惠金融的启示和建议.     

让民间借贷走向阳光地带

最近,国务院发布的《关于投资体制改革的决定》明确提出,要放宽社会资本的投资领域,允许社会资本进入法律法规未禁入的基础设施、公用事业及其他行业和领域。这一新的信号提示人们:     

温州金融改革:民间资本的春天来了?

3月28日,国务院常务会议决定设立温州市金融综合改革试验区,批准实施《浙江省温州市金融综合改革试验区总体方案》,要求通过体制机制创新,构建与经济社会发展相匹配的多元化金融体系,使金融服务明显改进,防范和化解金融风险能力明显增强,金融环境明显优化,为全国金融改革提供经验。     

Bank lending during the financial crisis of 2008

This paper shows that new loans to large borrowers fell by 47% during the peak period of the financial crisis (fourth quarter of 2008) relative to the prior quarter and by 79% relative to the peak of the credit boom (second quarter of 2007). New lending for real investment (such as working capital and capital expenditures) fell by only 14% in the last quarter of 2008, but contracted nearly as much as new lending for restructuring (LBOs, M&As, share repurchases) relative to the peak of the credit boom. After the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, there was a run by short-term bank creditors, making it difficult for banks to roll over their short term debt. We find that there was a simultaneous run by borrowers who drew down their credit lines, leading to a spike in commercial and industrial loans reported on bank balance sheets. We examine whether these two stresses on bank liquidity led them to cut lending. In particular, we show that banks cut their lending less if they had better access to deposit financing and thus, they were not as reliant on short-term debt. We also show that banks that were more vulnerable to credit-line drawdowns because they co-syndicated more of their credit lines with Lehman Brothers reduced their lending to a greater extent.     

Federal Reserve financial crisis lending programs and bank stock returns

We use an E-GARCH model to estimate the wealth effects of Federal Reserve lending during the financial crisis to Investment banks (I-Banks), “Too Big to Fail” (TBTF) banks, and “traditional” commercial banks. Borrowing from the Term Auction Facility program has negative wealth effects for all banks and I-banks in particular. We also find that the market view of the liquidity programs changed across the sample sub-periods. I-Bank and TBTF bank borrowing from the discount window is initially viewed positively, however continued use of the discount window and the Term Auction Facility was generally (though not universally) viewed negatively. Commercial Paper Funding Facility program participation is consistently positive only for traditional banks and programs that focus on the purchase of specific securities (e.g., commercial paper) to address specific problems also appear to primarily benefit traditional banks. The inconsistency of results across the time periods of the crisis is telling as market participants struggled to discern what access to these programs meant.     

Option compensation,risky mortgage lending,and the financial crisis

We examine how option compensation affects banks' risky mortgage origination and sale decisions before the financial crisis in 2008. We find that, in the period immediately before the financial crisis, option compensation has little impact on the riskiness of mortgages originated and is negatively associated with mortgage lenders' propensity to sell risky mortgages. The results are consistent with banks' incentives to maximize revenues from origination and servicing fees while managing risk exposure by adjusting the sale of risky mortgages. For identification, we use bank-year fixed effects and matched loan applications to control for both supply- and demand-side factors of mortgage lending. We find similar results when using the variation in option compensation generated by the implementation of FAS 123R.     

Bank soundness and bank lending to new firms during the global financial crisis

This paper examines how the soundness of financial institutions affected bank lending to new firms during the 2008 financial crisis by using a unique firm–bank match‐level dataset of 1,467 unlisted small and medium‐sized enterprises incorporated in Japan. We employ a within‐firm estimator that can control for unobserved firms’ demand for credit through firm ? time fixed effects. The major findings of this paper are the following four points. First, sounder financial institutions may be generally less likely to provide financing to new firms. Second, our results suggest that sounder financial institutions were less likely to provide loans to new firms during the 2008 financial crisis. Third, financial institutions were less likely to provide financing to new firms during such crisis as compared to those with the same soundness during non‐crisis periods. Finally, such lending relationships to new firms that are established during the financial crisis by sounder financial institutions are more likely to be continued than such lending by less sound financial institutions.     

Korean bank governance reform after the Asian financial crisis

We discuss corporate governance reforms in the Korean banking sector, which include reforms in board composition and executive compensation, implemented after the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and examine the stock market's response to the reforms. We find that the banking returns and volatilities became more Granger-causally prior to both KOSPI and finance sector returns after 1998. The announcements of banking governance reforms are generally associated with significant increases in banking sector stock returns. The KIF survey finds that board governance is considered essential in assessing the value of the firm. The participants in the McKinsey survey indicate that they are willing to pay a premium of 24% on average for firms with outstanding corporate governance systems.     

Relationship lending,hierarchical distance and credit tightening: Evidence from the financial crisis

This paper examines the firms’ credit availability during the 2007–2009 financial crisis using a dataset of 5331 bank–firm relationships provided by borrowers’ credit folders of three Italian banks. It aims to test whether a strong lender–borrower relationship can produce less credit rationing for borrowing firms even during a credit crunch period. The results show that exclusivity of the relationship can mitigate the firm credit rationing. We also verify the influence of lending organizational structure during crisis. A new measure of distance in lending technologies has been introduced: the hierarchical distance calculated as the distance between the branch that originates the loan and the location of the hierarchical level responsible for financing decision. Our findings document a negative impact of distance on credit availability, consistent with the idea that proximity facilitates the transmission of soft information.     

Government lending in a crisis

The economic disruption from the COVID-19 pandemic prompted governments around the world to initiate an unprecedented number of temporary lending and tax deferment programs. Which firms will benefit from these programs? What are the implications for firm balance sheets and post-crisis survival? We provide some novel insights on these questions by studying one of the first government programs of this type, which Sweden launched at the height of the 2008–2009 financial crisis. The Swedish program allowed firms to temporarily suspend payment of all labor-related taxes and fees, treating these deferred amounts as a short-term loan from the government. Firms participating in the program are younger, less profitable, hold fewer cash reserves, are more leveraged, and have less unused slack in their credit lines when the crisis hits. Given the structure of the Swedish program, it provided more liquidity to firms with relatively larger ex ante wage bills. Exploiting this feature of the policy, we find that firms use the program to increase overall debt levels rather than to substitute for other borrowing. The leverage increase is due entirely to higher levels of non-bank debt. Firms use the funds to avoid making even deeper cuts to current assets. Despite the increase in leverage, access to the lending program is unrelated to the likelihood a firm files for bankruptcy and is negatively related to the likelihood a firm encounters severe financial distress in the years immediately following the crisis.     

Predatory lending and the subprime crisis

We measure the effect of a 2006 antipredatory pilot program in Chicago on mortgage default rates to test whether predatory lending was a key element in fueling the subprime crisis. Under the program, risky borrowers or risky mortgage contracts or both triggered review sessions by housing counselors who shared their findings with the state regulator. The pilot program cut market activity in half, largely through the exit of lenders specializing in risky loans and through a decline in the share of subprime borrowers. Our results suggest that predatory lending practices contributed to high mortgage default rates among subprime borrowers, raising them by about a third.     

Bank ownership,lending, and local economic performance during the 2008–2009 financial crisis

Although government banks are frequently associated with political capture and resource misallocation, they may be well-positioned during times of crisis to provide counter-cyclical support. Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, Brazil׳s government banks substantially increased lending. Localities in Brazil with a high share of government banks received more loans and experienced better employment outcomes relative to localities with a low share of government banks. While increased government bank lending mitigated an economic downturn, we find that this lending was politically targeted, inefficiently allocated, and reduced productivity growth.     

帮助民间金融走向规范

近几个月,温州民间借贷危机被炒得沸沸扬扬,地方政府的应对政策也引起各方热议。针对民间金融酿成局部金融风险和企业逃债等问题,温州市政府制定了综合性的应对策略。