简化一般均衡模型中一般均衡点的确定

经济学教材在讨论一般均衡的时候,往往以两个人、两种生产要素、两种产品这种最简单的社会作为研究对象,它们通常只阐述了一般均衡的存在,但都没有说明这种最简单的社会一般均衡点的确定即以此作为研究对象。     

Building a computable general equilibrium tax model for Italy

In this paper, we develop a multi-sectoral computable general equilibrium tax model for Italy allowing for a number of fiscal tools. We illustrate the methodology for modelling and accommodating the full range of direct and indirect taxes into the national general equilibrium model. In particular, we build a commodity tax matrix by commodity, source, user and tax type; and a production tax matrix by industry and tax type. We also put a special emphasis on the institutional sector accounts, incorporating a detailed system of equations. Our model provides a powerful tool for acquiring new insights in fiscal policy analysis, through the assessment of tailored tax reforms, which can consist of either changes in tax rates and tax bases for indirect and direct taxes. Finally, to validate the model we perform an equalizing Value-Added-Tax rates reform. We find that a budget-neutral uniform tax rate reform would be GDP and welfare improving. However, results across agents and sectors vary.     

Time-inconsistent preferences in a general equilibrium model

This paper introduces time-inconsistent preferences in a multicommodity general equilibrium framework with incomplete markets. The standard concept of competitive equilibrium is extended in order to allow for changes in intertemporal preferences. Depending on whether or not agents recognize that their intertemporal preferences change, agents are called sophisticated or naïve. This paper presents competitive equilibrium notions for economies with naïve agents and economies with sophisticated agents and provides assumptions under which both types of equilibria exist. Surprisingly, the set of naïve equilibria in societies populated by time-consistent households is not allocationally equivalent to the set of competitive equilibria. For sophisticated equilibria, the equivalence holds. Time-inconsistency also raises conceptual issues about the appropriate concept of efficiency. Choices have to be made concerning the incorporation of future preferences and the appropriate instruments to create Pareto improvements. For both naïve and sophisticated societies, we present four possible efficiency concepts. Suitable conditions are specified for which both naïve and sophisticated equilibria satisfy appropriate efficiency concepts.     

A short-run general equilibrium model for a small,open economy

This paper introduces some features observed in developing countries into a CGE model. In particular, quantitative restrictions on exports and imports are incorporated and quota-derived rents are included as a source of income. The economy is assumed to be small only on the import side, such that export prices are endogenous. A distinction between traded and treadeable goods is introduced, together with the possibility of ‘water in the tariff’. Thus, the law of one price need not hold. Another key feature is the modelling of supply with unutilized capacity. Thus, excess demands clear by price changes, output adjustments, or imports, depending on the degree of capacity utilization, the tradeability of the good, and the trade regime. An empirical application of the model shows that in a GE context, import quotas can worsen the trade balance while lowering real income and the real wage rate.     

An unpleasant dilemma for contemporary general equilibrium theory

By examining the contributions of two prominent contemporary neoclassical economists, i.e. Lucas and Hahn, the article attempts to shed light on the problematic relationship between neoclassical theory and observation. It is argued that this approach must face the unpleasant dilemma of having to choose between endowing general equilibrium theory with an explanatory role that is marred by its illegitimate notion of capital as a single factor of variable form (Lucas); or alternatively, to consistently treat each capital good as a distinct factor of production, with the bitter implication that the theory must simply renounce to have a correspondence with observation (Hahn).     

Asset price volatility in a nonconvex general equilibrium model

Summary. Asset prices and returns are known to vary significantly more than␣output or aggregate consumption growth, and an order of magnitude in excess of what is justified by innovations to fundamentals. We study excess price volatility in a lifecycle economy with two assets (claims on capital and␣a public debt bubble), heterogeneous agents, and increasing returns to financial intermediation. We show that a relatively modest nonconvexity generates a set valued equilibrium correspondence in asset prices, with two␣stable branches. Price volatility is the outcome of an equilibrium selection mechanism, which mixes adaptive learning with “noise”, and alternates stochastically between the two stable branches of the price correspondence. Received: March 19, 1998; revised version: June 2, 1998     

Inequalities and fluctuations in a dynamic general equilibrium model

   Summary. In the present paper a tractable two-sector neo-classical growth model with heterogeneous agents is considered. The local dynamic properties of the equilibrium path are analyzed in relation with the underlying characteristics of the economy. In particular, the existence of fluctuations is related to the degree of heterogeneity in labor and in capital endowments. When applied to international trade theory, the analysis shows that free trade may distabilize a world economy that is originally stable under the regime of autarky. Received: December 28, 1998; revised version: October 29, 1999     

A bargaining model in general equilibrium

The goal of the paper is to present a simple model of rational endogenous household formation in a general equilibrium framework in which Pareto optimality at the economy level is not necessarily obtained. The simplest example of household formation is the case in which pairs of individuals engage themselves in a bargaining process on the division of some wealth: if an agreement on the distribution is (not) reached, we can say that the household is (not) formed. The vast majority of existing bargaining models predicts agreements on an efficient outcome. A seminal paper by Crawford (Econometrica 50:607–637, 1982) describes a very simple game with incomplete information in which, even with rational agents, disagreement causes welfare losses. We embed that model in a general equilibrium framework and present some results on equilibria both in the bargaining game and the associated exchange economy. Crawford’s results support Schelling’s intuition on the reasons of disagreement: it may arise if players’ commitments are reversible. Crawford shows that high probabilities of reversibility tend to favor the bargaining impasse, in fact with low probability. We prove that even if those probabilities are arbitrarily close to zero, disagreement is an equilibrium outcome, with high probability. That conclusion seems to be an even stronger support to Schelling’s original viewpoint. In the exchange economy model with that noncooperative bargaining game as a first stage, we present significant examples of economies for which equilibria exist. Because of disagreement, Pareto suboptimal exchange economy equilibria exist for all elements in the utility function and endowment spaces and they may coexist with Pareto optimal equilibria even at the same competitive prices.     

A simple dynamic general equilibrium model

We analyse a single sector economy with H > 1 infinitely-lived agents that operate in a continuous-time framework. Utility functions are recursive but not additive. Both efficient and perfect foresight competitive equilibrium allocations are considered. The existence and stability of such allocations are investigated locally, i.e., in a neighbourhood of steady-state allocations. The model is shown to be useful for explaining the distribution of wealth and consumption across agents, and for analysing the way in which wealth redistribution can affect the dynamics of aggregate economic variables.     

An evaluation of the performance of an applied general equilibrium model of the Spanish economy

Summary In 1985–86 the authors were members of a team that constructed a static applied general equilibrium model that was used to analyze the impact on the Spanish economy of the 1986 fiscal reform, which accompanied Spain's entry into the European Community. This paper compares the results obtained to recently published data for 1985–87; we find that the model performed well in predicting the changes in relative prices and resource allocation that actually occurred, particularly if we incorporate exogenous shocks that affected the Spanish economy in 1986. We also analyze the sensitivity of the results to alternative specifications of the labor market and macroeconomic closure rules; we find that the central results are robust.We gratefully acknowledge financial support from NSF Grant SES 89-22036 (Kehoe) and CICYT Grant PB 89 + 0309 (Polo and Sancho). We thank participants in the IIASA Applied General Equilibrium Conference, Laxenburg, Austria, August 1991; the International Trade Workshop at UCLA, March 1992; the Graduate Public Finance Course at the University of Minnesota, Winter 1993; Antonio Gomez Gomez-Plana; and Betsy Caucutt for helpful suggestions. Above all, we wish to thank our colleagues who have worked with us on the MEGA (Model d'Equilibri General Aplicat) Project at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona: Antonio Manresa, Pedro Javier Noyola, Jaime Serra-Puche, Cristina Echevarria, Walter Garcia, Ana Laborda, and Xavier Ramirez. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.     

A general equilibrium model of statistical discrimination

We study a general equilibrium model with endogenous human capital formation in which ex ante identical groups may be treated asymmetrically in equilibrium. The interaction between an informational externality and general equilibrium effects creates incentives for groups to specialize. Discrimination may arise even if the corresponding model with a single group has a unique equilibrium. The dominant group gains from discrimination, rationalizing why a majority may be reluctant to eliminate discrimination. The model is also consistent with “reverse discrimination” as a remedy against discrimination since it may be necessary to decrease the welfare of the dominant group to achieve parity.     

Harvesting in an integrated general equilibrium model

Harvesting of prey biomass is analyzed in an integrated ecological-economic system whose submodels, a predator–prey ecosystem and a simple economy, are microfounded dynamic general equilibrium models. These submodels are interdependent because the ecosystem responds to harvesting—through the reactions of optimizing individual organisms—by changing the provision of public ecosystem services to consumers. General analytical results are derived regarding the impact of harvesting policies on short-run equilibria of both submodels, on population dynamics, and on stationary states of the integrated model. A key insight is that prey biomass carries a positive ecosystem price which needs to be added as a tax mark-up to the economic price of harvested biomass to attain allocative efficiency. Further information on the dynamics is gained by resorting to numerical analysis of the policy regimes of zero harvesting, laissez-faire harvesting and efficient harvesting.

It “... is a matter of weighing costs and benefits of taking action, whether the action is the “inert” one of leaving resources alone in order to conserve them, or whether it involves exploiting a resource ... for so-called material ends”. Pearce (1976, p. 320)

Helpful comments from an anonymous referee are gratefully acknowledged. Remaining errors are the authors’ sole responsibility.     

Resource allocation in a general equilibrium model of production under uncertainty

The purpose of this paper is to examine the implications of uncertainty for resource allocation, real income, and income distribution in terms of a simple two-sector general equilibrium model of a small country where uncertainty is introduced by assuming that production in one sector occurs in a stochastic environment. Assuming decreasing risk aversion, we show that an increase in uncertainty causes the movement of the resources away from the uncertain sector, a decline in expected real income, and a shift in the distribution of income against the factor employed intensively by the uncertain sector.     

Spatial patterns of biodiversity conservation in a multiregional general equilibrium model

Migration dynamics and local biodiversity are interrelated in a way that is likely to affect patterns of regional specialisation. We assess this relationship with a New Economic Geography model that has been extended with biodiversity. Biodiversity is heterogeneous, and responds to habitat availability. The results indicate that a symmetric pattern of regional specialisation is more likely, and that additional equilibria may emerge as the marginal utility of biodiversity increases. In the policy analysis we focus on the case where the overall social optimum is symmetric and show that it can be supported as a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. However, multiple Nash equilibria may exist.     

Bequests,taxation and the distribution of wealth in a general equilibrium model

This paper examines the role of bequests and of taxation on bequests for the distribution of wealth. We investigate a model with overlapping generations and heterogenous households where parents derive utility directly from their bequests. We obtain all results analytically. Using the coefficient of variation as the measure of inequality, bequests per se diminish the inequality of wealth since they raise private savings and hence average wealth holdings more than the variance of wealth. From a policy perspective, taxing bequests and redistributing government revenue lump-sum among the young generation further decreases wealth inequality.     

On a general equilibrium model of the incidence of the corporation tax under uncertainty

This paper addresses two issues. First, we demonstrate that when there is uncertainty in a general equilibrium model of a large country the usual rule for the auctioneer, that of searching for a set of relative prices at which excess demand in each market is zero, is no longer appropriate. It is suggested that the setting of expected demand to expected supply in each market would be a convenient generalization. Secondly, results on the incidence of the corporation income tax when there is uncertainty in the corporate sector, and alternatively when there is uncertainty in the noncorporate sector, are presented.     

Some general equilibrium analysis applied to fiscal harmonization in the European community

This paper applies numerical general equilibrium analysis to consideration of domestic welfare impacts of some alternative schemes of fiscal harmonization in the E.E.C. A ‘coefficient of resource saving’ showing the maximum percentage resource shrinkage or minimum resource expansion consistent with a current welfare level is computed for each of 5 E.E.C. member states under a number of alternative tax replacements.