The London Business School with Gower Publishing

The Autumn Statement updated the government's spending plans and its forecast from those announced in the Budget in March. On both counts there is very little difference between the Treasury view and our own forecast released in October. The Treasury supports our projection that output and demand will decelerate in 1989, that inflation will peak in the first half of the year at about 7 per cent and fall back to 5 per cent by the end of the year and that the deficit on the current account of the balance of payments will narrow only marginally over the next 12 months. On public spending in 1989–90, our October forecast was close to the unchanged official figures. It was clear to us - though not to most City commentators - that savings on unemployment benefit, debt interest and elsewhere would enable greater spending on programmes within an unchanged planning total. In later years the government has upped its expenditure plans from those announced a year ago, as we had assumed it would. As a result, the Autumn Statement projects significant increases in real public spending from now on. We show that, under a more appropriate inflation forecast, public spending rises nearly 2 per cent next year but falls back in 1990–92. Finally we argue that, unless the Chancellor decides to run an even larger PSDR (public sector debt repayment) than the £12bn built into our forecast - and the Autumn Statement forecast assumes a PSDR in 1989–90 similar to the expected outturn in 1988–9 of £10bn - the scope for tax cuts remains intact.     

Forecast Summary

There is one overriding question which this issue of Economic Outlook seeks to address: to what extent will the tight monetary policy now in place produce a slowdown in consumer spending and take the savings ratio back up from last year's record lows? The answer, provided by the forecast, is that the savings ratio will rebound this year and our Macroeconomic Viewpoint argues that this will be sufficient, in combination with a rising budget surplus, to effect a reduction in inflation and the current account deficit over the medium term. But it does not achieve the government's target, set out in the MTFS, of a balanced budget - the public sector remains in chronic surplus. This objective requires national savings to be privatized and, in a special Microeconomic Viewpoint, we put the case for tax incentives to boost personal saving and enable the budget surplus to be reduced in a way which does not add to demand.     

The London Business School with Gower Publishing

Last year the Chancellor followed "the path of prudence and caution", cutting taxes by £4bn and budgeting for a public sector surplus of £3bn. This year - rather more compellingly - he is travelling the same route. Against the background of a record current account deficit and rising inflation, Mr. Lawson has tightened fiscal policy, cutting taxes in 1989–90 by nearly £2bn - less than is needed to offset real fiscal drag. His main priority, reaffirmed in the Budget speech, is to tackle inflation and, to this end, he chose not to revalorize excise duties. This was reinforced by a reduction in national insurance contributions, which not only benefits the low paid in relative terms, but also sharpens the incentive to supply labour at the bottom end of the wage spectrum. But this reform of national insurance is not cheap. Even though it is not practicable to implement the changes until October, the cost in 1989–90 is estimated at £1bn, rising to £2.8bn in 1990–1. This is equivalent, in PSDR terms, to a 2 per cent cut in the basic rate of income tax arid, in our post-Budget forecast, precludes further tax cuts in 1990. Unless there is an unexpectedly large rebound in personal savings, the Chancellor is likely to find himself in his present position in a year's time: presiding over a large budget surplus but unable to reduce it significantly for fear of rekindling inflation or aggravating the current account deficit. Simply writing declining numbers for the PSDR into the MTFS offers no genuine guidance on medium-term fiscal policy and may even be positively misleading to financial markets.     

THE 1981 BUDGET

In this Forecast Release we examine the short-term prospects for the UK economy in the light of the Budget and other developments. Compared with our February forecast the Budget has raised taxes by about £2 bn but it has also increased public expenditure by a similar amount The net effect on the PSBR, compared with our February forecast, is therefore small, especially if the Treasury's estimates for nationalised industry profits and/or public sector wages prove over-optimistic. We therefore believe that the outturn for the PSBR in 1981-82 could be close to the figure of £12 bn presented in our last forecast.
We also believe that the prospects for output and inflation are little changed The Budget by itself will have raised prices by about 1 per cent compared with our previous forecast but because we had probably over-estimated indirect tax receipts, the net effect on prices is small For output, the likely reduction in consumers' expenditure is more or less offset by higher public spending. We continue to expect a fall in output between 1980 and 1981 of 1–11/2 per cent, inflation during the year at about 10 per cent, a current account surplus of £3 bn, monetary growth of 8 to 9 per cent and a PSBR of £12 bn.     

Forecast Summary

The recovery that we forecast in February remains intact, though its composition is shifting between external and domestic demand. As we reported in International Economic Outlook earlier this month, the recession in Europe is intensifying so that, even with the devaluation-induced improvement in competitiveness, exports are being held back The weaker world outlook is the main factor behind a lower growth forecast next year. For 1993, however, we are continuing to forecast growth of 11/2 per cent, principally on the basis of more buoyant consumer spending. But the boost from consumption, while welcome in the first stage of recovery, is short-lived since the higher taxes already announced for next year hold back the growth of disposable incomes. Again this is desirable for the share of consumption, private and public, in GDP has been rising steadily and needs to be reversed in order to devote resources to reducing the two deficits: the PSBR and the trade gap. Over the forecast as a whole it is exports and investment which drive demand, not consumption. Underlying inflation has fallen below 3 per cent for the first time in twenty years, but it is now at its cyclical low point. We expect some increase in inflation from now on, though the Government's 1–4 per cent target is not likely to be breached this year. Next year and beyond, however, without more action on the budget deficit or a sharper increase in interest rates than we are assuming, inflation is forecast to settle in the 4–5 per cent range. Unemployment has fallen in recent months but the underlying trend remains upwards. We expect the three million level to be reached in the second half of the year.     

Economic Outlook 1985- 1989: The London Business School with Gower Publishing: Forecast Release: THE AUTUMN STATEMENT: IF YOU CAN'T BEAT 'EM

In announcing significant increases in public spending in the Autumn Statement, the government has recognised that the scope for further interest rate reductions ahead of the election is virtually nil. It has therefore sought to boost demand, and its own popularity, by a fiscal relaxation. It so doing, it is prepared to risk a PSBR. (excluding privatization) of £27bn, exactly in line with the estimates which we made in June of Labour Party policy. In terms of macroeconomic policy, therefore, the gap between the two parties is virtually closed, while that between Mr. Major's government and that of Mrs. Thatcher is evident. Front this starting point, we argue that honouring Mr. Laniont's pledge on income tax could be at the expense of removing tax relief on mortgage interest payments and that a Labour government which still cherishes higher public spending may be forced into continuing the privatization programme. Under either Party there is a strong political case for tax increases, or for rescinding some of the planned increase in spending, early in the life of the next Parliament in order to bring the economic and political cycles back into synchronisation from which they were disturbed by Mr. Lawson's tax-cutting Budget of 1988.     

The London Business School with Gower Publishing

Collapsing oil prices and a falling dollar set the background to a Budget in which the Chancellor, hamstrung by lower oil revenues, was seen as having little room for manoeuvre. In fact the sharp fall in the sterling price of oil has provided him with the perfect excuse for not making significant cuts in personal income tax that were largely irrelevant to the needs of the economy. Instead of a boost to household demand we have had, thanks to OPEC, a transfer to companies in the form of a reduction in costs. This should enable them to expand output against a background of falling inflation. Our post-Budget assessment of macroeconomic prospects (Section I), made on the Treasury's assumption of a $15 oil price, shows output growing by 2 1/2 per cent this year and inflation falling below 3 per cent in 1987. We are thus less optimistic than the Treasury about output but more optimistic about inflation. How was the Chancellor able, within the confines of the Medium-Term Financial Strategy, to give anything away having lost so much oil revenue? A detailed analysis of the PSBR forecast (Section II) reveals good reasons why non-oil tax revenues should be some £3 1/2n higher than forecast this time last year. But, because we still expect public spending to be above the official figures, our PSBR forecast is £1bn higher than the Treasury's. Although the macroeconomic impact of the Budget was small (especially in relation to that of the fall in oil prices which preceded it), it continued the process of tax reform. We focus, in Section III, on the new proposals to deal with the problem of the pension fund surpluses to which we drew attention in the November issue of Financial Outlook. We conclude that the proposed measures could have a larger effect on tax revenues in the longer term than is indicated by the Treasury's Budget estimates.     

Executive Summary

Our assessment of the outlook for the UK economy over the next two years has become slightly more cautious in the wake of the additional fiscal tightening announced in the November Budget. Although we had anticipated tax and public spending measures of the right magnitude in 1994/95, the Budget was more severe in 1995/96 and beyond than we had expected. We have scaled back our estimates of growth for 1995 and 1996 accordingly. On a more positive note, we expect the outlook for inflation to be better than we indicated last October. The mid-1990s are' likely to see a period of sustained low inflation which has not been seen since the 1960s. The government's target measure - RPI excluding mortgage interest - is not expected to test the 4 per cent target ceiling though it is stuck in the 3-3.5 per cent range for most of the forecast period. Despite expecting slower growth, we are now more optimistic about unemployment, which we expect to fall below 2.4 million in 1997. We now believe that increased labour market flexibility should allow the economy to grow on a lower real wage and productivity growth path, at least while unemployment remains so high. However, whether this improved performance would allow the UK to sustain an unemployment of below 2 million without a serious resurgence of inflation is still open to question.     

The First Unified Budget What Should Mr. Clarke Do?

Mr. Clarke has the distinction of presenting the first Unified Budget, an innovation introduced by his predecessor. He does so against a subdued inflation outlook and a recovery from recession that has been proceeding since the first half of last year. But he is also aware that there are risks to this favourable outlook: European recession may slow growth, and there is the worry that underlying inflation may breach the Government's 4 per cent ceiling. III this Viewpoint, we argue that the Chancellor should go further that his predecessor in curbing public borrowing, aiming for a reduction of sonic £4-5bn; this fiscal contraction could be accompanied by a further 0.5 per cent reduction in interest rates, or more if the recovery shows signs of faltering. A rebalancing of monetary and fiscal policy in this way reduces the risks associated with a high level of public borrowing, can help in reducing the excessive level of consumption (private and public) in the UK economy, and offers the best means of maintaining a competitive exchange rate without inflation. A curious feature of the first Unified Budget is that, having moved tax decisions to the autumn, the Chancellor appears to have ruled out further government spending cuts beyond those agreed by the Cabinet before the summer: with more favourable inflation arid the public sector pay limit, there would seem to be scope for a further reduction in the Control Total. On the revenue side, the Chancellor should seek to raise revenues in such a way that does not adversely affect incentives. Here he has several options: to extend the VAT net; to eliminate income tax allowances or reduce them to the 20p rate of tax; or to introduce new user charges. There is also the opportunity, one year on from the UK's exit from the ERM, to restate the basis for a sustainable macroeconomic framework. This should include a rebalancing of monetary and fiscal policy, and a move to enhance the powers of the Bank of England but with parliamentary accountability.     

The London Business School with Gower Publishing: Forecast Release: THE TIMING OF RECOVERY

In his Budget speech the Chancellor argued that "there are good reasons to expect that the recovery will begin around the middle of this year, although initially it may be slow. As we found ten years ago, confidence revives as inflation comes down… Just as falling consumer spending contributed to the onset of recession, so returning consumer confidence is likely to lead the recovery." Since then Mr. Lamont has detected 'faint stirrings' of a recovery in activity, while the Prime Minister is confident of a return to growth, arguing this month that "there are far too many indications for anyone to doubt that in the second half of this year there will be a great improvement and we will be coining out of recession." For all the official confidence that their relatively modest prognosis, which we shared in our June forecast, is proving correct, there are many who remain doubtful. The survey data, while improving, do not yet convincingly point to an upturn and there is a fear that while lower inflation and easier monetary policy would on their own produce higher spending, this effect could be outweighed by consumer caution in the face of rising unemployment. This Forecast Release examines these issues. It focuses particularly on the link between lower interest rates, falling inflation, rising unemployment and the savings ratio and finds that, on the basis of the experience in the recessions of 1975 and 1980 and the boom of 1988, it would be surprising if the savings ratio were not to head lower in the second half of the year. The latest figures on retail sales, which rose more than 1 per cent in June, suggest that this may already be happening, though this will only be confirmed by data showing a greater willingness on the part of consumers to step up their borrowing once again.     

Assumptions–Central Forecast

We continue to make our best guesses about likely policy developments rather than assuming 'unchanged' policies. In the central forecast we assume that the broad thrust of policy is unchanged, i.e. we have made the technical assumption that the present government is returned in the next General Election. But, because an election must be held within the next 15 months, we also consider the medium-term prospects under alternative economic policies. (For details see p. 19.) In the central forecast. e herefore. we assume that policy will continue to be guided-though not completely determined-by an extended Medium- Term Financial Strategy (MTFS). For 1983-4 the MTFS requires the PSBR to be 23/4% per cent of GDP at market prices. Given official inflation and output forecasts, the Chancellor is therefore aiming for a 1983-4 PSBR of £8bn (Autumn Statement, p. 13). In the central forecast. however, we have assumed that the Budget of 15 March will give greater weight to the political objectives of cutting income tax and maintaining the attack on inflation, even if this implies slippage from the MTFS targets. Specifcally we have assumed that the standard rate of income tax will be cut by lp. that personal tax allowances will be raised by 12 per cent and that indirect taxes will be raised by only half the amount required for full revalorisation. This amounts to a total tax giveaway (compared with unchangedpolicy) of £1 1/2 and results in a PSBR of just over £9bn. 3.1 per cent of GDPat market prices.     

THE TREASURY'S BUDGET

This year's Budget not only marked the end of Thatcherism, it also pointed to a shift in power back towards the Treasury. Mrs. Thatcher's favoured approach on local finance, child benefit and mortgage tax relief were unceremoniously dumped and replaced by the Treasury emphasis on fiscal neutrality and marginal tax rates. We discuss what this might mean for future Budgets. The Treasury forecast is extremely gloomy, predicting a 2 per cent drop in output this year. We remain more optimistic and, as in February, expect a revival in consumer spending to lead the recovery over the next few months. Despite our stronger output forecast, we endorse the Treasury view that inflation and the current account deficit will fall sharply this year.     

Forecast Overview

We have revised up our forecasts for GDP growth in 2015 and 2016 to 3% and 2.8% respectively, from 2.7% and 2.5% three months ago. This follows the plunge in the oil price, which will push inflation sharply lower and boost household spending power. It is unlikely that the MPC will consider raising interest rates while inflation is very low, so we have also pushed back our forecast for the first rate hike from Q3 2015 to Q1 2016…     

Briefing Paper: The Interdependence of Fiscal and Monetary Policy under Economic and Monetary Union

This article explores the implications of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) for the conduct of fiscal policy. Under EMU, where the European Central Bank is successful in controlling inflation, the loss of seigniorage revenues causes a potential problem for public sector deficits. To prevent the debt-income ratio from spiralling upwards, a primary budget surplus is ultimately required. EMU has usually been considered as a strong central monetary authority which forces fiscal discipline on lax national governments. But this is not the only possibility. Because the debt ratio can be reduced by surprise inflation, the price expectations of the private sector are important. Once these are taken into account, EMU can be examined in a 'game' framework in which the reputation of the authorities and the existence or otherwise of cooperation between the fiscal and monetary authorities becomes a critical factor.
The paper finds that where the authorities enjoy reputation and cooperate, a one-off reduction in public spending will lead to a permanent decline in the real interest rate and crowd in extra private spending (consumption and investment). Without reputation the cut in government spending has to be sustained. Where there is neither reputation nor cooperation, the outcome depends on the structure of the European economy and whether fiscal policy can effect the terms of trade between countries. If the terms of trade remain unchanged, the outturn is similar to the case of cooperation without reputation, but where the terms of trade can be improved in one country, there is no incentive to cut public spending. In this case the outturn is higher inflation with private spending crowded out.     

United States

Real GDP growth slowed to an annualised rate of 1.4% in Q1 2017 from 2.1% in Q4 2016. Growth in Q1 was constrained by weak consumer spending and inventories, while residential and business investment rose strongly. But, we believe this lull will be short‐lived and forecast a rebound in GDP growth to around 3.0% in Q2. The factors that constrained consumer spending, including higher inflation, unusually warm weather and slower tax refunds, were not repeated in Q2.     

The London Business School with Gower Publishing

The knives are out for the Chancellor whose opinion poll ratings are at a record low level. He is being personally blamed for the Conservatives' poor showing in this month's elections and, according to newspaper reports, is certain to lose his job in a Cabinet reshuffle, probably in the summer. Mr. Lamont has presided over the UK economy over a difficult period - though many of his policies and problems were inherited from his predecessor (Mr. Major) - and arguably he should have resigned last September following the failure of the ERM policy and the huge cost of intervention. Since then Mr. Lamont, probably on the advice of his Treasury officials, has followed a determinedly non-populist approach, notably on public spending last autumn, interest rate cuts earlier in the year and tax increases in the Budget. But, as economic recovery becomes better established, and the focus turns to the structural problems of the British economy, it is evident that some very tough choices will have to be made. Over the medium term the balance of payments and public sector deficits are going to have to be tackled which means devoting resources in the first place to exports and investment, not to consumption. This means no more interest rate cuts, higher taxes and public spending cuts, which Mr. Lamont has already shown he is willing to implement, and requires a Chancellor who is able to stand up to the more populist and erratic approach of the Prime Minister. The danger would be that a new Chancellor, seeking to court popularity in a way that Mr. Lamont has not, opts for the easy alternative in the short run - to the longer-term detriment of the economy. Almost by definition, certainly in the absence of either an independent Bank of England or an external exchange rate constraint, only the Treasury can take the tough line and so the Chancellor has to be unpopular - Nigel Lawson's best received Budget, that of 1988, is now universally damned. Mr. Lamont may be about to be buried but he should be praised for taking the non-populist line.     

The London Business School with Gower Publishing

As an aid to short-term corporate planning this Forecast Release concentrates on developments in 1978. The commentary and tables are based on the revised forecast which included the effects of the policy package of 26 October and the freeing of the pound on 31 October. Instead of our normal assumption of 'unchanged' policies we have included a possible set of budget measures for next spring. These are a reduction in income tax amounting to £2 billion and a 10 per cent increase in those indirect taxes that do not automatically rise with inflation (e.g. specific duties on alcohol and tobacco). The net effect of this on public finances is to increase the borrowing requirement to £8.6 billion, compared to a forecast on 'unchanged policies' of £7 billion.
The tables give changes for the year as a whole but where the pattern of development changes sharply in the course of the year (as, for example, with consumers' expenditure) the text caws attention to the half-yearly path.     

Future changes in age and household patterns: Some implications for public finances

Using stochastic forecasting techniques, this paper assesses the consequences for public finances of changes in age and household structures in Denmark over the period 2008–2037. Focusing on components of welfare provisions and tax payments with noticeable differences across age and household status, we show that, based on a point forecast, the fiscal impact of changes in household structures amounts to an annual negative effect of 0.5% of GDP, and the effect of changes in age structures is forecast to worsen the public budget by 3.7% of GDP per year. While being subject to a considerable amount of uncertainty, the prospect of such a dramatic weakening of public finances is likely to trigger demands for welfare reforms characterized by a more individualized system of public transfer and tax payments, in addition to the measures that have already been taken to address the fiscal effects of population ageing.     

The monetary policy dilemma: Will interest rates have to rise?

UK interest rates are now at their lowest level for more than two decades, and the government is hoping that interest rates can be kept at a low and sustainable level comparable to the 1960s. Indeed, some commentators are calling for still lower interest rates to offset the risk that the £12bn tax increases and cuts in government spending that will come into effect in the next financial year will lead to stagnant consumer spending and a stalled recovery. Against this must be weighed the risk that the recent very good run of inflation figures will prove temporary. Both headline and underlying inflation will be pushed up by indirect tax increases and there is the possibility that wages will follow too, as employees seek to maintain their living standards in a tightening labour market. That risk would point to a much more cautious monetary policy stance and the possibility that the government may need to raise rates from their present level if it is to achieve its inflation objective. The Chancellor faces a clear dilemma. In this Viewpoint, we assess the evidence available to guide him in his decisions and draw out the implications for the future path of interest rates.     

Japan

With persistent trade frictions and a significant loss of global growth momentum clouding the external outlook, growth will remain constrained by weak exports and a deceleration in investment spending. Manufacturing, particularly subsectors affected by the ongoing ICT slowdown, has continued to suffer, while the service sector has held up better. However, domestically, the consumption tax hike implemented on 1 October will weigh on consumption spending. We forecast GDP to grow 0.8% in 2019 and just 0.2% in 2020 (due to the impact of the consumption tax rise).