The political economy of entry barriers

We study a political economy model of entry barriers. Each period the policymaker determines whether to impose a high barrier to entry, and the special interest groups try to influence the policymaker's decision. Entry is accompanied by creative destruction—when many new firms enter, old firms are more likely to be driven out of the market. Therefore the current incumbents (industry leaders) tend to lobby for a higher entry barrier and potential entrants (industry followers) are likely to lobby for a freer environment for entry. We analyze both static and dynamic versions of the model to examine what kind of environment supports a policy that blocks entry. In the dynamic model, the economy can exhibit various different dynamics. In particular, multiple steady states may arise in equilibrium.     

The political economy of capital market integration and tax competition

This paper investigates the effect of capital market integration (CMI) on capital taxes in a political economy framework in which policy is influenced by lobbying of interest groups. CMI increases the efficiency cost of the capital tax, which introduces incentives to reduce the tax rate, but also reduces lobbying by owners of capitalists, which introduces countering incentives to increase the tax rate. CMI can therefore result in a higher capital tax rate. When the market share of each country is small, CMI may increase government supply of public goods and enhance efficiency, which implies that, in the presence of policy endogeneity through lobbying, decentralized policymaking can be more efficient than centralized policymaking.     

Theoretical foundations of sustainable economic welfare indicators — ISEW and political economy of the disembedded system

The conceptual foundations of the Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare (ISEW) are surveyed and critiqued. It is argued that the three underlying theories of community, psychic income, and social welfare economics supply certain theoretical foundations for the ISEW. The focal point of the theories is to evaluate the positives and negatives of economic growth, with the hope of achieving a practical measure of sustainable economic welfare. However, they are not as well developed as they should be: the three theories have partial, underdeveloped explanations of the benefits (services) and costs (disservices) generated in the system. The theoretical particulars of ISEW abstract from the workings of the capitalist system, because the ISEW advocates have not specified a society in the socioeconomic system which we currently have. Specifically, there is no underlying linked systems view of the disembedded economy — where the exchange economy tends to dominate other aspects of culture. Without a systematic understanding of the political economy of capitalism, the ISEW is potentially flawed in design. Therefore, there is a need to search for a critical approach to sustainable economic welfare. As a point of departure, it is better to have a political economy theory. The political economy of the disembedded system provides an alternative theoretical approach to ISEW.     

The political economy of land reform choices in Central and Eastern Europe

In all Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) land reform has been a key part of the overall agrarian reforms and land reform procedures differ significantly among CEECs. This paper, by focusing on distributional effects and political economy implications, explains why thirteen CEEC governments chose particular reform procedures. Key factors in their choices are the history of the land ownership, including the post-collectivization ownership status, length of Communist rule, the ethnicity of pre-collectivization owners, and the equality of pre-collectivization asset distribution. These factors influence the distributional consequences of the land reform, including the (potential) conflicts between efficiency, social equity, and historical justice, and thus the political economy equilibrium.     

The ins and outs of unemployment in Canada, 1976–2008

Abstract This paper studies the flows into and out of unemployment in Canada at an aggregate and a number of disaggregated levels. I find that inflows into unemployment are countercyclical and outflows are procyclical. At an aggregate level, changes in the rate at which individuals leave unemployment account for most of the changes in unemployment rates in Canada between 1976 and 2008. However, flows into unemployment matter more at some disaggregated levels. There are also some differences in the contributions of flows into and out of unemployment to changes in unemployment rates across the 1981–82 and 1990–92 recessions.     

Economic policy,the new economy and the social rate of return to R&D in UK manufacturing

This article focuses on the question of whether public policy changes and/or the new economy have influenced the social returns to R&D expenditure in UK manufacturing over the three decades up to the end of the millennium. The basic methodology is reasonably straightforward, to estimate a production function in which, in addition to labour and fixed capital, R&D appears separately in a form that directly enables estimates of the social return to investment in knowledge and how it has changed over time. The results suggest that neither changes in government R&D policy nor the new economy have raised social returns to R&D.     

浙江民营经济转型升级的金融支持体系研究

浙江民营经济面临转型升级,这需要金融支持体系促进这一进程。本文从经济转型升级与金融支持的互动关系入手,分析浙江金融支持民营经济转型升级的现状和制约性因素,进而提出构建浙江民营经济转型升级的金融支持体系的基本思路,从而为浙江当前继续保持经济、金融平稳较快发展做出有益的探讨。     

The political economy of public health expenditure and wait times in a public‐private mixed health care system

Abstract This paper investigates the determinants of public health expenditure in a public‐private mixed health care system, where a longer wait time for public care is the major difference between public and private sectors. Voter preferences for health care vary according to their age and by income, and public policy choices are part of a multi‐dimensional, competitive political equilibrium. We show how equilibrium public health expenditure and wait times depend on demographics and explain why they are independent of the distributions of income and political influence. We also show that population aging may not always lead to more public health expenditure.     

The impact of public goods and services and public R&D on the non-observed economy size,wages inequality and growth

We develop a general equilibrium endogenous growth model in which final goods can be produced either in the Non-Observed Economy (NOE) or in the Official Economy (OE). In particular, by solving transitional dynamics numerically towards the unique and stable steady state, we show that, by affecting the technological-knowledge bias in favour of the OE, productive public goods and services and public policies promoting R&D explain the simultaneous rise in the OE size, the wage premium in favour of OE workers and the economic growth rate. These results are mainly in line with empirical evidence for developed countries, since the 1990s.     

制度变迁中土地产权的性质与合约选择:一个有关合作经济的案例分析

This paper discusses an evolutionary process of rural collective property rights or agricultural cooperation economy in detail. We convince that both the evolution of the household contract system and the rural cooperation economy in the market elaborate the key position of property rights’ multi-attribute in the formation of contract structure and organization shape. If there were strong externality between several elements of household, the collective property rights should be chosen. __________ Translated from Guanli Shijie 管理世界 (Management World), 2008, (6): 61–67, 94