Chronicles of a democracy postponed

We explain a lack of civic culture in today's Russia, closely related to a democratic deficit in the country, by a path dependency which has originated at the critical juncture of transition to market economy. Suppression of democracy in the early 1990s to expedite unpopular reform exposed the new institutional order to oligarchic capture and set in motion a vicious circle of extractive economic and political institutions. The latter have been shaping views and attitudes in the society via institutional learning, continuously suppressing civic culture and solidifying social foundations for extractive institutions. We present evidence from the World Values Survey supporting the above conclusions.     

Can economic, land use and climatic stresses lead to famine, disease, warfare and death? Using Europe's calamitous 14th century as a parable for the modern age

Although many of today's ecological, climatic and socio-economic problems seem unprecedented, similar events have occurred in the past. As such, historic periods of climatic and economic volatility can be used as a way of developing frameworks for analyzing today's predicament. Western Europe's “middle ages” (circa 11-14th century) may be one such case. By the 12th century, medieval Europe had shifted from the subsistence agrarian economy that emerged following the collapse of the Roman Empire to one where spatially dispersed trade in agricultural commodities helped support a complex society that devoted considerable resources to cultural works. This shift was facilitated by new institutional arrangements centred on monastic orders that provided access to both new agricultural and food processing technologies as well as trade routes. These institutional arrangements contributed to population growth and land clearing. All of these factors increased the wealth of society but also concentrated this wealth in a small number of communities that were dependent on an ever-increasing and exploited hinterland for resources. Ultimately, this created a tightly coupled continent-wide subsistence system that was vulnerable to the weather, economic and disease shocks of the 14th century when Europe's population declined by perhaps 50%. In exploring this history, the goal of this paper is to draw on a diverse theoretical body of literature (that includes resiliency theory, landscape ecology, political science and ecological economics) to develop a series of hypotheses about how large-scale complex civilizations can become vulnerable to climate change.     

The Correspondence Principle: A Superfluous Tool of Economic Analysis

I analyze the evolution of trout recreational fisheries with the objective of identifying possible factors that might be driving current controversies in biodiversity policy reforms on the governance of alien and invasive species. Findings suggest that trout species have attained a cultural status, which makes it difficult to have them eradicated without facing stiff resistance from the trout-dependent sector. Results suggested that a process of leisure augmentation through environmental greed underpinned the introduction and continuance of spreading trout. With this process came also the development of a complex set of institutions that protected trout since they served an honorific role. My findings also suggest that the Ayresian thesis that all ceremonial systems are past-binding could be relaxed because ceremonial interests also envision alternative futures that can entrench and further protect ceremonial systems. To that end, these ceremonial interests facilitate path-breaking, but harmful institutional change. I extend Paul Dale Bush's concept of institutional spaces by assigning faces to the concept, resulting in expansion of possible institutional adjustment configurations. I find that this reorganization of Bush's concept tells the historical evolution of institutions of the leisure class in South Africa in a more dynamic way.     

The Church and Community Responsibility

A theoretical anlysis of contemporary institutional changes in the developed economies is attempted in order to characterize what a post fordist growth regime could be. One starts to recall some stylized facts about the present growth regime, i.e. about the contemporary dynamics of productivity on one side and of demand formation on the other side. We then discuss the main theoretical tools provided by the Regulation theory to analyse the institutional nexus which frames the growth regimes. The analytical framework of institutional change that we derive insist on the predominance at each period of one of the five structural forms that are distinguished by the Regulation School. As did the dynamics of institutional changes with the wage labor relationships in the previous period, today's evolutions of the forms of competition (broadly taken) condition all institutional changes. This gives us a general grid to define the features of a post Fordist regime. Still differences in history and structures leave room for sizeable differentiation in the national trajectories of the developed economies, all the more so that competition between nation States much prevent them to launch the structural policies that would be relevant with the new regime.     

States and Markets: The Advantage of an Early Start

In this paper, an index of the depth of experience with state-level institutions, or state antiquity, is derived for a large set of countries. We show that state antiquity is significantly correlated with measures of political stability and institutional quality, with income per capita, and with the rate of economic growth between 1960 and 1995. State antiquity contributes significantly to the explanation of differences in growth rates, explaining half of the differences in growth rates between countries like China and Mauritania, which are located at the two ends of the spectrum. It is also a good instrument for social infrastructure, which explains cross-country differences in worker productivity.     

The Institution,the Economy and the Market: Karl Polanyi's Institutional Thought for Economists

This paper aims to clarify the logical structure of Karl Polanyi's concept of institution, especially with regard to his most important contribution to political economy—the conception of self-regulating markets as institutions. Although Polanyi did not provide a well-developed concept of institution, this article argues that such a concept exists in his work. Moreover, there is in Polanyi's work a sophisticated institutionalist account of the self-regulating market that has been largely overlooked as Polanyi does not present it explicitly. Analyzing the economy as an institutionalized process, as Polanyi does, reveals that the market is neither a natural nor a spontaneous phenomenon—a conclusion that runs counter to conventional economic thinking. Polanyi's approach enables us to view capitalism (the ‘market society’ in Polanyi's language) through a highly specific cultural fact: the fiction of the self-regulating market. This institutional perspective needs to be reassessed beyond new-institutionalist theoretical constructions.     

Political turnover and the accumulation of democratic capital

Certain democratic institutions tend to persist in some countries whereas they are frequently reversed in others. Focusing on strong constraints on executive power as one such institution, this paper theoretically studies the cross-country differences in the costs of relaxing these constraints. The model features two political parties that stochastically alternate in office according to a political uncertainty parameter. In each period, the incumbent can make reversible investments into the future government's ability to reform executive constraints. The main results indicate that more competitive elections and higher degrees of policy polarization between the political parties lead to high and persistent levels of investment into the society's stock of “democratic capital”. These higher costs of institutional reform in turn result in durable strong executive constraint-regimes.     

Understanding china's economic performance

Broadly speaking, two schools of thought have emerged to interpret China's rapid growth since 1978: the experimentalist school and the convergence school. The experimentalist school attributes China's successes to the evolutionary, experimental, and incremental nature of China's reforms. Specifically, the resulting non-capitalist institutions are claimed to be successful in (a) agriculture where land is not owned by the fanners; (b) township and village enterprises (TVEs) which are owned collectively by rural communities; and (c) state owned enterprises (SOEs) where increased competition and increased wage incentive, but not privatization, have been emphasized.

The convergence school holds that China's successes are the consequences of its institutions being allowed to converge with those of non-socialist market economies, and that China's economic structure at the start of reforms is a major explanation for the rapid growth. China had a high population density heavily concentrated in low-wage agriculture, a condition that was favorable for labor-intensive export-led growth in other parts of East Asia. The convergence school also holds that China's gradualism results primarily from a lack of consensus over the proper course, with power still divided between market reformers and old-style socialists; and that the “innovative” non-capitalist institutions are responses to China's political circumstances and not to its economic circumstances.

Perhaps the best test of the two approaches is whether China's policy choices are in fact leading to institutions harmonized with normal market economies or to more distinctive innovations. In this regard, the recent policy trend has been towards institutional harmonization rather than institutional innovation, suggesting that the government accepts that the ingredients for a dynamic market economy are already well-known.     

Review Essay

Sen's capability approach has a culturally specific side, with capabilities influenced by social structures and institutions. Although Sen acknowledges this, he expresses his theory in individualistic terms and makes little allowance for culture or social structure. The present paper draws from recent social theory to discuss how the capability approach could be developed to give an explicit treatment of cultural and structural matters. Capabilities depend not only on entitlements but on institutional roles and personal relations: these can be represented openly if capabilities are disaggregated into individual, social and structural capacities. The three layers interact, and a full analysis of capabilities should consider them all. A stratified method implies that raising entitlements will not on its own be enough to enhance capabilities and that cultural and structural changes will be needed.     

金融地理学理论视角及中国金融地理研究

基于对国际文献和中国实际的了解和思考,从金融机构的空间结构、空间发展过程以及金融机构与环境的关系等方面分析了金融地理学的主要研究内容。主要理论问题包括地理存在论、金融变化的区域经济影响观点、区域金融系统演化模式、金融地理的路径依赖、金融全球化与地方关系等;在此基础上,从环境对金融地理影响、全球化与区域金融系统、行政格局与金融体系、金融系统与区域发展、金融企业地理5方面提出中国金融地理研究的切入点。     

CULTURE AND GROWTH: SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

Using Hofstede's cultural data set, this paper examines the impact of cultural characteristics on a nation's economic performance. Using a two‐step estimation procedure, we first estimate a panel growth regression and obtain estimates of each nation's fixed effects, which reflect idiosyncratic differences in growth performance. In the second step, we regress the fixed effects on invariant cultural and institutional variables. Our estimation results suggest that individuality and tolerance for uncertainty are the most important cultural factors in explaining nation‐specific growth performance. Furthermore, our findings suggest that political and property rights play a major role in determining idiosyncratic growth.     

Asia and the Reform of Global Governance

Asia's growing economic weight in the world economy is unlikely to produce substantial changes in global economic governance. National economic capabilities are not easily translated into influence over governance outcomes or institutions. Governments must deploy strategies of engagement with key institutions; incumbent powers will attempt counterstrategies. Coalition-building within and outside the region confronts substantial obstacles that reduce Asia's bargaining leverage. Asian preferences over institutional design and policies are unlikely to diverge from the status quo. A more pessimistic scenario includes resistance to global surveillance, spillover from other issue-areas, and defensive regionalism that undermines global institutions.     

Integrating Schumpeter and Keynes: Hyman Minsky’s Theory of Capitalist Development

Taking the idea that institutional reproduction is not obvious and that institutions are vulnerable has significant conceptual implications. Institutional vulnerability can arise through communication between actors in a common language. To apprehend this requires an elaboration of John Searle's (1995, 2005) argument that language is the fundamental institution. Ontologically, language delineates and circumscribes a community. A community cannot function without a common language, and language at the same time constitutes a community's boundaries, allowing for focused and effective communication within a community. Communication through language introduces ambiguity as well, however, and so institutional reproduction, mediated by language, is a deeply contentious process. Communication across boundaries may particularly "irritate" a system, as Niklas Luhmann has argued. How can institutions then be re-identified through change? Searle's general form for institutions is in need of elaboration. We develop arguments by drawing upon Luhmann's (1995) systems analysis and notion of communication.     

THE QUALITY OF INSTITUTIONS AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT

Using bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI) stocks around the world, we explore the importance of a wide range of institutional variables as determinants of the location of FDI. While we find that better institutions have overall a positive and economically significant effect on FDI, some institutional aspects matter more than others do. Especially, the unpredictability of laws, regulations and policies, excessive regulatory burden, government instability and lack of commitment play a major role in deterring FDI. For example, the effect of a one standard deviation improvement in the regulatory quality of the host country increases FDI by a factor of around 2. These results are robust to different specifications, estimation methods, and institutional variables. We also present evidence on the significance of institutions as a determinant of FDI over time.     

The Role of Agricultural Productivity on Structural Change

Many authors have estimated and found that the productivity growth in agriculture is higher than that in non‐agriculture in today's richest countries. Several papers suggested that growth in agricultural productivity was essential for today's richest countries to take off early. However, few articles noticed that growth in agricultural productivity is critical in driving structural change in today's richest countries. This paper studies a two‐sector neoclassical growth model with subsistence agricultural consumption and shows that growth in agricultural productivity plays a more important role than growth in non‐agricultural productivity in governing massive structural change in today's richest countries.     

Elements of Publicness in Urban Transit

This paper examines the claim that Veblen's theory of cultural evolution has generalized Darwinian principles to socioeconomic phenomena. Our argument takes place in the debate around "generalized Darwinism" in evolutionary and institutional economics. We claim that Veblen frequently relied on the concept of selection and considered institutions both as units and as factors of selection. We also argue that some of Veblen's insights can be clarified by expressing them in evolutionary-game theoretic terms. Thus, we suggest a close connection between the ontological framework of generalized Darwinism and the technical study of evolutionary phenomena through evolutionary game theory.     

Understanding Douglass North in game-theoretic language

By using game-theoretic language, this paper attempts to interpret the North's recent framework for institutional studies. Particularly relying on a foundational study of knowledge and culture in epistemic game theory, it clarifies three subtly different meanings of the beliefs used by North – behavioral, cultural, and elites’ subjective – in the evolutions of institutions. It also suggests the ways to respond to the North's call for interdisciplinary approach by applying analytical tools of strategic complementarities and linked games.     

International flows of people and institutional change

International travel clearly increases human interaction over space and exposes societies to foreign influences, foreign ideas, and foreign institutions. Does international travel promote institutional change in a traveler's home country? This paper uses panel data from 149 countries to test the hypothesis of institutional change stemming from international travel. We generally find that foreign travel does not affect political institutions. In one sub-sample, we find limited evidence that international travel can be a determinant of institutional quality in the home country depending upon whether the home country is an autocracy or democracy.     

人情社会中的制度安排——基于互动行为的博弈分析

在人情社会中,制度安排要适应文化环境。非正式制度安排的自发性、非强制性和广泛性特征体现了这种制度安排在自发形成过程中社会伦理文化的决定性作用。正式制度安排具有强制性,但是,也必须与文化环境兼容,否则这种制度安排就将是无效的,或者是不可持续的。本文基于行为互动的博弈方法,以监考制度为例,以说明人情与制度的冲突,以及如何设计制度以实现集体理性与个体理性兼容,制度与人情兼容问题。     

What is the Message of ‘Understanding the Process of Economic Change’ for Economic Historians?

This paper addresses Douglas North's latest book in the light of his intellectual lifework. North's original insistence upon the role of transaction costs did not require a departure from the neoclassical framework as clear-cut as the one required by North's latest emphasis on the role of intentionality. North's recent interest in the cognitive premises of institutional constraints to rational choice considerably expands the scope of the economic analysis of change. However, North still considers institutions supporting homo oeconomicus to be the most important progressive element in history. The paper argues that North's message goes beyond what he would be willing to transfer into the practice of economic historians. In particular, North's new conceptual framework should open the way to the acknowledgment that a plurality of progress-oriented institutions are possible, and that individualism itself could be seen as a multi-dimensional concept.